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1. Essays, Scottish

ESSAYS

AND

TREATISES

ON

SEVERAL SUBJECTS.

BY

DAVID HUME, Esq;

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ESSAYS,

MORAL, POLITICAL,

AND

LITERARY.

PART I*.

* PUBLISHED in 1742.

ESSAY I.

OF THE DELICACY OF TASTE AND PASSION.

SOME People are ſubject to a certain *delicacy* of *paſſion*, which makes them extremely ſenſible to all the accidents of life, and gives them a lively joy upon every proſperous event, as well as a piercing grief, when they meet with misfortunes and adverſity. Favors and good offices eaſily engage their friendſhip; while the ſmalleſt injury provokes their reſentment. Any honor or mark of diſtinction elevates them above meaſure; but they are as ſenſibly touched with contempt. People of this character have, no doubt, much more lively enjoyments, as well as more pungent ſorrows, than men of cool and ſedate tempers: But, I believe, when every thing is balanced, there is no one, who would not rather chuſe to be of the latter character, were he entirely maſter of his own diſpoſition. Good or ill fortune is very little at our own diſpoſal: And when a perſon, that has this ſenſibility of temper, meets with any misfortune, his ſorrow or reſentment takes intire poſſeſſion of him, and deprives him of all reliſh in the common occurrences of life; of which the right enjoyment forms the greateſt part of our happineſs. Great pleaſures are much leſs frequent than great pains; ſo that a ſenſible temper muſt meet with fewer trials in the former way than in the latter. Not to mention, that men of ſuch lively paſſions are apt to be tranſported beyond all bounds of prudence and diſcretion, and to take falſe ſteps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable.

THERE is a *delicacy* of *taſte* obſervable in ſome men, which very much reſembles this *delicacy* of *paſſion*, and produces the ſame ſenſibility to beauty and deformity of every kind, as that does to proſperity and adverſity, obligations and injuries. When you preſent a poem or a picture to a man poſſeſſed of this talent, the delicacy of his feeling, makes him be touched very ſenſibly with every part of it; nor are the maſterly ſtrokes perceived with more exquiſite reliſh and ſatisfaction, than the negligences or abſurdities with diſguſt and uneaſineſs. A polite and judicious converſation affords him the higheſt entertainment; rudeneſs or impertinence is as great a puniſhment to him. In ſhort, delicacy of taſte has the ſame effect as delicacy of paſſion: It enlarges the ſphere both of our happineſs and miſery, and makes us ſenſible to pains as well as pleaſures, which eſcape the reſt of mankind.

I BELIEVE, however, there is no one, who will not agree with me, that notwithſtanding this reſemblance, a delicacy of taſte is as much to be deſired and cultivated as a delicacy of paſſion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if poſſible. The good or ill accidents of life are very little at our diſpoſal; but we are pretty much maſters what books we ſhall read, what diverſions we ſhall partake of, and what company we ſhall keep. Philoſophers have endeavored to render happineſs entirely independent of every thing external. That is impoſſible to be *attained:* But every wiſe man will endeavor to place his happineſs on ſuch objects as depend moſt upon himſelf; and *that* is not to be *attained* ſo much by any other means as by this delicacy of ſentiment. When a man is poſſeſſed of that talent, he is more happy by what pleaſes his taſte, than by what gratifies his appetites, and receives more enjoyment from a poem or a piece of reaſoning than the moſt expenſive luxury can afford.

How far delicacy of taſte, and that of paſſion, are connected together in the original frame of the mind, it is hard to determine. To me there appears a very conſiderable connexion betwixt them. For we may obſerve that women, who have more delicate paſſions than men, have alſo a more delicate taſte of the ornaments of life, of dreſs, equipage, and the ordinary decencies of behavior. Any excellency in theſe hits their taſte much ſooner than ours; and when you pleaſe their taſte, you ſoon engage their affections.

BUT whatever connection there may be originally betwixt theſe diſpoſitions, I am perſuaded, that nothing is ſo proper to cure us of this delicacy of paſſion, as the cultivating of that higher and more refined taſte, which enables us to judge of the characters of men, of compoſitions of genius, and of the productions of the nobler arts. A greater or leſs reliſh of thoſe obvious beauties which ſtrike the ſenſes, depends entirely upon the greater or leſs ſenſibility of the temper: But, with regard to the ſciences and liberal arts, a fine taſte is, in ſome meaſure, the ſame with ſtrong ſenſe, or at leaſt depends ſo much upon it, that they are inſeparable. To judge aright of a compoſition of genius, there are ſo many views to be taken in, ſo many circumſtances to be compared, and ſuch a knowledge of human nature requiſite, that no man, who is not poſſeſſed of the ſoundeſt judgment, will ever make a tolerable critic in ſuch performances. And this is a new reaſon for cultivating a reliſh in the liberal arts. Our judgment will ſtrengthen by this exerciſe: We ſhall form juſter notions of life: Many things, which pleaſe or afflict others, will appear to us too frivolous to engage our attention: And we ſhall loſe by degrees that ſenſibility and delicacy of paſſion, which is ſo incommodious.

BUT perhaps I have gone too far in ſaying, That a cultivated taſte for the polite arts extinguiſhes the paſſions, and renders us indifferent to thoſe objects which are ſo fondly purſued by the reſt of mankind. On farther reflection, I find, that it rather improves our ſenſibility for all the tender and agreeable paſſions; at the ſame time that it renders the mind incapable of the rougher and more boiſterous emotions.

Ingenuas didiciſſe fideliter artes,
Emollit mores, nec ſinit eſſe feros.

For this, I think there may be aſſigned two very natural reaſons. In the *firſt* place, nothing is ſo improving to the temper as the ſtudy of the beauties, either of poetry, eloquence, muſick, or painting. They give a certain elegance of ſentiment, to which the reſt of mankind are entire ſtrangers. The emotions they excite are ſoft and tender. They draw the mind off from the hurry of buſineſs and intereſt; cheriſh reflection; diſpoſe to tranquillity; and produce an agreeable melancholy, which, of all diſpoſitions of the mind, is the beſt ſuited to love and friendſhip.

In the *ſecond* place, a delicacy of taſte is favorable to love and friendſhip, by confining our choice to few people, and making us indifferent to the company and converſation of the greateſt part of men. You will very ſeldom find, that mere men of the world, whatever ſtrong ſenſe they may be endowed with, are very nice in diſtinguiſhing of characters, or in marking thoſe inſenſible differences and gradations which make one man preferable to another. Any one, that has competent ſenſe, is ſufficient for their entertainment: They talk to him, of their pleaſure and affairs, with the ſame frankneſs as they would to another; and finding many, who are fit to ſupply his place, they never feel any vacancy or want in his abſence. But to make uſe of the alluſion of a celebrated * French author, the judgment may be compared to a clock or watch, where the moſt ordinary machine is ſufficient to tell the hours; but the moſt elaborate and artificial can only point out the minutes and ſeconds, and diſtinguiſh the ſmalleſt differences of time. One that has well digeſted his knowlege both of books and men, has little enjoyment but in the company of a few ſelect companions. He feels too ſenſibly, how much all the reſt of mankind fall ſhort of the notions which he has entertained. And, his affections being thus confined within a narrow circle, no wonder he carries them further than if they were more general and undiſtinguiſhed. The gaiety and frolic of a bottle-companion improves with him into a ſolid friendſhip; And the ardours of a youthful appetite become an elegant paſſion.

* *Monſ.* Fontenelle, *Pluralité des Mondes.* Soir 6.

ESSAY II.

OF THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.

NOTHING is more apt to ſurpriſe a foreigner, than the extreme liberty, which we enjoy in this country, of communicating whatever we pleaſe to the public, and of openly cenſuring every meaſure, entered into by the king or his miniſters. If the adminiſtration reſolve upon war, 'tis affirmed, that either wilfully or ignorantly they miſtake the intereſt of the nation, and that peace, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, is infinitely preferable. If the paſſion of the miniſters lie towards peace, our political writers breathe nothing but war and devaſtation, and repreſent the pacific conduct of the government as mean and puſillanimous. As this liberty is not indulged in any other government, either republican or monarchical; in HOLLAND and VENICE, no more than in FRANCE or SPAIN; it may very naturally give occaſion to theſe two queſtions, *How it happens that* GREAT BRITAIN *enjoys ſuch a peculiar privilege?* and *Whether the unlimited exerciſe of this liberty be advantageous or prejudicial to the public?*

As to the firſt queſtion, Why the laws indulge us in ſuch an extraordinary liberty? I believe the reaſon may be derived from our mixed form of government, which is neither wholly monarchical, nor wholly republican. It will be found, if I miſtake not, a true obſervation in politics, that the two extremes in government, liberty and ſlavery, commonly approach neareſt to each other; and that as you depart from the extremes, and mix a little of monarchy with liberty, the government becomes always the more free; and on the other hand, when you mix a little of liberty with monarchy, the yoke becomes always the more grievous and intolerable. I ſhall endeavor to explain myſelf. In a government, ſuch as that of FRANCE, which is entirely abſolute, and where laws, cuſtom, and religion concur, all of them, to make the people fully ſatisfied with their condition, the monarch cannot entertain the leaſt *jealouſy* againſt his ſubjects, and therefore is apt to indulge them in great *liberties* both of ſpeech and action. In a government altogether republican, ſuch as that of HOLLAND, where there is no magiſtrate ſo eminent as to give *jealouſy* to the ſtate, there is alſo no danger in intruſting the magiſtrates with very large diſcretionary powers; and tho' many advantages reſult from ſuch powers, in the preſervation of peace and order, yet they lay a conſiderable reſtraint on men's actions, and make every private ſubject pay a great reſpect to the government. Thus it ſeems evident, that the two extremes of abſolute monarchy and of a republic, approach very near to each other in the moſt material circumſtances. In the *firſt*, the magiſtrate has no jealouſy of the people: In the *ſecond*, the people have no jealouſy of the magiſtrate: Which want of jealouſy begets a mutual confidence and truſt in both caſes, and produces a ſpecies of liberty in monarchies, and of arbitrary power in republics.

To juſtify the other part of the foregoing obſervation, that in every government the means are moſt wide of each other, and that the mixtures of monarchy and liberty render the yoke either more eaſy or more grievous; I muſt take no-

tice of a remark of TACITUS with regard to the ROMANS under the emperors, that they neither could bear total ſlavery nor total liberty, *Nec totam ſervitutem, nec totam libertatem pati poſſunt.* This remark a celebrated poet has tranſlated and applied to the ENGLISH, in his lively deſcription of queen ELIZABETH's policy and government.

Et ſit aimer ſon joug a l' Anglois indompté,
Qui ne peut ni ſervir, ni vivre en liberté. HENRIADE, *Liv.* I.

ACCORDING to theſe remarks, we are to conſider the ROMAN government under the emperors as a mixture of deſpotiſm and liberty, where the deſpotiſm prevailed; and the ENGLISH government as a mixture of the ſame kind, but where the liberty predominates. The conſequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing obſervation; and ſuch as may be expected from thoſe mixed forms of government, which beget a mutual watchfulneſs and jealouſy. The ROMAN emperors were, many of them, the moſt frightful tyrants that ever diſgraced human nature; and 'tis evident their cruelty was chiefly excited by their *jealouſy*, and by their obſerving, that all the great men of ROME bore with impatience the dominion of a family, which, but a little before, was no ways ſuperior to their own. On the other hand, as the republican part of the government prevails in ENGLAND, tho' with a great mixture of monarchy, 'tis obliged, for its own preſervation, to maintain a watchful *jealouſy* over the magiſtrates, to remove all diſcretionary powers, and to ſecure every one's life and fortune by general and inflexible laws. No action muſt be deemed a crime but what the law has plainly determined to be ſuch: No crime muſt be imputed to a man but from a legal proof before his judges; and even theſe judges muſt be his fellow-ſubjects, who are obliged, by their own intereſt, to have a watchful eye over the encroachments and violence of the miniſters. From theſe cauſes it proceeds, that there is as much liberty, and even, perhaps, licentiouſneſs in BRITAIN, as there were formerly ſlavery and tyranny in ROME.

THESE principles account for the great liberty of the preſs in theſe kingdoms, beyond what is indulged in any other government. 'Tis ſufficiently known, that arbitrary power would ſteal in upon us, were we not extremely watchful to prevent its progreſs, and were there not an eaſy method of conveying the alarum from one end of the kingdom to the other. The ſpirit of the people muſt frequently be rouzed in order to curb the ambition of the court; and the dread of rouſing this ſpirit, muſt be employed to prevent that ambition. Nothing ſo effectual to this purpoſe as the liberty of the preſs, by which all the learning, wit and genius of the nation may be employed on the ſide of liberty, and every one be animated to its defence. As long, therefore, as the republican part of our government can maintain itſelf againſt the monarchical, it muſt he extremely jealous of the liberty of the preſs, as of the utmoſt importance to its preſervation.

SINCE therefore the liberty of the preſs is ſo eſſential to the ſupport of our mixed government; this ſufficiently decides the ſecond queſtion, *Whether this liberty be advantageous or prejudicial*; there being nothing of greater importance in every ſtate than the preſervation of the ancient government, eſpecially if it be a free one. But I would fain go a ſtep farther, and aſſert, that ſuch a liberty is attended

tended with ſo few inconveniencies, that it may be claimed as the common right of mankind, and ought to be indulged them almoſt in every government: except the eccleſiaſtical, to which indeed it would prove fatal. We need not dread from this liberty any ſuch ill conſequences as followed from the harangues of the popular demagogues of ATHENS and tribunes of ROME. A man reads a book or pamphlet alone and coolly. There is none preſent from whom he can catch the paſſion by contagion. He is not hurried away by the force and energy of action. And ſhould he be wrought up to ever ſo ſeditious a humor, there is no violent reſolution preſented to him, by which he can immediately vent his paſſion. The liberty of the preſs, therefore, however abuſed, can ſcarce ever excite popular tumults or rebellion. And as to thoſe murmurs or ſecret diſcontents it may occaſion, 'tis better they ſhould get vent in words, that they may come to the knowlege of the magiſtrate before it be too late, in order to his providing a remedy againſt them. Mankind, 'tis true, have always a greater propenſion to believe what is ſaid to the diſadvantage of their governors, than the contrary; but this inclination is inſeparable from them, whether they have liberty or not. A whiſper may fly as quick, and be as pernicious as a pamphlet. Nay, it will be more pernicious, where men are not accuſtomed to think freely, or diſtinguiſh betwixt truth and falſhood.

IT has alſo been found, as the experience of mankind increaſes, that the *people* are no ſuch dangerous monſter as they have been repreſented, and that 'tis in every reſpect better to guide them, like rational creatures, than to lead or drive them, like brute beaſts. Before the United Provinces ſet the example, toleration was deemed incompatible with good government; and it was thought impoſſible, that a number of religious ſects could live together in harmony and peace, and have all of them an equal affection to their common country, and to each other. ENGLAND has ſet a like example of civil liberty; and tho' this liberty ſeems to occaſion ſome ſmall ferment at preſent, it has not as yet produced any pernicious effects; and it is to be hoped, that men, being every day more accuſtomed to the free diſcuſſion of public affairs, will improve in their judgment of them, and be with greater difficulty ſeduced by every idle rumor and popular clamor.

'TIS a very comfortable reflection to the lovers of liberty, that this peculiar privilege of BRITAIN is of a kind that cannot eaſily be wreſted from us, but muſt laſt as long as our government remains, in any degree, free and independent. 'Tis ſeldom, that liberty of any kind is loſt all at once. Slavery has ſo frightful an aſpect to men accuſtomed to freedom, that it muſt ſteal in upon them by degrees, and muſt diſguiſe itſelf in a thouſand ſhapes, in order to be received. But, if the liberty of the preſs ever be loſt, it muſt be loſt at once. The general laws againſt ſedition and libelling are at preſent as ſtrong as they poſſibly can be made. Nothing can impoſe a farther reſtraint, but either the clapping an IMPRIMATUR upon the preſs, or the giving to the court very large diſcretionary powers to puniſh whatever diſpleaſes them. But theſe conceſſions would be ſuch a barefaced violation of liberty, that they will probably be the laſt efforts of a deſpotic government. We may conclude, that the liberty of *Britain* is gone for ever when theſe attempts ſhall ſucceed.

ESSAY III.

OF IMPUDENCE AND MODESTY.

I AM of opinion, That the common complaints againſt Providence are ill-grounded, and that the good or bad qualities of men are the cauſes of their good or bad fortune, more than what is generally imagined. There are, no doubt, inſtances to the contrary, and theſe too pretty numerous; but few, in compariſon of the inſtances we have of a right diſtribution of proſperity and adverſity: nor indeed could it be otherwiſe from the common courſe of human affairs. To be endowed with a benevolent diſpoſition, and to love others, will almoſt infallibly procure love and eſteem; which is the chief circumſtance in life, and facilitates every enterprize and undertaking; beſides the ſatisfaction, which immediately reſults from it. The caſe is much the ſame with the other virtues. Proſperity is naturally, tho' not neceſſarily attached to virtue and merit; and adverſity, in like manner, to vice and folly.

I MUST, however, confeſs, that this rule admits of an exception, with regard to one moral quality; and that *modeſty* has a natural tendency to conceal a man's talents, as *impudence* diſplays them to the utmoſt, and has been the only cauſe why many have riſen in the world, under all the diſadvantages of low birth and little merit. Such indolence and incapacity is there in the generality of mankind, that they are apt to receive a man for whatever he has a mind to put himſelf off for; and admit his over-bearing airs as proofs of that merit which he aſſumes to himſelf. A decent aſſurance ſeems to be the natural attendant of virtue; and few men can diſtinguiſh impudence from it: As, on the other hand, diffidence, being the natural reſult of vice and folly, has drawn diſgrace upon modeſty, which in outward appearance ſo nearly reſembles it.

As impudence, tho' really a vice, has the ſame effects upon a man's fortune, as if it were a virtue; ſo we may obſerve, that it is almoſt as difficult to be attained, and is, in that reſpect, diſtinguiſhed from all the other vices, which are acquired with little pains, and continually encreaſe upon indulgence. Many a man, being ſenſible that modeſty is extremely prejudicial to him in making his fortune, has reſolved to be impudent, and to put a bold face upon the matter: But, 'tis obſervable, that ſuch people have ſeldom ſucceeded in the attempt, but have been obliged to relapſe into their primitive modeſty. Nothing carries a man thro' the world like a true genuine natural impudence. Its counterfeit is good for nothing, nor can ever ſupport itſelf. In any other attempt, whatever faults a man commits and is ſenſible of, he is ſo much the nearer his end. But when he endeavours at impudence, if he ever failed in the attempt, the remembrance of that failure will make him bluſh, and will infallibly diſconcert him: After which every bluſh is a cauſe for new bluſhes, 'till he be found out to be an arrant cheat, and a vain pretender to impudence.

IF any thing can give a modeſt man more aſſurance, it muſt be ſome advantages of fortune, which chance procures to him. Riches naturally gain a man

a favourable reception in the world, and give merit a double luſtre, when a perſon is endowed with it; and ſupply its place, in a great meaſure, when it is abſent. 'Tis wonderful to obſerve what airs of ſuperiority fools and knaves, with large poſſeſſions, give themſelves above men of the greateſt merit in poverty. Nor do the men of merit make any ſtrong oppoſition to theſe uſurpations; or rather ſeem to favor them by the modeſty of their behaviour. Their good ſenſe and experience make them diffident of their judgment, and cauſe them to examine every thing with the greateſt accuracy: As, on the other hand, the delicacy of their ſentiments makes them timorous leſt they commit faults, and loſe in the practice of the world that integrity of virtue, ſo to ſpeak, of which they are ſo jealous. To make wiſdom agree with confidence, is as difficult as to reconcile vice and modeſty.

THESE are the reflections which have occurred upon this ſubject of impudence and modeſty; and I hope the reader will not be diſpleaſed to ſee them wrought into the following allegory.

JUPITER, in the beginning, joined VIRTUE, WISDOM, and CONFIDENCE together; and VICE, FOLLY, and DIFFIDENCE: And thus connected, ſent them into the world. But tho' he thought he had matched them with great judgment, and ſaid that *Confidence* was the natural companion of *Virtue*, and that *Vice* deſerved to be attended with *Diffidence*, they had not gone far before diſſenſion aroſe among them. *Wiſdom*, who was the guide of the one company, was always accuſtomed before ſhe ventured upon any road, however beaten, to examine it carefully; to enquire whither it led; what dangers, difficulties and hindrances might poſſibly or probably occur in it. In theſe deliberations ſhe uſually conſumed ſome time; which delay was very diſpleaſing to *Confidence*, who was always inclined to hurry on, without much forethought or deliberation, in the firſt road he met. *Wiſdom* and *Virtue* were inſeparable: But *Confidence* one day, following his impetuous nature, advanced a conſiderable way before his guides and companions; and not feeling any want of their company, he never enquired after them, nor ever met with them more. In like manner, the other ſociety, tho' joined by JUPITER, diſagreed and ſeparated. As *folly* ſaw very little way before her, ſhe had nothing to determine concerning the goodneſs of roads, nor could give the preference to one above another; and this want of reſolution was encreaſed by *Diffidence*, who, with her doubts and ſcruples, always retarded the journey. This was a great annoyance to *Vice*, who loved not to hear of difficulties and delays, and was never ſatisfied without his full career, in whatever his inclinations led him to *Folly*, he knew, tho' ſhe hearkened to *Diffidence*, would be eaſily managed when alone; and therefore, as a vicious horſe throws his rider, he openly beat away this controller of all his pleaſures, and proceeded in his journey with *Folly*, from whom he is inſeparable. *Confidence* and *Diffidence* being, after this manner, both thrown looſe from their reſpective companies, wandered for ſome time; till at laſt chance led them at the ſame time to one village. *Confidence* went directly up to the great houſe, which belonged to WEALTH, the lord of the village; and without ſtaying for a porter, intruded himſelf immediately into the innermoſt apartments, where he found *Vice* and *Folly* well received before him. He joined the train; recommended himſelf very quickly to his landlord; and entered into ſuch familiarity with *Vice*, that he was enliſted in the ſame com-

company with *Folly*. They were frequent gueſts of *Wealth*, and from that moment inſeparable. *Diffidence*, in the mean time, not daring to approach the great houſe, accepted of an invitation from POVERTY, one of the tenants; and entering the cottage, found *Wiſdom* and *Virtue*, who being repulſed by the landlord, had retired thither. *Virtue* took compaſſion of her, and *Wiſdom* found, from her temper, that ſhe would eaſily improve: So they admitted her into their ſociety. Accordingly, by their means, ſhe altered in a little time ſomewhat of her manner, and becoming much more amiable and engaging, was now called by the name of *Modeſty*. As ill company has a greater effect than good, *Confidence*, tho' more refractory to counſel and example, degenerated ſo far by the ſociety of *Vice* and *Folly*, as to paſs by the name of IMPUDENCE. Mankind, who ſaw theſe ſocieties as JUPITER firſt joined them, and know nothing of theſe mutual deſertions, are thereby led into ſtrange miſtakes; and wherever they ſee *Impudence*, make account of *Virtue* and *Wiſdom*, and wherever they obſerve *Modeſty*, call her attendants *Vice* and *Folly*.

ESSAY IV.

THAT POLITICS MAY BE REDUCED TO A SCIENCE.

IT is a great queſtion with ſeveral, Whether there be any eſſential difference betwixt one form of government and another? and, whether every form may not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill adminiſtred *? Were it once admitted, that all governments are alike, and that the only difference conſiſts in the character and conduct of the governors, moſt political diſputes would be at an end, and all *Zeal* for one conſtitution above another, muſt be eſteemed mere bigotry and folly. But, tho' a friend to *Moderation*, I cannot forbear condemning this ſentiment, and ſhould be ſorry to think, that human affairs admit of no greater ſtability, than what they receive from the caſual humors and characters of particular men.

'TIS true, thoſe who maintain, that the goodneſs of all government conſiſts in the goodneſs of the adminiſtration, may cite many particular inſtances in hiſtory, where the very ſame government, in different hands, has varied ſuddenly into the two oppoſite extremes of good and bad. Compare the FRENCH government under HENRY III. and under HENRY IV. Oppreſſion, levity, artifice on the part of the rulers; faction, ſedition, treachery, rebellion, diſloyalty on the part of the ſubjects: Theſe compoſe the character of the former miſerable æra. But when the patriot and heroic prince, who ſucceeded, was once firmly ſeated on the throne, the government, the people, every thing ſeemed to be totally changed; and all from the difference of the temper and ſentiments of theſe two ſovereigns. An equal difference of a contrary kind, may be found on comparing the reigns of

* *For forms of government let fools conteſt:*
Whate'er is beſt adminiſter'd is beſt. ESSAY on MAN, Book 3.

ELIZABETH and JAMES, at leaſt with regard to foreign affairs: and inſtances of this kind may be multiplied, almoſt without number, from ancient as well as modern hiſtory.

BUT here I would beg leave to make a diſtinction. All abſolute governments (and ſuch that of ENGLAND was, in a great meaſure, till the middle of the laſt century, notwithſtanding the numerous panegyrics on ancient ENGLISH liberty) muſt very much depend on the adminiſtration; and this is one of the great inconveniences of that form of government. But a republican and free government would be a moſt obvious abſurdity, if the particular checks and controls, provided by the conſtitution, had really no influence, and made it not the intereſt, even of bad men, to operate for the public good. Such is the intention of theſe forms of government, and ſuch is their real effect, where they are wiſely conſtituted: As, on the other hand, they are the ſources of all diſorder, and of the blackeſt crimes, where either ſkill or honeſty has been wanting in their original frame and inſtitution.

So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and ſo little dependence have they on the humors and temper of men, that conſequences almoſt as general and certain may be deduced from them, on moſt occaſions, as any which the mathematical ſciences afford us.

THE ROMAN government gave the whole legiſlative power to the commons, without allowing a negative either to the nobility or conſuls. This unbounded power the commons poſſeſſed in a collective, not in a repreſentative body. The conſequences were: When the people, by ſucceſs and conqueſt, had become very numerous, and had ſpred themſelves to a great diſtance from the capital, the city-tribes, tho' the moſt contemptible, carried almoſt every vote: They were, therefore, moſt cajoled by every one who affected popularity: they were ſupported in idleneſs by the general diſtribution of corn, and by particular bribes, which they received from almoſt every candidate: By this means they became every day more licentious, and the CAMPUS MARTIUS was a perpetual ſcene of tumult and ſedition: armed ſlaves were introduced among theſe raſcally citizens; ſo that the whole government fell into anarchy, and the greateſt happineſs which the ROMANS could look for, was the deſpotic power of the CÆSARS. Such are the effects of democracy without a repreſentative.

A NOBILITY may poſſeſs the whole, or any part of the legiſlative power of a ſtate, in two different ways. Either every nobleman ſhares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as compoſed of parts, which have each a diſtinct power and authority. The VENETIAN nobility are an inſtance of the firſt kind of government: The POLISH of the ſecond. In the VENETIAN government the whole body of nobility poſſeſſes the whole power, and no nobleman has any authority which he receives not from the whole. In the POLISH government every nobleman, by means of his fiefs, has a peculiar hereditary authority over his vaſſals, and the whole body has no authority but what it receives from the concurrence of its parts. The diſtinct operations and tendencies of theſe two ſpecies of government might be made moſt apparant even *a priori*. A VENETIAN nobility is infinitely preferable to a POLISH, let the humors and education of men be ever ſo much varied. A nobility, who poſſeſs their power in common, will preſerve peace and order, both among themſelves, and their ſubjects; and

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no member can have authority enough to control the laws for a moment. The nobles will preſerve their authority over the people, but without any grievous tyranny, or any breach of private property; becauſe ſuch a tyrannical government promotes not the intereſt of the whole body, however it may that of ſome individuals. There will be a diſtinction of rank between the nobility and people, but this will be the only diſtinction in the ſtate. The whole nobility will form one body, and the whole people another, without any of thoſe private feuds and animoſities, which ſpread ruin and deſolation every where. 'Tis eaſy to ſee the diſadvantages of a POLISH nobility in every one of theſe particulars.

'TIS poſſible ſo to conſtitute a free government, as that a ſingle perſon, call him duke, prince, or king, ſhall poſſeſs a very large ſhare of power, and ſhall form a proper balance or counterpoiſe to the other parts of the legiſlature. This chief magiſtrate may be either *elective* or *hereditary*; and tho' the former inſtitution may, to a ſuperficial view, appear the moſt advantageous; yet a more accurate inſpection will diſcover in it greater inconveniencies than in the latter, and ſuch as are founded on cauſes and principles eternal and immutable. The filling of the throne, in ſuch a government, is a point of too great and too general intereſt, not to divide the whole people into factions: From whence a civil war, the greateſt of ills, may be apprehended, almoſt with certainty, upon every vacancy. The prince elected muſt be either a *Foreigner* or a *Native:* The former will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; ſuſpicious of his new ſubjects, and ſuſpected by them; giving his confidence entirely to ſtrangers, who will have no other care but of enriching themſelves in the quickeſt manner, while their maſter's favor and authority are able to ſupport them. A native will carry into the throne all his private animoſities and friendſhips, and will never be regarded, in his elevation, without exciting the ſentiments of envy in thoſe, who formerly conſidered him as their equal. Not to mention, that a crown is too high a reward ever to be given to merit alone, and will always induce the candidates to employ force, or money, or intrigue, to procure the votes of the electors: So that ſuch an election will give no better chance for ſuperior merit in the prince, than if the ſtate had truſted to birth alone for determining their ſovereign.

IT may therefore be pronounced as an univerſal axiom in politics, *That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vaſſals, and a people voting by their repreſentatives, form the beſt* MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, *and* DEMOCRACY. But in order to prove more fully, that politics admit of general truths, which are invariable by the humor or education either of ſubject or ſovereign, it may not be amiſs to obſerve ſome other principles of this ſcience, which may ſeem to deſerve that character.

IT may eaſily be obſerved, that tho' free governments have been commonly the moſt happy for thoſe who partake of their freedom; yet are they the moſt ruinous and oppreſſive for their provinces: And this obſervation may, I believe, be fixed as a maxim of the kind we are here ſpeaking of. When a monarch extends his dominions by conqueſt, he ſoon learns to conſider his old and his new ſubjects as on the ſame footing; becauſe, in reality, all his ſubjects are to him the ſame, except the few friends and favorites, with whom he is perſonally acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any diſtinction betwixt them in his *general* laws; and, at the ſame time, is no leſs careful to prevent all *particular* acts of oppreſſion on the one as on the other. But a free ſtate neceſſarily makes a great diſtinction,

tion, and muſt always do ſo, till men learn to love their neighbors as well as themſelves. The conquerors, in ſuch a government, are all legiſlators, and will be ſure ſo to contrive matters, by reſtrictions of trade, and by taxes, as to draw ſome private, as well as public, advantage from their conqueſts. Provincial governors have alſo a better chance in a republic, to eſcape with their plunder, by means of bribery or intereſt; and their fellow-citizens, who find their own ſtate to be inriched by the ſpoils of the ſubject-provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate ſuch abuſes. Not to mention, that it is a neceſſary precaution in a free ſtate to change the governors frequently; which obliges theſe temporary tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate ſufficient wealth before they give place to their ſucceſſors. What cruel tyrants were the ROMANS over the world during the time of their commonwealth! 'Tis true, they had laws to prevent oppreſſion in their provincial magiſtrates; but CICERO informs us, that the ROMANS could not better conſult the intereſt of the provinces than by repealing theſe very laws. For, ſays he, in that caſe, our magiſtrates, having entire impunity, would plunder no more than would ſatisfy their own rapaciouſneſs: Whereas, at preſent, they muſt alſo ſatisfy that of their judges, and of all the great men of ROME, whoſe protection they ſtand in need of. Who can read of the cruelties and oppreſſions of VERRES without horror and aſtoniſhment? And, who is not touched with indignation to hear, that after CICERO had exhauſted on that abandoned criminal all the thunders of his eloquence, and had prevailed ſo far as to get him condemned to the utmoſt extent of the laws; yet that cruel tyrant lived peaceably to old age, in opulence and eaſe, and, thirty years afterward, was put into the proſcription by MARK ANTHONY, on account of his exorbitant wealth, where he fell, with CICERO himſelf, and all the moſt virtuous men of ROME? After the diſſolution of the commonwealth, the ROMAN yoke became eaſier upon the provinces, as TACITUS informs us *; and it may be obſerved, that many of the worſt emperors, DOMITIAN †, for inſtance, were very careful to prevent all oppreſſion of the provinces. In ‡ TIBERIUS's time, GAUL was eſteemed richer than ITALY itſelf: Nor, do I find, during the whole time of the ROMAN monarchy, that the empire became leſs rich or populous in any of its provinces; though indeed its valor and military diſcipline were always upon the decline. The oppreſſion and tyranny of the CARTHAGINIANS over their ſubject ſtates in AFRICA went ſo far, as we learn from POLYBIUS ||, that not contented with exacting the half of all the product of the ground, which of itſelf was a very high rent, they alſo loaded them with many other taxes. If we paſs from antient to modern times, we ſhall find the ſame obſervation to hold. The provinces of abſolute monarchies are always better treated than thoſe of free ſtates. Compare the *Païs conquis* of FRANCE with IRELAND, and you will be convinced of this truth; tho' this latter kingdom being, in a good meaſure, peopled from ENGLAND, poſſeſſes ſo many rights and privileges as ſhould naturally make it challenge better treatment than that of a conquered province. CORSICA is alſo an obvious inſtance to the ſame purpoſe.

* Ann. lib 1. cap. 2.

† SUET. in vita DOMIT.

‡ *Egregium reſumendæ libertati tempus, ſi ipſi flerentes, quam inops* ITALIA, *quam imbellis urbana plebs, nihil validum in exercitibus, niſi quod externum cogitarent.* TACIT. Ann. lib. 3.

|| Lib. 1. cap. 72.

THERE

THERE is an obſervation of MACHIAVEL, with regard to the conqueſts of ALEXANDER the Great, which, I think, may be regarded as one of thoſe eternal political truths which no time nor accidents can vary. It may ſeem ſtrange, ſays that politician, that ſuch ſudden conqueſts, as thoſe of ALEXANDER, ſhould be poſſeſſed ſo peaceably by his ſucceſſors, and that the PERSIANS, during all the confuſions and civil wars of the GREEKS, never made the ſmalleſt efforts towards the recovery of their former independent government. To ſatisfy us concerning the cauſe of this remarkable event, we may conſider, that a monarch may govern his ſubjects in two different ways. He may either follow the maxims of the eaſtern princes, and ſtretch his power ſo far as to leave no diſtinction of ranks among his ſubjects, but what proceeds immediately from himſelf; no advantage of birth; no hereditary honors and poſſeſſions; and, in a word, no credit among the people, except from his commiſſion alone. Or a monarch may exert his power after a milder manner, like our EUROPEAN princes; and leave other ſources of honor, beſide his ſmile and favor: Birth, titles, poſſeſſions, valor, integrity, knowlege, or great and fortunate atchievements. In the former ſpecies of government, after a conqueſt, 'tis impoſſible ever to ſhake off the yoke; ſince no one poſſeſſes, among the people, ſo much perſonal credit and authority as to begin ſuch an enterprize: Whereas, in the latter, the leaſt misfortune, or diſcord of the victors, will encourage the vanquiſhed to take arms, who have leaders ready to prompt and conduct them in every undertaking *.

* I HAVE taken it for granted, according to the ſuppoſition of MACHIAVEL, that the antient PERSIANS had no nobility; tho' there is reaſon to ſuſpect, that the FLORENTINE ſecretary, who ſeems to have been better acquainted with the ROMAN than the GREEK authors, was miſtaken in this particular. The more antient PERSIANS, whoſe manners are deſcribed by XENOPHON, were a free people, and had nobility. Their ομοτιμοι were preſerved even after the extending of their conqueſts and the conſequent change of their government. ARIAN mentions them in DARIUS's time, *De exped.* ALEX. lib. 2. Hiſtorians alſo ſpeak often of the perſons in command as men of family. TYGRANES, who was general of the MEDES under XERXES, was of the race of ACHÆMENES, HEROD. lib. 7. cap. 62. ARTACHÆES, who directed the cutting of the canal about mount ATHOS, was of the ſame family. Id. cap. 117. MEGABYZUS was one of the ſeven eminent PERSIANS who conſpired againſt the MAGI. His ſon, ZOPYRUS, was in the higheſt command under DARIUS, and delivered BABYLON to him. His grandſon, MEGABYZUS, commanded the army, defeated at MARATHON. His great grandſon ZOPYRUS, was alſo eminent, and was baniſhed PERSIA. HEROD. lib. 3. THUC. lib. 1. ROSACES, who commanded an army in ÆGYPT under ARTAXERXES, was alſo deſcended from one of the ſeven conſpirators, DIOD. SIC. lib. 16. AGESILAUS, in XENOPHON, Hiſt. GRÆC. lib. 4. being deſirous of making a marriage betwixt king COTYS his ally, and the daughter of SPITHRIDATES a PERSIAN of rank, who had deſerted to him, firſt aſks COTYS what family SPITHRIDATES is of. One of the moſt conſiderable in PERSIA, ſays COTYS. ARIÆUS, when offered the ſovereignty by CLEARCHUS and the ten thouſand GREEKS, refuſed it as of too low a rank, and ſaid, that ſo many eminent PERSIANS, would never endure his rule. *Id. de exped.* lib. 2. Some of the families, deſcended from the ſeven PERSIANS abovementioned remained during all ALEXANDER's ſucceſſors; and MITHRIDATES, in ANTIOCHUS' time, is ſaid by POLYBIUS to be deſcended from one of them, lib. 5. cap. 43. ARTABAZUS was eſteemed, as ARIAN ſays, εν τοις πρωτοις Περσων. lib. 3. And when ALEXANDER married in one day 80 of his captains to PERSIAN women, his intention plainly was to ally the MACEDONIANS with the moſt eminent PERSIAN families. Id. lib. 7. DIODORUS SICULUS ſays they were of the moſt noble birth in PERSIA, lib. 17. The government of PERSIA was deſpotic, and conducted, in many reſpects, after the eaſtern manner, but was not carried ſo far as to extirpate all nobility, and confound all ranks and orders. It left men who were ſtill great, by themſelves and their family, independent of their office and commiſſion. And the reaſon why the MACEDONIANS kept ſo eaſily dominion over them was owing to other cauſes eaſy to be found in the hiſtorians; tho' it muſt be owned that MACHIAVEL's reaſoning is, in itſelf, juſt, however doubtful its application to the preſent caſe.

SUCH is the reaſoning of MACHIAVEL, which ſeems to me very ſolid and concluſive; though I wiſh he had not mixed falſhood with truth, in aſſerting, that monarchies governed according to the eaſtern policy, though more eaſily kept when once ſubdued, yet are the moſt difficult to ſubdue; ſince they cannot contain any powerful ſubject, whoſe diſcontent and faction may facilitate the enterprizes of an enemy. For beſides, that ſuch a tyrannical government enervates the courage of men, and renders them indifferent towards the fortunes of their ſovereign; beſides this, I ſay, we find by experience, that even the temporary and delegated authority of the generals and magiſtrates; being always, in ſuch governments, as abſolute within its ſphere, as that of the prince himſelf; is able, with barbarians accuſtomed to a blind ſubmiſſion, to produce the moſt dangerous and fatal revolutions. So that, in every reſpect, a gentle government is preferable, and gives the greateſt ſecurity to the ſovereign as well as to the ſubject.

LEGISLATORS, therefore, ought not to truſt the future government of a ſtate entirely to chance, but ought to provide a ſyſtem of laws to regulate the adminiſtration of public affairs to the lateſt poſterity. Effects will always correſpond to cauſes; and wiſe regulations in any commonwealth, are the moſt valuable legacy which can be left to future ages. In the ſmalleſt court or office, the ſtated forms and methods, by which buſineſs muſt be conducted, are found to be a conſiderable check on the natural depravity of mankind. Why ſhould not the caſe be the ſame in public affairs? Can we aſcribe the ſtability and wiſdom of the VENETIAN government, through ſo many ages, to any thing but the form of government? And is it not eaſy to point out thoſe defects in the original conſtitution, which produced the tumultuous governments of ATHENS and ROME, and ended at laſt in the ruin of theſe two famous republics? And ſo little dependance has this affair on the humors and education of particular men, that one part of the ſame republic may be wiſely conducted, and another weakly, by the very ſame men, merely on account of the difference of the forms and inſtitutions, by which theſe parts are regulated. Hiſtorians inform us that this was actually the caſe with GENOA. For while the ſtate was always full of ſedition, and tumult, and diſorder, the bank of St. GEORGE, which had become a conſiderable part of the people, was conducted, for ſeveral ages, with the utmoſt integrity and wiſdom *.

THE ages of greateſt public ſpirit are not always moſt eminent for private virtue. Good laws may beget order and moderation in the government, where the manners and cuſtoms have inſtilled little humanity or juſtice into the tempers of men. The moſt illuſtrious period of the ROMAN hiſtory, conſidered in a political view, is that between the beginning of the firſt and end of the laſt PUNIC war; the due balance betwixt the nobility and people being then fixed by the conteſts of the tribunes, and not being yet loſt by the extent of conqueſts. Yet at this very time, the horrid practice of poiſoning was ſo common, that, during part of a ſeaſon, a *Prætor* puniſhed capitally for this crime above three thouſand † perſons, in a part of ITALY; and found informations of this nature ſtill multiplying upon

* *Eſſempio veramente raro, & da Filoſofi intante lire imaginato & vedute Republiche mai non trovate, vedere dentro ad un medeſimo cerebio, fra medeſimi cittadini, la liberta, & la tirannide, la vita civile et la corretta, la giuſtitia & la licenza; perche quello ordine ſolo mantiene quella citta piena di coſtumi antichi & venerabili. E s'egli auveniſſe (che col tempo in ogni modo auverrà) que* SAN GIORGIO *tutta quel'a citta occupaſſe, ſarrebbe quella una Repubblica piu que la* VENETIANA *memorabile.*

Della Hiſt. Florentinè, lib. 8.

† T. LIVII, lib. 40. cap. 43.

him. There is a ſimilar, or rather a worſe inſtance *, in the more early times of the commonwealth. So depraved in private life were that people, whom in their hiſtories we ſo much admire. I doubt not but they were really more virtuous during the time of the two *Triumvirates*, when they were tearing their common country to pieces, and ſpreading ſlaughter and deſolation over the face of the earth, merely for the choice of tyrants †.

Here, then, is a ſufficient inducement to maintain, with the utmoſt Zeal, in every free ſtate, thoſe forms and inſtitutions by which liberty is ſecured, the public good conſulted, and the avarice or ambition of particular men reſtrained and puniſhed. Nothing does more honor to human nature, than to ſee it ſuſceptible of ſo noble a paſſion; as nothing can be a greater indication of meanneſs of heart in any man, than to ſee him devoid of it. A man who loves only himſelf, without regard to friendſhip or merit, is a deteſtable monſter; and a man, who is only ſuſceptible of friendſhip, without public ſpirit, or a regard to the community, is deficient in the moſt material part of virtue.

But this is a ſubject which needs not be longer inſiſted on at preſent. There are enow of zealots on both ſides who kindle up the paſſions of their partizans, and under the pretence of public good, purſue the intereſts and ends of their particular faction. For my part, I ſhall always be more fond of promoting moderation than zeal; tho' perhaps the ſureſt way of producing moderation in every party is to increaſe our zeal for the public. Let us therefore try, if it be poſſible, from the foregoing doctrine, to draw a leſſon of moderation with regard to the parties into which our country is at preſent ‡ divided; at the ſame time, that we allow not this moderation to abate the induſtry and paſſion with which every individual is bound to purſue the good of his country.

Those who either attack or defend a miniſter in ſuch a government as ours, where the utmoſt liberty is allowed, always carry matters to an extreme, and exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to the public. His enemies are ſure to charge him with the greateſt enormities, both in domeſtic and foreign management; and there is no meanneſs nor crime, of which, in their account, he is not capable. Unneceſſary wars, ſcandalous treaties, profuſion of public treaſure, oppreſſive taxes, every kind of mal-adminiſtration is aſcribed to him. To aggravate the charge, his pernicious conduct, it is ſaid, will extend its baneful influence even to poſterity, by undermining the beſt conſtitution in the world, and diſordering that wiſe ſyſtem of laws, inſtitutions and cuſtoms, by which our anceſtors, for ſo many centuries, have been ſo happily governed. He is not only a wicked miniſter in himſelf, but has removed every ſecurity provided againſt wicked miniſters for the future.

On the other hand, the partizans of the miniſter make his panegyric run as high as the accuſation againſt him, and celebrate his wiſe, ſteady and moderate conduct in every part of his adminiſtration. The honor and intereſt of the nation ſupported abroad, public credit maintained at home, perſecution reſtrained, faction ſubdued; the merit of all theſe bleſſings is aſcribed ſolely to the miniſter.

* *Id.* lib. 8. cap. 18.

† *L'Aigle contre L'Aigle,* Romains *contre* Romains,
Combattans ſeulement pour le choix de tyrans. Corneille.

‡ In 1742.

At the ſame time he crowns all his other merits, by a religious care of the beſt conſtitution in the world, which he has preſerved inviolate in all its parts, and has tranſmitted entire, to be the happineſs and ſecurity of the lateſt poſterity.

When this accuſation and panegyric are received by the partizans of each party, no wonder they beget a moſt extraordinary ferment on both ſides, and fill the nation with the moſt violent animoſities. But I would fain perſuade theſe party-zealots, that there is a flat contradiction both in the accuſation and panegyric, and that it were impoſſible for either of them to run ſo high, were it not for this contradiction. If our conſtitution be really * *that noble fabric, the pride of* Britain, *the envy of our neighbours, raiſed by the labor of ſo many centuries, repaired at the expence of ſo many millions, and cemented by ſuch a profuſion of blood*; I ſay, if our conſtitution does in any degree deſerve theſe eulogies, it would never have ſuffered a wicked and a weak miniſter to govern triumphantly for a courſe of twenty years, when oppoſed by the greateſt geniuſes of the nation, who exerciſed the utmoſt liberty of tongue and pen, in parliament, and in their frequent appeals to the people. But, if the miniſter be wicked and weak, to the degree ſo ſtrenuouſly inſiſted on, the conſtitution muſt be faulty in its original principles, and he cannot conſiſtently be charged with undermining the beſt conſtitution of the world. A conſtitution is only ſo far good, as it provides a remedy againſt mal-adminiſtration; and if the British conſtitution, when in its greateſt vigor, and repaired by two ſuch remarkable events, as the *Revolution* and *Acceſſion*, where our ancient royal family was ſacrificed to it; if our conſtitution, I ſay, with ſo great advantages, does not, in fact, provide any ſuch remedy, we are rather beholden to any miniſter who undermines it, and affords us an opportunity of erecting in its place a better conſtitution.

I would make uſe of the ſame topics to moderate the zeal of thoſe who defend the miniſter. *Is our conſtitution ſo excellent?* Then a change of miniſtry can be no ſuch dreadful event; ſince 'tis eſſential to ſuch a conſtitution, in every miniſtry, both to preſerve itſelf from violation, and to prevent all enormities in the adminiſtration. *Is our conſtitution very bad?* Then ſo extraordinary a jealouſy and apprehenſion, on account of changes, is ill-placed; and a man ſhould no more be anxious in this caſe, than a huſband, who had married a woman from the ſtews, ſhould be watchful to prevent her infidelity. Public affairs, in ſuch a conſtitution, muſt neceſſarily go to confuſion, by whatever hands they are conducted; and the zeal of *patriots* is much leſs requiſite in that caſe than the patience and ſubmiſſion of *philoſophers*. The virtue and good intentions of Cato and Brutus are highly laudable; but, to what purpoſe did their zeal ſerve? To nothing, but to haſten the fatal period of the Roman government, and render its convulſions and dying agonies more violent and painful.

I would not be underſtood to mean, that public affairs deſerve no care and attention at all. Would men be moderate and conſiſtent, their claims might be admitted; at leaſt might be examined. The *country-party* might ſtill aſſert, that our conſtitution, tho' excellent, will admit of mal-adminiſtration to a certain degree; and therefore, if the miniſter be bad, 'tis proper to oppoſe him with a *ſuitable* degree of zeal. And, on the other hand, the *court-party* may be allowed,

* *Diſſertation on Parties*, Letter 10.

upon

upon the ſuppoſition that the miniſter were good, to defend, and with *ſome* zeal too, his adminiſtration. I would only perſuade men not to contend, as if they were fighting *pro aris & focis*, and change a good conſtitution into a bad one, by the violence of their factions *.

I HAVE not here conſidered any thing that is perſonal in the preſent controverſy. In the beſt civil conſtitution, where every man is reſtrained by the moſt rigid laws, 'tis eaſy to diſcover either the good or bad intentions of a miniſter, and to judge, whether his perſonal character deſerves love or hatred. But ſuch queſtions are of little importance to the public, and lay thoſe who employ their pens upon them, under a juſt ſuſpicion either of malevolence or of flattery.

* *What our author's opinion was of the famous miniſter here pointed at, may be learned from that eſſay, printed in the former editions, under the title of* A character of Sir ROBERT WALPOLE. *It was as follows:* There never was a man, whoſe actions and character have been more earneſtly and openly canvaſſed, than thoſe of the preſent miniſter, who, having governed a learned and free nation for ſo long a time, amidſt ſuch mighty oppoſition, may make a large library of what has been wrote for and againſt him, and is the ſubject of above half the paper that has been blotted in the nation within theſe twenty years. I wiſh, for the honor of our country, that any one character of him had been drawn with ſuch *judgment* and *impartiality*, as to have ſome credit with poſterity, and to ſhew, that our liberty has, once at leaſt, been employed to good purpoſe. I am only afraid of failing in the former quality of judgment: But if it ſhould be ſo, 'tis but one page more thrown away, after an hundred thouſand, upon the ſame ſubject, that have periſhed, and become uſeleſs. In the mean time, I ſhall flatter myſelf with the pleaſing imagination, that the following character will be adopted by future hiſtorians.

Sir *ROBERT WALPOLE*, prime miniſter of GREAT BRITAIN, is a man of ability, not a genius; good-natured, not virtuous; conſtant, not magnanimous; moderate, not equitable †. His virtues, in ſome inſtances, are free from the allay of thoſe vices, which uſually accompany ſuch virtues: He is a generous friend, without being a bitter enemy. His vices, in other inſtances, are not compenſated by thoſe virtues which are nearly allyed to them: His want of enterpriſe is not attended with frugality. The private character of the man is better than the public: His virtues more than his vices; His fortune greater than his fame. With many good qualities, he has incurred the public hatred: With good capacity he has not eſcaped ridicule... He would have been eſteemed more worthy of his high ſtation, had he never poſſeſſed it; and is better qualified for the ſecond than for the firſt place in any government. His miniſtry has been more advantageous to his family than to the public, better for this age than for poſterity, and more pernicious by bad precedents than by real grievances. During his time trade has flouriſhed, liberty declined, and learning gone to ruin. As I am a man, I love him; as I am a ſcholar, I hate him; as I am a BRITON, I calmly wiſh his fall. And were I a member of either houſe, I would give my vote for removing him from ST. JAMES's; but ſhould be glad to ſee him retire to HOUGHTON-HALL, to paſs the remainder of his days in eaſe and pleaſure.

† *Moderate in the exerciſe of power, not equitable in engroſſing it.*

The author is pleaſed to find, that after animoſities are laid, and calumny has ceaſed, the whole nation almoſt have returned to the ſame moderate ſentiments with regard to this great man; if they are not rather become more favourable to him, by a very natural tranſition, from one extreme to another. The author would not oppoſe theſe humane ſentiments towards the dead; tho' he cannot forbear obſerving, that the not paying more of our public debts was, as hinted in this character, a great, and the only great, error in that long adminiſtration.

ESSAY V.

OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT.

NOTHING is more ſurprizing to thoſe, who conſider human affairs with a philoſophical eye, than to ſee the eaſineſs with which the many are governed by the few; and to obſerve the implicite ſubmiſſion with which men reſign their own ſentiments and paſſions to thoſe of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is brought about, we ſhall find, that as FORCE is always on the ſide of the governed, the governors have nothing to ſupport them but opinion. 'Tis therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the moſt deſpotic and moſt military governments, as well as to the moſt free and moſt popular. The ſoldan of ÆGYPT, or the emperor of ROME, might drive his harmleſs ſubjects, like brute beaſts, againſt their ſentiments and inclination: But he muſt, at leaſt, have led his *mamalukes*, or *prætorian bands*, like men, by their opinion.

OPINION is of two kinds, *viz.* opinion of INTEREST, and opinion of RIGHT. By opinion of intereſt, I chiefly underſtand the ſenſe of the public advantage which is reaped from government; together with the perſuaſion, that the particular government, which is eſtabliſhed, is equally advantageous with any other that could eaſily be ſettled. When this opinion prevails among the generality of a ſtate, or among thoſe who have the force in their hands, it gives great ſecurity to any government.

RIGHT is of two kinds, right to POWER and right to PROPERTY. What prevalence opinion of the firſt kind has over mankind, may eaſily be underſtood by obſerving the attachment which all nations have to their ancient government, and even to thoſe names which have had the ſanction of antiquity. Antiquity always begets the opinion of right; and whatever diſadvantageous ſentiments we may entertain of mankind, they are always found to be prodigal both of blood and treaſure in the maintenance of public juſtice. This paſſion we may denominate enthuſiaſm, or we may give it what appellation we pleaſe; but a politician, who ſhould overlook its influence on human affairs, would prove himſelf but of a very limited underſtanding. There is, indeed, no particular, in which, at firſt ſight, there may appear a greater contradiction in the frame of the human mind than the preſent. When men act in a faction, they are apt, without any ſhame or remorſe, to neglect all the ties of honor and morality, in order to ſerve their party; and yet, when a faction is formed upon a point of right or principle, there is no occaſion, where men diſcover a greater obſtinacy, and a more determined ſenſe of juſtice and equity. The ſame ſocial diſpoſition of mankind is the cauſe of both theſe contradictory appearances.

'TIS ſufficiently underſtood, that the opinion of right to property is of the greateſt moment in all matters of government. A noted author has made property the foundation of all government; and moſt of our political writers ſeem inclined

inclined to follow him in that particular. This is carrying the matter too far; but ſtill it muſt be owned, that the opinion of right to property has a great influence in this ſubject.

Upon theſe three opinions, therefore, of public *intereſt*, of *right to power*, and of *right to property*, are all governments founded, and all authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other principles, which add force to theſe, and determine, limit, or alter their operation; ſuch as *ſelf-intereſt*, *fear*, and *affection*: But ſtill we may aſſert, that theſe other principles can have no influence alone, but ſuppoſe the antecedent influence of thoſe opinions above-mentioned. They are, therefore, to be eſteemed the ſecondary, not the original principles of government.

For, *firſt*, as to *ſelf-intereſt*, by which I mean the expectation of particular rewards, diſtinct from the general protection which we receive from government, 'tis evident, that the magiſtrate's authority muſt be antecedently eſtabliſhed, or, at leaſt be hoped for, in order to produce this expectation. The hope of reward may augment the authority with regard to ſome particular perſons; but can never give birth to it, with regard to the public. Men naturally look for the greateſt favors from their friends and acquaintance; and therefore, the hopes of any conſiderable number of the ſtate, would never center in any particular ſet of men, if theſe men had no other title to magiſtracy, and had no ſeparate influence over the opinions of mankind. The ſame obſervation may be extended to the other two principles of *fear* and *affection*. No man would have any reaſon to *fear* the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but from fear; ſince, as a ſingle man, his bodily force can reach but a ſmall way, and all farther power he poſſeſſes muſt be founded either on our own opinion, or on the preſumed opinion of others. And tho' *affection* to wiſdom and virtue in a *ſovereign* extends very far, and has great influence; yet he muſt be antecedently ſuppoſed inveſted with a public character, otherwiſe the public eſteem will ſerve him in no ſtead, nor will his virtue have any influence beyond a narrow ſphere.

A Government may endure for ſeveral ages, tho' the balance of power, and the balance of property do not agree. This chiefly happens, where any rank or order of the ſtate has acquired a large ſhare of the property; but, from the original conſtitution of the government, has no ſhare of the power. Under what pretext would any individual of that order pretend to intermeddle in public affairs? As men are commonly much attached to their ancient government, it is not to be expected, that the public would ever favor ſuch uſurpations. But where the original conſtitution allows any ſhare of power, tho' ſmall, to an order of men, who poſſeſs a large ſhare of the property, 'tis eaſy for them gradually to ſtretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to coincide with that of property. This has been the caſe with the houſe of commons in England.

Moſt writers, who have treated of the British government, have ſuppoſed, that as the houſe of commons repreſents all the commons of Great Britain, ſo its weight in the ſcale is proportioned to the property and power of all whom it repreſents. But this principle muſt not be received as abſolutely true. For tho' the people are apt to attach themſelves more to the houſe of commons, than to any other member of the conſtitution; that houſe being choſen by them as their repreſentatives, and as the public guardians of their liberty; yet are there inſtan-

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ces where the houſe, even when in oppoſition to the crown, has not been followed by the people; as we may particularly obſerve of the *tory* houſe of commons in the reign of king WILLIAM. Were the members of the houſe obliged to receive inſtructions from their conſtituents, like the DUTCH deputies, this would entirely alter the caſe; and, if ſuch immenſe power and riches, as thoſe of the whole commons of BRITAIN, were brought into the ſcale, 'tis not eaſy to conceive, that the crown could either influence that multitude of people, or withſtand that overbalance of property. 'Tis true, the crown has great influence over the collective body of BRITAIN in the elections of members; but were this influence which at preſent is only exerted once in ſeven years, to be employed in bringing over the people to every vote, it would ſoon be waſted; and no ſkill, popularity or revenue, cou'd ſupport it. I muſt, therefore, be of opinion, that an alteration, in this particular, would introduce a total alteration in our government, and would ſoon reduce it to a pure republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form. For tho' the people collected in a body like the ROMAN tribes, be quite unfit for government, yet when diſperſed in ſmall bodies, they are more ſuſceptible both of reaſon and order; the force of popular currents and tides is, in a great meaſure, broke; and the public intereſt may be purſued with ſome method and conſtancy. But 'tis needleſs to reaſon any farther concerning a form of government, which is never likely to have place in BRITAIN, and which ſeems not to be the aim of any party amongſt us. Let us cheriſh and improve our ancient government as much as poſſible, without encouraging a paſſion for ſuch dangerous novelties.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that the preſent political controverſy, with regard to *inſtructions*, is a very frivolous one, and can never be brought to any deciſion, as it is managed by both parties. The country-party pretend not, that a member is abſolutely bound to follow inſtructions, as an ambaſſador or general is confined by his orders, and that his vote is not to be received in the houſe, but ſo far as it is conformable to them. The court-party again, pretend not, that the ſentiments of the people ought to have no weight with each member; much leſs that he ought to deſpiſe the ſentiments of thoſe whom he repreſents, and with whom he is more particularly connected. And if their ſentiments be of weight, why ought they not to expreſs theſe ſentiments? The queſtion, then, is only concerning the degrees of weight which ought to be placed on inſtructions. But ſuch is the nature of language, that 'tis impoſſible for it to expreſs diſtinctly theſe different degrees; and if men will carry on a controverſy on this head, it may well happen, that they differ in their language, and yet agree in their ſentiments; or differ in their ſentiments, and yet agree in their language. Beſides, how is it poſſible to fix theſe degrees, conſidering the variety of affairs which come before the houſe, and the variety of places which members repreſent? Ought the inſtructions of TOTNESS to have the ſame weight as thoſe of LONDON? or inſtructions, with regard to the *Convention*, which reſpected foreign politics, to have the ſame weight as thoſe with regard to the *exciſe*, which reſpected only our domeſtic affairs?

ESSAY VI.

OF LOVE AND MARRIAGE.

I KNOW not whence it proceeds, that women are ſo apt to take amiſs every thing which is ſaid in diſparagement of the married ſtate; and always conſider a ſatyr upon matrimony as a ſatyr upon themſelves. Do they mean, that they are the parties principally concerned, and that if a backwardneſs to enter into that ſtate ſhould prevail in the world, they would be the greateſt ſufferers? Or, are they ſenſible, that the misfortunes and miſcarriages of the married ſtate are owing more to their ſex than to ours? I hope they do not intend to confeſs either of theſe two particulars, or to give ſuch an advantage to their adverſaries, the men, as even to allow them to ſuſpect it.

I HAVE often had thoughts of complying with this humor of the fair ſex, and of writing a panegyric upon marriage: But, in looking around for materials, they ſeemed to be of ſo mixed a nature, that at the concluſion of my reflections, I found that I was as much diſpoſed to write a ſatyr, which might be placed on the oppoſite pages of the panegyric: And I am afraid, that as ſatyr is, on moſt occaſions, thought to contain more truth than panegyric, I ſhould have done their cauſe more harm than good by this expedient. To miſrepreſent facts is what, I know, they will not require of me. I muſt be more a friend to truth, than even to them, where their intereſts are oppoſite.

I SHALL tell the women what it is our ſex complains of moſt in the married ſtate; and if they be diſpoſed to ſatisfy us in this particular, all the other differences will eaſily be accommodated. If I be not miſtaken, 'tis their love of dominion, which is the ground of the quarrel; tho' 'tis very likely, that they will think it an unreaſonable love of it in us, which makes us inſiſt ſo much upon that point. However this may be, no paſſion ſeems to have more influence on female minds, than this for power; and there is a remarkable inſtance in hiſtory of its prevailing above another paſſion, which is the only one that can be ſuppoſed a proper counterpoiſe for it. We are told that all the women in SCYTHIA once conſpired againſt the men, and kept the ſecret ſo well, that they executed their deſign before they were ſuſpected. They ſurpriſed the men in drink, or aſleep; bound them all faſt in chains; and having called a ſolemn council of the whole ſex, it was debated what expedient ſhould be uſed to improve the preſent advantage, and prevent their falling again into ſlavery. To kill all the men did not ſeem to the reliſh of any part of the aſſembly, notwithſtanding the injuries formerly received; and they were afterwards pleaſed to make a great merit of this lenity of theirs. It was, therefore, agreed to put out the eyes of the whole male ſex, and thereby reſign in all future time the vanity which they could draw from their beauty, in order to ſecure their authority. We muſt no longer pretend to dreſs and ſhow, ſay they; but then we ſhall be free from ſlavery. We ſhall hear no more tender ſighs; but in

in return we ſhall hear no more imperious commands. Love muſt for ever leave us; but he will carry ſubjection along with him.

'Tis regarded by ſome as an unlucky circumſtance, ſince the women were reſolved to maim the men, and deprive them of ſome of their ſenſes, in order to render them humble and dependent, that the ſenſe of hearing could not ſerve their purpoſe, ſince 'tis probable the females would rather have attacked that than the ſight: And I think it is agreed among the learned, that, in a married ſtate, 'tis not near ſo great an inconvenience to loſe the former ſenſe as the latter. However this may be, we are told by modern anecdotes, that ſome of the SCYTHIAN women did ſecretly ſpare their huſband's eyes; preſuming, I ſuppoſe, that they could govern them as well by means of that ſenſe as without it. But ſo incorrigible and intractable were theſe men, that their wives were all obliged, in a few years, as their youth and beauty decayed, to imitate the example of their ſiſters; which it was no difficult matter to do in a ſtate where the female ſex had once got the ſuperiority.

I KNOW not if our SCOTTISH ladies derive any thing of this humor from their SCYTHIAN anceſtors; but, I muſt confeſs that I have often been ſurprized to ſee a woman very well pleaſed to take a fool for her mate, that ſhe might govern with the leſs controul; and could not but think her ſentiments, in this reſpect, ſtill more barbarous than thoſe of the SCYTHIAN women above-mentioned; as much, as the eyes of the underſtanding are more valuable than thoſe of the body.

BUT to be juſt, and to lay the blame more equally, I am afraid it is the fault of our ſex, if the women be ſo fond of rule, and that if we did not abuſe our authority, they would never think it worth while to diſpute it. Tyrants, we know, produce rebels; and all hiſtory informs us, that rebels, when they prevail, are apt to become tyrants in their turn. For this reaſon, I could wiſh there were no pretenſions to authority on either ſide; but that every thing was carried on with perfect equality, as between two equal members of the ſame body. And to induce both parties to embrace thoſe amicable ſentiments, I ſhall deliver to them PLATO's account of the origin of love and marriage.

MANKIND, according to that fanciful philoſopher, were not, in their original, divided into male and female, as at preſent; but each individual perſon was a compound of both ſexes, and was in himſelf both huſband and wife, melted down into one living creature. This union, no doubt, was very entire, and the parts very well adjuſted together, ſince there reſulted a perfect harmony betwixt the male and female, altho' they were obliged to be inſeparable companions. And ſo great was the harmony and happineſs flowing from it, that the ANDROGYNES (for ſo PLATO calls them) or MEN-WOMEN, became inſolent upon their proſperity, and rebelled againſt the Gods. To puniſh them for this temerity, JUPITER could contrive no better expedient, than to divorce the male-part from the female, and make two imperfect beings of the compound, which was before ſo perfect. Hence the origin of men and women, as diſtinct creatures. But notwithſtanding this diviſion, ſo lively is our remembrance of the happineſs which we enjoyed in our primæval ſtate, that we are never at reſt in this ſituation; but each of theſe halves is continually ſearching thro' the whole ſpecies to find the other half, which was broken from it: And when they meet, they join again with the greateſt fondneſs and ſympathy. But it often happens, that they are miſtaken in this particular;

cular; that they take for their half what no way correſponds to them; and that the parts do not meet nor join in with each other, as is uſual in fractures. In this caſe the union is ſoon diſſolved, and each part is ſet looſe again to hunt for its loſt half, joining itſelf to every one whom it meets, by way of trial, and enjoying no reſt till its perfect ſympathy with its partner ſhews, that it has at laſt been ſucceſsful in its endeavours.

WERE I diſpoſed to carry on this fiction of PLATO, which accounts for the mutual love betwixt the ſexes in ſo agreeable a manner, I would do it by the following allegory.

WHEN JUPITER had ſeparated the male from the female, and had quelled their pride and ambition by ſo ſevere an operation, he could not but repent him of the cruelty of his vengeance, and take compaſſion on poor mortals, who were now become incapable of any repoſe or tranquillity. Such cravings, ſuch anxieties, ſuch neceſſities aroſe, as made them curſe their creation, and think exiſtence itſelf a puniſhment. In vain had they recourſe to every other occupation and amuſement. In vain did they ſeek after every pleaſure of ſenſe, and every refinement of reaſon. Nothing could fill that void, which they felt in their hearts, or ſupply the loſs of their partner, who was ſo fatally ſeparated from them. To remedy this diſorder, and to beſtow ſome comfort, at leaſt, on human race in their forlorn ſituation, JUPITER ſent down LOVE and HYMEN to collect the broken halves of human kind, and piece them together in the beſt manner poſſible. Theſe two deities found ſuch a prompt diſpoſition in mankind to unite again in their primæval ſtate, that they proceeded on their work with wonderful ſucceſs for ſome time; till at laſt, from many unlucky accidents, diſſenſion aroſe betwixt them. The chief counſellor and favorite of HYMEN was CARE, who was continually filling his patron's head with proſpects of futurity; a ſettlement, family, children, ſervants; ſo that little elſe was regarded in all the matches *they* made. On the other hand, *Love* had choſen PLEASURE for his favorite, who was as pernicious a counſellor as the other, and would never allow *Love* to look beyond the preſent momentary gratification, or the ſatisfying of the prevailing inclination. Theſe two favorites became, in a little time, irreconcileable enemies, and made it their chief buſineſs to undermine each other in all their undertakings. No ſooner had *Love* fixed upon two halves, which he was cementing together, and forming to a cloſe union, but *Care* inſinuates himſelf, and bringing HYMEN along with him, diſſolves the union produced by love, and joins each half to ſome other half, which he had provided for it. To be revenged of this, *Pleaſure* creeps in upon a pair already joined by HYMEN; and calling *Love* to his aſſiſtance, they under-hand contrive to join each half by ſecret links, to halves, which HYMEN was wholly unacquainted with. It was not long before this quarrel was felt in its pernicious conſequences; and ſuch complaints aroſe before the throne of JUPITER, that he was obliged to ſummon the offending parties to appear before him, in order to give an account of their proceedings. After hearing the pleadings on both ſides, he ordered an immediate reconcilement betwixt *Love* and HYMEN, as the only expedient for giving happineſs to mankind: And that he might be ſure this reconcilement ſhould be durable, he laid his ſtrict injunctions on them never to join any halves without conſulting their favorites *Care* and *Pleaſure*, and obtaining the conſent of both to the conjunction. Where this order is ſtrictly obſerved,

ſerved, the *Androgyne* is perfectly reſtored, and human race enjoy the ſame happineſs as in their primæval ſtate. The ſeam is ſcarce perceived that joins the two beings; but both of them combine to form one perfect and happy creature.

ESSAY VII.

OF THE STUDY OF HISTORY.

THERE is nothing which I would recommend more earneſtly to my female readers than the ſtudy of hiſtory, as an occupation, of all others, the beſt ſuited both to their ſex and education, much more inſtructive than their ordinary books of amuſement, and more entertaining than thoſe ſerious compoſitions, which are uſually to be found in their cloſets. Among other important truths, which they may learn from hiſtory, they may be informed of two particulars, the knowlege of which may contribute very much to their quiet and repoſe; *That* our ſex, as well as theirs, are far from being ſuch perfect creatures as they are apt to imagine, and, *That* Love is not the only paſſion, which governs the male-world, but is often overcome by avarice, ambition, vanity, and a thouſand other paſſions. Whether they be the falſe repreſentations of mankind in thoſe two particulars, which endear romances and novels ſo much to the fair ſex, I know not; but muſt confeſs, that I am ſorry to ſee them have ſuch an averſion to matter of fact, and ſuch an appetite for falſhood. I remember I was once deſired by a young beauty, for whom I had ſome paſſion, to ſend her ſome novels and romances for her amuſement in the country; but was not ſo ungenerous as to take the advantage, which ſuch a courſe of reading might have given me, being reſolved not to make uſe of poiſoned arms againſt her. I therefore ſent her PLUTARCH's lives, aſſuring her, at the ſame time, that there was not a word of truth in them from beginning to end. She peruſed them very attentively, 'till ſhe came to the lives of ALEXANDER and CÆSAR, whoſe names ſhe had heard of by accident; and then returned me the book, with many reproaches for deceiving her.

I MAY indeed be told, that the fair ſex have no ſuch averſion to hiſtory, as I have repreſented, provided it be *ſecret* hiſtory, and contain ſome memorable tranſaction proper to excite their curioſity. But as I do not find that truth, which is the baſis of hiſtory, is at all regarded in thoſe anecdotes, I cannot admit of this as a proof of their paſſion for that ſtudy. However this may be, I ſee not why the ſame curioſity might not receive a more proper direction, and lead them to deſire accounts of thoſe who lived in paſt ages as well as of their contemporaries. What is it to CLEORA, whether FULVIA entertains a ſecret commerce of *Love* with PHILANDER or not? Has ſhe not equal reaſon to be pleaſed, when ſhe is informed, (what is whiſpered about among hiſtorians) that CATO's ſiſter had an intrigue with CÆSAR, and palmed her ſon, MARCUS BRUTUS, upon her huſband

for his own, tho' in reality, he was her gallant's? And are not the loves of MESSALINA or JULIA as proper ſubjects of diſcourſe as any intrigue that this city has produced of late years?

BUT I know not whence it comes, that I have been thus ſeduced into a kind of raillery againſt the ladies: Unleſs, perhaps, it proceed from the ſame cauſe, which makes the perſon, who is the favourite of the company, be often the object of their good-natured jeſts and pleaſantries. We are pleaſed to addreſs ourſelves after any manner to one, who is agreeable to us; and, at the ſame time, preſume, that nothing will be taken amiſs by a perſon, who is ſecure of the good opinion and affections of every one preſent. I ſhall now proceed to handle my ſubject more ſeriouſly, and ſhall point out the many advantages, which flow from the ſtudy of hiſtory, and ſhow how well ſuited it is to every one, but particularly to thoſe who are debarred the ſeverer ſtudies, by the tenderneſs of their complexion, and the weakneſs of their education. The advantages found in hiſtory ſeem to be of three kinds, as it amuſes the fancy, as it improves the underſtanding, and as it ſtrengthens virtue.

IN reality, what more agreeable entertainment to the mind, than to be tranſported into the remoteſt ages of the world, and to obſerve human ſociety, in its infancy, making the firſt faint eſſays towards the arts and ſciences: To ſee the policy of government, and the civility of converſation refining by degrees, and every thing which is ornamental to human life advancing towards its perfection. To remark the riſe, progreſs, declenſion and final extinction of the moſt flouriſhing empires: The virtues, which contributed to their greatneſs; and the vices, which drew on their ruin. In ſhort, to ſee all human race, from the beginning of time, paſs, as it were, in review before us; appearing in their true colours, without any of thoſe diſguiſes, which, during their life-time, ſo much perplexed the judgment of the beholders. What ſpectacle can be imagined ſo magnificent, ſo various, ſo intereſting? What amuſement, either of the ſenſes or imagination, can be compared with it? Shall thoſe trifling paſtimes, which engroſs ſo much of our time, be preferred as more ſatisfactory, and more fit to engage our attention? How perverſe muſt that taſte be, which is capable of ſo wrong a choice of pleaſures?

BUT hiſtory is a moſt improving part of knowlege, as well as an agreeable amuſement; and a great part of what we commonly call *Erudition*, and value ſo highly, is nothing but an acquaintance with hiſtorical facts. An extenſive knowlege of this kind, belongs to men of letters; but I muſt think it an unpardonable ignorance in perſons of whatever ſex or condition, not to be acquainted with the hiſtory of their own country, together with the hiſtories of ancient GREECE and ROME. A woman may behave herſelf with good manners, and have even ſome vivacity in her turn of wit; but where her mind is ſo unfurniſhed, 'tis impoſſible her converſation can afford any entertainment to men of ſenſe and reflection.

I MUST add, That hiſtory is not only a valuable part of knowlege, but opens the door to many other parts, and affords materials to moſt of the ſciences. And indeed, if we conſider the ſhortneſs of human life, and our limited knowlege, even of what paſſes in our own time, we muſt be ſenſible, that we ſhould be for ever children in underſtanding, were it not for this invention, which extends our experience to all paſt ages, and to the moſt diſtant nations; making them contribute

as much to our improvement in wiſdom, as if they had actually lain under our obſervation. A man acquainted with hiſtory may, in ſome reſpect, be ſaid to have lived from the beginning of the world, and to have been making continual additions to his ſtock of knowlege in every century.

THERE is alſo an advantage in that experience which is acquired by hiſtory, above what is learned by the practice of the world, that it brings us acquainted with human affairs, without diminiſhing in the leaſt from the moſt delicate ſentiments of virtue. And, to tell the truth, I know not any ſtudy or occupation ſo unexceptionable as hiſtory in this particular. Poets can paint virtue in the moſt charming colours; but, as they addreſs themſelves entirely to the paſſions, they often become advocates for vice. Even philoſophers are apt to bewilder themſelves in the ſubtilty of their ſpeculations; and we have ſeen ſome go ſo far as to deny the reality of all moral diſtinctions. But I think it a remark worthy the attention of the ſpeculative, that the hiſtorians have been, almoſt without exception, the true friends of virtue, and have always repreſented it in its proper colors, however they may have erred in their judgments of particular perſons. MACHIAVEL himſelf diſcovers a true ſentiment of virtue in his hiſtory of FLORENCE. When he talks as a *Politician*, in his general reaſonings, he conſiders poiſoning, aſſaſſination and perjury as lawful arts of power; but when he ſpeaks as an *Hiſtorian*, in his particular narrations, he ſhews ſo keen an indignation againſt vice, and ſo warm an approbation of virtue, in many paſſages, that I could not forbear applying to him that remark of HORACE, That if you chaſe away nature, tho' with ever ſo great indignity, ſhe will always return upon you. Nor is this combination of hiſtorians in favor of virtue at all difficult to be accounted for. When a man of buſineſs enters into life and action, he is more apt to conſider the characters of men, as they have relation to his intereſt, than as they ſtand in themſelves; and has his judgment warped on every occaſion by the violence of his paſſion. When a philoſopher contemplates characters and manners in his cloſet, the general abſtract view of the objects leaves the mind ſo cold and unmoved, that the ſentiments of nature have no room to play, and he ſcarce feels the difference between vice and virtue. Hiſtory keeps in a juſt medium betwixt theſe extremes, and places the objects in their true point of view. The writers of hiſtory, as well as the readers, are ſufficiently intereſted in the characters and events, to have a lively ſentiment of blame or praiſe; and, at the ſame time, have no particular intereſt or concern to pervert their judgment.

Veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Elliciuntur. LUCRET.

ESSAY VIII.

OF THE INDEPENDENCY OF PARLIAMENT.

I HAVE frequently obſerved, in comparing the conduct of the *court* and *country* parties, that the former are commonly leſs aſſuming and dogmatical in converſation, more apt to make conceſſions; and tho' not, perhaps, more ſuſceptible of conviction, yet more able to bear contradiction than the latter; who are apt to fly out upon any oppoſition, and to regard one as a mercenary deſigning fellow, if he argues with any coolneſs and impartiality, or makes any conceſſions to their adverſaries. This is a fact, which, I believe, every one may have obſerved, who has been much in companies where political queſtions have been diſcuſſed; tho' were one to aſk the reaſon of this difference, every party would be apt to aſſign a different one. Gentlemen in the *Oppoſition* will aſcribe it to the very nature of their party, which, being founded on public ſpirit, and a zeal for the conſtitution, cannot eaſily endure ſuch doctrines, as are of pernicious conſequence to liberty. The courtiers, on the other hand, will be apt to put us in mind of the clown mentioned by lord SHAFTSBURY. "A clown, ſays that * excellent author, once took a fancy to hear the *Latin* diſputes of doctors at an univerſity. He was aſked what pleaſure he could take in viewing ſuch combatants, when he could never know ſo much, as which of the parties had the better. *For that matter*, replied the clown, *I a'n't ſuch a fool neither, but I can ſee who's the firſt that puts t'other into a paſſion.* Nature herſelf dictated this leſſon to the clown, that he who had the better of the argument would be eaſy and well-humored: But he who was unable to ſupport his cauſe by reaſon, would naturally loſe his temper, and grow violent."

To which of theſe reaſons ſhall we adhere? To neither of them, in my opinion; unleſs we have a mind to inliſt ourſelves, and become zealots in either party. I believe I can aſſign the reaſon of this different conduct of the two parties, without offending either. The country party are plainly moſt popular at preſent, and, perhaps, have been ſo in moſt adminiſtrations: So that, being accuſtomed to prevail in company, they cannot endure to hear their opinions controverted, but are as confident on the public favor, as if they were ſupported in all their ſentiments by the moſt infallible demonſtration. The courtiers, on the other hand, are commonly ſo run down by popular talkers, that if you ſpeak to them with any moderation, or make them the ſmalleſt conceſſions, they think themſelves extremely beholden to you, and are apt to return the favor by a like moderation and facility on their part. To be furious and paſſionate, they know, would only gain them the character of *ſhameleſs mercenaries*; not that of *zealous patriots*, which is the character that ſuch a warm behavior is apt to acquire to the other party.

IN all controverſies, we find, without regarding the truth or falſhood on either ſide, that thoſe who defend the eſtabliſhed and popular opinions, are always the moſt dogmatical and imperious in their ſtile: While their adverſaries affect a moſt

* Miſcellaneous Reflections, p. 107.

extraordinary

extraordinary gentleneſs and moderation, in order to ſoften, as much as poſſible, any prejudices that may lye againſt them. Conſider the behaviour of our *free-thinkers* of all denominations, whether they be ſuch as decry all revelation, or only oppoſe the exorbitant power of the clergy; COLLINS, TINDAL, FOSTER, HOADLEY. Compare their moderation and good-manners, with the zeal and even ſcurrility of their adverſaries, and you will be convinced of the truth of my obſervation. A like difference may be obſerved in the conduct of thoſe FRENCH writers, who maintained the controverſy with regard to ancient and modern learning. BOILEAU, *Monſieur & Madame* DACIER, *l'Abbe de* BOS, who defended the party of the ancients, mixed their reaſonings with ſatyre and invective: While FONTENELLE, *la* MOTTE, CHARPENTIER, and even PERRAULT never tranſgreſſed the bounds of moderation and good-breeding; tho' provoked by the moſt ſevere railleries of their adverſaries.

I AM led into this train of reflection, by conſidering ſome papers wrote upon that grand topic of *court-influence, and parliamentary dependence*, where, in my humble opinion, the country party, beſides vehemence and ſatyre, ſhew too rigid an inflexibility, and too great a jealouſy of making conceſſions to their adverſaries. Their reaſonings loſe their force, by being carried too far; and the popularity of their opinions has ſeduced them to neglect, in ſome meaſure, their juſtneſs and ſolidity. The following reaſoning will, I hope, ſerve to juſtify me in this opinion.

POLITICAL writers have eſtabliſhed it as a maxim, That in contriving any ſyſtem of government, and fixing the ſeveral checks and controuls of the conſtitution, every man ought to be ſuppoſed a *knave*, and to have no other end, in all his actions, but private intereſt. By this intereſt we muſt govern him, and, by means of it, make him co-operate to public good, notwithſtanding his inſatiable avarice and ambition. Without this, ſay they, we ſhall in vain boaſt of the advantages of any conſtitution, and ſhall find, in the end, that we have no ſecurity for our liberties or poſſeſſions, except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we ſhall have no ſecurity at all.

'TIS therefore a juſt *political* maxim, *That every man muſt be ſuppoſed a knave:* Tho' at the ſame time, it appears ſomewhat ſtrange, that a maxim ſhould be true in *politics*, which is falſe in *fact*. But to ſatisfy us on this head, we may conſider, that men are generally more honeſt in their private than in their public character, and will go greater lengths to ſerve a party, than when their own private intereſt is alone concerned. Honor is a great check upon mankind: But where a conſiderable body of men act together, this check is, in a great meaſure, removed; ſince a man is ſure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common intereſt, and he ſoon learns to deſpiſe the clamors of his adverſaries. To which we may add, that every court or ſenate is determined by the majority; ſo that, if ſelf-intereſt influences only the majority, (as it will always do) the whole ſenate follows the allurements of this ſeparate intereſt, and acts as if it contained not one member, who had any regard to public intereſt and liberty.

WHEN there offers, therefore, to our cenſure, and examination, any plan of government, real or imaginary, where the power is diſtributed among ſeveral courts, and ſeveral orders of men, we ſhould always conſider the private intereſt of

of each court, and each order; and, if we find, that, by the ſkilful diviſion of the power, the private intereſt muſt neceſſarily, in its operation, concur with the public, we may pronounce that government to be wiſe and happy. If, on the contrary, the private intereſt of each order be not checked, and be not directed to public intereſt, we ought to look for nothing but faction, diſorder, and tyranny from ſuch a government. In this opinion I am juſtified by experience, as well as by the authority of all philoſophers and politicians both antient and modern.

How much, therefore, would it have ſurprized ſuch a genius as CICERO, or TACITUS, to have been told, That, in a future age, there ſhould ariſe a very regular ſyſtem of *mixt* government, where the authority was ſo diſtributed, that one rank, whenever it pleaſed, might ſwallow up all the reſt, and engroſs the whole power of the conſtitution. Such a government, they would ſay, will not be a mixed government. For ſo great is the natural ambition of men, that they are never ſatisfied with power; and if one order of men, by purſuing its own intereſt, can uſurp upon every other order, it will certainly do ſo, and render itſelf, as far as poſſible, abſolute and uncontrolable.

BUT, in this opinion, experience ſhews they would have been miſtaken. For this is actually the caſe with the BRITISH conſtitution. The ſhare of power allotted by our conſtitution to the houſe of commons is ſo great, that it abſolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The king's legiſlative power is plainly no proper check to it. For tho' the king has a negative in the paſſing of laws; yet this, in fact, is eſteemed of ſo little moment, that whatever is voted by the two houſes, is always ſure to be paſſed into a law, and the royal aſſent is little better than a mere form. The principal weight of the crown lies in the executive power. But beſides that the executive power, in every government, is altogether ſubordinate to the legiſlative; beſides this, I ſay, the exerciſe of this power requires an immenſe expence, and the commons have aſſumed to themſelves the ſole power of diſpoſing of public money. How eaſy, therefore, would it be for that houſe to wreſt from the crown all theſe powers, one after another, by making every grant of money conditional, and chooſing their time ſo well, that their refuſal of ſubſidies ſhould only diſtreſs the government; without giving foreign powers any advantage over us? Did the houſe of commons depend in the ſame manner on the king, and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would not he command all their reſolutions, and be from that moment abſolute? As to the houſe of lords, they are a very powerful ſupport to the crown ſo long as they are, in their turn, ſupported by it; but both experience and reaſon ſhew us, that they have no force nor authority ſufficient to maintain themſelves alone, without ſuch ſupport.

How, therefore, ſhall we ſolve this paradox? And by what means is this member of our conſtitution confined within the proper limits; ſince, from our very conſtitution, it muſt neceſſarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confined by itſelf? How is this conſiſtent with our experience of human nature? I anſwer, That the intereſt of the body is here reſtrained by the intereſt of the individuals, and that the houſe of commons ſtretches not its power, becauſe ſuch an uſurpation would be contrary to the intereſt of the majority of its members. The crown has ſo many offices at its diſpoſal, that, when aſſiſted by the honeſt

honeſt and diſintereſted part of the houſe, it will always command the reſolutions of the whole; ſo far at leaſt, as to preſerve the ancient conſtitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we pleaſe; we may call it by the invidious appellations of *corruption* and *dependence*; but ſome degree and ſome kind of it are inſeparable from the very nature of the conſtitution, and neceſſary to the preſervation of our mixed government.

INSTEAD then of aſſerting * abſolutely, that the dependence of parliament, in every degree, is an infringement of BRITISH liberty, the country-party had better have made ſome conceſſions to their adverſaries, and have only examined what was the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty. But ſuch a moderation is not to be expected of party-men of any kind. After a conceſſion of this nature, all declamation muſt be abandoned; and a ſerious calm enquiry into the proper degree of court-influence, and parliamentary dependence would have been expected by the readers. And tho' the advantage, in ſuch a controverſy, might poſſibly remain to the *country-party*; yet the victory would not have been ſo compleat as they wiſh for, nor would a true patriot have given an entire looſe to his zeal, for fear of running matters into a contrary extreme, by diminiſhing too † far the influence of the crown. It was, therefore, thought beſt to deny, that this extreme could ever be dangerous to the conſtitution, or that the crown could ever have too little influence over members of parliament.

ALL queſtions concerning the proper medium between any two extremes are very difficult to be decided; both becauſe it is difficult to find *words* proper to fix this medium, and becauſe the good and ill, in ſuch caſes, run ſo gradually into each other, as even to render our *ſentiments* doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the preſent caſe, which would embarraſs the moſt knowing and moſt impartial examiner. The power of the crown is always lodged in a ſingle perſon, either king or miniſter; and as this perſon may have either a greater or leſs degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity or fortune, the power, which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. In pure republics, where the power is diſtributed among ſeveral aſſemblies or ſenates, the checks and controls are more regular in their operation; becauſe the members of ſuch numerous aſſemblies may be preſumed to be always nearly equal in capacity and virtue; and 'tis only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into conſideration. But a limited monarchy admits not of any ſuch ſtability; nor is it poſſible to aſſign to the crown ſuch a determinate degree of power, as will, in every hand, form a proper counter-balance to the other parts of the conſtitution. This is an unavoidable diſadvantage, among the many advantages, attending that ſpecies of government.

* See *Diſſertation on Parties*, throughout.

† By that *influence of the crown*, which I would juſtify, I mean only, that ariſing from the offices and honours which are at the diſpoſal of the crown. As to private *bribery*, it may be conſidered in the ſame light as the practice of employing ſpies, which is ſcarce juſtifiable in a good miniſter, and is infamous in a bad one: But to be a ſpy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous under all miniſtries, and is to be regarded as a ſhameleſs proſtitution. POLYBIUS juſtly eſteems the pecuniary influence of the ſenate and cenſors to be one of the regular and conſtitutional weights, which preſerved the balance of the ROMAN government. Lib. 6. cap. 15.

ESSAY IX.

WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INCLINES MORE TO ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, OR TO A REPUBLIC.

IT affords a violent prejudice againſt almoſt every ſcience, that no prudent man, however ſure of his principles, dares propheſy concerning any event, or foretell the remote conſequences of things. A phyſician will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after: And ſtill leſs dares a politician foretell the ſituation of public affairs a few years hence. HARRINGTON thought himſelf ſo ſure of his general principle, *That the balance of power depends on that of property*, that he ventured to pronounce it impoſſible ever to re-eſtabliſh monarchy in ENGLAND: But his book was ſcarce publiſhed when the king was reſtored; and we ſee that monarchy has ever ſince ſubſiſted upon the ſame footing as before. Notwithſtanding this unlucky example, I will venture to examine a very important queſtion, *viz. Whether the* BRITISH *government inclines more to abſolute monarchy, or to a republic; and in which of theſe two ſpecies of government it will moſt probably terminate?* As there ſeems not to be any great danger of a ſudden revolution either way, I ſhall at leaſt eſcape the ſhame attending my temerity, if I ſhould be found to have been miſtaken.

THOSE who aſſert, That the balance of our government inclines towards abſolute monarchy, may ſupport their opinion by the following reaſons. That property has a great influence on power cannot poſſibly be denied; but yet the general maxim, *That the balance of the one depends upon the balance of the other*, muſt be received with ſeveral limitations. 'Tis evident, that much leſs property in a ſingle hand will be able to counter-balance a greater property in ſeveral hands; not only becauſe it is difficult to make many perſons combine in the ſame views and meaſures; but alſo becauſe property, when united, cauſes much greater dependence, than the ſame property when diſperſed. An hundred perſons, of 1000 *l.* a year a-piece, can conſume all their income, and no body ſhall ever be the better for them, except their ſervants and tradeſmen, who juſtly regard their profits as the product of their own labour. But a man poſſeſſed of 100,000 *l.* a year, if he has either any generoſity, or any cunning, may create a great dependence by obligations, and ſtill a greater by expectations. Hence we may obſerve, that in all free governments any ſubject exorbitantly rich has always created a jealouſy, even tho' his riches bore no manner of proportion to the riches of the ſtate. CRASSUS's fortune, if I remember well, amounted only to about * ſixteen hundred thouſand pounds in our money; and yet we find, that, tho' his genius was nothing extraordinary, he was able, by means of his riches alone, to counter-balance, during his life-time, the power of POMPEY as well as that of CÆSAR, who afterwards became maſter of the world. The wealth of the MEDICIS made them maſters of FLORENCE; tho', 'tis probable, it was very inconſiderable, compared to the united property of that opulent republic.

* As intereſt in ROME was higher than with us, this might yield above 100,000 *l.* a year.

THESE conſiderations are apt to make one entertain a very magnificent idea of the BRITISH ſpirit and love of liberty; ſince we could maintain our free government, during ſo many centuries, againſt our ſovereigns, who, beſides the power and dignity and majeſty of the crown, have always been poſſeſſed of much more property than any ſubject has ever enjoyed in any commonwealth. But it may be ſaid, that this ſpirit, however great, will never be able to ſupport itſelf againſt that immenſe property, which is now lodged in the king, and which is ſtill increaſing. Upon a moderate computation, there are near three millions at the diſpoſal of the crown. The civil liſt amounts to near a million; the collection of all taxes to another million; and the employments in the army and navy, together with eccleſiaſtical preferments, to above a third million: An enormous ſum, and what may fairly be computed to be more than a thirtieth part of the whole income and labour of the kingdom. When we add to this immenſe property, the increaſing luxury of the nation, our proneneſs to corruption, together with the great power and prerogatives of the crown, and the command of ſuch numerous military forces, there is no one but muſt deſpair of being able, without extraordinary efforts, to ſupport our free government much longer under all theſe diſadvantages.

ON the other hand, thoſe who maintain, that the byaſs of the BRITISH government leans towards a republic, may ſupport their opinion by very ſpecious arguments. It may be ſaid, that tho' this immenſe property in the crown, be joined to the dignity of firſt magiſtrate, and to many other legal powers and prerogatives, which ſhould naturally give it a greater influence; yet it really becomes leſs dangerous to liberty upon that very account. Were BRITAIN a republic, and were any private man poſſeſſed of a revenue, a third, or even a tenth part as large as that of the crown, he would very juſtly excite jealouſy; becauſe he would infallibly have great authority in the government: And ſuch an irregular authority, not avowed by the laws, is always more dangerous than a much greater authority, which is derived from them. A * man poſſeſſed of uſurped power, can ſet no bounds to his pretenſions: His partizans have liberty to hope for every thing in his favor: His enemies provoke his ambition, with his fears, by the violence of their oppoſition: And the government being thrown into a ferment, every corrupted humor in the ſtate naturally gathers to him. On the contrary, a legal authority, tho' very great, has always ſome bounds, which terminate both the hopes and pretenſions of the perſon poſſeſſed of it: the laws muſt have provided a remedy againſt its exceſſes: Such an eminent magiſtrate has much to fear, and little to hope from his uſurpations: And as his legal authority is quietly ſubmitted to, he has ſmall temptation and ſmall opportunity of extending it farther. Beſides, it happens, with regard to ambitious aims and projects, what may be obſerved with regard to ſects of philoſophy and religion. A new ſect excites ſuch a ferment, and is both oppoſed and defended with ſuch vehemence, that it ſpreads always faſter, and multiplies its partizans with greater rapidity, than any old eſtabliſhed opinion, recommended by the ſanction of the laws and of antiquity. Such is the nature of novelty, that where any thing pleaſes, it becomes doubly agreeable, if new; but if it diſpleaſes, it is doubly diſpleaſing, upon that very

* *On ne monte jamais ſi haut que quand on ne ſçait pas ou on va,* ſaid CROMWELL to the preſident DE BELLIEVRE. DE RETZ's Memoirs.

account. And, in moſt caſes, the violence of enemies is favorable to ambitious projects, as well as the zeal of partizans.

It may farther be ſaid, that tho' men be very much governed by intereſt; yet even intereſt itſelf, and all human affairs are entirely governed by *opinion*. Now, there has been a very ſudden and a very ſenſible change in the opinions of men within theſe laſt fifty years by the progreſs of learning and of liberty. Moſt people, in this iſland, have diveſted themſelves of all ſuperſtitious reverence to names and authority: The clergy have much loſt their credit: their pretenſions and doctrines have been ridiculed; and even religion can ſcarce ſupport itſelf in the world. The mere name of *king* commands little reſpect; and to talk of a king as GOD's vicegerent upon earth, or to give him any of thoſe magnificent titles, which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in every one. Tho' the crown, by means of its large revenue, may maintain its authority in times of tranquillity, upon private intereſt and influence; yet as the leaſt ſhock or convulſion muſt break all theſe intereſts to pieces, the kingly power, being no longer ſupported by the ſettled principles and opinions of men, will immediately diſſolve. Had men been in the ſame diſpoſition at the *revolution*, as they are at preſent, monarchy would have run a great riſque of being entirely loſt in this iſland.

Durst I venture to deliver my own ſentiments amidſt theſe oppoſite arguments, I would aſſert, that unleſs there happen ſome extraordinary convulſion, the power of the crown, by means of its large revenue, is rather upon the increaſe; tho', at the ſame time I own, that its progreſs ſeems very ſlow, and almoſt inſenſible. The tide has run long, and with ſome rapidity, to the ſide of popular government, and is juſt beginning to turn towards monarchy.

'Tis well known that every government muſt come to a period, and that death is unavoidable to the political as well as to the animal body. But, as one kind of death may be preferable to another, it may be enquired, whether it be more deſirable for the British conſtitution to terminate in a popular government, or in abſolute monarchy? Here I would declare frankly, that tho' liberty be infinitely preferable to ſlavery, in almoſt every caſe; yet I ſhould much rather wiſh to ſee an abſolute monarch than a republic in this iſland. For, let us conſider, what kind of republic we have reaſon to expect. The queſtion is not concerning any fine imaginary republic, of which a man may form a plan in his cloſet. There is no doubt, but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than abſolute monarchy, or even than our preſent conſtitution. But what reaſon have we to expect that any ſuch a government will ever be eſtabliſhed in Britain, upon the diſſolution of our monarchy? If any ſingle perſon acquire power enough to take our conſtitution to pieces, and put it up a-new, he is really an abſolute monarch; and we have had already an inſtance of this kind, ſufficient to convince us, that ſuch a perſon will never reſign his power, or eſtabliſh any free govetnment. Matters, therefore, muſt be truſted to their natural progreſs and operation; and the houſe of commons, according to its preſent conſtitution, muſt be the only legiſlature in ſuch a popular government. The inconveniences, attending ſuch a ſituation of affairs, preſent themſelves by thouſands. If the houſe of commons, in ſuch a caſe, ever diſſolves itſelf, which is not to be expected, we may look for a civil war every election. If it continues itſelf, we ſhall ſuffer all the tyranny of a faction, ſubdivided into new factions. And as ſuch a violent

government cannot long ſubſiſt, we ſhall, at laſt, after infinite convulſions, and civil wars, find repoſe in abſolute monarchy, which it would have been happier for us to have eſtabliſhed peaceably from the beginning. Abſolute monarchy, therefore, is the eaſieſt death, the true *Euthanaſia* of the BRITISH conſtitution.

THUS, if we have reaſon to be more jealous of monarchy, becauſe the danger is more imminent from that quarter; we have alſo reaſon to be more jealous of popular government, becauſe that danger is more terrible. This may teach us a leſſon of moderation in all our political controverſies.

ESSAY X.

OF PARTIES IN GENERAL.

OF all men, who diſtinguiſh themſelves by memorable atchievements, the firſt place of honor ſeems due to LEGISLATORS, and founders of ſtates, who tranſmit a ſyſtem of laws and inſtitutions to ſecure the peace, happineſs, and liberty of future generations. The influence of uſeful inventions in the arts and ſciences may, perhaps, extend farther than thoſe of wiſe laws, whoſe effects are limited both in time and place; but the benefit ariſing from the former is not ſo ſenſible as that which proceeds from the latter. Speculative ſciences do, indeed, improve the mind; but this advantage reaches only to a few perſons, who have leiſure to apply themſelves to them. And as to practical arts, which increaſe the commodities and enjoyments of life, 'tis well known, that mens happineſs conſiſt not ſo much in an abundance of theſe, as in the peace and ſecurity with which they poſſeſs them; and thoſe bleſſings can only be derived from good government. Not to mention, that general virtue and good morals in a ſtate, which are ſo requiſite to happineſs, can never ariſe from the moſt refined precepts of philoſophy, or even the ſevereſt injunctions of religion; but muſt proceed entirely from the virtuous education of the youth, the effect of wiſe laws and inſtitutions. I muſt, therefore, preſume to differ from my lord BACON in this particular, and muſt regard antiquity as ſomewhat unjuſt in its diſtribution of honor, when it made gods of all the inventors of uſeful arts, ſuch as CERES, BACCHUS, ÆSCULAPIUS; and dignified legiſlators, ſuch as ROMULUS and THESEUS, only with the appellation of demi-gods, and heroes.

As much as legiſlators and founders of ſtates ought to be honored and reſpected among men, as much ought the founders of ſects and factions to be deteſted and hated; becauſe the influence of factions is directly contrary to that of laws. Factions ſubvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fierceſt animoſities among men of the ſame nation, who ought to give mutual aſſiſtance and protection to each other. And what ſhould render the founders of parties more odious is, the difficulty of extirpating theſe parties, when once they have taken riſe in any ſtate. They naturally propagate themſelves for many centuries, and ſeldom end but by the total diſſolution of that government, in which they are planted. They are, beſides, ſeeds which grow moſt plentifully in the richeſt ſoils; and tho' deſpotic governments be not entirely free from them, it muſt be confeſſed, that

they riſe more eaſily, and propagate themſelves faſter in free governments, where they always infect the legiſlature itſelf, which alone could be able, by the ſteady application of rewards and puniſhments, to eradicate them.

FACTIONS or parties may be divided into PERSONAL and REAL; that is, into factions founded on perſonal friendſhip or animoſity among thoſe who compoſe the factions, and into thoſe founded on ſome real difference of ſentiment or intereſt. The reaſon of this diſtinction is obvious, tho' I muſt acknowlege, that parties are ſeldom found pure and unmixt, either of the one kind or the other. 'Tis not often ſeen, that a government divides into factions, where there is no difference in the views of theſe factions, either real or apparent, trivial or material: And in thoſe factions, which are founded on the moſt real and moſt material difference, there is always obſerved to be a great deal of perſonal animoſity or affection. But notwithſtanding this mixture, a party may be denominated either perſonal or real, according to that principle which is predominant, and is found to have the greateſt influence.

PERSONAL factions ariſe moſt eaſily in ſmall republics. Every domeſtic quarrel becomes an affair of ſtate. Love, vanity, emulation, any paſſion begets public diviſion, as well as ambition and reſentment. The NERI and BIANCHI of FLORENCE, the FREGOSI and ADORNI of GENOA, the COLONNESI and ORSINI of modern ROME, were parties of this kind.

MEN have ſuch a propenſity to divide into perſonal factions, that the ſmalleſt appearance of real difference will produce them. What can be imagined more trivial than the difference between one color of livery and another in horſe-races? Yet this difference begot two moſt inveterate factions in the GREEK empire, the PRASINI and VENETI, who never ſuſpended their animoſities, till they ruined that unhappy government.

WE find in the ROMAN hiſtory a very remarkable faction betwixt two tribes, the POLLIA and PAPIRIA, which continued for the ſpace of near three hundred years, and diſcovered itſelf in their ſuffrages at every election of magiſtrates *. This faction was the more remarkable, that it could continue for ſo long a tract of time; even tho' it did not ſpread itſelf, nor draw any of the other tribes into a ſhare of the quarrel. If mankind had not a ſtrong propenſity to ſuch diviſions, the indifference of the reſt of the community muſt have ſuppreſſed this fooliſh animoſity, that had not any aliment of new benefits and injuries, of ſympathy and antipathy, which never fail to take place, when the whole ſtate is rent into two equal factions.

NOTHING is more uſual than to ſee parties, which have begun upon a real difference, continue even after that difference is loſt. When men are once inliſted

* As this fact has not been much obſerved by antiquaries or politicians, I ſhall deliver it in the words of the ROMAN hiſtorian. *Populus* TUSCULANUS *cum conjugibus ac liberis* ROMAM *venit: Ea multitudo, veſte mutata, & ſpecie reorum tribus circuit, genibus ſe omnium advolvens. Plus itaque miſericordia ad pœnæ veniam impetrandam, quam cauſa ad crimen purgandum valuit. Tribus omnes, præter* POLLIAM, *antiquarunt legem.* POLLIÆ *ſententia fuit, puberes verberatos necari, liberos conjugeſque ſub corona lege belli venire: Memoriamque ejus iræ* TUSCULANIS *in pœnæ tam atrocis auctores manſiſſe ad patris ætatem conſtat; nec quemquam fere ex* POLLIA *tribu candidatum* PAPIRIAM *ferre ſolitam.* T. LIVII, lib. 8. The CASTELANI and NICOLLOTTI are two mobbiſh factions in VENICE, who frequently box together, and then lay aſide their quarrels preſently.

on

on oppoſite ſides, they contract an affection to the perſons with whom they are united, and an animoſity againſt their antagoniſts: And theſe paſſions they often tranſmit to their poſterity. The real difference between GUELF and GHIBBELLINE was long loſt in ITALY, before theſe factions were extinguiſhed. The GUELFS adhered to the pope, the GHIBBELLINES to the emperor; and yet the family of SFORSA, who were in alliance with the emperor, tho' they were GUELFS, being expelled MILAN by the king * of FRANCE, aſſiſted by JACOMO TRIVULZIO and the GHIBBELLINES, the pope concurred with the latter, and they formed leagues with the pope againſt the emperor.

THE civil wars which aroſe ſome few years ago in MOROCCO, betwixt the *blacks* and *whites*, merely on account of their complexion, are founded on a very pleaſant difference. We laugh at them; but I believe, were things rightly examined, we afford much more occaſion of ridicule to the MOORS. For, what are all the wars of religion, which have prevailed in this polite and knowing part of the world? They are certainly more abſurd than the MOORISH civil wars. The difference of complexion is a ſenſible and a real difference: But the difference about an article of faith, which is utterly abſurd and unintelligible, is not a difference of ſentiments, but only a difference of a few phraſes and expreſſions, which one party accepts of, without underſtanding them; and the other refuſes, in the ſame manner. Beſides, I do not find, that the *whites* in MOROCCO ever impoſed on the *blacks* any neceſſity of altering their complexion, or threatened them with inquiſitions and penal laws in caſe of obſtinacy: Nor have the *blacks* been more unreaſonable in this particular. But is a man's opinion, where he is able to form a real opinion, more at his diſpoſal than his complexion? And can one be induced by force or fear to do more than paint and diſguiſe in the one caſe as well as in the other?

REAL factions may be divided into factions from *intereſt*, from *principle*, and from *affection*. Of all factions, thoſe from intereſt are the moſt reaſonable, and the moſt excuſable. Where two orders of men, ſuch as the nobles and people, have a diſtinct authority in a government, which is not very accurately balanced and modelled, they naturally follow a diſtinct intereſt: nor can we reaſonably expect a different conduct from that degree of ſelfiſhneſs, which is implanted in human nature. It requires very great ſkill in a legiſlator to prevent ſuch factions; and many philoſophers are of opinion, that this ſecret, like the *grand elixir*, or *perpetual motion*, may amuſe men in theory, but can never poſſibly be reduced to practice. In deſpotic governments, indeed, factions often do not appear; but they are never the leſs real; or rather, they are more real and more pernicious, upon that very account. The diſtinct orders of men, nobles and people, ſoldiers and merchants, have all a diſtinct intereſt; but the more powerful oppreſſes the weaker with impunity, and without reſiſtance; which begets a ſeeming tranquillity in ſuch governments.

THERE has been an attempt to divide the *landed* and *trading* intereſt in *England*; but without ſucceſs. The intereſt of theſe two bodies is not really diſtinct, and never will be ſo, till our public debts increaſe to ſuch a degree, as to become altogether oppreſſive and intolerable.

* LEWIS XII.

PARTIES

PARTIES from *principles*, eſpecially abſtract ſpeculative principles, are known only to modern times, and are, perhaps, the moſt extraordinary and unaccountable *phænomenon*, which has ever yet appeared in human affairs. Where different principles beget a contrariety of conduct, which is the caſe with all different political principles, the matter may be more eaſily explained. A man, who eſteems the true right of government to lie in one man, or one family, cannot eaſily agree with his fellow-citizen, who thinks, that another man or family is poſſeſſed of this right. Each naturally wiſhes that right may take place, according to his own notions of it. But where the difference of principles is attended with no contrariety of action, but each may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbor, as happens in all religious controverſies; what madneſs, what fury can beget ſuch unhappy and ſuch fatal diviſions?

Two men, travelling on the highway, the one eaſt, the other weſt, can eaſily paſs each other, if the way be broad enough: But two men, reaſoning upon oppoſite principles of religion, cannot ſo eaſily paſs, without ſhocking; tho' one ſhould think, that the way were alſo, in that caſe, ſufficiently broad, and that each might proceed, without interruption, in his own courſe. But ſuch is the nature of the human mind, that it always takes hold of every mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully fortified and corroborated by an unanimity of ſentiments, ſo it is ſhocked and diſturbed by any contrariety. Hence the eagerneſs, which moſt people diſcover in a diſpute; and hence their impatience of oppoſition, even in the moſt ſpeculative and indifferent opinions.

THIS principle, however frivolous it may appear, ſeems to have been the origin of all religious wars and diviſions. But, as this principle is univerſal in human nature, its effects would not have been confined to one age, and to one ſect of religion, did it not there concur with other more accidental cauſes, which raiſe it to ſuch a height, as to produce the higheſt miſery and devaſtation. Moſt religions of the ancient world aroſe in the unknown ages of government, when men were as yet barbarous and uninſtructed, and the prince, as well as peaſant, was diſpoſed to receive, with implicite faith, every pious tale or fiction which was offered him. The magiſtrate embraced the religion of the people, and entering cordially into the care of ſacred matters, naturally acquired an authority in them, and united the eccleſiaſtical with the civil power. But the *Chriſtian* religion ariſing, while principles directly oppoſite to it were firmly eſtabliſhed in the polite part of the world, who deſpiſed the nation that firſt broached this novelty; no wonder, that in ſuch circumſtances, it was but little countenanced by the civil magiſtrate, and that the prieſthood were allowed to engroſs all the authority in the new ſect. So bad a uſe did they make of this power, even in thoſe early times, that the perſecutions of Chriſtianity may, perhaps * *in part*, be aſcribed

* I ſay, *in part*; For 'tis a vulgar error to imagine, that the ancients were as great friends to toleration as the ENGLISH or DUTCH are at preſent. The laws againſt external ſuperſtition, amongſt the ROMANS, were as ancient as the time of the twelve tables; and the JEWS as well as CHRISTIANS were ſometimes puniſhed by them: tho', in general, theſe laws were not rigorouſly executed. Immediately after the conqueſt of GAUL, they forbad all but the natives to be initiated into the religion of the DRUIDS; and this was a kind of perſecution. In about a century after this conqueſt, the emperor, CLAUDIUS, quite aboliſhed that ſuperſtition by penal laws; which would have been a very grievous perſecution, if the imitation of the ROMAN manners had not, before-hand, weaned the

aſcribed to the violence inſtilled by them into their followers. And the ſame principles of prieſtly government continuing, after Chriſtianity became the eſtabliſhed religion, they have engendered a ſpirit of perſecution, which has ever ſince been the poiſon of human ſociety, and the ſource of the moſt inveterate factions in every government. Such factions, therefore, on the part of the people, may juſtly be eſteemed factions of *principle*; but, on the part of the prieſts, who are the prime movers, they are really factions of *intereſt*.

THERE is another cauſe (beſide the authority of the prieſts, and the ſeparation of the eccleſiaſtical and civil powers) which has contributed to render CHRISTENDOM the ſcene of religious wars and diviſions. Religions, that ariſe in ages totally ignorant and barbarous, conſiſt moſtly of traditional tales and fictions, which may be very different in every ſect, without being contrary to each other; and even when they are contrary, every one adheres to the tradition of his own ſect, without much reaſoning or diſputation. But as philoſophy was widely ſpread over the world, at the time when Chriſtianity aroſe, the teachers of the new ſect were obliged to form a ſyſtem of ſpeculative opinions; to divide, with ſome accuracy, their articles of faith; and to explain, comment, confute, and confirm with all the ſubtilty of argument and ſcience. From hence naturally aroſe keenneſs in diſpute, when the chriſtian religion came to be ſplit into new diviſions and hereſies: And this keenneſs aſſiſted the prieſts in their pernicious policy, of begetting a mutual hatred and antipathy among their deluded followers. Sects of philoſophy, in the ancient world, were more zealous than parties of religion; but, in modern times, parties of religion are more furious and enraged than the moſt cruel factions which ever aroſe from intereſt and ambition.

I HAVE mentioned parties from *affection* as a kind of *real* parties, beſide thoſe from *intereſt* and *principle*. By parties from affection, I underſtand thoſe which are founded on the different affections of men towards particular families and perſons, whom they deſire to rule over them. Theſe parties are often very violent; tho', I muſt own, it is ſomewhat unaccountable, that men ſhould attach themſelves ſo ſtrongly to perſons, with whom they are no way acquainted, whom perhaps they never ſaw, and from whom they never received, nor can ever hope for any favor. Yet this we find often to be the caſe, and even with men, who, on other occaſions, diſcover no great generoſity of ſpirit, nor are found to be eaſily tranſported by friendſhip beyond their own intereſt. We are apt, I know not how, to think the relation betwixt us and our ſovereign very cloſe and intimate. The ſplendor of majeſty and power beſtows an importance on the fortunes even of a ſingle perſon. And when a man's good-nature gives him not this imaginary intereſt, his ill-nature will, from ſpite and oppoſition to perſons whoſe ſentiments are different from his own,

the GAULS from their ancient prejudices. SUETONIUS *in vitâ* CLAUDII. PLINY aſcribes the abolition of the Druid ſuperſtitions to TIBERIUS, probably becauſe that emperor had taken ſome ſteps towards reſtraining them, (lib. 30. cap. 1.) This is an inſtance of the uſual caution and moderation of the ROMANS in ſuch caſes; and very different from their violent and ſanguinary method of treating the *Chriſtians*. Hence we may entertain a ſuſpicion, that thoſe furious perſecutions of *Chriſtianity* were, in ſome meaſure, owing to the imprudent zeal and bigotry of the firſt propagators of that ſect; and Eccleſiaſtical hiſtory affords us many reaſons to confirm this ſuſpicion.

ESSAY XI.

OF THE PARTIES OF GREAT BRITAIN.

WERE the BRITISH government propoſed as a ſubject of ſpeculation to a ſtudious man, he would immediately perceive in it a ſource of diviſion and party, which it would be almoſt impoſſible for it, under any adminiſtration, to avoid. The juſt balance between the republican and monarchical part of our conſtitution is really, in itſelf, ſo extremely delicate and uncertain, that when joined to mens paſſions and prejudices, 'tis impoſſible but different opinions muſt ariſe concerning it, even among perſons of the beſt underſtanding. Thoſe of mild tempers, who love peace and order, and deteſt ſedition and civil wars, will always entertain more favourable ſentiments of monarchy, than men of bold and generous ſpirits, who are paſſionate lovers of liberty, and think no evil comparable to ſubjection and ſlavery. And tho' all reaſonable men agree in general to preſerve our mixed government; yet when they come to particulars, ſome will incline to truſt larger powers to the crown, to beſtow on it more influence, and to guard againſt its encroachments with leſs caution, than others who are terrified at the moſt diſtant approaches of tyranny and deſpotic power. Thus are there parties of PRINCIPLE involved in the very nature of our conſtitution, which may properly enough be denominated thoſe of † COURT and COUNTRY. The ſtrength and violence of each of theſe parties will much depend upon the particular adminiſtration. An adminiſtration may be ſo bad, as to throw a great majority into the oppoſition; as a good adminiſtration will reconcile to the court many of the moſt paſſionate lovers of liberty. But, however the nation may fluctuate betwixt them, the parties themſelves will always ſubſiſt, ſo long as we are governed by a limited monarchy.

BUT, beſides this difference of *Principle*, thoſe parties are very much fomented by a difference of INTEREST, without which they could ſcarce ever be dangerous or violent. The crown will naturally beſtow all its truſt and power upon thoſe, whoſe principles, real or pretended, are moſt favorable to monarchical government; and this temptation will naturally engage them to go greater lengths than their principles would otherwiſe carry them. Their antagoniſts, who are diſappointed in their ambitious aims, throw themſelves into the party whoſe principles incline them to be moſt jealous of royal power, and naturally carry thoſe principles to a greater length than ſound politics will juſtify. Thus, the *Court* and *Country*-parties, which are the genuine offſpring of the BRITISH government, are a kind of mixt parties, and are influenced both by principle and by

† Theſe words have become of general uſe, and therefore I ſhall employ them, without intending to expreſs by them an univerſal blame of the one party, or approbation of the other. The court-party may, no doubt, on ſome occaſions conſult beſt the intereſt of the country, and the country-party oppoſe it. In like manner, the ROMAN parties were denominated *Optimates* and *Populares*; and CICERO, like a true party-man, defines the *Optimates* to be ſuch as, in all their public conduct, regulated themſelves by the ſentiments of the beſt and worthieſt of the ROMANS: *Pro Sextio, cap.* 45. The term of *Country-party* may afford a favorable definition or etymology of the ſame kind: But it would be folly to draw any argument from that head, and I have no regard to it in employing theſe terms.

intereſt. The heads of the factions are commonly moſt governed by the latter motive; the inferior members of them by the former. I muſt be underſtood to mean this of perſons who have motives for taking party on any ſide. For, to tell the truth, the greateſt part are commonly men who aſſociate themſelves they know not why; from example, from paſſion, from idleneſs. But ſtill it is requiſite, that there be ſome ſource of diviſion, either in principle or intereſt; otherwiſe ſuch perſons would not find parties, to which they could aſſociate themſelves.

As to eccleſiaſtical parties; we may obſerve, that, in all ages of the world, prieſts have been enemies to liberty *, and 'tis certain, that this ſteady conduct of theirs muſt have been founded on fixt reaſons of intereſt and ambition. Liberty of thinking, and of expreſſing our thoughts, is always fatal to prieſtly power, and to thoſe pious frauds, on which it is commonly founded; and, by an infallible connexion, which prevails among every ſpecies of liberty, this privilege can never be enjoyed, at leaſt, has never yet been enjoyed, but in a free government. Hence it muſt happen, in ſuch a government as that of BRITAIN, that the eſtabliſhed clergy, while things are in their natural ſituation, will always be of the *Court*-part; as, on the contrary, diſſenters of all kinds will be of the *Country*-party; ſince they can never hope for that toleration, which they ſtand in need of, but by means of our free government. All princes, who have aimed at deſpotic power, have known of what importance it was to gain the eſtabliſhed clergy: As the clergy, on their ſide, have ſhewn a great facility of entering into the views of ſuch princes †. GUSTAVUS VAZA was, perhaps, the only ambitious monarch, that ever depreſſed the church, at the ſame time, that he diſcouraged liberty. But the exorbitant power of the biſhops in SWEDEN, who, at that time, overtopped the crown, together with their attachment to a foreign family, was the reaſon of his embracing ſuch an unuſual ſyſtem of politics.

THIS obſervation concerning the propenſity of prieſts to deſpotic power, and to the government of a ſingle perſon, is not true with regard to one ſect only. The *Preſbyterian* and *Calviniſtic* clergy in HOLLAND were always profeſſed friends to the family of ORANGE; as the *Arminians*, who were eſteemed heretics, were always of the LOUVESTEIN faction, and zealous for liberty. But if a prince has the choice of both, 'tis eaſy to ſee, that he will prefer the epiſcopal to the preſbyterian form of government, both becauſe of the greater affinity between monarchy and epiſcopacy, and becauſe of the facility which a prince finds, in ſuch a government, of ruling the clergy, by means of their eccleſiaſtical ſuperiors ‡.

IF we conſider the firſt riſe of parties in ENGLAND, during the civil wars, we ſhall find, that it was exactly conformable to this general theory, and that the

* This propoſition is true, notwithſtanding, that in the early times of the ENGLISH government, the clergy were the great and principal oppoſers of the crown: But, at that time, their poſſeſſions were ſo immenſely great, that they compoſed a conſiderable part of the proprietors of ENGLAND, and in many conteſts were direct rivals of the crown.

† Judæi ſibi ipſi reges impoſuere; qui mobilitate vulgi expulſi, reſumpta per arma dominatione; fugas civium, urbium everſiones, fratrum, conjugum, parentum neces, aliaque ſolita regibus auſi, ſuperſtitionem fovebant; quia honor ſacerdotii firmamentum potentiæ aſſumebatur. TACIT. *hiſt. lib.* 5.

‡ Populi imperium juxta libertatem: paucorum dominatio regiæ libidini propior eſt. TACIT. *Ann. lib.* 6.

ſpecies

ſpecies of government gave birth to theſe parties, by a regular and infallible operation. The ENGLISH conſtitution, before that time, had lain in a kind of confuſion; yet ſo, as that the ſubjects poſſeſſed many noble privileges, which, tho' not, perhaps, exactly bounded and ſecured by law, were univerſally deemed, from long poſſeſſion, to belong to them as their birth-right. An ambitious, or rather an ignorant, prince aroſe, who eſteemed all theſe privileges to be conceſſions of his predeceſſors, revocable at pleaſure; and, in proſecution of this principle, he openly acted in violation of liberty, during the courſe of ſeveral years. Neceſſity, at laſt, conſtrained him to call a parliament: the ſpirit of liberty aroſe and ſpred itſelf: The prince, being without any ſupport, was obliged to grant every thing required of him: And his enemies, jealous and implacable, ſet no bounds to their pretenſions. Here then began thoſe conteſts, in which it was no wonder, that men of that age were divided into different parties; ſince, even at this day, the impartial are at a loſs to decide concerning the juſtice of the quarrel. The pretenſions of the parliament, if yielded to, broke the balance of our conſtitution, by rendering the government almoſt intirely republican. If not yielded to, we were, perhaps, ſtill in danger of deſpotic power, from the ſettled principles and inveterate habits of the king, which had plainly appeared in every conceſſion that he had been conſtrained to make to his people. In this queſtion, ſo delicate and uncertain, men naturally fell to the ſide which was moſt conformable to their uſual principles; and thoſe, who were the moſt paſſionate favorers of monarchy, declared for the king, as the zealous friends of liberty ſided with the parliament. The hopes of ſucceſs being nearly equal on both ſides, *intereſt* had no general influence in this conteſt: So that ROUND-HEAD and CAVALIER were merely parties of principle; neither of which diſowned either monarchy or liberty; but the former party inclined moſt to the republican part of our government, and the latter to the monarchical. In this reſpect they may be conſidered as court and country-party enflamed into a civil war, by an unhappy concurrence of circumſtances, and by the turbulent ſpirit of the age. The commonwealth's men, and the partizans of deſpotic power, lay concealed in both parties, and formed but an inconſiderable part of them.

THE clergy had concurred with the king's arbitrary deſigns, according to their uſual maxims in ſuch caſes: And, in return, were allowed to perſecute their adverſaries, whom they called heretics and ſchiſmatics. The eſtabliſhed clergy were epiſcopal; the non-conformiſts preſbyterian: So that all things concurred to throw the former, without reſerve, into the king's party; and the latter into that of the parliament. The *Cavaliers* being the court-party, and the *Roundheads* the country-party, the union was infallible between the former and the eſtabliſhed prelacy, and between the latter and preſbyterian non-conformiſts. This union is ſo natural, according to the general principles of politics, that it requires ſome very extraordinary ſituation of affairs to break it.

EVERY one knows the event of this quarrel; fatal to the king firſt, and to the parliament afterwards. After many confuſions and revolutions, the royal family was at laſt reſtored, and the government eſtabliſhed on the ſame footing as before. CHARLES II. was not made wiſer by the example of his father; but proſecuted the ſame meaſures, tho' at firſt, with more ſecrecy and caution. New parties aroſe, under the appellations of *Whig* and *Tory*, which have continued ever ſince to

confound and diſtract our government. What the nature is of theſe parties, is, perhaps, one of the moſt difficult queſtions, which can be met with, and is a proof, that hiſtory may contain problems, as uncertain as any, which are to be found in the moſt abſtract ſciences. We have ſeen the conduct of theſe two parties, during the courſe of ſeventy years, in a vaſt variety of circumſtances, poſſeſſed of power, and deprived of it, during peace and during war: Perſons, who profeſs themſelves of one ſide or other, we meet every hour, in company, in our pleaſures, in our ſerious occupations: We ourſelves are conſtrained, in a manner, to take party; and living in a country of the higheſt liberty, every one may openly declare all his ſentiments and opinions: And yet we are at a loſs to tell the nature, pretenſions, and principles of the two parties. The queſtion is, perhaps, in itſelf, ſomewhat difficult; but has been rendered more ſo, by the prejudice and violence of party.

When we compare the parties of WHIG and TORY, to thoſe of ROUND-HEAD and CAVALIER, the moſt obvious difference, which appears betwixt them, conſiſts in the principles of *paſſive obedience*, and *indefeaſible right*, which were but little heard of among the CAVALIERS, but became the univerſal doctrine, and were eſteemed the true characteriſtic of a TORY. Were theſe principles puſhed into their moſt obvious conſequences, they imply a formal renunciation of all our liberties, and an avowal of abſolute monarchy; ſince nothing can be a greater abſurdity than a limited power, which muſt not be reſiſted, even when it exceeds its limitations. But as the moſt rational principles are often but a weak counterpoiſe to paſſion; 'tis no wonder, that theſe abſurd principles, *ſufficient*, according to a celebrated * author, *to ſhock the common ſenſe of a* HOTTENTOT or SAMOIEDE, were found too weak for that effect. The TORIES, as men, were enemies to oppreſſion; and alſo, as ENGLISHMEN, they were enemies to deſpotic power. Their zeal for liberty, was, perhaps, leſs fervent than that of their antagoniſts; but was ſufficient to make them forget all their general principles, when they ſaw themſelves openly threatened with a ſubverſion of the antient government. From theſe ſentiments aroſe the *revolution*; an event of mighty conſequence, and the firmeſt foundation of BRITISH liberty. The conduct of the TORIES, during that event, and after it, will affords us a true inſight into the nature of that party.

IN the *firſt* place, They appear to have had the ſentiments of true BRITONS in their affection to liberty, and in their determined reſolution not to ſacrifice it to any abſtract principles whatſoever, or to any imaginary rights of princes. This part of their character might juſtly have been doubted of before the *revolution*, from the obvious tendency of their avowed principles, and from their great compliances with a court, which made little ſecret of its arbitrary deſigns. The *revolution* ſhewed them to have been, in this reſpect, nothing but a genuine *court-party*, ſuch as might be expected in a BRITISH government: That is, *Lovers of liberty, but greater lovers of monarchy*. It muſt, however, be confeſſed, that they carried their monarchical principles further, even in practice, but more ſo in theory, than was, in any degree, conſiſtent with a limited government.

Secondly, NEITHER their principles nor affections concurred, entirely or heartily, with the ſettlement made at the *revolution*, or with that which has ſince taken

* Diſſertation on parties, *Letter* 2d.

place. This part of their character may ſeem contradictory to the former; ſince any other ſettlement, in thoſe circumſtances of the nation, muſt probably have been dangerous, if not fatal to liberty. But the heart of man is made to reconcile contradictions; and this contradiction is not greater than that betwixt *paſſive obedience*, and the *reſiſtance* employed at the *revolution*. A TORY, therefore, ſince the *revolution*, may be defined in a few words, to be *a lover of monarchy, tho' without abandoning liberty; and a partizan of the family of* STUART. As a WHIG may be defined to be *a lover of liberty, tho' without renouncing monarchy; and a friend to the ſettlement in the* PROTESTANT *line* *.

THESE different views, with regard to the ſettlement of the crown, were accidental, but natural additions to the principles of the *court* and *country* parties, which are the genuine parties of the BRITISH government. A paſſionate lover of monarchy is apt to be diſpleaſed at any change of the ſucceſſion; as ſavoring too much of a commonwealth: A paſſionate lover of liberty, is apt to think that every part of the government ought to be ſubordinate to the intereſts of liberty. 'Tis however remarkable, that tho' the principles of WHIG and TORY were both of them of a compound nature; yet the ingredients, which predominated in both, were not correſpondent to each other. A TORY loved monarchy, and bore an affection to the family of STUART; but the latter affection was the predominant inclination of the party. A WHIG loved liberty, and was a friend to the ſettlement in the PROTESTANT line; but the love of liberty was profeſſedly his predominant inclination. The TORIES have frequently acted as republicans, where either policy or revenge has engaged them to that conduct; and there was no one of

* The author above cited has aſſerted, that the REAL diſtinction betwixt WHIG and TORY was loſt at the *revolution*, and that ever ſince they have continued to be mere *perſonal* parties, like the GUELFS and GIBBELINES, after the emperors had loſt all authority in ITALY. Such an opinion, were it received, would turn our whole hiſtory into an enigma.

I ſhall firſt mention, as a proof of a real diſtinction betwixt theſe parties, what every one may have obſerved or heard concerning the conduct and converſation of all his friends and acquaintance on both ſides. Have not the TORIES always bore an avowed affection to the family of STUART, and have not their adverſaries always oppoſed with vigor the ſucceſſion of that family?

The TORY principles are confeſſedly the moſt favorable to monarchy. Yet the tories have almoſt always oppoſed the court theſe fifty years; nor where they cordial friends to king WILLIAM, even when employed by him. Their quarrel, therefore, cannot be ſuppoſed to have lain with the throne, but with the perſon who ſat on it.

They concurred heartily with the court during the four laſt years of queen ANNE. But is any one at a loſs to find the reaſon?

The ſucceſſion of the crown in the BRITISH government is a point of too great conſequence to be abſolutely indifferent to perſons, who concern themſelves, in any degree, about the fortune of the public; much leſs can it be ſuppoſed, that the TORY party, who never valued themſelves upon moderation, could maintain a *ſtoical* indifference in a point of ſuch importance. Were they, therefore, zealous for the houſe of HANOVER? Or was there any thing, that kept an oppoſite zeal from openly appearing, if it did not openly appear, but prudence, and a ſenſe of decency?

'Tis monſtrous to ſee an eſtabliſhed epiſcopal clergy in declared oppoſition to the court, and a non-conformiſt preſbyterian clergy in conjunction with it. What could have produced ſuch an unnatural conduct in both? Nothing, but that the former eſpouſed monarchical principles too high for the preſent ſettlement, which is founded on principles of liberty: And the latter, being afraid of the prevalence of thoſe high principles, adhered to that party, from whom they had reaſon to expect liberty and toleration.

The different conduct of the two parties, with regard to foreign politics, is alſo a proof to the ſame purpoſe. HOLLAND has always been moſt favoured by one, and FRANCE by the other. In ſhort, the proofs of this kind ſeem ſo palpable and evident, that 'tis almoſt needleſs to collect them.

that

that party, who, upon the ſuppoſition, that he was to be diſappointed in his views with regard to the ſucceſſion, would not have deſired to impoſe the ſtricteſt limitations on the crown, and to bring our form of government as near republican as poſſible, in order to depreſs the family, which, according to his apprehenſion, ſucceeded without any juſt title. The WHIGS, 'tis true, have alſo taken ſteps dangerous to liberty, under color of ſecuring the ſucceſſion and ſettlement of the crown, according to their views: But as the body of the party had no paſſion for that ſucceſſion, otherwiſe than as the means of ſecuring liberty, they have been betrayed into theſe ſteps by ignorance or frailty, or the intereſts of their leaders. The ſucceſſion of the crown was, therefore, the chief point with the TORIES: The ſecurity of our liberties with the WHIGS. Nor is this ſeeming irregularity at all difficult to be accounted for, by our preſent theory. *Court* and *country* parties are the true parents of TORY and WHIG. But 'tis almoſt impoſſible, that the attachment of the *court* party to monarchy ſhould not degenerate into an attachment to the monarch; there being ſo cloſe a connexion betwixt them, and the latter being ſo much the more natural object. How eaſily does the worſhip of the divinity degenerate into a worſhip of the idol? The connexion is not ſo great betwixt liberty, the divinity of the old *country* party or WHIGS, and any monarch or royal family; nor is it ſo reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that in that party, the worſhip can ſo eaſily be transferred from the one to the other. Tho' even that would be no great miracle.

'TIS difficult to penetrate into the thoughts and ſentiments of any particular man; but 'tis almoſt impoſſible to diſtinguiſh thoſe of a whole party, where it often happens, that no two perſons agree preciſely in the ſame maxims of conduct. Yet I will venture to affirm, that it was not ſo much PRINCIPLE, or an opinion of indefeaſible right, which attached the TORIES to the antient royal family, as AFFECTION, or a certain love and eſteem for their perſons. The ſame cauſe divided ENGLAND formerly between the houſes of YORK and LANCASTER, and SCOTLAND between the families of BRUCE and BALIOL; in an age, when political diſputes were but little in faſhion, and when political *principles* muſt of courſe have had but little influence on mankind. The doctrine of paſſive obedience is ſo abſurd in itſelf, and ſo oppoſite to our liberties, that it ſeems to have been chiefly left to pulpit-declaimers, and to their deluded followers among the vulgar. Men of better ſenſe were guided by *affection*; and as to the leaders of this party, 'tis probable, that *intereſt* was their chief motive, and that they acted more contrary to their private ſentiments, than the leaders of the oppoſite party. Tho' 'tis almoſt impoſſible to maintain with zeal the right of any perſon or family, without acquiring a good-will to them, and changing the *principle* into *affection*; yet this is leſs natural to people of an elevated ſtation and liberal education, who have had full opportunity of obſerving the weakneſs, folly, and arrogance of monarchs, and have found them to be nothing ſuperior, if not rather inferior, to the reſt of mankind. The *intereſt*, therefore, of being heads of a party does often, with ſuch people, ſupply the place both of *principle* and *affection*.

SOME, who will not venture to aſſert, that the *real* difference betwixt WHIG and TORY was loſt at the *revolution*, ſeem inclined to think, that the difference is now aboliſhed, and that affairs are ſo far returned to their natural ſtate, that there are at preſent no other parties amongſt us but *court* and *country*; that is, men,

who by intereſt or principle are attached either to monarchy or to liberty. It muſt, indeed, be confeſt, that the TORY party ſeem, of late, to have decayed much in their numbers; ſtill more in their zeal; and I may venture to ſay, ſtill more in their credit and authority. There are few men of knowlege or learning, at leaſt, few philoſophers, ſince Mr. LOCKE has wrote, who would not be aſhamed to be thought of that party; and in almoſt all companies the name of OLD WHIG is mentioned as an unconteſtable appellation of honor and dignity. Accordingly, the enemies of the miniſtry, as a reproach, call the courtiers, the true TORIES: and as an honor, denominate the gentlemen in the *oppoſition* the true WHIGS. The TORIES have been ſo long obliged to talk in the republican ſtile, that they ſeem to have made converts of themſelves by their hypocriſy, and to have embraced the ſentiments, as well as language of their adverſaries. There are, however, very conſiderable remains of that party in ENGLAND, with all their old prejudices; and a proof, that *court* and *country* are not our only parties, is, that almoſt all the diſſenters ſide with the court, and the lower clergy, at leaſt, of the church of ENGLAND, with the oppoſition. This may convince us, that ſome byaſs ſtill hangs upon our conſtitution, ſome extrinſic weight, which turns it from its natural courſe, and cauſes a confuſion in our parties.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that we never had any TORIES in SCOTLAND, according to the proper ſignification of the word, and that the diviſion of parties in this country was really into WHIGS and JACOBITES. A JACOBITE ſeems to be a TORY, who has no regard to the conſtitution, but is either a zealous partizan of abſolute monarchy, or at leaſt willing to ſacrifice our liberties to the obtaining the ſucceſſion in that family to which he is attached. The reaſon of the difference betwixt ENGLAND and SCOTLAND, I take to be this: Political and religious diviſions in the latter country, have been, ſince the *revolution*, regularly correſpondent to each other. The PRESBYTERIANS were all WHIGS without exception: Thoſe who favoured *epiſcopacy*, of the oppoſite party. And as the clergy of the latter ſect were turned out of their churches at the *revolution*, they had no motive for making any compliances with the government in their oaths or their forms of prayers, but openly avowed the higheſt principles of their party; which is the cauſe, why their followers have been more violent than their brethren of the TORY party in ENGLAND *.

* Some of the opinions delivered in theſe Eſſays, with regard to the public tranſactions in the laſt century, the author, on more accurate examination, found occaſion to retract in his *Hiſtory of* GREAT BRITAIN. And as he would not enſlave himſelf to the ſyſtems of either party, neither would he fetter his judgment by his own preconceived opinions and principles; nor is he aſhamed to acknowlege his miſtakes.

ESSAY XII.

OF SUPERSTITION AND ENTHUSIASM.

THAT the corruption of the beſt things produces the worſt, is grown into a maxim, and is commonly proved, among other inſtances, by the pernicious effects of *ſuperſtition* and *enthuſiaſm*, the corruptions of true religion.

THESE two ſpecies of falſe religion, tho' both pernicious, are yet of a very different, and even of a contrary nature. The mind of man is ſubject to certain unaccountable terrors and apprehenſions, proceeding either from the unhappy ſituation of private or public affairs, from ill health, from a gloomy and melancholy diſpoſition, or from the concurrence of all theſe circumſtances. In ſuch a ſtate of mind, infinite unknown evils are dreaded from unknown agents; and where real objects of terror are wanting, the ſoul, active to its own prejudice, and foſtering its predominant inclination, finds imaginary ones, to whoſe power and malevolence it ſets no limits. As theſe enemies are entirely inviſible and unknown, the methods taken to appeaſe them are equally unaccountable, and conſiſt in ceremonies, obſervances, mortifications, ſacrifices, preſents, or in any practice, however abſurd and frivolous, which either folly or knavery recommends to a blind and terrified credulity. Weakneſs, fear, melancholy, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the true ſources of SUPERSTITION.

BUT the mind of man is alſo ſubject to an unaccountable elevation and preſumption, proceeding from proſperous ſucceſs, from luxuriant health, from ſtrong ſpirits, or from a bold and confident diſpoſition. In ſuch a ſtate of mind, the imagination ſwells with great, but confuſed conceptions, to which no ſublunary beauties or enjoyments can correſpond. Every thing mortal and periſhable vaniſhes as unworthy of attention. And a full range is given to the fancy in the inviſible regions or world of ſpirits, where the ſoul is at liberty to indulge itſelf in every imagination, which may beſt ſuit its preſent taſte and diſpoſition. Hence ariſe raptures, tranſports, and ſurprizing flights of fancy; and confidence and preſumption ſtill increaſing, theſe raptures being altogether unaccountable, and ſeeming quite beyond the reach of our ordinary faculties, are attributed to the immediate inſpiration of that Divine Being, who is the object of devotion. In a little time, the inſpired perſon comes to regard himſelf as the chief favorite of the divinity; and when this frenzy once takes place, which is the ſummit of enthuſiaſm, every whimſy is conſecrated: Human reaſon, and even morality are rejected as fallacious guides: And the fanatic madman delivers himſelf over, blindly, and without reſerve, to the ſuppoſed illapſes of the ſpirit, and to inſpirations from above. Hope, pride, preſumption, a warm imagination, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the true ſources of ENTHUSIASM.

THESE two ſpecies of falſe religion might afford occaſion to many ſpeculations; but I ſhall confine myſelf, at preſent, to a few reflections concerning their different influence on government and ſociety.

MY firſt reflection is, *That ſuperſtition is favorable to prieſtly power, and enthuſiaſm as much or rather more contrary to it, than ſound reaſon and philoſophy.* As

ſuperſtition

ſuperſtition is founded on fear, ſorrow, and a depreſſion of ſpirits, it repreſents the man to himſelf in ſuch deſpicable colors, that he appears unworthy in his own eyes, of approaching the divine preſence, and naturally has recourſe to any other perſon, whoſe ſanctity of life, or, perhaps, impudence and cunning, have made him be ſuppoſed more favoured by the divinity. To him the ſuperſtitious entruſt their devotions: To his care they recommend their prayers, petitions, and ſacrifices: And by his means, hope to render their addreſſes acceptable to their incenſed deity. Hence the origin of * PRIESTS, who may juſtly be regarded as one of the groſſeſt inventions of a timorous and abject ſuperſtition, which, ever diffident of itſelf, dares not offer up its own devotions, but ignorantly thinks to recommend itſelf to the divinity, by the mediation of his ſuppoſed friends and ſervants. As ſuperſtition is a conſiderable ingredient in almoſt all religions, even the moſt fanatical; there being nothing but philoſophy able to conquer entirely theſe unaccountable terrors; hence it proceeds, that in almoſt every ſect of religion there are prieſts to be found. But the ſtronger mixture there is of ſuperſtition, the higher is the authority of the prieſthood. Modern judaiſm and popery, (eſpecially the latter) being the moſt unphiloſophical and abſurd ſuperſtitions which have yet been known in the world, are the moſt enſlaved by their prieſts. As the church of ENGLAND may juſtly be ſaid to retain ſome mixture of popiſh ſuperſtition, it partakes alſo, in its original conſtitution, of a propenſity to prieſtly power and dominion; particularly in the reſpect it exacts to the ſacerdotal character. And tho', according to the ſentiments of that church, the prayers of the prieſt muſt be accompanied with thoſe of the laity; yet is he the mouth of the congregation, his perſon is ſacred, and without his preſence few would think their public devotions, or the ſacraments, and other rites, acceptable to the divinity.

ON the other hand, it may be obſerved, that all enthuſiaſts have been free from the yoke of eccleſiaſtics, and have expreſt great independence in their devotion; with a contempt of forms, ceremonies, and traditions. The *quakers* are the moſt egregious, tho' at the ſame time, the moſt innocent enthuſiaſts that have been yet known; and are, perhaps, the only ſect, who have never admitted prieſts amongſt them. The *independents*, of all the ENGLISH ſectaries, approach neareſt to the *quakers* in fanaticiſm, and in their freedom from prieſtly bondage. The *preſbyterians* follow after, at an equal diſtance in both theſe particulars. In ſhort, this obſervation is founded on the moſt certain experience; and will alſo appear to be founded on reaſon, if we conſider, that as enthuſiaſm ariſes from a preſumptuous pride and confidence, it thinks itſelf ſufficiently qualified to *approach* the Divinity, without any human mediator. Its rapturous devotions are ſo fervent, that it even imagines itſelf *actually* to *approach* him by the way of contemplation and inward converſe; which makes it neglect all thoſe outward ceremonies and obſervances, to which the aſſiſtance of the prieſts appear ſo requiſite in the eyes of their ſuperſtitious votaries. The fanatic conſecrates himſelf, and beſtows on his own perſon a ſacred character, much ſuperior to what forms and ceremonious inſtitutions can confer on any other.

* By *Prieſts*, I here mean only the pretenders to power and dominion, and to a ſuperior ſanctity of character, diſtinct from virtue and good morals. Theſe are very different from *clergymen*, who are ſet apart, *by the laws*, to the care of ſacred matters, and to the conducting our public devotions with greater decency and order. Here is no rank of men more to be reſpected than the latter.

My *fecond* reflection with regard to thefe ſpecies of falſe religion is, *that religions, which partake of enthuſiaſm are, on their firſt riſe, much more furious and violent than thoſe which partake of ſuperſtition; but in a little time become much more gentle and moderate.* The violence of this ſpecies of religion, when excited by novelty, and animated by oppoſition, appears from numberleſs inſtances; of the *anabaptiſts* in GERMANY, the *camiſars* in FRANCE, the *levellers* and other fanatics in ENGLAND, and the *covenanters* in SCOTLAND. Enthuſiaſm being founded on ſtrong ſpirits, and a preſumptuous boldneſs of character, it naturally begets the moſt extreme reſolutions; eſpecially after it riſes to that height as to inſpire the deluded fanatics with the opinion of divine illuminations, and with a contempt for the common rules of reaſon, morality and prudence.

'Tis thus enthuſiaſm produces the moſt cruel deſolations in human ſociety: But its fury is like that of thunder and tempeſt, which exhauſt themſelves in a little time, and leave the air more calm and ſerene than before. When the firſt fire of enthuſiaſm is ſpent, men naturally, in ſuch fanatical ſects, ſink into the greateſt remiſſneſs and coolneſs in ſacred matters; there being no body of men amongſt them, endowed with ſufficient authority, whoſe intereſt is concerned to ſupport the religious ſpirit: No rites, no ceremonies, no holy obſervances, which may enter into the common train of life, and preſerve the ſacred principles from oblivion. Superſtition, on the contrary, ſteals in gradually and inſenſibly; renders men tame and ſubmiſſive; is acceptable to the magiſtrate, and ſeems inoffenſive to the people: Till at laſt the prieſt, having firmly eſtabliſhed his authority, becomes the tyrant and diſturber of human ſociety, by his endleſs contentions, perſecutions, and religious wars. How ſmoothly did the ROMISH church advance in their acquiſition of power? But into what diſmal convulſions did they throw all EUROPE, in order to maintain it? On the other hand, our ſectaries, who were formerly ſuch dangerous bigots, are now become very free reaſoners; and the *quakers* ſeem to approach nearly the only regular body of *deiſts* in the univerſe, the *literati*, or the diſciples of CONFUCIUS in CHINA *.

My *third* obſervation on this head is, *that ſuperſtition is an enemy to civil liberty, and enthuſiaſm a friend to it.* As ſuperſtition groans under the dominion of the prieſts, and enthuſiaſm is deſtructive of all eccleſiaſtical power, this ſufficiently accounts for the preſent obſervation. Not to mention, that enthuſiaſm being the infirmity of bold and ambitious tempers, is naturally accompanied with a ſpirit of liberty; as ſuperſtition on the contrary, renders men tame and abject, and fits them for ſlavery. We learn from the ENGLISH hiſtory, that, during the civil wars, the *independents* and *deiſts*, tho' the moſt oppoſite in their religious principles; yet were united in their political ones, and were alike paſſionate for a commonwealth. And ſince the origin of *whig* and *tory*, the leaders of the *whigs* have either been *deiſts* or profeſt *latitudinarians* in their principles; that is, friends to toleration, and indifferent to any particular ſect of *chriſtians*: While the ſectaries, who have all a ſtrong tincture of enthuſiaſm, have always, without exception, concurred with that party, in the defence of civil liberty. The reſemblance in their ſuperſtitions long united the high-church *tories* and the *Roman catholics*, in the ſupport of prerogative and kingly power; tho' experience of the tole-

* The CHINESE Literati have no prieſts nor eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhment.

rating ſpirit of the *whigs* ſeems of late to have reconciled the *cabolics* to that party.

THE *moliniſts* and *janſeniſts* in FRANCE have a thouſand unintelligible diſputes, which are not worthy the reflection of a man of ſenſe: But what principally diſtinguiſhes theſe two ſects, and alone merits attention, is the different ſpirit of their religion. The *moliniſts*, conducted by the *jeſuites*, are great friends to ſuperſtition, rigid obſervers of external forms and ceremonies, and devoted to the authority of the prieſts, and to tradition. The *janſeniſts* are enthuſiaſts, and zealous promoters of the paſſionate devotion, and of the inward life; little influenced by authority; and, in a word, but half catholics. The conſequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing reaſoning. The *jeſuites* are the tyrants of the people, and the ſlaves of the court: And the *janſeniſts* preſerve alive the ſmall ſparks of the love of liberty, which are to be found in the FRENCH nation.

ESSAY XIII.

OF AVARICE.

'TIS eaſy to obſerve, that comic writers exaggerate every character, and draw their fop, or coward with ſtronger features than are any where to be met with in nature. This moral kind of painting for the ſtage has been often compared to the painting for cupolas and cielings, where the colors are overcharged, and every part is drawn exceſſively large, and beyond nature. The figures ſeem monſtrous and diſproportioned, when ſeen too nigh; but become natural and regular, when ſet at a diſtance, and placed in that point of view, in which they are intended to be ſurveyed. For a like reaſon, when characters are exhibited in theatrical repreſentations, the want of reality removes, in a manner, the perſonages; and rendering them more cold and unentertaining, makes it neceſſary to compenſate, by the force of coloring, what they want in ſubſtance. Thus we find in common life, that when a man once allows himſelf to depart from truth in his narrations, he never can keep within the bounds of probability; but adds ſtill ſome new circumſtance to render his ſtories more marvellous, and to ſatisfy his imagination. Two men in buckram ſuits became eleven to Sir JOHN FALSTAFF before the end of his ſtory.

THERE is only one vice, which may be found in life with as ſtrong features, and as high a coloring as need be employed by any ſatyriſt or comic poet; and that is AVARICE. Every day we meet with men of immenſe fortunes, without heirs, and on the very brink of the grave, who refuſe themſelves the moſt common neceſſaries of life, and go on heaping poſſeſſions on poſſeſſions, under all the real preſſures of the ſevereſt poverty. An old uſurer, ſays the ſtory, lying in his laſt agonies was preſented by the prieſt with the crucifix to worſhip. He opens his eyes a moment before he expires, conſiders the crucifix, and cries, *Theſe jewels are not true; I can only lend ten piſtoles upon ſuch a pledge.* This was probably the invention of ſome epigrammatiſt; and yet every one, from his own experience,

may be able to recollect almoſt as ſtrong inſtances of perſeverance in avarice. 'Tis commonly reported of a famous miſer in this city, that finding himſelf near death, he ſent for ſome of the magiſtrates, and gave them a bill of an hundred pounds, payable after his deceaſe; which ſum he intended ſhould be diſpoſed of in charitable uſes; but ſcarce were they gone, when he orders them to be called back, and offers them ready money, if they would abate five pounds of the ſum. Another noted miſer in the north, intending to defraud his heirs, and leave his fortune to the building an hoſpital, protracted the drawing of his will from day to day; and 'tis thought, that if thoſe intereſted in it had not paid for the drawing it, he had died inteſtate. In ſhort, none of the moſt furious exceſſes of love and ambition are in any reſpect to be compared to the extremes of avarice.

THE beſt excuſe that can be made for avarice is, that it generally prevails in old men, or in men of cold tempers, where all the other affections are extinct; and the mind being incapable of remaining without ſome paſſion or purſuit, at laſt finds out this monſtrouſly abſurd one, which ſuits the coldneſs and inactivity of its temper. At the ſame time, it ſeems very extraordinary, that ſo froſty, ſpiritleſs a paſſion ſhould be able to carry us farther than all the warmth of youth and pleaſure. But if we look more narrowly into the matter, we ſhall find, that this very circumſtance renders the explication of the caſe more eaſy. When the temper is warm and full of vigor, it naturally ſhoots out more ways than one, and produces inferior paſſions to counter-balance, in ſome degree, its predominant inclination. 'Tis impoſſible for a perſon of that temper, however bent on any purſuit, to be deprived of all ſenſe of ſhame, or all regard to the ſentiments of mankind. His friends muſt have ſome influence over him: And other conſiderations are apt to have their weight. All this ſerves to reſtrain him within ſome bounds. But 'tis no wonder that the avaritious man, being, from the coldneſs of his temper, without regard to reputation, to friendſhip, or to pleaſure, ſhould be carried ſo far by his prevailing inclination, and ſhould diſplay his paſſion in ſuch ſurprizing inſtances.

ACCORDINGLY we find no vice ſo irreclaimable as avarice: And tho' there ſcarcely has been a moraliſt or philoſopher, from the beginning of the world to this day, who has not levelled a ſtroke at it, we hardly find a ſingle inſtance of any perſon's being cured of it. For this reaſon, I am more apt to approve of thoſe, who attack it with wit and humor, than of thoſe who treat it in a ſerious manner. There being ſo little hopes of doing good to the people infected with this vice, I would have the reſt of mankind, at leaſt, diverted by our manner of expoſing it: As indeed there is no kind of diverſion, of which they ſeem ſo willing to partake.

AMONG the fables of *Monſieur de la* MOTTE, there is one levelled againſt avarice, which ſeems to me more natural and eaſy, than moſt of the fables of that ingenious author. A miſer, ſays he, being dead, and fairly interred, came to the banks of the STYX, deſiring to be ferried over along with the other ghoſts. CHARON demands his fare, and is ſurprized to ſee the miſer, rather than pay it, throw himſelf into the river, and ſwim over to the other ſide, notwithſtanding all the clamor and oppoſition that could be made to him. All hell was in an uproar; and each of the judges was meditating ſome puniſhment, ſuitable to a crime of ſuch dangerous

gerous conſequence to the infernal revenues. Shall he be chained to the rock with PROMETHEUS? Or tremble below the precipice in company with the DANAIDES? Or aſſiſt SISYPHUS in rolling his ſtone? No, ſays MINOS, none of theſe. We muſt invent ſome ſeverer puniſhment. Let him be ſent back to the earth, to ſee the uſe his heirs are making of his riches.

I HOPE it will not be interpreted as a deſign of ſetting myſelf in oppoſition to this celebrated author, if I proceed to deliver a fable of my own, which is intended to expoſe the ſame vice of avarice. The hint of it was taken from theſe lines of Mr. POPE.

Damned to the mines, an equal fate betides
The ſlave that digs it, and the ſlave that hides.

OUR old mother Earth once lodged an indictment againſt AVARICE before the courts of heaven, for her wicked and malicious council and advice, in tempting, inducing, perſuading, and traiterouſly ſeducing the children of the plaintiff to commit the deteſtable crime of parricide upon her, and, mangling her body, ranſack her very bowels for hidden treaſure. The indictment was very long and verboſe; but we muſt omit a great part of the repetitions and ſynonymous terms, not to tire our reader too much with our tale. AVARICE, being called before JUPITER to anſwer to this charge, had not much to ſay in her own defence. The injury was clearly proved upon her. The fact, indeed, was notorious, and the injury had been frequently repeated. When therefore the plaintiff demanded juſtice, JUPITER very readily gave ſentence in her favor; and his decree was to this purpoſe, That ſince dame *Avarice*, the defendant, had thus grievouſly injured dame *Earth*, the plaintiff, ſhe was hereby ordered to take that treaſure, of which ſhe had felonioufly robbed the ſaid plaintiff, by ranſacking her boſom, and in the ſame manner, as before, opening her boſom, reſtore it back to her, without dimunition or retention. From this ſentence, it ſhall follow, ſays JUPITER to the by-ſtanders, That, in all future ages, the retainers of *Avarice* ſhall bury and conceal their riches, and thereby reſtore to the earth what they took from her.

ESSAY XIV.

OF THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN NATURE.

THERE are certain ſects, which ſecretly form themſelves in the learned world, as well as in the political; and tho' ſometimes they come not to an open rupture, yet they give a different turn to the ways of thinking of thoſe who have taken party on either ſide. The moſt remarkable of this kind are the ſects, that are founded on the different ſentiments with regard to the *dignity of human nature*; which is a point that ſeems to have divided philoſophers and poets, as well as divines, from the beginning of the world to this day. Some exalt our ſpecies to the ſkies, and repreſent man as a kind of human demi-god, who derives his origin from heaven, and retains evident marks of his lineage and deſcent.

Others

Others inſiſt upon the blind ſides of human nature, and can diſcover nothing, except vanity, in which man ſurpaſſes the other animals, whom he affects ſo much to deſpiſe. If an author poſſeſſes the talent of rhetoric, and declamation, he commonly takes party with the former: If his turn lies towards irony and ridicule, he naturally throws himſelf into the other extreme.

I AM far from thinking, that all thoſe, who have depreciated human nature have been enemies to virtue, and have expoſed the frailties of their fellow-creatures with any bad intention. On the contrary, I am ſenſible, that a very delicate ſenſe of morals, eſpecially when attended with ſomewhat of the *Miſanthrope*, is apt to give a man a diſguſt of the world, and to make him conſider the common courſe of human affairs with too much ſpleen and indignation. I muſt, however, be of opinion, that the ſentiments of thoſe, who are inclined to think favorably of mankind, are much more advantageous to virtue, than the contrary principles which give us a mean opinion of our nature. When a man is poſſeſſed of a high notion of his rank and character in the creation, he will naturally endeavor to act up to it, and will ſcorn to do a baſe or vicious action, which might ſink him below that figure which he makes in his own imagination. Accordingly we find, that all our polite and faſhionable moraliſts inſiſt upon this topic, and endeavor to repreſent vice as unworthy of man, as well as odious in itſelf.

WOMEN are generally much more flattered in their youth than men; which may proceed from this reaſon, among others, that their chief point of honor is conſidered as much more difficult than ours, and requires to be ſupported by all that decent pride, which can be inſtilled into them.

WE find very few diſputes which are not founded on ſome ambiguity in the expreſſion; and I am perſuaded, that the preſent diſpute concerning the dignity of human nature, is not more exempt from it than any other. It may, therefore, be worth while to conſider, what is real, and what is only verbal, in this controverſy.

THAT there is a natural difference betwixt merit and demerit, virtue and vice, wiſdom and folly, no reaſonable man will deny: but yet 'tis evident, that in affixing the term, which denotes either our approbation or blame, we are commonly more influenced by compariſon than by any fixt unalterable ſtandard in the nature of things. In like manner, quantity, and extenſion, and bulk, are by every one acknowleged to be real things: But when we call any animal *great* or *little*, we always form a ſecret compariſon between that animal and others of the ſame ſpecies; and 'tis that compariſon which regulates our judgment concerning its greatneſs. A dog and a horſe may be of the very ſame ſize, while the one is admired for the greatneſs of its bulk, and the other for the ſmallneſs. When I am preſent, therefore, at any diſpute, I always conſider with myſelf, whether it be a queſtion of compariſon or not that is the ſubject of the controverſy; and if it be, whether the diſputants compare the ſame objects together, or talk of things that are widely different. As the latter is commonly the caſe, I have long ſince learnt to neglect ſuch diſputes as manifeſt abuſes of leiſure, the moſt valuable preſent that could be made to mortals.

IN forming our notions of human nature, we are very apt to make a compariſon betwixt men and animals, which are the only creatures endowed with thought that fall under our ſenſes. Certainly this compariſon is very favorable to mankind.

kind. On the one hand we ſee a creature, whoſe thoughts are not limited by any narrow bounds, either of place or time; who carries his reſearches into the moſt diſtant regions of this globe, and beyond this globe, to the planets and heavenly bodies; looks backward to conſider the firſt origin of human race; caſts his eyes forward to ſee the influence of his actions upon poſterity, and the judgments which will be formed of his character a thouſand years hence; a creature, who traces cauſes and effects to a great length and intricacy; extracts general principles from particular appearances; improves upon his diſcoveries; corrects his miſtakes; and makes his very errors profitable. On the other hand, we are preſented with a creature the very reverſe of this; limited in its obſervations and reaſonings to a few ſenſible objects which ſurround it; without curioſity, without foreſight; blindly conducted by inſtinct, and arriving in a very ſhort time, at its utmoſt perfection, beyond which it is never able to advance a ſingle ſtep. What a wide difference is there betwixt theſe creatures! And how exalted a notion muſt we entertain of the former, in compariſon of the latter!

THERE are two means commonly employed to deſtroy this concluſion: *Firſt*, By making an unfair repreſentation of the caſe, and inſiſting only upon the weakneſſes of human nature. And *ſecondly*, By forming a new and ſecret compariſon between man and beings of the moſt perfect wiſdom. Among the other excellencies of man, this is remarkable, that he can form a notion of perfections much beyond what he has experience of in himſelf; and is not limited in his conception of wiſdom and virtue. He can eaſily exalt his notions, and conceive a degree of knowlege, which, when compared to his own, will make the latter appear very contemptible, and will cauſe the difference betwixt that and the ſagacity of animals, in a manner, to diſappear and vaniſh. Now this being a point, in which all the world is agreed, that human underſtanding falls infinitely ſhort of perfect wiſdom: 'Tis proper we ſhould know when this compariſon takes place, that we may not diſpute, where there is no real difference in our ſentiments. Man falls much ſhorter of perfect wiſdom, and even of his own ideas of perfect wiſdom, than animals do of man; but yet the latter difference is ſo conſiderable, that nothing but a compariſon with the former, can make it appear of little moment.

'TIS alſo very uſual to *compare* one man with another; and finding very few whom we can call *wiſe* or *virtuous*, we are apt to entertain a contemptible notion of our ſpecies in general. That we may be ſenſible of the fallacy of this way of reaſoning, we may obſerve, that the honorable appellations of wiſe and virtuous, are not annexed to any particular degree of thoſe qualities of *wiſdom* and *virtue*; but ariſe altogether from the compariſon we make betwixt one man and another. When we find a man, who arrives at ſuch a pitch of wiſdom as is very uncommon, we pronounce him a wiſe man: So that to ſay, there are few wiſe men in the world, is really to ſay nothing; ſince 'tis only by their ſcarcity, that they merit that appellation. Were the loweſt of our ſpecies as wiſe as TULLY, or my lord BACON, we ſhould ſtill have reaſon to ſay, that there are few wiſe men. For in that caſe we ſhould exalt our notions of wiſdom, and ſhould not pay a ſingular honor to any one, who was not ſingularly diſtinguiſhed by his talents. In like manner, I have heard it obſerved by thoughtleſs people, that there are few women poſſeſſed of beauty, in compariſon of thoſe who want it; not conſidering, that we beſtow the epithet of *beautiful* only on ſuch as poſſeſs a degree of beauty, that

that is common to them with a few. The ſame degree of beauty in a woman is called deformity, which is treated as real beauty in one of our ſex.

As 'tis uſual, in forming a notion of our ſpecies, to *compare* it with the other ſpecies above or below it, or to compare the individuals of the ſpecies among themſelves; ſo we often compare together the different motives or actuating principles of human nature, in order to regulate our judgment concerning it. And indeed, this is the only kind of compariſon which is worth our attention, or decides any thing in the preſent queſtion. Were our ſelfiſh and vicious principles ſo much predominant above our ſocial and virtuous, as is aſſerted by ſome philoſophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible notion of human nature.

There is much of a diſpute of words in all this controverſy. When a man denies the ſincerity of all public ſpirit or affection to a country and community, I am at a loſs what to think of him. Perhaps he never felt this paſſion in ſo clear and diſtinct a manner as to remove all his doubts concerning its force and reality. But when he proceeds afterwards to reject all private friendſhip, if no intereſt or ſelf-love intermixes itſelf; I am then confident that he abuſes terms, and confounds the ideas of things; ſince it is impoſſible for any one to be ſo ſelfiſh, or rather ſo ſtupid, as to make no difference betwixt one man and another, and give no preference to qualities, which engage his approbation and eſteem. Is he alſo, ſay I, as inſenſible to anger as he pretends to be to friendſhip? And does injury and wrong no more affect him than kindneſs or benefits? Impoſſible: He does not know himſelf: He has forgot the movements of his mind; or rather he makes uſe of a different language from the reſt of his countrymen, and calls not things by their proper names. What ſay you of natural affection? (I ſubjoin) Is that alſo a ſpecies of ſelf-love? Yes: All is ſelf-love. *Your* children are loved only becauſe they are yours: *Your* friend for a like reaſon: And *your* country engages you only ſo far as it has a connexion with *yourſelf:* Were the idea of ſelf removed, nothing would affect you: You would be altogether inactive and inſenſible: Or if you ever gave yourſelf any movement, it would only be from vanity, and a deſire of fame and reputation to this ſame ſelf: I am willing, reply I, to receive your interpretation of human actions, provided you admit the facts. That ſpecies of ſelf-love, which diſplays itſelf in kindneſs to others, you muſt allow to have great influence, and even greater, on many occaſions, than that which remains in its original ſhape and form. For how few are there, who, having a family, children, and relations, do not ſpend more on the maintenance and education of theſe than on their own pleaſures? This, indeed, you juſtly obſerve, may proceed from their ſelf-love, ſince the proſperity of their family and friends is one, or the chief of their pleaſures, as well as their chief honor. Be you alſo one of theſe ſelfiſh men, and you are ſure of every one's good opinion and good will; or not to ſhock your nice years with theſe expreſſions, the ſelf-love of every one, and mine amongſt the reſt, will then incline us to ſerve you, and ſpeak well of you.

In my opinion, there are two things which have led aſtray thoſe philoſophers, who have inſiſted ſo much on the ſelfiſhneſs of man. In the *firſt* place, they found, that every act of virtue or friendſhip was attended with a ſecret pleaſure: from whence they concluded, that friendſhip and virtue could not be diſintereſted. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous ſentiment or paſſion produces the pleaſure,

pleaſure, and does not ariſe from it. I feel a pleaſure in doing good to my friend, becauſe I love him; but do not love him for the ſake of that pleaſure.

In the *ſecond* place, it has always been found, that the virtuous are far from being indifferent to praiſe; and therefore they have been repreſented as a ſet of vain-glorious men, who had nothing in view but the applauſes of others: But this alſo is a fallacy. 'Tis very unjuſt in the world, when they find any tincture of vanity in a laudable action, to depreciate it upon that account, or aſcribe it entirely to that motive. The caſe is not the ſame with vanity, as with other paſſions. Where avarice or revenge enters into any ſeemingly virtuous action, 'tis difficult for us to determine how far it enters, and 'tis natural to ſuppoſe it the ſole actuating principle. But vanity is ſo cloſely allied to virtue, and to love the fame of laudable actions approaches ſo near the love of laudable actions for their own ſake, that theſe paſſions are more capable of mixture, than any other kinds of affection; and 'tis almoſt impoſſible to have the latter without ſome degree of the former. Accordingly we find, that this paſſion for glory is always warped and varied according to the particular taſte or ſentiment of the mind on which it falls. Nero had the ſame vanity in driving a chariot, that Trajan had in governing the empire with juſtice and ability. To love the glory of virtuous actions is a ſure proof of the love of virtuous actions.

ESSAY XV.

OF CIVIL LIBERTY.

THOSE who employ their pens on political ſubjects, free from party-rage, and party-prejudices, cultivate a ſcience, which, of all others, contributes moſt to public utility, and even to the private ſatisfaction of thoſe who addict themſelves to the ſtudy of it. I am apt, however, to entertain a ſuſpicion, that the world is ſtill too young to fix many general truths in politics, which will remain true to the lateſt poſterity. We have not as yet had experience of above three thouſand years; ſo that not only the art of reaſoning is ſtill defective in this ſcience, as well as in all others, but we even want ſufficient materials upon which we can reaſon. 'Tis not fully known, what degrees of refinement, either in virtue or vice, human nature is ſuſceptible of; nor what may be expected of mankind from any great revolution in their education, cuſtoms, or principles. Machiavel was certainly a great genius; but having confined his ſtudy to the furious and tyrannical governments of ancient times, or to the little diſorderly principalities of Italy, his reaſonings, eſpecially upon monarchical government, have been found extremely defective; and there ſcarce is any maxim in his *prince*, which ſubſequent experience has not entirely refuted. *A weak prince*, ſays he, *is incapable of receiving good counſel; for if he conſult with ſeveral, he will not be able to chooſe among their different counſels. If he abandon himſelf to one, that miniſter may, perhaps, have capacity; but he will not be long a miniſter: He will be ſure to diſpoſſeſs his maſter, and place himſelf and his own family upon the throne.* I mention this, among innumerable inſtances, of the errors of that politician, proceeding, in a great meaſure, from his having lived in too early an age of the world, to be

a good judge of political truth. Almoſt all the princes of EUROPE are at preſent governed by their miniſters; and have been ſo for near two centuries; and yet no ſuch event has ever happened, or can poſſibly happen. SEJANUS might project dethroning the CÆSARS; but FLEURY, tho' ever ſo vicious, could not, while in his ſenſes, entertain the leaſt hopes of diſpoſſeſſing the BOURBONS.

TRADE was never eſteemed an affair of ſtate, 'till the laſt century; and there ſcarcely is any ancient writer on politics, who has made mention of it *. Even the ITALIANS have kept a profound ſilence with regard to it; tho' it has now excited the chief attention, as well of miniſters of ſtate, as of ſpeculative reaſoners. The great opulence, grandeur, and military atchievements of the two maritime powers, ſeem firſt to have inſtructed mankind in the vaſt importance of an extenſive commerce.

HAVING, therefore, intended in this eſſay to have made a full compariſon of civil liberty and abſolute government, and to have ſhewn the great advantages of the former above the latter; I began to entertain a ſuſpicion, that no man in this age was ſufficiently qualified for ſuch an undertaking; and that whatever any one ſhould advance on that head would, in all probability, be refuted by further experience, and be rejected by poſterity. Such mighty revolutions have happened in human affairs, and ſo many events have ariſen contrary to the expectation of the ancients, that they are ſufficient to beget the ſuſpicion of ſtill further changes.

IT had been obſerved by the ancients, that all the arts and ſciences aroſe among free nations; and, that the PERSIANS and EGYPTIANS, notwithſtanding all their eaſe, opulence and luxury, made but faint efforts towards a reliſh in thoſe finer pleaſures, which were carried to ſuch perfection by the GREEKS, amidſt continual wars, attended with poverty, and the greateſt ſimplicity of life and manners. It had alſo been obſerved, that as ſoon as the GREEKS loſt their liberty tho' they encreaſed mightily in riches, by means of the conqueſt of ALEXANDER; yet the arts, from that moment, declined among them, and have never ſince been able to raiſe their head in that climate. Learning was tranſplanted to ROME, the only free nation at that time in the univerſe; and having met with ſo favorable a ſoil, it made prodigious ſhoots for above a century; till the decay of liberty produced alſo the decay of letters, and ſpred a total barbariſm over the world. From theſe two experiments, of which each was double in its kind, and ſhewed the fall of learning in deſpotic governments, as well as its riſe in popular ones, LONGINUS thought himſelf ſufficiently juſtified, in aſſerting, that the arts and ſciences could never flouriſh, but in a free government: And in this opinion, he has been followed by ſeveral eminent writers † in our own country, who either confined their view merely to ancient facts, or entertained too great a partiality in favor of that form of government, which is eſtabliſhed amongſt us.

BUT what would theſe writers have ſaid, to the inſtances of modern ROME and of FLORENCE? Of which the former carried to perfection all the finer arts of ſculpture, painting and muſic, as well as poetry, tho' they groaned under tyranny, and under the tyranny of prieſts: While the latter made the greateſt progreſs in

* XENOPHON mentions it; but with a doubt if it be of any advantage to a ſtate. Εἰδὶ καὶ ἐμπορία ὠφελεῖ τι πόλιν, &c. XEN. HIERO. PLATO totally excludes it from his imaginary republic. De Legibus, lib. 4.

† Mr. ADDISON and lord SHAFTESBURY.

the arts and ſciences, after they began to loſe their liberty by the uſurpations of the family of the MEDICIS. ARIOSTO, TASSO, GALILÆO, no more than RAPHAEL, and MICHAEL ANGELO, were not born in republics. And tho' the LOMBARD ſchool was famous as well as the ROMAN, yet the VENETIANS have had the ſmalleſt ſhare in its honors, and ſeem rather inferior to the other ITALIANS, in their genius for the arts and ſciences. RUBENS eſtabliſhed his School at ANTWERP, not at AMSTERDAM; DRESDEN, not HAMBURGH, is the centre of politeneſs in GERMANY.

BUT the moſt eminent inſtance of the flouriſhing of learning in deſpotic governments, is that of FRANCE, which ſcarce ever enjoyed any eſtabliſhed liberty, and yet has carried the arts and ſciences as near perfection as any other nation. The ENGLISH are, perhaps, better philoſophers; the ITALIANS better painters and muſicians; the ROMANS were better orators: But the FRENCH are the only people, except the GREEKS, who have been at once philoſophers, poets, orators, hiſtorians, painters, architects, ſculptors, and muſicians. With regard to the ſtage, they have excelled even the GREEKS, who have far excelled the ENGLISH. And, in common life, they have, in a great meaſure, perfected that art, the moſt uſeful and agreeable of any, *l'Art de Vivre*, the art of ſociety and converſation.

IF we conſider the ſtate of the ſciences and polite arts in our own country, HORACE's obſervation, with regard to the ROMANS, may, in a great meaſure, be applied to the BRITISH.

——— *Sed in longum tamen ævum*
Manſerunt, hodieque manent veſtigia ruris.

THE elegance and propriety of ſtile have been very much neglected among us. We have no dictionary of our language, and ſcarce a tolerable grammar. The firſt polite proſe we have, was wrote by a man who is ſtill alive *. As to SPRAT, LOCKE, and even TEMPLE, they knew too little of the rules of art to be eſteemed very elegant writers. The proſe of BACON, HARRINGTON, and MILTON, is altogether ſtiff and pedantic; tho' their ſenſe be excellent. Men, in this country, have been ſo much occupied in the great diſputes of *Religion*, *Politics* and *Philoſophy*, that they had no reliſh for the minute obſervations of grammar and criticiſm. And tho' this turn of thinking muſt have conſiderably improved our ſenſe and our talent of reaſoning beyond thoſe of other nations; it muſt be confeſſed, that even in thoſe ſciences above-mentioned, we have not any ſtandard-book, which we can tranſmit to poſterity: And the utmoſt we have to boaſt of, are a few eſſays towards a more juſt philoſophy; which, indeed, promiſe very much, but have not, as yet, reached any degree of perfection.

IT has become an eſtabliſhed opinion, that commerce can never flouriſh but in a free government; and this opinion ſeems to be founded on a longer and larger experience than the foregoing, with regard to the arts and ſciences. If we trace commerce in its progreſs thro' TYRE, ATHENS, SYRACUSE, CARTHAGE, VENICE, FLORENCE, GENOA, ANTWERP, HOLLAND, ENGLAND, &c. we ſhall always find it to have fixt its ſeat in free governments. The three greateſt trading towns now in the world, are LONDON, AMSTERDAM, and HAMBURGH; all free cities, and proteſtant cities; that is, enjoying a double liberty. It muſt,

* Dr. SWIFT.

however, be obſerved, that the great jealouſy entertained of late, with regard to the commerce of FRANCE, ſeems to prove, that this maxim is no more certain and infallible, than the foregoing, and that the ſubjects of an abſolute prince may become our rivals in commerce, as well as in learning.

DURST I deliver my opinion in an affair of ſo much uncertainty, I would aſſert, that, notwithſtanding the efforts of the FRENCH, there is ſomething pernicious to commerce inherent in the very nature of abſolute government, and inſeparable from it: Tho' the reaſon I would aſſign for this opinion, is ſomewhat different from that which is commonly inſiſted on. Private property ſeems to me almoſt as ſecure in a civilized EUROPEAN monarchy, as in a republic; nor is danger much apprehended in ſuch a government, from the violence of the ſovereign; more than we commonly dread harm from thunder, or earthquakes, or any accident the moſt unuſual and extraordinary. Avarice, the ſpur of induſtry, is ſo obſtinate a paſſion, and works its way thro' ſo many real dangers and difficulties, that 'tis not likely it will be ſcared by an imaginary danger, which is ſo ſmall, that it ſcarce admits of calculation. Commerce therefore, in my opinion, is apt to decay in abſolute governments, not becauſe it is there leſs *ſecure*, but becauſe it is leſs *honorable*. A ſubordination of ranks is abſolutely neceſſary to the ſupport of monarchy. Birth, titles, and place, muſt be honored above induſtry and riches. And while theſe notions prevail, all the conſiderable traders will be tempted to throw up their commerce, in order to purchaſe ſome of thoſe employments, to which privileges and honors are annexed.

SINCE I am upon this head of the alterations which time has produced, or may produce in politics, I muſt obſerve, that all kinds of government, free and deſpotic, ſeem to have undergone, in modern times, a great change to the better, with regard both to foreign and domeſtic management. The *balance of power* is a ſecret in politics, fully known only to the preſent age; and I muſt add, that the internal POLICE of the ſtate has alſo received great improvements within the laſt century. We are informed by SALLUST, that CATALINE'S army was much augmented by the acceſſion of the highwaymen about ROME; tho' I believe, that all of that profeſſion, who are at preſent diſperſed over EUROPE, would not amount to a regiment. In CICERO'S pleadings for MILO, I find this argument, among others, made uſe of to prove, that his client had not aſſaſſinated CLODIUS. Had MILO, ſays he, intended to have killed CLODIUS, he had not attacked him in the day-time, and at ſuch a diſtance from the city: He had way-laid him at night, near the ſuburbs, where it might have been pretended, that he was killed by robbers; and the frequency of the accident would have favored the deceit. This is a ſurprizing proof of the looſe police of ROME, and of the number and force of theſe robbers; ſince CLODIUS * was at that time attended with thirty ſlaves, who were compleatly armed, and ſufficiently accuſtomed to blood and danger in the frequent tumults excited by that ſeditious tribune.

BUT tho' all kinds of government be improved in modern times, yet monarchical government ſeems to have made the greateſt advances towards perfection. It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly ſaid in praiſe of republics alone, *that they are a government of Laws, not of men.* They are

* *Vide Aſc. Ped. in Orat. pro Milone.*

found

found susceptible of order, method, and constancy, to a surprizing degree. Property is there secure; industry encouraged; the arts flourish; and the prince lives secure among his subjects, like a father among his children. There are perhaps, and have been for two centuries, near two hundred absolute princes, great and small, in EUROPE; and allowing twenty years to each reign, we may suppose, that there have been in the whole two thousand monarchs or tyrants, as the GREEKS would have called them: Yet of these there has not been one, not even PHILIP II. of SPAIN, so bad as TIBERIUS, CALIGULA, NERO, or DOMITIAN, who were four in twelve amongst the ROMAN emperors. It must, however, be confessed, that tho' monarchical governments have approached nearer to popular ones, in gentleness and stability; they are still much inferior. Our modern education and customs instil more humanity and moderation than the ancient; but have not as yet been able to overcome entirely the disadvantages of that form of government.

BUT here I must beg leave to advance a conjecture, which seems very probable, but which posterity alone can fully judge of. I am apt to think, that in monarchical governments there is a source of improvement, and in popular governments a source of degeneracy, which in time will bring these species of government still nearer an equality. The greatest abuses, which arise in FRANCE, the most perfect model of pure monarchy, proceed not from the number or weight of the taxes, beyond what are to be met with in free countries; but from the expensive, unequal, arbitrary, and intricate method of levying them, by which the industry of the poor, especially of the peasants and farmers, is, in a great measure, discouraged, and agriculture rendered a beggarly and a slavish employment. But to whose advantage do these abuses tend? If to that of the nobility, they might be esteemed inherent in that form of government; since the nobility are the true supports of monarchy; and 'tis natural their interest should be more consulted, in such a constitution, than that of the people. But the nobility are, in reality, the principal losers by this oppression; since it ruins their estates, and beggars their tenants. The only gainers by it are the *Financiers*, a race of men rather odious to the nobility and the whole kingdom. If a prince or a minister, therefore, should arise, endowed with sufficient discernment to know his own and the public interest, and with sufficient force of mind to break thro' ancient customs, we might expect to see these abuses remedied; in which case, the difference betwixt their absolute government and our free one, would not appear so considerable as at present.

THE source of degeneracy, which may be remarked in free governments, consists in the practice of contracting debt, and mortgaging the public revenues, by which taxes may, in time, become altogether intolerable, and all the property of the state be brought into the hands of the public. This practice is of modern date. The ATHENIANS, tho' governed by a republic, paid near two hundred *per Cent.* for those sums of money, which any emergent occasion made it necessary for them to borrow; as we learn from XENOPHON *. Among the moderns, the DUTCH first introduced the practice of borrowing great sums at low interest, and

* Κτῆσιν δὲ ἀπ' οὐδενὸς ἂν οὕτω καλὴν κτήσαιντο ὥσπερ ἀφ' οὗ ἂν προτελέσωσιν εἰς τὴν ἀφορμήν. — οἱ δέ γε πλείστοι Ἀθηναίων πλείονα λήψονται κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ ὅσα ἂν εἰσενέγκωσιν, οἱ γὰρ μνᾶν προτελέσαντες, ἐγγὺς δυοῖν μναῖν πρόσοδον ἕξουσι — ὃ δόκει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀσφαλέστατόν τε καὶ πολυχρονιώτατον εἶναι. ΞΕΝ. ΠΟΡΟΙ.

have

have well nigh ruined themſelves by it. Abſolute princes have alſo contracted debt; but as an abſolute prince may play the bankrupt when he pleaſes, his people can never be oppreſt by his debts. In popular governments, the people, and chiefly thoſe who have the higheſt offices, being commonly the public creditors, 'tis difficult for the ſtate to make uſe of this remedy, which, however it may be ſometimes neceſſary, is always cruel and barbarous. This, therefore, ſeems to be an inconvenience, which nearly threatens all free governments; eſpecially our own, at the preſent juncture of affairs. And what a ſtrong motive is this, to increaſe our frugality of the public money; leſt, for want of it, we be reduced, by the multiplicity of taxes, to curſe our free government, and wiſh ourſelves in the ſame ſtate of ſervitude with all the nations that ſurround us?

ESSAY XVI.

OF ELOQUENCE.

THOSE, who conſider the periods and revolutions of human kind, as repreſented in hiſtory, are entertained with a ſpectacle full of pleaſure and variety, and ſee, with ſurprize, the manners, cuſtoms, and opinions of the ſame ſpecies ſuſceptible of ſuch prodigious changes in different periods of time. It may, however, be obſerved, that in *civil* hiſtory there is found a much greater uniformity than in the hiſtory of learning and ſcience, and that the wars, negotiations, and politics of one age reſemble more thoſe of another, than the taſte, wit, and ſpeculative principles. Intereſt and ambition, honor and ſhame, friendſhip and enmity, gratitude and revenge, are the prime movers in all public tranſactions; and theſe paſſions are of a very ſtubborn and intractable nature, in compariſon of the ſentiments and underſtanding, which are eaſily varied by education and example. The GOTHS were much more inferior to the ROMANS, in taſte and ſcience, than in courage and virtue.

BUT not to compare together nations ſo widely different, that they may almoſt be eſteemed of a different ſpecies; it may be obſerved, that even this latter period of human learning, is, in many reſpects, of an oppoſite character to the ancient; and that if we be ſuperior in philoſophy, we are ſtill, notwithſtanding all our refinements, much inferior in eloquence.

IN ancient times, no work of genius was thought to require ſo great parts and capacity, as the ſpeaking in public; and ſome eminent writers have pronounced the talents, even of a great poet or philoſopher, to be of an inferior nature to thoſe requiſite for ſuch an undertaking. GREECE and ROME produced, each of them, but one accompliſhed orator; and whatever praiſes the other celebrated ſpeakers might merit, they were ſtill eſteemed much inferior to theſe great models of eloquence. 'Tis obſervable, that the ancient critics could ſcarce find two orators in any age, who deſerved to be placed preciſely in the ſame rank, and poſſeſſed the ſame degree of merit. CALVUS, CÆLIUS, CURIO, HORTENSIUS, CÆSAR roſe one above another: But the greateſt of that age was inferior to CICERO, the moſt

moſt eloquent ſpeaker, who had ever appeared in ROME. Thoſe of fine taſte, however, pronounced this judgment of the ROMAN orator, as well as of the GRECIAN, that both of them ſurpaſſed in eloquence all that had ever appeared, but that they were far from reaching the perfection of their art, which was infinite, and not only exceeded human force to attain, but human imagination to conceive. CICERO declares himſelf diſſatisfied with his own performances; nay, even with thoſe of DEMOSTHENES. *Ita ſunt avidæ & capaces meæ aures*, ſays he, *& ſemper aliquid immenſum, infinitumque deſiderant.*

THIS ſingle circumſtance is ſufficient to make us apprehend the wide difference between ancient and modern eloquence, and let us ſee how much the latter is inferior to the former. Of all the polite and learned nations, BRITAIN alone poſſeſſes a popular government, or admits into the legiſlature ſuch numerous aſſemblies as can be ſuppoſed to lie under the dominion of eloquence. But what has BRITAIN to boaſt of in this particular? In enumerating all the great men, who have done honor to our country, we exult in our poets and philoſophers; but what orators are ever mentioned? Or where are the monuments of their genius to be met with? There are found indeed, in our hiſtories, the names of ſeveral, who directed the reſolutions of our parliament: But neither themſelves nor others have taken the pains to preſerve their ſpeeches; and the authority which they poſſeſſed ſeems to have been owing to their experience, wiſdom, or power, more than to their talents for oratory. At preſent, there are above half a dozen ſpeakers in the two houſes, who, in the judgment of the public, have reached very near the ſame pitch of eloquence; and no man pretends to give any one the preference to the reſt. This ſeems to me a certain proof, that none of them have attained much beyond a mediocrity in their art, and that the ſpecies of eloquence, which they aſpire to, gives no exerciſe to the ſublimer faculties of the mind, but may be reached by ordinary talents and a ſlight application. A hundred cabinet-makers in LONDON can work a table or a chair equally well; but no one poet can write verſes with ſuch ſpirit and elegance as Mr. POPE.

WE are told, that when DEMOSTHENES was to plead, all ingenious men flocked to ATHENS from the moſt remote parts of GREECE, as to the moſt celebrated ſpectacle of the world *. At LONDON you may ſee men ſauntering in the court of requeſts, while the moſt important debate is carrying on in the two houſes; and many do not think themſelves ſufficiently compenſated, for the loſing of their dinners, by all the eloquence of our moſt celebrated ſpeakers. When old CIBBER is to act, the curioſity of ſeveral is more excited, than when our prime miniſter is to defend himſelf from a motion for his removal or impeachment.

EVEN a perſon unacquainted with the noble remains of ancient orators, may judge, from a few ſtrokes, that the ſtile or ſpecies of their eloquence was infinitely more ſublime than that which modern orators aſpire to. How abſurd would it appear, in our temperate and calm ſpeakers, to make uſe of an *Apoſtrophe*, like that noble one of DEMOSTHENES, ſo much celebrated by QUINCTILIAN and LONGINUS, when, juſtifying the unſucceſsful battle of CHÆRONEA, he breaks out,

* Ne illud quidem intelligunt, non modo ita memoriæ proditum eſſe, ſed ita neceſſe fuiſſe, cum DEMOSTHENES dicturus eſſet, ut concurſus, audiendi cauſa, ex tota GRECIA fierent. At cum iſti ATTICI dicunt, non modo a corona (quod eſt ipſum miſerabile) ſed etiam ab advocatis relinquuntur. CICERO de Claris Oratoribus.

No,

No, my Fellow-Citizens, No: You have not erred. I ſwear by the manes *of thoſe heroes, who fought for the ſame cauſe in the plains of* MARATHON and PLATÆA. Who could now endure ſuch a bold and poetical figure, as that which CICERO employs, after deſcribing in the moſt tragical terms the crucifixion of a ROMAN citizen. *Should I paint the horrors of this ſcene, not to* ROMAN *citizens, not to the allies of our ſtate, not to thoſe who have ever heard of the* ROMAN *Name, not even to men, but to brute-creatures; or, to go farther, ſhould I lift up my voice, in the moſt deſolate ſolitude, to the rocks and mountains, yet ſhould I ſurely ſee thoſe rude and inanimate parts of nature moved with horror and indignation at the recital of ſo enormous an action* *. With what a blaze of eloquence muſt ſuch a ſentence be ſurrounded to give it grace, or cauſe it to make any impreſſion on the hearers? And what noble art and ſublime talents are requiſite to arrive, by juſt degrees, at a ſentiment ſo bold and exceſſive: To inflame the audience, ſo as to make them accompany the ſpeaker in ſuch violent paſſions, and ſuch elevated conceptions: And to conceal, under a torrent of eloquence, the artifice, by which all this is effectuated!

SUITABLE to this vehemence of thought and expreſſion, was the vehemence of action, obſerved in the ancient orators. The *ſupploſio pedis*, or ſtamping of the foot, was one of the moſt uſual and moderate geſtures which they made uſe of †; tho' that is now eſteemed too violent, either for the ſenate, bar, or pulpit, and is only admitted into the theatre, to accompany the moſt violent paſſions, which are there repreſented.

ONE is ſomewhat at a loſs to what cauſe we may aſcribe ſo ſenſible a decline of eloquence in latter ages. The genius of mankind, at all times, is, perhaps, equal: The moderns have applied themſelves, with great induſtry and ſucceſs, to all the other arts and ſciences: And one of the moſt learned nations of the univerſe poſſeſſes a popular government; which ſeems requiſite for the full diſplay of theſe noble talents: But notwithſtanding all theſe advantages, our progreſs in eloquence is very inconſiderable, in compariſon of the advances, which we have made in all the other parts of learning.

SHALL we aſſert, that the ſtrains of ancient eloquence are unſuitable to our age, and not to be imitated by modern orators? Whatever reaſons may be made uſe of to prove this, I am perſuaded they will be found, upon examination, to be unſound and unſatisfactory.

Firſt, IT may be ſaid, that in ancient times, during the flouriſhing period of the GREEK and ROMAN learning, the municipal laws, in every ſtate, were but few and ſimple, and the deciſion of cauſes was, in a great meaſure, left to the equity and common ſenſe of the judges. The ſtudy of the laws was not then a laborious occupation. requiring the drudgery of a whole life to finiſh it, and utterly incompatible with every other ſtudy or profeſſion. The great ſtateſmen and generals

* *The original is*; Quod ſi hæc non ad cives Romanos, non ad aliquos amicos noſtræ civitatis, non ad eos qui populi Romani nomen audiſſent; denique, ſi non ad homines, veram ad beſtias; aut etiam, ut longius progrediar, ſi in aliqua deſertiſſima ſolitudine, ad ſaxa & ad ſcopulos hæc conqueri & deplorare vellem, tamen omnia muta atque inanima, tanta & tam indigna rerum atrocitate commoverentur. Cic. in ver.

† Ubi dolor? Ubi ardor animi, qui etiam ex infantium ingeniis elicere voces & querelas ſolet? nulla perturbatio animi, nulla corporis: frons non percuſſa, non femur; pedis *(quod minimum eſt)* nulla ſupploſio. Itaque tantum abfuit ut inflammares noſtros animos; ſomnum iſto loco vix tenebamus. Cicero de Claris Oratoribus.

of ſucceeding in that attempt. It ſhould make them redouble their art, not abandon it intirely. The ancient orators ſeem alſo to have been on their guard againſt this jealouſy of their audience; but they took a different way of eluding it *. They hurried away with ſuch a torrent of ſublime and pathetic, that they left their hearers no leiſure to perceive the artifice, by which they were deceived. Nay, to conſider the matter aright, they were not deceived by any artifice. The orator, by the force of his own genius and eloquence, firſt inflamed himſelf with anger, indignation, pity, ſorrow; and then communicated thoſe impetuous movements to his audience.

Does any man pretend to have more good ſenſe than Julius Cæsar? Yet that haughty conqueror, we know, was ſo ſubdued by the charms of Cicero's eloquence, that he was, in a manner, conſtrained to change his ſettled purpoſe and reſolution, and to abſolve a criminal, whom, before that orator pleaded, he was determined to condemn.

Some objections, I own, notwithſtanding his vaſt ſucceſs, may lie againſt ſome paſſages of the Roman orator. He is too florid and rhetorical: His figures are too ſtriking and palpable: His diviſions drawn chiefly from the rules of the ſchool: And his wit diſdains not always the artifice even of a pun, rhyme, or jingle of words. The Grecian addreſſed himſelf to an audience much leſs refined than the Roman ſenate or judges. The loweſt vulgar of Athens were his ſovereigns, and the arbiters of his eloquence †. Yet is his manner much more chaſte and auſtere than that of the other. Could it be copied, its ſucceſs would be infallible over a modern aſſembly. 'Tis rapid harmony, exactly adjuſted to the ſenſe: 'Tis vehement reaſoning, without any appearance of art: 'Tis diſdain, anger, boldneſs, freedom, involved in a continued ſtream of argument: And of all human productions, the orations of Demosthenes preſent to us the models, which approach the neareſt to perfection.

Thirdly, It may be pretended, that the diſorders of the ancient governments, and the enormous crimes, of which the citizens were often guilty, afforded much ampler matter for eloquence than can be met with among the moderns. Were there no Verres or Catiline, there would be no Cicero. But that this reaſon can have no great influence, is evident. 'Twould be eaſy to find a Philip in modern times; but where ſhall we find a Demosthenes?

What remains, then, but that we lay the blame on the want of genius, or of judgment in our ſpeakers, who either found themſelves incapable of reaching the heights of ancient eloquence, or rejected all ſuch endeavors, as unſuitable to the ſpirit of modern aſſemblies? A few ſucceſsful attempts of this nature might rouze up the genius of the nation, excite the emulation of the youth, and accuſtom our ears to a more ſublime and more pathetic elocution, than what we have been hi-

* Longinus, cap. 15.

† The orators formed the taſte of the Athenian people, not the people of the orators. Gorgias Leontinus was very taking with them, till they became acquainted with a better manner. His figures of ſpeech, ſays Diodorus Siculus, his antitheſis, his ισοκωλα, his ομοιοτελευτον, which are now deſpiſed, had a great effect upon the audience. Lib. 12. page 106. *ex editione* Rhod: 'Tis in vain therefore for modern orators to plead the taſte of their hearers as an apology for their lame performances. It would be ſtrange prejudice in favor of antiquity, not to allow a British parliament to be naturally ſuperior in judgment and delicacy to an Athenian mob.

therto entertained with. There is certainly ſomething accidental in the firſt riſe and the progreſs of the arts in any nation. I doubt whether a very ſatisfactory reaſon can be given, why ancient ROME, tho' it received all its arts from GREECE, could attain only to a taſte or reliſh of ſtatuary, painting and architecture, without reaching the practice of theſe noble arts: While modern ROME has been excited, by a few remains found among the ruins of antiquity, and has carried theſe arts to the greateſt perfection. Had ſuch a cultivated genius for oratory, as WALLER's for poetry, ariſen, during the civil wars, when liberty began to be fully eſtabliſhed, and popular aſſemblies to enter into all the moſt material points of government; I am perſuaded ſo illuſtrious an example would have given a quite different turn to BRITISH eloquence, and made us reach the perfection of the ancient model. Our orators would then have done honor to their country, as well as our poets and philoſophers, and BRITISH CICEROS have appeared as well as BRITISH PLUTARCHS and VIRGILS.

I HAVE confeſt that there is ſomething accidental in the origin and progreſs of the arts in any nation; and yet I cannot forbear thinking, that if the other learned and polite nations of EUROPE had poſſeſt the ſame advantages of a popular government, they would probably have carried eloquence to a greater height than it has yet reached in BRITAIN. The FRENCH ſermons, eſpecially thoſe of FLECHIER and BOSSUET, are much ſuperior to the ENGLISH in this particular; and in both of them there are many ſtrokes of the moſt ſublime poetry. None but private cauſes, in that country, are ever debated before their parliament or courts of judicature; but notwithſtanding this diſadvantage, there appears a ſpirit of eloquence in many of their lawyers, which, with proper cultivation and encouragement, might riſe to the greateſt height. The pleadings of PATRU are very elegant, and give us room to imagine what ſo fine a genius could have performed in queſtions concerning public liberty or ſlavery, peace or war, who exerts himſelf with ſuch ſucceſs, in debates concerning the price of an old horſe, or a goſſiping ſtory of a quarrel betwixt an abbeſs and her nuns. For 'tis remarkable, that this polite writer, tho' eſteemed by all the men of wit in his time, was never employed in the moſt conſiderable cauſes of their courts of judicature, but lived and died in poverty: From an ancient prejudice induſtriouſly propagated by the dunces in all countries, *That a man of genius is unfit for buſineſs.* The diſorders produced by the factions againſt cardinal MAZARINE, made the Parliament of PARIS enter into the diſcuſſion of public affairs, and during that ſhort interval, there appeared many ſymptoms of the revival of ancient eloquence. The *avocat general*, TALON, in an oration, invoked on his knees the ſpirit of St. LOUIS to look down with compaſſion on his divided and unhappy people, and to inſpire them, from above, with the love of concord and unanimity *. The members of the FRENCH academy have attempted to give us models of eloquence in their harangues at their admittance: But, having no ſubject to diſcourſe upon, they have run altogether into a fulſome ſtrain of panegyric and flattery, the moſt barren of all ſubjects. Their ſtile, however, is commonly, on theſe occaſions, very elevated and ſublime, and might reach the greateſt heights, were it employed on a ſubject more favorable and engaging.

* DE RETZ's Memoirs.

THERE are ſome circumſtances, I confeſs, in the ENGLISH temper and genius, which are diſadvantageous to the progreſs of eloquence, and render all attempts of that kind more dangerous and difficult among them than among any other nation. The ENGLISH are conſpicuous for *good-ſenſe*, which makes them very jealous of any attempts to deceive them by the flowers of rhetoric and elocution. They are alſo peculiarly *modeſt*; which makes them conſider it as a piece of arrogance to offer any thing but reaſon to public aſſemblies, or attempt to guide them by paſſion or fancy. I may, perhaps, be allowed to add, that the people in general are not remarkable for delicacy of taſte, or for ſenſibility to the charms of the the muſes. Their *muſical parts*, to uſe the expreſſion of a noble author, are but indifferent. Hence their comic poets, to move them, muſt have recourſe to obſcenity; their tragic poets to blood and ſlaughter: And hence their orators, being deprived of any ſuch reſource, have abandoned altogether the hopes of moving them, and have confined themſelves to plain argument and reaſoning.

THESE circumſtances, joined to particular accidents, may, perhaps, have retarded the growth of eloquence in this kingdom; but will not be able to prevent its ſucceſs, if ever it appear amongſt us: And one may ſafely pronounce, that this is a field, in which the moſt flouriſhing lawrels may yet be gathered, if any youth of accompliſhed genius, thoroughly acquainted with all the polite arts, and not ignorant of public buſineſs, ſhould appear in parliament, and accuſtom our ears to an eloquence more commanding and pathetic. And to confirm me in this opinion, there occur two conſiderations, the one derived from ancient, the other from modern times.

'Tis ſeldom or never found, when a falſe taſte in poetry or eloquence prevails among any people, that it has been preferred to a true, upon compariſon and reflection. It commonly prevails merely from ignorance of the true, and from the want of perfect models, to lead men into a juſter apprehenſion, and more refined reliſh of thoſe productions of genius. When *theſe* appear, they ſoon unite all ſuffrages in their favor, and, by their natural and powerful charms, gain over, even the moſt prejudiced, to the love and admiration of them. The principles of every paſſion, and of every ſentiment, is in every man; and when touched properly, they riſe to life, and warm the heart, and convey that ſatisfaction by which a work of genius is diſtinguiſhed from the adulterate beauties of a capricious wit and fancy. And if this obſervation be true, with regard to all the liberal arts, it muſt be peculiarly ſo, with regard to eloquence; which, being merely calculated for the public, and for men of the world, cannot, with any pretext of reaſon, appeal from the people to more refined judges; but muſt ſubmit to the public verdict, without reſerve or limitation. Whoever, upon compariſon, is deemed by a common audience the greateſt orator, ought moſt certainly to be pronounced ſuch, by men of ſcience and erudition. And tho' an indifferent orator may triumph for a long time, and be eſteemed altogether perfect by the vulgar, who are ſatisfied with his accompliſhments, and know not in what he is defective: Yet, whenever the true genius ariſes, *he* draws to him the attention of every one, and immediately appears ſuperior to his rival.

Now, to judge, by this rule, ancient eloquence, that is, the ſublime and paſſionate, is of a much juſter taſte than the modern, or the argumentative and rational; and, if properly executed, will always have more command and authority

over mankind. We are ſatisfied with our mediocrity, becauſe we have had no experience of any thing better: But the ancients had experience of both, and, upon compariſon, gave the preference to that kind, of which they have left us ſuch applauded models. For, if I am not miſtaken, our modern eloquence is of the ſame ſtile or ſpecies with that which ancient critics denominated ATTIC eloquence, that is, calm, elegant and ſubtile, which inſtructed the reaſon more than affected the paſſions, and never raiſed its tone above argument or common diſcourſe. Such was the eloquence of LYSIAS among the ATHENIANS, and of CALVUS among the ROMANS. Theſe were eſteemed in their time; but when compared with DEMOSTHENES and CICERO, were eclipſed like a taper when ſet in the rays of a meridian ſun. Thoſe latter orators poſſeſſed the ſame elegance and ſubtilty, and force of argument, with the former; but what rendered them chiefly admirable, was that pathetic and ſublime, which, on proper occaſions, they threw into their diſcourſe, and by which they commanded the reſolutions of their audience.

OF this ſpecies of eloquence we have ſcarce had any inſtances in BRITAIN, at leaſt in our public ſpeakers. In our writers, we have had ſome inſtances, which have met with great applauſe, and might aſſure our ambitious youth of equal or ſuperior glory in attempts for the revival of ancient eloquence. Lord BOLINGBROKE's productions, with all their defects in argument, method, and preciſion, contain a force and energy, which our orators ſcarce ever aim at; tho' 'tis evident, that ſuch an elevated ſtile has much better grace in a ſpeaker than in a writer, and is aſſured of more prompt and more aſtoniſhing ſucceſs. 'Tis there ſeconded by the graces of voice and action: The movements are mutually communicated betwixt the orator and the audience: And the very aſpect of a large aſſembly, attentive to the diſcourſe of one man, muſt inſpire him with a peculiar elevation, ſufficient to give a propriety to the ſtrongeſt figures and expreſſions. 'Tis true, there is a great prejudice againſt *ſet-ſpeeches*; and a man can ſcarce eſcape ridicule, who repeats a diſcourſe, as a ſchool-boy his leſſon, and takes no notice of any thing which has been advanced in the courſe of the debate. But where is the neceſſity of falling into this abſurdity? A public ſpeaker muſt know beforehand the queſtion under debate. He may compoſe all the arguments, objections, and anſwers, ſuch as he thinks will be moſt proper for his diſcourſe *. If any thing new occur, he may ſupply it from his invention; nor will the difference be very apparent between his elaborate and his extemporary compoſitions. The mind naturally continues with the ſame *impetus* or *force*, which it has acquired by its motion; as a veſſel, once impelled by the oars, carries on its courſe for ſome time, when the original impulſe is ſuſpended.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that even tho' our modern orators ſhould not elevate their ſtile, or aſpire to a rivalſhip with the antient; yet there is a material defect in moſt of their ſpeeches, which they might correct, without departing from that compoſed air of argument and reaſoning, to which they limit their ambition. Their great affectation of extemporary diſcourſes has

* The firſt of the ATHENIANS, who compoſed and wrote his ſpeeches was PERICLES, a man of buſineſs and a man of ſenſe, if ever there was one Πρῶτος γραπτὸν λόγον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ εἶπε, τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν σχιδιαζόντων. Suidas in Περίκλης.

made

made them reject all order and method, which ſeems ſo requiſite to argument, and without which 'tis ſcarce poſſible to produce an entire conviction on the mind. 'Tis not, that one would recommend many formal diviſions in a public diſcourſe, unleſs the ſubject very evidently offer them: But 'tis eaſy, without this formality, to obſerve a method, and make that method conſpicuous to the hearers, who will be infinitely pleaſed to ſee the arguments riſe naturally from one another, and will retain a more thorow perſuaſion, than can ariſe from the ſtrongeſt reaſons, which are thrown together in confuſion.

ESSAY XVII.

OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES.

THERE is nothing which requires greater nicety, in our enquiries concerning human affairs, than to diſtinguiſh exactly what is owing to *chance*, and what proceeds from *cauſes*; nor is there any ſubject, in which an author is more apt to deceive himſelf, by falſe ſubtilties and refinements. To ſay, that any event is derived from chance, cuts ſhort all farther enquiry concerning it, and leaves the writer in the ſame ſtate of ignorance with the reſt of mankind. But when the event is ſuppoſed to proceed from certain and ſtable cauſes, he may then diſplay his ingenuity, in aſſigning theſe cauſes; and as a man of any ſubtilty can never be at a loſs in this particular, he has thereby an opportunity of ſwelling his volumes, and diſcovering his profound knowlege in obſerving what eſcapes the vulgar and ignorant.

THE diſtinguiſhing betwixt chance and cauſes muſt depend upon every particular man's ſagacity, in conſidering every particular incident. But, if I were to aſſign any general rule to help us in applying this diſtinction, it would be the following, *What depends upon a few perſons is, in a great meaſure, to be aſcribed to chance, or ſecret and unknown cauſes: What ariſes from a great number, may often be accounted for by determinate and known cauſes.*

THERE may two very natural reaſons be aſſigned for this rule. *Firſt*, If you ſuppoſe a dye to have any byaſs, however ſmall, to a particular ſide, this byaſs, tho' perhaps, it may not appear in a few throws, will certainly prevail in a great number, and will caſt the balance intirely to that ſide. In like manner, when any *cauſes* beget a particular inclination or paſſion, at a certain time, and among a certain people; tho' many individuals may eſcape the contagion, and be ruled by paſſions peculiar to themſelves; yet the multitude will certainly be infected with the common paſſion, and be governed by it in all their actions.

Secondly, THOSE principles or cauſes, which are fitted to operate on a multitude, are always of a groſſer and more ſtubborn nature, leſs ſubject to accidents, and leſs influenced by whim and private fancy, than thoſe which operate on a few only. The latter are commonly ſo delicate and refined, that the ſmalleſt incident in the health, education, or fortune of a particular perſon, is ſufficient to divert their courſe,

courſe, and retard their operation; nor is it poſſible to reduce them to any general maxims or obſervations. Their influence at one time, will never aſſure us concerning their influence at another; even tho' all the general circumſtances ſhould be the ſame in both caſes.

To judge by this rule, the domeſtic and the gradual revolutions of a ſtate, muſt be a more proper ſubject of reaſoning and obſervation, than the foreign and the violent, which are commonly produced by ſingle perſons, and are more influenced by whim, folly or caprice, than by general paſſions and intereſts. The depreſſion of the lords, and riſe of the commons in ENGLAND, after the ſtatutes of alienations, and the increaſe of trade and induſtry, are more eaſily accounted for by general principles, than the depreſſion of the SPANISH, and riſe of the FRENCH monarchy, after the death of CHARLES QUINT. Had HARRY IV. Cardinal RICHELIEU, and LOUIS XIV. been SPANIARDS; and PHILIP II, III, and IV, and CHARLES II. been FRENCHMEN, the hiſtory of theſe two nations had been intirely reverſed.

FOR the ſame reaſon, 'tis more eaſy to account for the riſe and progreſs of commerce in any kingdom, than for that of learning; and a ſtate, which ſhould apply itſelf to the encouragement of the one, would be much more aſſured of ſucceſs, than one which ſhould cultivate the other. Avarice, or the deſire of gain, is an univerſal paſſion, which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all perſons: But curioſity, or the love of knowlege, has a very limited influence, and requires youth, leiſure, education, genius, and example, to make it govern any perſon. You will never want bookſellers, while there are buyers of books: But there may frequently be readers, where there are no authors. Multitudes of people, neceſſity and liberty, have begot commerce in HOLLAND: But ſtudy and application have ſcarce produced any eminent writers.

WE may, therefore, conclude, that there is no ſubject, in which we muſt proceed with more caution, than in tracing the hiſtory of the arts and ſciences; leſt we aſſign cauſes which never exiſted, and reduce what is merely contingent to ſtable and univerſal principles. Thoſe, who cultivate the ſciences in any ſtate, are always few in number: the paſſion, which governs them, limited: Their taſte and judgment tender and eaſily perverted: And their application diſturbed with the ſmalleſt accident. Chance, therefore, or ſecret and unknown cauſes, muſt have a great influence on the riſe and progreſs of all the refined arts.

BUT there is a reaſon, which induces me not to aſcribe the matter altogether to chance. Tho' the perſons, who cultivate the ſciences with ſuch aſtoniſhing ſucceſs, as to attract the admiration of poſterity, be always few, in all nations and all ages: 'tis impoſſible but a ſhare of the ſame ſpirit and genius muſt be antecedently diffuſed thro' the people among whom they ariſe, in order to produce, form, and cultivate, from their earlieſt infancy, the taſte and judgment of thoſe eminent writers. The maſs cannot be altogether inſipid, from which ſuch refined ſpirits are extracted *. *There is a God within us*, ſays OVID, *who breathes that divine fire by which we are animated.* Poets, in all ages, have advanced this claim to inſpiration. There is not however any thing ſupernatural in the caſe. Their

* Eſt Deus in nobis; agitante caleſcimus illo:
Impetus hic, ſacræ ſemina mentis habet. OVID. *Faſt. Lib.* I.

fire

fire is not kindled from heaven. It only runs along the earth; is caught from one breaſt to another; and burns brighteſt, where the materials are beſt prepared, and moſt happily diſpoſed. The queſtion, therefore, concerning the riſe and progreſs of the arts and ſciences, is not altogether a queſtion concerning the taſte, genius, and ſpirit of a few, but concerning thoſe of a whole people; and may, therefore, be accounted for, in ſome meaſure, by general cauſes and principles. I grant, that a man, who ſhould enquire why ſuch a particular poet, as HOMER, for inſtance, exiſted in ſuch a place, at ſuch a time, would throw himſelf head-long into chimæra, and could never treat of ſuch a ſubject, without a multitude of falſe ſubtilties and refinements. He might as well pretend to give a reaſon, why ſuch particular generals, as FABIUS and SCIPIO, lived in ROME at ſuch a time, and why FABIUS came into the world before SCIPIO. For ſuch incidents as thoſe, no other reaſon can be given but that of HORACE.

Scit genius, natale comes, qui temperat aſtrum,
Naturæ Deus humanæ, mortalis in unum ———
——*Quodque caput, vultu mutabilis, albus & ater.*

BUT, I am perſuaded, that in many caſes very good reaſons might be given, why ſuch a particular nation is more polite and learned, at a particular time, than any of its neighbors. At leaſt, this is ſo curious a ſubject, that it were a pity to abandon it intirely, before we have found, whether or not it be ſuſceptible of reaſoning, and can be reduced to any general principles. I ſhall therefore proceed to deliver a few obſervations on this ſubject, which I ſubmit, with entire deference, to the cenſure and examination of the learned.

My firſt obſervation is, *That it is impoſſible for the arts and ſciences to ariſe, at firſt, among any people, unleſs that people enjoy the bleſſing of a free government.*

IN the firſt ages of the world, when men are, as yet, barbarous and ignorant, they ſeek no farther ſecurity againſt mutual violence and injuſtice, than the choice of ſome rulers, few or many, in whom they place an implicite confidence, without providing any ſecurity, by laws or political inſtitutions, againſt the violence and injuſtice of theſe rulers. If the authority be centred in a ſingle perſon, and if the people, either by conqueſt, or by the ordinary courſe of propagation, increaſe to a great multitude, the monarch, finding it impoſſible, in his own perſon, to execute every office of ſovereignty, in every place, muſt delegate his authority to inferior magiſtrates, who preſerve peace and order in their particular diſtricts. As experience and education have not yet refined the judgments of men to any conſiderable degree, the prince, who is himſelf unreſtrained, never dreams of reſtraining his miniſters, but delegates his full authority to every one, whom he ſets over any portion of the people. All general laws are attended with inconveniencies, when applied to particular caſes; and it requires great penetration and experience, both to perceive that theſe inconveniencies are fewer than what reſult from full diſcretionary powers in every magiſtrate; and alſo, to diſcern what general laws are, upon the whole, attended with feweſt inconveniencies. This is a matter of ſo great difficulty, that men may have made ſome advances, even in the ſublime arts of poetry and eloquence, where a rapidity of genius and imagination aſſiſts their progreſs, before they have arrived at any great refinement in their municipal laws, where frequent trials, and diligent obſervation can alone direct their improve-

improvements. It is not, therefore, to be ſuppoſed, that a barbarous monarch, unreſtrained and uninſtructed, will ever become a legiſlator, or think of reſtraining his *Baſhas* in every province, or even his *Cadis* in every village. We are told, that the late *Czar*, tho' actuated with a noble genius, and ſmit with the love and admiration of EUROPEAN arts; yet profeſſed an eſteem for the TURKISH policy in this particular, and approved of ſuch ſummary deciſions of cauſes, as are practiſed in that barbarous monarchy, where the judges are not reſtrained by any methods, forms, or laws. He did not perceive, how contrary ſuch a practice would have been to all his other endeavors for refining his people. Deſpotic power, in all caſes, is ſomewhat oppreſſive and debaſing; but 'tis altogether ruinous and intolerable, when contracted into a ſmall compaſs; and becomes ſtill worſe, when the perſon, who poſſeſſes it, knows that the time of his authority is limited and uncertain. *Habet ſubjectos tanquam ſuos; viles, ut alienos* *. He governs the ſubjects with full authority, as if they were his own; and with negligence or tyranny, as belonging to another. A people governed after ſuch a manner are *ſlaves*, in the full and proper ſenſe of the word; and 'tis impoſſible they can ever aſpire to any refinements of taſte or reaſon. They dare not ſo much as pretend to enjoy the neceſſaries of life in plenty or ſecurity.

To expect therefore, that the arts and ſciences ſhould take their firſt riſe in a monarchy, is to expect a contradiction. Before theſe refinements have taken place, the monarch is ignorant and uninſtructed; and, not having knowlege ſufficient to make him ſenſible of the neceſſity of balancing his government upon general laws, he delegates his full powers to all inferior magiſtrates. This barbarous policy debaſes the people, and for ever prevents all improvement. Were it poſſible, that, before ſcience was known in the world, a monarch could poſſeſs ſo much wiſdom as to become a legiſlator, and govern his people by law, not by the arbitrary will of their fellow ſubjects, it might be poſſible for that ſpecies of government to be the firſt nurſery of arts and ſciences. But in that ſuppoſition there ſeems to be a manifeſt contradiction.

'TIS poſſible, that a republic, in its infant-ſtate, may be ſupported by as few laws as a barbarous monarchy, and may entruſt as unlimited an authority to its magiſtrates or judges. But, beſides that the frequent elections of theſe magiſtrates by the people, are a conſiderable check upon their authority; 'tis impoſſible, but, in time, the neceſſity of reſtraining the magiſtrates, in order to preſerve liberty, muſt at laſt appear, and give riſe to general laws and ſtatutes. The ROMAN Conſuls, for ſome time, decided, all cauſes, without being confined by any poſitive ſtatutes, till the people, bearing this yoke with impatience, created the *decemvirs*, who promulgated the *twelve tables*: a body of laws, which, tho', perhaps, they were not equal in bulk to one ENGLISH act of parliament, were almoſt the only written rules which regulated property and puniſhment, for ſome ages, in that famous republic. They were, however, ſufficient, together with the forms of a free government, to ſecure the lives and properties of the citizens; to exempt one man from the dominion of another; and to protect every one againſt the violence or tyranny of his fellow citizens. In ſuch a ſituation the ſciences may raiſe their heads, and flouriſh: But never can have being amidſt ſuch a ſcene of oppreſſion and ſlavery, as always reſults from barbarous monarchies, where the people alone are reſtrained by the authority of the magiſtrates, and the ma-

* TACIT. Hiſt. lib. 1.

giſtrates are not reſtrained by any law or ſtatute. An unlimited deſpotiſm of this nature, while it exiſts, effectually puts a ſtop to all improvements, and keeps men from attaining that knowlege, which is requiſite to inſtruct them in the advantages ariſing from a better police, and more moderate authority.

HERE then are the advantages of republics. Tho' a republic ſhould be barbarous, it neceſſarily, by an infallible operation, gives riſe to LAW, even before mankind have made any conſiderable advances in the other ſciences. From law ariſes ſecurity: From ſecurity curioſity: And from curioſity knowlege. The latter ſteps of this progreſs may be more accidental; but the former are altogether neceſſary. A republic, without laws, can never have any duration. On the contrary, in a monarchical government, law ariſes not neceſſarily from the forms of the government. Monarchy, when abſolute, contains even ſomething repugnant to law. Great wiſdom and reflexion can alone reconcile them. But ſuch a degree of wiſdom can never be expected, before the greater refinements and improvements of human reaſon. Theſe refinements require curioſity, ſecurity and law. The *firſt* growth, therefore, of the arts and ſciences can never be expected in deſpotic governments.

ACCORDING to the neceſſary progreſs of things, law muſt precede ſcience. In republics law may precede ſcience, and may ariſe from the very nature of the government. In monarchies it ariſes not from the nature of the government, and cannot precede ſcience. An abſolute prince, who is barbarous, renders all his miniſters and magiſtrates as abſolute as himſelf: And there needs no more to prevent, for ever, all induſtry, curioſity, and ſcience.

THERE are other cauſes which diſcourage the riſe of the refined arts in deſpotic governments; tho' I take the want of laws, and the delegation of full powers to every petty magiſtrate, to be the principal. Eloquence certainly ariſes more naturally in popular governments: Emulation too, in every accompliſhment, muſt be there more animated and enlivened: And genius and capacity have a fuller ſcope and career. All theſe cauſes render free governments the only proper *nurſery* for the arts and ſciences.

THE ſecond obſervation which I ſhall make on this head, is, *That nothing is more favorable to the riſe of politeneſs and learning, than a number of neighboring independent ſtates connected together by commerce and policy.* The emulation, which naturally riſes among thoſe neighboring ſtates, is an obvious ſource of improvement: But what I would chiefly inſiſt on is the ſtop, which ſuch limited territories give both to *power* and to *authority*.

EXTENDED governments, where a ſingle perſon has great influence, become ſoon deſpotic; but ſmall ones change naturally into commonwealths. A large government is accuſtomed by degrees to tyranny; becauſe each act of violence is at firſt performed upon a part, which, being diſtant from the majority, is not taken notice of, nor excites any violent ferment. Beſides, a large government, tho' the whole be diſcontented, may, by a little art, be kept in obedience; while each part, ignorant of the reſolutions of the reſt, is afraid to begin any commotion or inſurrection. Not to mention, that there is a ſuperſtitious reverence for princes, which mankind naturally fall into when they do not often ſee the ſovereign, and when many of them become not acquainted with him, ſo as to perceive his weakneſſes. And as large ſtates can afford a great expence, in order to

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weak ſides of that philoſophy? The ſevereſt ſcrutiny, which NEWTON's theory has undergone, proceeded not from his countrymen but from foreigners; and if it can overcome the obſtacles which it meets with at preſent in all parts of EUROPE, it will probably go down triumphant to the lateſt poſterity. The ENGLISH are become ſenſible of the ſcandalous licentiouſneſs of their ſtage, from the example of the FRENCH decency and morals. The FRENCH are convinced, that their theatre has become ſomewhat effeminate, by too much love and gallantry; and begin to approve of the more maſculine taſte of ſome neighboring nations.

IN CHINA there ſeems to be a pretty conſiderable ſtock of politeneſs and ſcience, which, in the courſe of ſo many centuries, might naturally be expected to ripen into ſomething more perfect and finiſhed, than what has yet ariſen from them. But CHINA is one vaſt empire, ſpeaking one language, governed by one law, and ſympathizing in the ſame manners. The authority of any teacher, ſuch as CONFUSIUS, was propagated eaſily from one corner of the empire to another. None had courage to reſiſt the torrent of popular opinion. And poſterity were not bold enough to diſpute what had been univerſally received by their anceſtors. This ſeems to be one natural reaſon, why the ſciences have made ſo ſlow a progreſs in that mighty empire *.

IF we conſider the face of the globe, EUROPE, of all the four parts of the world, is the moſt broken by ſeas, rivers, and mountains; and GREECE of all countries of EUROPE. Hence theſe regions were naturally divided into ſeveral diſtinct governments. And hence the ſciences aroſe in GREECE; and EUROPE has been hitherto the moſt conſtant habitation of them.

I HAVE ſometimes been inclined to think, that interruptions in the periods of learning, were they not attended with ſuch a deſtruction of ancient books, and the records of hiſtory, would be rather favorable to the arts and ſciences, by breaking the progreſs of authority, and dethroning the tyrannical uſurpers over human reaſon. In this particular, they have the ſame influence, as interruptions in political governments and ſocieties. Conſider the blind ſubmiſſion of the ancient philoſophers to the ſeveral maſters in each ſchool, and you will be convinced, that no good could ever be expected from an hundred centuries of ſuch a ſervile philoſophy. Even the ECLECTICS, who aroſe about the age of AUGUSTUS, notwithſtanding their profeſſing to chuſe freely what pleaſed them from every dif-

* If it be aſked how we can reconcile to the foregoing principles the happineſs, riches, and good police of the CHINESE, who have always been governed by a ſole monarch, and can ſcarce form an idea of a free government; I would anſwer, that tho' the CHINESE government be a pure monarchy, it is not, properly ſpeaking, abſolute. This proceeds from a peculiarity of the ſituation of that country: They have no neighbors, except the TARTARS, from whom they were, in ſome meaſure, ſecured, at leaſt ſeemed to be ſecured, by their famous wall, and by the great ſuperiority of their numbers. By this means, military diſcipline has always been much neglected amongſt them; and their ſtanding forces are mere militia, of the worſt kind; and unfit to ſuppreſs any general inſurrection in countries ſo extremely populous. The ſword therefore, may properly be ſaid to be always in the hands of the people, which is a ſufficient reſtraint upon the monarch, and obliges him to lay his *mandarins* or governors of provinces under the reſtraint of general laws, in order to prevent thoſe rebellions, which we learn from hiſtory to have been ſo frequent and dangerous in that government. Perhaps, a pure monarchy of this kind, were it fitted for defence againſt foreign enemies, would be the beſt of all governments, as having both the tranquillity attending kingly power, and the moderation and liberty of popular aſſemblies.

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ferent ſect, were yet, in the main, as ſlaviſh and dependent as any of their brethren; ſince they ſought for truth, not in nature, but in the ſeveral ſchools; where they ſuppoſed ſhe muſt neceſſarily be found, tho' not united in a body, yet diſperſed in parts. Upon the revival of learning, thoſe ſects of STOICS and EPICUREANS, PLATONISTS, and PYTHAGOREANS, could never regain any credit or authority; and, at the ſame time, by the example of their fall, kept men from ſubmitting, with ſuch blind deference, to thoſe new ſects, which have attempted to gain an aſcendant over them.

THE *third* obſervation, which I ſhall form on this head, of the riſe and progreſs of the arts and ſciences, is, *That tho' the only proper* Nurſery *of theſe noble plants be a free government, yet they may be tranſplanted into any government; and that a republic is moſt favorable to the growth of the ſciences, and a civilized monarchy to that of the polite arts.*

To balance a large ſtate or ſociety, whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of ſo great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehenſive, is able, by the mere dint of reaſon and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many muſt unite in this work: Experience muſt guide their labor: Time muſt bring it to perfection: And the feeling of inconveniencies muſt correct the miſtakes, which they inevitably fall into, in their firſt trials and experiments. Hence the impoſſibility appears, that this undertaking ſhould be begun and carried on in any monarchy; ſince ſuch a form of government, e're civilized, knows no other ſecret in policy, than that of entruſting unlimited powers with every governor or magiſtrate, and ſubdividing the people into ſo many claſſes and orders of ſlavery. From ſuch a ſituation, no improvements can ever be expected in the ſciences, in the liberal arts, in laws, and ſcarce in the manual arts or manufactures. The ſame barbariſm and ignorance, with which the government commences, is propagated to all poſterity, and can never come to a period by the efforts or ingenuity of ſuch unhappy ſlaves.

BUT tho' law, the ſource of all ſecurity and happineſs, ariſes late in any government, and is the ſlow product of order and of liberty, it is not preſerved with the ſame difficulty, with which it is produced; but when it has once taken root, is a hardy plant, which will ſcarce ever periſh thro' the ill culture of men, or the rigor of the ſeaſons. The arts of luxury, and much more the liberal arts, which depend on a refined taſte or ſentiment, are eaſily loſt: becauſe they are always reliſhed by a few only, whoſe leiſure, fortune and genius fit them for ſuch amuſements. But what is profitable to every mortal, and in common life, when once diſcovered, can ſcarce ever periſh, but by the total ſubverſion of ſociety, and by ſuch furious inundations of barbarous invaders, as obliterate all memory of former arts and civility. Imitation alſo is apt to tranſport theſe coarſer and more uſeful arts from one climate to another, and make them precede the refined arts in their progreſs; tho' perhaps they ſprang after them in their firſt riſe and propagation. From theſe cauſes proceed civilized monarchies, where the arts of government, firſt invented in free ſtates, are preſerved to the mutual advantage and ſecurity of ſovereign and ſubject.

HOWEVER perfect, therefore, the monarchical form may appear to ſome politicians, it owes all its perfection to the republican; nor is it poſſible, that a pure deſpotiſm, eſtabliſhed among a barbarous people, can ever, by its native force

and energy, refine and poliſh itſelf. It muſt borrow its laws, and methods, and inſtitutions, and conſequently its ſtability and order, from free governments. Theſe advantages are the ſole growth of republics. The extenſive deſpotiſm of a barbarous monarchy, by entering into the detail of the government, as well as into the principal points of adminiſtration, for ever prevents all ſuch improvements.

In a civilized monarchy, the prince alone is unreſtrained in the exerciſe of his authority, and poſſeſſes alone a power, which is not bounded by any thing but cuſtom, example, and the ſenſe of his own intereſt. Every miniſter or magiſtrate, however eminent, muſt ſubmit to the general laws, which govern the whole ſociety, and muſt exert the authority delegated to him after the manner, which is preſcribed. The people depend on none but their ſovereign, for the ſecurity of their property. He is ſo far removed from them, and is ſo much exempt from private jealouſies or intereſts, that this dependence is not felt. And thus a ſpecies of government ariſes, to which, in a high political rant, we may give the name of *Tyranny*, but which, by a juſt and prudent adminiſtration, may afford tolerable ſecurity to the people, and may fulfil moſt of the ends of political ſociety.

But tho' in a civilized monarchy, as well as in a republic, the people have ſecurity for the enjoyment of their property; yet in both theſe forms of government, thoſe who poſſeſs the ſupreme authority have the diſpoſal of many honors and advantages, which excite the ambition and avarice of mankind. The only difference is, that in a republic, the candidates for offices muſt look downwards, to gain the ſuffrages of the people; in a monarchy, they muſt turn their attention upwards, to court the good graces and favor of the great. To be ſucceſsful in the former way, 'tis neceſſary for a man to make himſelf *uſeful*, by his induſtry, capacity, or knowlege: To be proſperous in the latter way, 'tis requiſite for him to render himſelf *agreeable*, by his wit, complaiſance, or civility. A ſtrong genius ſucceeds beſt in republics: A refined taſte in monarchies. And conſequently the ſciences are the more natural growth of the one, and the polite arts of the other.

Not to mention, that monarchies, receiving their chief ſtability from a ſuperſtitious reverence to prieſts and princes, have almoſt always abriged the liberty of reaſoning, with regard to religion and politics, and conſequently metaphyſics and morals. All theſe form the moſt conſiderable branches of ſcience. Mathematics and natural philoſophy, which only remain, are not half ſo valuable.

There is a very great connection among all the arts, which contribute to pleaſure; and the ſame delicacy of taſte, which enables us to make improvements in one, will not allow the others to remain altogether rude and barbarous. Amongſt all the arts of converſation, no one pleaſes more than mutual deference or civility, which leads us to reſign our own inclinations to thoſe of our companion, and to curb and conceal that preſumption and arrogance ſo natural to the human mind. A good-natured man, who is well educated, practiſes this civility to every mortal, without premeditation or intereſt. But, in order to render that valuable quality general among any people, it ſeems neceſſary to aſſiſt the natural diſpoſitions by ſome general motive. Where power riſes upwards from the

repreſents his friend ATTICUS, in thoſe dialogues, where he himſelf is introduced as a ſpeaker. That learned and virtuous ROMAN, whoſe dignity, tho' he was only a private gentleman, was inferior to that of no one in ROME, is there ſhewn in rather a more pitiful light than PHILALETHES's friend in our modern dialogues. He is a humble admirer of the orator, pays him frequent compliments, and receives his inſtructions, with all the deference that a ſcholar owes to his maſter *. Even CATO is treated in ſomewhat a cavalier manner in the dialogues *de finibus*. And 'tis remarkable, that CICERO, being a great ſceptic in matters of religion, and unwilling to determine any thing on that head among the different ſects of philoſophy, introduces his friends diſputing concerning the being and nature of the gods, while he is only a hearer; becauſe, forſooth, it would have been an impropriety for ſo great a genius as himſelf, had he ſpoke, not to have ſaid ſomething deciſive on the ſubject, and have carried every thing before him, as he always does on other occaſions. There is alſo a ſpirit of dialogue obſerved in the eloquent books *de Oratore*, and a tolerable equality maintained among the ſpeakers: But then theſe ſpeakers are the great men of the age preceding the author, and he recounts the conference as only from hearſay.

ONE of the moſt particular details of a real dialogue, which we meet with in antiquity is related by POLYBIUS †, when PHILIP, king of MACEDON, a prince of wit and parts, met with TITUS FLAMININUS, one of the politeſt of the ROMANS as we learn from PLUTARCH ‡, accompanied with ambaſſadors from almoſt all the GREEK cities. The ÆTOLIAN ambaſſador very abruptly tells the king, that he talked like a fool or a madman (ληρειν) *That's evident*, ſays his majeſty, *even to a blind man*; which was a raillery on the blindneſs of his excellency. Yet all this paſt not the uſual bounds: For the conference was not diſturbed; and FLAMININUS was very well diverted with theſe ſtrokes of humor. At the end, when PHILIP craved a little time to conſult with his friends, of whom he had none preſent, the ROMAN general, being deſirous alſo to ſhew his wit, as the hiſtorian ſays, tells him, *that perhaps the reaſon, why he had none of his friends with him, was becauſe he had murdered them all*; which was actually the caſe. This unprovoked piece of ruſticity is not condemned by the hiſtorian, cauſed no farther reſentment in PHILIP, than to excite a SARDONIAN ſmile, or what we call a grin, and hindered him not from renewing the conference next day. PLUTARCH ‖ too mentions this raillery amongſt the witty and agreeable ſayings of FLAMININUS.

'Tis but an indifferent compliment, which HORACE pays to his friend GROSPHUS, in the ode addreſſed to him. *No one*, ſays he, *is happy in every reſpect. And I may perhaps enjoy ſome advantages, which you are deprived of. You poſſeſs great riches: Your bellowing herds cover the* SILICIAN *plains: Your chariot is drawn by the fineſt horſes: And you are arrayed in the richeſt purple. But the indulgent fates, with a ſmall inheritance, have given* ME *a fine genius, and have endowed me with a contempt for the malignant judgments of the vulgar* ‡. PHÆDRUS, ſays to his patron,

* ATT. Non mihi videtur ad beate vivendum ſatis eſſe virtutem. MAR. At hercule BRUTO meo videtur; cujus ego judicium, pace tua dixerim, longe antepono tuo. TUSC. Quæ. lib. 5.

† Lib. 17. ‡ In vita FLAMIN.

‖ In vita FLAMIN.

‡ —— Nihil eſt ab omni
Parte beatum.
Abſtudit clarum cita mors ACHILLEM,
Longa TITHONUM minuit ſenectus,
Et mihi forſan, tibi quod negarit,
Porriget hora.

tron, EUTYCHUS, *If you intend to read my works, I ſhall be pleaſed: If not, I ſhall, at leaſt, have the advantage of pleaſing poſterity* *. I am apt to think that a modern poet would not have been guilty of ſuch an impropriety as that which may be obſerved in VIRGIL's addreſs to AUGUSTUS, when, after a great deal of extravagant flattery, and after having deifyed the emperor, according to the cuſtom of thoſe times, he, at laſt, places this god on the ſame level with himſelf. *By your gracious nod*, ſays he, *render my undertaking proſperous*; *and taking pity*, together with me, *of the Swains ignorant of huſbandry, beſtow your favorable influence on this work* †. Had men, in that age, been accuſtomed to obſerve ſuch niceties, a writer ſo delicate as VIRGIL would certainly have given a different turn to this ſentence. The court of AUGUSTUS, however polite, had not yet, it ſeems, wore off the manners of the republic.

CARDINAL WOLSEY apologized for his famous piece of inſolence, in ſaying, EGO ET REX MEUS, *I and my king*, by obſerving, that this expreſſion was exactly conformable to the *Latin* idiom, and that a ROMAN always named himſelf before the perſon to whom, or of whom he ſpake. Yet this ſeems to have been an inſtance of want of civility among that people. The ancients made it a rule, That the perſon of the greateſt dignity ſhould be mentioned firſt in the diſcourſe; inſomuch, that we find, the ſpring of a quarrel and jealouſy between the ROMANS and ÆTOLIANS, to have been a poet's naming the ÆTOLIANS before the ROMANS, in celebrating a victory gained by their united arms over the MACEDONIANS ‡. Thus LIVIA diſguſted TIBERIUS by placing her own name before his in an inſcription ‖.

No advantages in this world are pure and unmixed. In like manner, as modern politeneſs, which is naturally ſo ornamental, runs often into affectation and foppery and diſguiſe and inſincerity; ſo the ancient ſimplicity, which is naturally ſo amiable and affecting, often degenerates into ruſticity and abuſe, ſcurrility and obſcenity.

Te greges centum, Siculæque circum
Mugiunt vaccæ: tibi tollit, hinni-
Tum apta quadrigis equa: te bis Afro
Murice tinctæ
Veſtiunt lanæ: mihi parva rura, &
Spiritum Graiæ tenuem Camœnæ
Parca non mendax dedit & malignum
Spernere vulgus. Lib. 2. Ode 16.

* Quem ſi leges, lætabor; ſin autem minus,
Habebunt certe quo ſe oblectent poſteri.

† Ignaroſque viæ *mecum* miſeratus agreſtes
Ingredere, & votis jam nunc aſſueſce vocari.

One would not ſay to a prince or great man, "When you and I were in ſuch a place, we ſaw "ſuch a thing happen." But, "when you were "in ſuch a place, I attended you: And ſuch a "thing happened."

Here I cannot forbear mentioning a piece of delicacy obſerved in FRANCE, which ſeems to me exceſſive and ridiculous. You muſt not ſay, "That is "a very fine dog, madam." But, "madam, that "is a very fine dog." They think it indecent that thoſe words, *dog* and *madam*, ſhould be coupled together in the ſentence; tho' they have no reference to each other in the ſenſe.

After all, I acknowlege, that this reaſoning from ſingle paſſages of ancient authors may ſeem fallacious; and that the foregoing arguments cannot have great force, but with thoſe who are well acquainted with theſe writers, and know the truth of the general poſition. For inſtance, what abſurdity would it be to aſſert, that VIRGIL underſtood not the force of the terms he employs, and could not chuſe his epithets with propriety? Becauſe in the following lines, addreſſed alſo to AUGUSTUS, he has failed in that particular, and has aſcribed to the INDIANS a quality, which ſeems, in a manner, to turn his hero into ridicule.

—— Et te, maxime CÆSAR,
Qui nunc extremis ASIÆ jam victor in oris
Imbellem avertis ROMANIS arcibus Indum.
Georg. Lib. 2.

‡ PLUT. in vita FLAMININI.

‖ TACIT. Ann. lib. 3. cap. 64.

If the ſuperiority in politeneſs ſhould be allowed to modern times, the modern notions of *gallantry* and *honor*, the natural product of courts and monarchies, will probably be aſſigned as the cauſes of this refinement. No one denies theſe inventions to be modern *: But ſome of the moſt zealous partizans of the ancients, have aſſerted them to be foppiſh and ridiculous, and a reproach, rather than a credit to the preſent age †. It may here be proper to examine this queſtion, with regard both to gallantry and honor. We ſhall begin with gallantry.

NATURE has implanted in all living creatures an affection betwixt the ſexes, which even in the fierceſt and moſt rapacious animals, is not merely confined to the ſatisfaction of the bodily appetite, but begets a friendſhip and mutual ſympathy, which runs thro' the whole tenor of their lives. Nay, even in thoſe ſpecies, where nature limits the indulgence of this appetite to one ſeaſon and to one object, and forms a kind of marriage or aſſociation betwixt a ſingle male and female, there is yet a viſible complacency and benevolence, which extends farther, and mutually ſoftens the affections of the ſexes towards each other ‡. How much more muſt this have place in man, where the confinement of the appetite is not natural; but either proceeds accidentally from ſome ſtrong charm of love, or ariſes from reflections on duty and convenience? Nothing, therefore, can proceed leſs from affectation than the paſſion of gallantry. 'Tis *natural* in the higheſt degree. Art and education, in the moſt elegant courts, make no more alteration on it, than on all the other laudable paſſions. They only turn the mind more towards it; they refine it; they poliſh it; and give it a proper grace and expreſſion.

BUT gallantry is as *generous* as it is *natural*. To correct ſuch groſs vices, as lead us to commit a real injury to others, is the part of morals, and the object of the moſt ordinary education. Where *that* is not attended to, in ſome degree, no human ſociety can ſubſiſt. But in order to render converſation, and the intercourſe of minds more eaſy and agreeable, Good-manners have been invented, and have carried the matter ſomewhat farther. Wherever nature has given the mind a propenſity to any vice, or to any paſſion diſagreeable to others, refined breeding has taught men to throw the byaſs on the oppoſite ſide, and to preſerve, in all their behavior, the appearance of ſentiments contrary to thoſe which they naturally incline to. Thus, as we are commonly proud and ſelfiſh, and apt to aſſume the preference above others, a polite man learns to behave with deference towards thoſe with whom he converſes, and to yield the ſuperiority to them in all the common incidents of ſociety. In like manner, wherever a perſon's ſituation may naturally beget any diſagreeable ſuſpicion in him, 'tis the part of good-manners to prevent it, by a ſtudied diſplay of ſentiments, directly contrary to thoſe of which he is apt to be jealous. Thus, old men know their infirmities, and naturally dread contempt from the youth: Hence, well-educated youth, redouble the inſtances of reſpect and deference to their elders. Strangers and foreigners are without protec-

* IN the *Self-Tormentor* of TERENCE, CLINIAS, whenever he comes to town, inſtead of waiting on his miſtreſs, ſends for her to come to him.

† My Lord SHAFTSBURY, ſee his *Moraliſts*.

‡ Tutti gli altri animai, che ſono in terra,
O che vivon quieti & ſtanno in pace;
O ſi vengon a riſſa, & ſi fan guerra,
A la femina il maſchio non la face.
L'orſa con l'orſo al boſco ſicura erra,
La Leoneſſa appréſſo il Leon giace,
Con Lupo vive il Lupa ſicura.
Ne la Guivenca ha del Torel paura.
ARIOSTO, Canto 5.

I MUST confeſs, That my own particular choice rather leads me to prefer the company of a few ſelect companions, with whom I can, calmly and peaceably enjoy the feaſt of reaſon, and try the juſtneſs of every reflection, whether gay or ſerious, that may occur to me. But as ſuch a delightful ſociety is not every day to be met with, I muſt think, that mixt companies, without the fair-ſex, are the moſt inſipid entertainment in the world, and deſtitute of gaiety and politeneſs, as much as of ſenſe and reaſon. Nothing can keep them from exceſſive dulneſs but hard drinking; a remedy worſe than the diſeaſe.

AMONG the ancients, the character of the fair-ſex was conſidered as altogether domeſtic, nor were they regarded as part of the polite world, or of good company. This, perhaps, is the true reaſon why the ancients have not left us one piece of pleaſantry, that is excellent, (unleſs one may except the banquet of XENOPHON, and the dialogues of LUCIAN) tho' many of their ſerious compoſitions are altogether inimitable. HORACE condemns the coarſe railleries and cold jeſts of PLAUTUS: But, tho' the moſt eaſy, agreeable, and judicious writer in the world, is his own talent for ridicule very ſtriking or refined? This, therefore, is one conſiderable improvement, which the polite arts have received from gallantry, and from courts, where it firſt aroſe.

THE point of *honor*, or duelling, is a modern invention, as well as *gallantry*; and by ſome eſteemed equally uſeful for the refining of manners: But how it has contributed to that effect, I am at a loſs to determine. Converſation, among the greateſt ruſtics, is not commonly infeſted with ſuch rudeneſs as can give occaſion to duels, even according to the moſt refined laws of this fantaſtic honor; and, as to the other ſmall indecencies, which are the moſt offenſive, becauſe the moſt frequent, they can never be cured by the practice of duelling. But theſe notions are not only *uſeleſs*: They are alſo *pernicious*. By ſeparating the man of honor from the man of virtue, the greateſt profligates have got ſomething to value themſelves upon, and have been able to keep themſelves in countenance, tho' guilty of the moſt ſhameful and moſt dangerous vices. They are debauchees, ſpend-thrifts, and never pay a farthing they owe: But they are men of honor; and therefore are to be received as gentlemen in all companies.

THERE are ſome of the parts of modern honor, which are the moſt eſſential parts of morality; ſuch as fidelity, the obſerving promiſes, and telling truth. Theſe points of honor Mr. ADDISON had in his eye, when he made JUBA ſay,

Honor's a ſacred tye, the law of kings,
The noble mind's diſtinguiſhing perfection,
That aids and ſtrengthens virtue, when it meets her,
And imitates her actions where ſhe is not:
It ought not to be ſported with.

Theſe lines are very beautiful: But I am afraid, that Mr. ADDISON has here been guilty of that impropriety of ſentiment, with which, on other occaſions, he has ſo juſtly reproached our poets. The ancients certainly never had any notion of *honor* as diſtinct from *virtue*.

BUT, to return from this digreſſion, I ſhall advance it as a *fourth* obſervation on this head, of the riſe and progreſs of the arts and ſciences, *That when the arts and ſciences come to perfection in any ſtate, from that moment they naturally, or rather*

neceſſarily decline, and ſeldom or never revive in that nation, where they formerly flouriſhed.

IT muſt be confeſſed, that this maxim, tho' conformable to experience, may, at firſt ſight, be eſteemed very contrary to reaſon. If the natural genius of mankind be the ſame in all ages, and in almoſt all countries, (as I am of opinion it is) it muſt very much forward and cultivate this genius, to be poſſeſſed of exact patterns in every art, which may regulate the taſte, and fix the objects of imitation. The models left us by the ancients gave birth to all the arts about 200 years ago, and have mightily advanced their progreſs in every country of EUROPE: Why had they not a like effect during the reign of TRAJAN and his ſucceſſors, when they were much more entire, and were ſtill admired and ſtudied by the whole world? So late as the emperor JUSTINIAN, the POET, by way of diſtinction, was underſtood, among the GREEKS, to be HOMER; among the ROMANS, VIRGIL. Such admiration ſtill remained for theſe divine geniuſes; tho' no poet had appeared for many centuries, who could juſtly pretend to have imitated them.

A MAN's genius is always in the beginning of his life, as much unknown to himſelf as to others; and 'tis only after frequent trials, attended with ſucceſs, that he dares think himſelf equal to thoſe undertakings, in which they who have ſucceeded, have fixed the admiration of mankind. If his own nation be already poſſeſſed of many models of eloquence, he naturally compares his own juvenile exerciſes with theſe; and being ſenſible of the infinite diſproportion betwixt them, is diſcouraged from any further attempts, and never aims at a rivalſhip with thoſe authors, whom he ſo much admires. A noble emulation is the ſource of every excellence. Admiration and modeſty naturally extinguiſh this emulation. And no one is ſo liable to an exceſs of admiration and modeſty, as a truly great genius.

NEXT to emulation, the greateſt encourager of the noble arts is praiſe and glory. A writer is animated with new force, when he hears the applauſes of the world for his former productions; and, being rouzed by ſuch a motive, he often reaches a pitch of perfection, which is equally ſurprizing to himſelf and to his readers. But when the poſts of honour are all occupied, his firſt attempts are but coldly received by the public; being compared to productions, which are both in themſelves more excellent, and have already the advantage of an eſtabliſhed reputation. Were MOLIERE and CORNEILLE to bring upon the ſtage at preſent their early productions, which were formerly ſo well received, it would diſcourage the young poets, to ſee the indifference and diſdain of the public. The ignorance of the age alone could have given admiſſion to the *Prince of* TYRE; but 'tis to that we owe *the Moor:* Had *Every man in his humor* been rejected, we had never ſeen VOLPONE.

PERHAPS it may not be for the advantage of any nation, to have the arts imported from their neighbors in too great perfection. This extinguiſhes emulation, and ſinks the ardor of the generous youth. So many perfect models of ITALIAN painting brought into BRITAIN, inſtead of exciting our artiſts, is the cauſe of their ſmall progreſs in that noble art. The ſame, perhaps, was the caſe of ROME, when it received the arts from GREECE. That multitude of polite productions in the FRENCH language, diſperſed all over GERMANY and the NORTH, hinder theſe nations from cultivating their own language, and keep them ſtill dependent on their neighbors for thoſe elegant entertainments.

'TIS

'Tis true, the ancients had left us models in every kind of writing, which are highly worthy of admiration. But beſides that they were wrote in languages, which were known only to the learned; beſides this, I ſay, the compariſon is not ſo perfect nor intire between modern wits, and thoſe who lived in ſo remote an age. Had WALLER been born in ROME, during the reign of TIBERIUS, his firſt productions had been deſpiſed, when compared to the finiſhed odes of HORACE. But in this iſland the ſuperiority of the ROMAN poet diminiſhed nothing from the fame of the ENGLISH. We eſteemed ourſelves ſufficiently happy, that our climate and language could produce but a faint copy of ſo excellent an original.

IN ſhort, the arts and ſciences, like ſome plants, require a freſh ſoil; and however rich the land may be, and however you may recruit it by art or care, it will never, when once exhauſted, produce any thing that is perfect or finiſhed in the kind.

ESSAY XVIII.

THE EPICUREAN*.

'TIS a great mortification to the vanity of man, that his utmoſt art and induſtry can never equal the meaneſt of nature's productions, either for beauty or value. Art is only the underworkman, and is employed to give a few ſtrokes of embelliſhment to thoſe pieces, which come from the hand of the maſter. Some of the drapery may be of his drawing; but he is not allowed to touch the principal figure. Art may make a ſuit of clothes: But nature muſt produce a man.

EVEN in thoſe productions, which are commonly denominated works of art, we find, that the nobleſt of the kind are beholden for their chief beauty to the force and happy influence of nature. To the *Oeſtrum* or native enthuſiaſm of the poets, we owe whatever is admirable in their productions. The greateſt genius, where nature at any time fails him (for ſhe is not equal) throws aſide the lyre, and hopes not, from the rules of art, to reach that divine harmony, which muſt proceed from her inſpiration alone. How poor are thoſe ſongs, where a happy flow of fancy has not furniſhed materials for art to embelliſh and refine!

BUT of all the fruitleſs attempts of art, no one is ſo ridiculous, as that which the ſevere philoſophers have undertaken, the producing an *artificial happineſs*, and making us be pleaſed by rules of reaſon, and by reflection. Why did none of them claim the reward, which XERXES promiſed to him, who could invent a new pleaſure. Unleſs, perhaps, they invented ſo many pleaſures for their own uſe,

* OR, *the man of elegance and pleaſure*. The intention of this and the three following eſſays is not ſo much, to explain accurately the ſentiments of the ancient ſects of philoſophy, as to deliver the ſentiments of ſects, that naturally form themſelves in the world, and entertain different ideas of human life and of happineſs. I have given each of them the name of the philoſophical ſect, to which it bears the greateſt affinity.

that

that they deſpiſed riches, and ſtood in no need of any enjoyments, which the rewards of that monarch could procure them. I am apt, indeed, to think, that they were not willing to furniſh the PERSIAN court with a new pleaſure, by preſenting it with ſo new and unuſual an object of ridicule. Their ſpeculations, when confined to theory, and gravely delivered in the ſchools of GREECE, might excite admiration in their ignorant pupils: But the attempting to reduce ſuch principles to practice would ſoon betray their abſurdity.

You pretend to make me happy by reaſon, and by rules of art. You muſt, then, create me anew by rules of art. For on my original frame and ſtructure does my happineſs depend. But you want power to effect this; and ſkill too, I am afraid: Nor can I entertain a leſs opinion of nature's wiſdom than of yours. And let her conduct the machine, which ſhe has ſo wiſely framed. I find, that I ſhould only ſpoil it by my tampering.

To what purpoſe ſhould I pretend to regulate, refine, or invigorate any of thoſe ſprings or principles, which nature has implanted in me? Is this the road by which I muſt reach happineſs? But happineſs implies eaſe, contentment, repoſe and pleaſure; not watchfulneſs, care, and fatigue. The health of my body conſiſts in the facility with which all its operations are performed. The ſtomach digeſts the aliments: The heart circulates the blood: The brain ſeparates and refines the ſpirits: And all this without my concerning myſelf in the matter. When by my will alone I can ſtop the blood, as it runs with impetuoſity along its canals, then may I hope to change the courſe of my ſentiments and paſſions. In vain ſhould I ſtrain my faculties, and endeavor to receive pleaſure from an object, which is not fitted by nature to affect my organs with delight. I may give myſelf pain by my fruitleſs endeavors, but ſhall never reach any pleaſure.

AWAY then with all thoſe vain pretences of making ourſelves happy within ourſelves, of feaſting on our own thoughts, of being ſatisfied with the conſciouſneſs of well-doing, and of deſpiſing all aſſiſtance and all ſupplies from external objects. This is the voice of PRIDE, not of NATURE. And it were well, if even this pride could ſupport itſelf, and communicate a real *inward* pleaſure, however melancholy or ſevere. But this impotent pride can do no more than regulate the *outſide*; and with infinite pains and attention compoſe the language and countenance to a philoſophical dignity, in order to deceive the ignorant vulgar. The heart, mean while, is empty of all enjoyment: And the mind, unſupported by its proper objects, ſinks into the deepeſt ſorrow and dejection. Miſerable but vain mortal! Thy mind be happy within itſelf! With what reſources is it endowed to fill ſo immenſe a void, and ſupply the place of all thy bodily ſenſes and faculties? Can thy head ſubſiſt without thy other members? In ſuch a ſituation,

What fooliſh figure muſt it make?
Do nothing elſe but ſleep *and* ake.

Into ſuch a lethargy, or ſuch a melancholy, muſt thy mind be plunged, when deprived of foreign occupations and enjoyments.

KEEP me, therefore, no longer in this violent conſtraint. Confine me not within myſelf; but point out to me thoſe objects and pleaſures, which afford the chief enjoyment. But why do I apply to you, proud and ignorant ſages, to

ſhew

ſhew me the road to happineſs? Let me conſult my own paſſions and inclinations. In them muſt I read the dictates of nature; not in your frivolous diſcourſes.

But ſee, propitious to my wiſhes, the divine, the amiable * Pleasure, the ſupreme Love of GODS and men, advances towards me. At her approach, my heart beats with genial heat, and every ſenſe and every faculty is diſſolved in joy; while ſhe pours around me all the embelliſhments of the ſpring, and all the treaſures of the autumn. The melody of her voice charms my ears with the ſofteſt muſic, as ſhe invites me to partake of thoſe delicious fruits, which, with a ſmile that diffuſes a glory on the heavens and the earth, ſhe preſents to me. The ſportive Cupids, who attend her, or fan me with their odoriferous wings, or pour on my head the moſt fragrant oils, or offer me their ſparkling nectar in golden goblets. O! for ever let me ſpred my limbs on this bed of roſes, and thus, thus feel the delicious moments, with ſoft and downy ſteps, glide along. But cruel chance! Whither do you fly ſo faſt? Why do my ardent wiſhes, and that load of pleaſures, under which you labor, rather haſten than retard your unrelenting pace? Suffer me to enjoy this ſoft repoſe, after all my fatigues in ſearch of happineſs. Suffer me to ſatiate myſelf with theſe delicacies, after the pains of ſo long and ſo fooliſh an abſtinence.

But it will not do. The roſes have loſt their hue: The fruit its flavor: And that delicious wine, whoſe fumes, ſo late, intoxicated all my ſenſes with ſuch delight, now ſolicits in vain the fated palate. *Pleaſure* ſmiles at my languor. She beckens her ſiſter, *Virtue*, to come to her aſſiſtance. The gay, the frolic *Virtue* obſerves the call, and brings along the whole troop of my jovial friends. Welcome, thrice welcome, my ever dear companions, to theſe ſhady bowers, and to this luxurious repaſt. Your preſence has reſtored to the roſe its hue, and to the fruit its flavor. The vapors of this ſprightly nectar now again play around my heart; while you partake of my delights, and diſcover in your chearful looks, the pleaſure which you receive from my happineſs and ſatisfaction. The like do I receive from yours; and encouraged by your joyous preſence, ſhall again renew the feaſt, with which, from too much enjoyment, my ſenſes were well nigh ſated; while the mind kept not pace with the body, nor afforded relief to her overburthened partner.

In our chearful diſcourſes, better than in the formal reaſonings of the ſchools, is true wiſdom to be found. In our friendly endearments, better than in the hollow debates of ſtateſmen and pretended patriots, does true virtue diſplay itſelf. Forgetful of the paſt, ſecure of the future, let us here enjoy the preſent; and while we yet poſſeſs a being, let us fix ſome good, beyond the power of fate or fortune. To-morrow will bring its own pleaſures along with it: Or ſhould it diſappoint our fond wiſhes, we ſhall at leaſt enjoy the pleaſure of reflecting on the pleaſures of to-day.

Fear not, my friends, that the barbarous diſſonance of Bacchus, and of his revellers, ſhould break in upon this entertainment, and confound us with their turbulent and clamorous pleaſures. The ſprightly muſes wait around; and with their charming ſymphony, ſufficient to ſoften the wolves and tygers of the ſavage

* *Dia Voluptas.* Lucret.

deſert,

deſert, inſpire a ſoft joy into every boſom. Peace, harmony, and concord reign in this retreat; nor is the ſilence ever broke but by the muſic of our ſongs, or the chearful accents of our friendly voices.

But hark! the favorite of the muſes, the gentle Damon, ſtrikes the lyre; and while he accompanies its harmonious notes with his more harmonious ſong, he inſpires us with the ſame happy debauch of fancy, by which he is himſelf tranſported. "Ye happy youth," he ſings, "Ye favored of heaven †, while the "wanton ſpring pours upon you all her blooming honors, let not *glory* ſeduce "you, with her deluſive blaze, to paſs in perils and dangers this delicious ſeaſon, "this prime of life. Wiſdom points out to you the road to pleaſure: Nature "too beckens you to follow her in that ſmooth and flowry path. Will you "ſhut your ears to their commanding voice? Will you harden your heart to "their ſoft allurements? Oh, deluded mortals, thus to loſe your youth; thus "to throw away ſo invaluable a preſent, to trifle with ſo periſhing a bleſſing. "Contemplate well your recompence. Conſider that glory, which ſo allures "your proud hearts, and ſeduces you with your own praiſes. 'Tis an eccho, a "dream, nay the ſhadow of a dream, which is diſſipated by every wind, and "loſt by every contrary breath of the ignorant and ill-judging multitude. You "fear not, that even death itſelf ſhall raviſh it from you. But behold! while "you are yet alive, calumny bereaves you of it; ignorance neglects it; nature en-"joys it not; fancy alone, renouncing every pleaſure, receives this airy recom-"pence, empty and unſtable as herſelf."

Thus the hours paſs unperceived along, and lead in their wanton train all the pleaſures of ſenſe, and all the joys of harmony and friendſhip. Smiling *innocence* cloſes the proceſſion; and while ſhe preſents herſelf to our raviſhed eyes, ſhe embelliſhes the whole ſcene, and renders the view of theſe pleaſures as tranſporting, after they have paſt us, as when, with laughing countenances, they were yet advancing towards us.

But the ſun has ſunk below the horizon; and darkneſs ſtealing ſilently upon us, has now buried all nature in an univerſal ſhade. Rejoice, my friends, con-"tinue your repaſt, or change it for ſoft repoſe. Tho' abſent, your joy or your "tranquillity ſhall ſtill be mine." *But whither do you go? Or what new pleaſures call you from our ſociety? Is there aught agreeable without your friends? And can aught pleaſe, in which we partake not?* "Yes, my friends; the joy, which "I now ſeek, admits not of your participation. Here alone I wiſh your abſence: "And here alone can I find a ſufficient compenſation for the loſs of your ſo-"ciety."

But I have not advanced far thro' the ſhades of the thick wood, which ſpreds a double night around me, e're, methinks, I perceive thro' the gloom, the charming Cælia, the miſtreſs of my wiſhes, who wanders impatient thro' the grove, and preventing the appointed hour, ſilently chides my tardy ſteps. But the joy, which ſhe receives from my preſence, beſt pleads my excuſe; and diſſipating every anxious and every angry thought, leaves room for nought but mu-

† An imitation of the Syrens ſong in Taſſo.
"O Giovinetti, mentre Aprile & Maggio
"V' ammantan di fiorité & verdi ſpoglie, &c.
Giureſalemme liberata, *Canto* 14.

tual joy and rapture. With what words, my fair one, ſhall I expreſs my tenderneſs, or deſcribe the emotions which now warm my tranſported boſom! Words are too faint to deſcribe my love; and if, alas! you feel not the ſame flame within you, in vain ſhall I endeavor to convey to you a juſt conception of it. But your every word and every motion ſuffice to remove this doubt; and while they expreſs your paſſion, ſerve alſo to enflame mine. How amiable this ſolitude, this ſilence, this darkneſs! No objects now importune the raviſhed ſoul. The thought, the ſenſe, all full of nothing but our mutual happineſs, wholly poſſeſs the mind, and convey a pleaſure, which deluded mortals vainly ſeek for in every other enjoyment.———

But why does your boſom heave with theſe ſighs, while tears bathe your glowing cheeks? Why diſtract your heart with ſuch vain anxieties? Why ſo often aſk me, *How long my love ſhall yet endure?* Alas, my Cælia, Can I reſolve this queſtion? *Do I know how long my life ſhall yet endure?* But does this alſo diſturb your tender breaſt? And is the image of our frail mortality for ever preſent with you, to throw a damp on your gayeſt hours, and poiſon even thoſe joys which love inſpires. Conſider rather, that if life be frail, if youth be tranſitory, we ſhould well employ the preſent moment, and loſe no part of ſo periſhable an exiſtence. Yet a little moment, and *theſe* ſhall be no more. We ſhall be, as if we had never been. Not a memory of us be left upon earth; and even the fabulous ſhades below will not afford us a habitation. Our fruitleſs anxieties, our vain projects, our uncertain ſpeculations ſhall all be ſwallowed up and loſt. Our preſent doubts, concerning the original cauſe of all things, muſt never, alas! be reſolved. This alone we may be certain of, that if any governing mind preſide over the univerſe, he muſt be pleaſed to ſee us fulfil the ends of our being, and enjoy that pleaſure, for which alone we were created. Let this reflection give eaſe to your anxious thoughts; but render not your joys too ſerious, by dwelling for ever upon it. 'Tis ſufficient, once, to be acquainted with this philoſophy, in order to give an unbounded looſe to love and jollity, and remove all the ſcruples of a vain ſuperſtition: But while youth and paſſion, my fair-one, prompt our eager deſires, we muſt find gayer ſubjects of diſcourſe, to intermix with theſe amorous careſſes.

ESSAY XIX.

THE STOIC †.

THERE is this obvious and material difference in the conduct of nature, with regard to man and other animals, that having endowed the former with a ſublime celeſtial ſpirit, and having given him an affinity with ſuperior beings, ſhe allows not ſuch noble faculties to lie lethargic or idle; but urges him, by neceſſity, to employ, on every emergence, his utmoſt *art* and *induſtry*. Brute creatures have many of their neceſſities ſupplied by nature, being cloathed and armed by this beneficent parent of all things: And where their own *induſtry* is

† Or the Man of action and virtue.

requiſite

requiſite on any occaſion, nature, by implanting inſtincts, ſtill ſupplies them with the *art*, and guides them to their good, by her unerring precepts. But man, expoſed naked and indigent to the rude elements, riſes ſlowly from that helpleſs ſtate, by the care and vigilance of his parents; and having attained his utmoſt growth and perfection, reaches only a capacity of ſubſiſting, by his own care and vigilance. Every thing is ſold to ſkill and labour; and where nature furniſhes the materials, they are ſtill rude and unfiniſhed, till induſtry, ever active and intelligent, refines them from their brute ſtate, and fits them for human uſe and convenience.

Acknowlege, therefore, O man, the beneficence of nature: For ſhe has given thee that intelligence which ſupplies all thy neceſſities. But let not indolence, under the falſe appearance of gratitude, perſuade thee to reſt contented with her preſents. Would'ſt thou return to the raw herbage for thy food, to the open ſky for thy covering, and to ſtones and clubs for thy defence againſt the ravenous animals of the deſert? Then return alſo to thy ſavage manners, to thy timorous ſuperſtition, to thy brutal ignorance; and ſink thyſelf below thoſe animals, whoſe condition thou admireſt, and wouldeſt ſo fondly imitate.

Thy kind parent, nature, having given thee art and intelligence, has filled the whole globe with materials for theſe talents to work upon: hearken to her voice, which ſo plainly tells thee, that thou thyſelf ſhouldeſt alſo be the object of thy induſtry, and that by art and attention thou canſt alone acquire that ability, which will raiſe thee to thy proper ſtation in the univerſe. Behold this artizan, who converts a rude and ſhapeleſs ſtone into a noble metal; and molding that metal by his cunning hands, creates, as it were by magic, every weapon for his defence, and every utenſil for his convenience. He has not this ſkill from nature: Uſe and practice have taught it him: And if thou wouldeſt emulate his ſucceſs, thou muſt follow his laborious footſteps.

But while thou *ambitiouſly* aſpireſt to the perfecting thy bodily powers and faculties, wouldeſt thou *meanly* neglect thy mind, and from a prepoſterous ſloth, leave it ſtill rude and uncultivated, as it came from the hands of nature? Far be ſuch folly and negligence from every rational being. If nature has been frugal in her gifts and endowments, there is the more need of art to ſupply her defects. If ſhe has been generous and liberal, know that ſhe ſtill expects induſtry and application on our part, and revenges herſelf in proportion to our negligent ingratitude. The richeſt genius, like the moſt fertile ſoil, when uncultivated, ſhoots up into the rankeſt weeds; and inſtead of vines and olives for the pleaſure and uſe of man, produces to its ſlothful owner, the moſt abundant crop of poiſons.

The great end of all human induſtry, is the attainment of happineſs. For this were arts invented, ſciences cultivated, laws ordained, and ſocieties modelled, by the profoundeſt wiſdom of patriots and legiſlators. Even the lonely ſavage, who lies expoſed to the inclemency of the elements, and the fury of wild beaſts, forgets not, for a moment, this grand object of his being. Ignorant as he is of every art of life, he keeps ſtill in view the end of all thoſe arts, and eagerly ſeeks for felicity amidſt that darkneſs with which he is environed. But as much as the wildeſt ſavage is inferior to the poliſhed citizen, who under the protection of laws, enjoys every convenience which induſtry has invented; ſo much is this citizen himſelf inferior to the man of virtue, and the true philoſopher, who governs his

appetites, ſubdues his paſſions, and has learned, from reaſon, to ſet a juſt value on every purſuit and enjoyment. For is there an art and apprenticeſhip requiſite for every other attainment? And is there no art of life, no rule, no precepts to direct us in this principal concern? Can no particular pleaſure be attained without ſkill; and can the whole be regulated without reflection or intelligence, by the blind guidance of appetite and inſtinct? Surely then no miſtakes are ever committed in this affair; but every man, however diſſolute and negligent, proceeds in the purſuit of happineſs, with as unerring a motion, as that which the celeſtial bodies obſerve, when, conducted by the hand of the Almighty, they roll along the etherial plains. But if miſtakes be often, be inevitably committed, let us regiſter theſe miſtakes; let us conſider their cauſes; let us weigh their importance; let us enquire for their remedies. When from this we have fixed all the rules of conduct, we are *philoſophers:* When we have reduced theſe rules to practice, we are *ſages.*

Like many ſubordinate artiſts, employed to form the ſeveral wheels and ſprings of a machine: Such are thoſe who excel in all the particular arts of life. *He* is the maſter workman who puts thoſe ſeveral parts together, moves them according to juſt harmony and proportion, and produces true felicity as the reſult of their conſpiring order.

While thou haſt ſuch an alluring object in view, ſhall that labor and attention, which is requiſite to the attaining thy end, ever ſeem burdenſome and intolerable? Know, that this labor itſelf is the chief ingredient of the felicity to which thou aſpireſt, and that every enjoyment ſoon becomes inſipid and diſtaſteful, when not acquired by fatigue and induſtry. See the hardy hunters riſe from their downy couches, ſhake off the ſlumbers which ſtill weigh down their heavy eye-lids, and, e're *Aurora* has yet covered the heavens with her flaming mantle, haſten to the foreſt. They leave behind, in their own houſes, and in the neighboring plains, animals of every kind, whoſe fleſh furniſhes the moſt delicious fare, and which offer themſelves to the fatal ſtroke. Laborious man diſdains ſo eaſy a purchaſe. He ſeeks for a prey, which hides itſelf from his ſearch, or flies from his purſuit, or defends itſelf from his violence. Having exerted in the chace every paſſion of the mind, and every member of the body, he then finds the charms of repoſe, and with joy compares its pleaſures to thoſe of his engaging labors.

And can vigorous induſtry give pleaſure to the purſuit even of the moſt worthleſs prey, which frequently eſcapes our toils? And cannot the ſame induſtry render the cultivating our mind, the moderating our paſſions, the enlightening our reaſon, an agreeable occupation; while we are every day ſenſible of our progreſs, and behold our inward features and countenance brightening inceſſantly with new charms? Begin by curing yourſelf of this lethargic indolence; the taſk is not difficult: You need but taſte the ſweets of honeſt labor. Proceed to learn the juſt value of every purſuit; long ſtudy is not requiſite: Compare, tho' but for once, the mind to the body, virtue to fortune, and glory to pleaſure. You will then perceive the advantages of induſtry: You will then be ſenſible what are the proper objects of your induſtry.

In vain do you ſeek repoſe from beds of roſes: In vain do you hope for enjoyment from the moſt delicious wines and fruits. Your indolence itſelf becomes a fatigue:

a fatigue: Your pleaſure itſelf creates diſguſt. The mind, unexerciſed, finds every delight inſipid and loathſome, and e're yet the body, full of noxious humors, feels the torment of its multiplied diſeaſes, your nobler part is ſenſible of the invading poiſon, and ſeeks in vain to relieve its anxiety by new pleaſures, which ſtill augment the fatal malady.

I NEED not tell you, that by this eager purſuit of pleaſure, you more and more expoſe yourſelf to fortune and accidents, and rivet your affections on external objects, which chance may, in a moment, raviſh from you. I ſhall ſuppoſe, that your indulgent ſtars favor you ſtill with the enjoyment of your riches and poſſeſſions. I prove to you, that even in the midſt of your luxurious pleaſures, you are unhappy; and that, by too much indulgence, you are incapable of enjoying what proſperous fortune ſtill allows you to poſſeſs.

BUT ſurely the inſtability of fortune is a conſideration not to be over-looked or neglected. Happineſs cannot poſſibly exiſt, where there is no ſecurity; and ſecurity can have no place, where fortune has any dominion. Tho' that unſtable deity ſhould not exert her rage againſt you, the dread of it would ſtill torment you; would diſturb your ſlumbers, haunt your dreams, and throw a damp on the jollity of your moſt delicious banquets.

THE temple of wiſdom is ſeated on a rock, above the rage of the fighting elements, and inacceſſible to all the malice of man. The rolling thunder breaks below; and thoſe more terrible inſtruments of human fury reach not to ſo ſublime a height. The ſage, while he breathes that ſerene air, looks down with pleaſure, mixed with compaſſion, on the errors of miſtaken mortals, who blindly ſeek for the true path of life, and purſue riches, nobility, honor, or power for genuine felicity. The greateſt part he beholds diſappointed of their fond wiſhes: Some lament, that having once poſſeſſed the object of their deſires, it is raviſhed from them by envious fortune: and all complain, that even their own vows, tho' granted, cannot give them happineſs, or relieve the anxiety of their diſtracted minds.

BUT does the ſage preſerve himſelf always in this philoſophic indifference, and reſt contented with lamenting the miſeries of mankind, without ever employing himſelf for their relief? Does he conſtantly indulge this ſevere wiſdom, which, by pretending to elevate him above human accidents, does in reality harden his heart, and render him careleſs of the intereſts of mankind, and of ſociety? No: he knows that in this ſullen *Apathy*, neither true wiſdom nor true happineſs are to be found. He feels too ſtrongly the charm of the ſocial affections ever to counteract ſo ſweet, ſo natural, ſo virtuous a propenſity. Even when, bathed in tears, he laments the miſeries of human race, of his country, of his friends, and unable to give ſuccor, can only relieve them by compaſſion; he yet rejoices in the generous diſpoſition, and feels a ſatisfaction ſuperior to that of the moſt indulged ſenſe. So engaging are the ſentiments of humanity, that they brighten up the very face of ſorrow, and operate like the ſun, which, ſhining on a duſky cloud or falling rain, paints on them the moſt glorious colors which are to be found in the whole circle of nature.

BUT 'tis not here alone, that the ſocial virtues diſplay their energy. With whatever ingredient you mix them, they are ſtill predominant. As ſorrow cannot overcome them, ſo neither can ſenſual pleaſure obſcure them. The joys of love, how-

however tumultuous, baniſh not the tender ſentiments of ſympathy and affection They even derive their chief influence from that generous paſſion; and when preſented alone, afford nothing to the unhappy mind but laſſitude and diſguſt. Behold this ſprightly debauchee, who profeſſes a contempt of all other pleaſures but thoſe of wine and jollity: Separate him from his companions, like a ſpark from a fire, where before it contributed to the general blaze: His alacrity ſuddenly extinguiſhes; and tho' ſurrounded with every other means of delight, he lothes the ſumptuous banquet, and prefers even the moſt abſtracted ſtudy and ſpeculation, as more agreeable and entertaining.

But the ſocial paſſions never afford ſuch tranſporting pleaſures, or make ſo glorious an appearance in the eyes both of GOD and man, as when, ſhaking off every earthly mixture, they aſſociate themſelves with the ſentiments of virtue, and prompt us to laudable and worthy actions. As harmonious colours mutually give and receive a luſtre by their friendly union; ſo do theſe ennobling ſentiments of the human mind. See the triumph of nature in parental affection! What ſelfiſh paſſion; what ſenſual delight is a match for it! Whether a man exults in the proſperity and virtue of his offſpring, or flies to their ſuccor, thro' the moſt threatening and tremendous dangers?

Proceed ſtill in purifying the generous paſſion, you will ſtill the more admire its ſhining glories. What charms are there in the harmony of minds, and in a friendſhip founded on mutual eſteem and gratitude! What ſatisfaction in relieving the diſtreſſed, in comforting the afflicted, in raiſing the fallen, and in ſtopping the career of cruel fortune, or of more cruel man, in their inſults over the good and virtuous! But what ſupreme joy in the victories over vice as well as miſery, when, by virtuous example or wiſe exhortation, our fellow-creatures are taught to govern their paſſions, reform their vices, and ſubdue their worſt enemies, which inhabit within their own boſoms?

But theſe objects are ſtill too limited for the human mind, which, being of celeſtial origin, ſwells with the divineſt and moſt enlarged affections, and carrying its attention beyond kindred and acquaintance, extends its benevolent wiſhes to the moſt diſtant poſterity. It views liberty and laws as the ſource of human happineſs, and devotes itſelf with the utmoſt alacrity, to their guardianſhip and protection. Toils, dangers, death itſelf carry their charms, when we brave them for the public good, and ennoble that being, which we generouſly ſacrifice for the intereſts of our country. Happy the man, whom indulgent fortune allows to pay to virtue what he owes to nature, and to make a generous gift of what muſt otherwiſe be raviſhed from him by cruel neceſſity!

In the true ſage and patriot are united whatever can diſtinguiſh human nature, or elevate mortal man to a reſemblance with the divinity. The ſofteſt benevolence, the moſt undaunted reſolution, the tendereſt ſentiments, the moſt ſublime love of virtue, all theſe animate ſucceſſively his tranſported boſom. What ſatisfaction, when he looks within, to find the moſt turbulent paſſions tuned to juſt harmony and concord, and every jarring ſound baniſhed from this enchanting muſic! If the contemplation, even of inanimate beauty, be ſo delightful; if it raviſhes the ſenſes, even when the fair form is foreign to us: What muſt be the effects of moral beauty? And what influence muſt it have, when it embelliſhes our own mind, and is the reſult of our own reflection and induſtry?

BUT where is the reward of virtue? And what recompence has nature provided for ſuch important ſacrifices, as thoſe of life and fortune, which we muſt often make to it? Oh, ſons of earth! Are you ignorant of the value of this celeſtial miſtreſs? And do you meanly enquire for her portion, when you obſerve her genuine charms? But know, that nature has been indulgent to human weakneſs, and has not left this favorite child naked and unendowed. She has provided virtue of the richeſt dowry; but being careful, leſt the allurements of intereſt ſhould engage ſuch ſuitors, as were inſenſible of the native worth of ſo divine a beauty, ſhe has wiſely provided, that this dowry can have no charms but in the eyes of thoſe who are already tranſported with the love of virtue. GLORY is the portion of virtue, the ſweet reward of honorable toils, the triumphant crown, which covers the thoughtful head of the diſintereſted patriot, or the duſty brow of the victorious warrior. Elevated by ſo ſublime a prize, the man of virtue looks down with contempt on all the allurements of pleaſure, and all the menaces of danger. Death itſelf loſes its terrors, when he conſiders, that its dominion extends only over a part of him, and that, in ſpite of death and time, the rage of the elements, and the endleſs viciſſitude of human affairs, he is aſſured of an immortal fame among all the ſons of men.

THERE ſurely is a being who preſides over the univerſe; and, who, with infinite wiſdom and power, has reduced the jarring elements into juſt order and proportion. Let ſpeculative reaſoners diſpute, how far this beneficent being extends his care, and whether he prolongs our exiſtence beyond the grave, in order to beſtow on virtue its juſt reward, and render it fully triumphant. The man of morals, without deciding any thing on ſo dubious a ſubject, is ſatisfied with that portion which is marked out to him by the ſupreme diſpoſer of all things. Gratefully he accepts of that farther reward prepared for him; but if diſappointed, he thinks not virtue an empty name; but juſtly eſteeming it it's own reward, he gratefully acknowleges the bounty of his creator, who by calling him forth into exiſtence, has thereby afforded him an opportunity of once acquiring ſo invaluable a poſſeſſion.

ESSAY XX.

THE PLATONIST *.

TO ſome philoſophers it appears matter of ſurprize, that all mankind, poſſeſſing the ſame nature, and being endowed with the ſame faculties, ſhould yet differ ſo widely in their purſuits and inclinations, and that one ſhould utterly condemn what is fondly ſought after by another. To ſome it appears matter of ſtill more ſurprize, that a man ſhould differ ſo widely from himſelf at different times; and, after poſſeſſion, reject with diſdain what, before, was the object of all his vows and wiſhes. To me this feveriſh uncertainty and irreſolution, in hu-

* Or, the man of contemplation and *philoſophical* devotion.

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man conduct, ſeems altogether unavoidable; nor can a rational ſoul, made for the contemplation of the ſupreme being, and of his works, ever enjoy tranquility or ſatisfaction, while detained in the ignoble purſuits of ſenſual pleaſure or popular applauſe. The divinity is a boundleſs ocean of bliſs and glory: Human minds are ſmaller ſtreams, which ariſing at firſt from this ocean, ſeek ſtill, amid all their wanderings, to return to it, and to loſe themſelves in that immenſity of perfection. When checked in this natural courſe, by vice or folly, they become furious and enraged; and, ſwelling to a torrent, do then ſpread horror and devaſtation on the neighbouring plains.

In vain, by pompous phraſe and paſſionate expreſſion, each recommends his own purſuit, and invites the credulous hearers to an imitation of his life and manners. The heart belies the countenance, and ſenſibly feels, even amid the higheſt ſucceſs, the unſatisfactory nature of all thoſe pleaſures, which detain it from its true object. I examine the voluptuous man before enjoyment; I meaſure the vehemence of his deſire: and the importance of his object; I find that all his happineſs proceeds only from that hurry of thought which takes him from himſelf, and turns his view from his guilt and miſery. I conſider him a moment after; he has now enjoyed the pleaſure, which he fondly ſought after. The ſenſe of his guilt and miſery returns upon him with double anguiſh: His mind tormented with fear and remorſe; his body depreſſed with diſguſt and ſatiety.

But a more auguſt, at leaſt a more haughty perſonage preſents himſelf boldly to our cenſure; and aſſuming the title of a philoſopher and man of morals, offers to ſubmit to the moſt rigid examination. He challenges, with a viſible, tho' concealed impatience, our approbation and applauſe; and ſeems offended, that we ſhould heſitate a moment before we break out into admiration of his virtue. Seeing this impatience, I heſitate ſtill more: I begin to examine the motives of his ſeeming virtue: But behold! e'er I can enter upon this enquiry, he flings himſelf from me; and addreſſing his diſcourſe to that crowd of heedleſs auditors, fondly abuſes them by his magnificent pretenſions.

O Philosopher! thy wiſdom is vain, and thy virtue unprofitable. Thou ſeekeſt the ignorant applauſes of men, not the ſolid reflections of thy own conſcience, or the more ſolid approbation of that being, who, with one regard of his all-ſeeing eye, penetrates the univerſe. Thou ſurely art conſcious of the hollowneſs of thy pretended probity, whilſt calling thyſelf a citizen, a ſon, a friend, thou forgetteſt thy higher ſovereign, thy true father, thy greateſt benefactor. Where is the adoration due to ſuch infinite perfection, whence every thing good and valuable is derived? Where is the gratitude, owing to thy creator, who called thee forth from nothing, who placed thee in all theſe relations to thy fellow-creatures, and requiring thee to fulfil the duty of each relation, forbids thee to neglect what thou oweſt to himſelf, the moſt perfect being, to whom thou art connected by the cloſeſt tye?

But thou art thyſelf thy own idol: Thou worſhippeſt thy *imaginary* perfections: Or rather, ſenſible of thy *real* imperfections, thou ſeekeſt only to deceive the world, and to pleaſe thy fancy, by multiplying thy ignorant admirers. Thus not contented with neglecting what is moſt excellent in the univerſe, thou deſireſt to ſubſtitute in his place what is moſt vile and contemptible.

Consider all the works of men's hands; all the inventions of human wit, in which thou affecteſt ſo nice a diſcernment: Thou wilt find, that the moſt perfect production

production ſtill proceeds from the moſt perfect thought, and that 'tis MIND alone, which we admire, while we beſtow our applauſe on the graces of a well proportioned ſtatue, or the ſymmetry of a noble pile. The ſtatuary, the architect comes ſtill in view, and makes us reflect on the beauty of his art and contrivance, which, from a heap of unformed matter, could extract ſuch expreſſions and propoſtions. This ſuperior beauty of thought and intelligence thou thyſelf acknowlegeſt, while thou inviteſt us to contemplate, in thy conduct, the harmony of affections, the dignity of ſentiments, and all thoſe graces of a mind, which chiefly merit our attention. But why ſtoppeſt thou ſhort? Seeſt thou nothing farther that is valuable? Amid thy rapturous applauſes of beauty and order, art thou ſtill ignorant where is to be found the moſt conſummate beauty? the moſt perfect order? Compare the works of art with thoſe of nature. The one are but imitations of the other. The nearer art approaches to nature, the more perfect is it eſteemed. But ſtill, how wide are its neareſt approaches, and what an immenſe interval may be obſerved between them? Art copies only the outſide of nature, leaving the inward and more admirable ſprings and principles; as exceeding her imitation, as beyond her comprehenſion. Art copies only the minute productions of nature, deſpairing to reach that grandeur and magnificence, which are ſo aſtoniſhing in the maſterly works of her original. Can we then be ſo blind, as not to diſcover an intelligence and a deſign in the exquiſite and moſt ſtupendous contrivance of the univerſe? Can we be ſo ſtupid, as not to feel the warmeſt raptures of worſhip and adoration, upon the contemplation of that intelligent being, ſo infinitely good and wiſe?

THE moſt perfect happineſs, ſurely, muſt ariſe from the contemplation of the moſt perfect object. But what more perfect than beauty and virtue? And where is beauty to be found equal to that of the univerſe? Or virtue, which can be compared to the benevolence and juſtice of the deity? If aught can diminiſh the pleaſure of this contemplation, it muſt be either the narrowneſs of our faculties, which conceals from us the greateſt part of theſe beauties and perfections; or the ſhortneſs of our lives, which allows not time ſufficient to inſtruct us in them. But 'tis our comfort, that if we imploy worthily the faculties here aſſigned us, they will be enlarged in another ſtate of exiſtence, ſo as to render us more ſuitable worſhippers of our maker: And that the taſk, which can never be finiſhed in time, will be the buſineſs of an eternity.

ESSAY XXI.

THE SCEPTIC.

I HAVE long entertained a great ſuſpicion, with regard to the deciſions of philoſophers upon all ſubjects, and found in myſelf a greater inclination to diſpute, than aſſent to their concluſions. There is one miſtake, to which they ſeem liable, almoſt without exception; they confine too much their principles, and make no account of that vaſt variety, which nature has ſo much affected in

all her operations. When a philoſopher has once laid hold of a favorite principle, which perhaps accounts for many natural effects, he will extend the ſame principle over the whole creation, and reduce it to every phænomenon, tho' by the moſt violent and abſurd reaſoning. Our own mind being narrow and contracted, we cannot extend our conception to the variety and extent of nature; but imagine, that ſhe is as much bounded in her operations, as we are in our ſpeculations.

But if ever this infirmity of philoſophers is to be ſuſpected on any occaſion, 'tis in their reaſonings concerning human life, and the methods of attaining happineſs. In that caſe, they are led aſtray, not only by the narrowneſs of their underſtandings, but alſo by that of their paſſions. Almoſt every one has a predominant inclination, to which all his other deſires and affections ſubmit, and which governs him, tho', perhaps, with ſome intervals, thro' the whole courſe of his life. 'Tis difficult for him to apprehend, that any thing, which appears totally indifferent to him, can ever give enjoyment to any perſon, or can poſſeſs charms, which altogether eſcape his obſervation. His own purſuits are always, in his account, the moſt engaging: The objects of his paſſion, the moſt valuable: And the road which he purſues, the only one that leads to happineſs.

But would theſe prejudiced reaſoners reflect a moment, there are many obvious inſtances and arguments, ſufficient to undeceive them, and make them enlarge their maxims and principles. Do they not ſee the vaſt variety of inclinations and purſuits among our ſpecies, where each man ſeems fully ſatisfied with his own courſe of life, and would eſteem it the greateſt unhappineſs to be confined to that of his neighbor? Do they not feel in themſelves, that what pleaſes at one time, diſpleaſes at another, by the change of inclination; and that it is not in their power, by their utmoſt efforts, to recall that taſte or appetite, which formerly beſtowed charms on what now appears indifferent or diſagreeable? What is the meaning therefore of thoſe general preferences of the town or country life, of a life of action or one of pleaſure, of retirement or ſociety; when, beſides the different inclinations of different men, every one's experience may convince him, that each of theſe kinds of life is agreeable in its turn, and that their variety or their judicious mixture, chiefly contributes to the rendering all of them agreeable.

But ſhall this buſineſs be allowed to go altogether at adventures? And muſt a man conſult only his humor and inclination, in order to determine his courſe of life, without ever employing his reaſon to inform him what road is preferable, and leads moſt ſurely to happineſs? Is there no difference then between one man's conduct and another's?

I answer, There is a great difference. One man, following his inclinations, in chuſing his courſe of life, may imploy much ſurer means for ſucceeding than another, who is led by his inclination into the ſame courſe of life, and purſues the ſame object. *Are riches the chief object of your deſires?* Acquire ſkill in your profeſſion, be diligent in the exerciſe of it; and enlarge the circle of your friends and acquaintance; avoid pleaſure and expence, and never be generous, but with a view of gaining more than you could ſave by frugality. *Would you acquire the public eſteem?* Guard equally againſt the extremes of arrogance and fawning. Let it appear that you ſet a value upon yourſelf, but without deſpiſing others.

If you fall into either of the extremes, you either provoke men's pride by your inſolence, or teach them to deſpiſe you by your timorous ſubmiſſion, and by the mean opinion which you ſeem to entertain of yourſelf.

THESE, you ſay, are the maxims of common prudence and diſcretion; what every parent inculcates on his child, and what every man of ſenſe purſues in the courſe of life, which he has choſen. --- What is it then you deſire more? Do you come to a philoſopher, as to a *cunning man*, to learn ſomething by magic or witchcraft, beyond what can be known by common prudence and diſcretion? -- Yes; we come to a philoſopher to be inſtructed, How we ſhall chuſe our ends, more than the means for attaining theſe ends: We want to know, what deſires we ſhall ſatisfy, what paſſions we ſhall comply with, what appetites we ſhall indulge. As to the reſt, we truſt to common ſenſe, and the general maxims of the world, for our inſtruction.

I AM ſorry, then, I have pretended to be a philoſopher: For I find your queſtions very perplexing; and am in danger, if my anſwer be too rigid and ſevere, of paſſing for a pedant and ſcholaſtic; if it be too eaſy and free, of being taken for a preacher of vice and immorality. However, to ſatisfy you, I ſhall deliver my opinion upon the matter, and only deſire you to eſteem it of as little conſequence as I do myſelf. By that means you will neither think it worthy of your ridicule nor your anger.

IF we can depend upon any principle, which we learn from philoſophy, this, I think, may be conſidered as certain and undoubted, That there is nothing in itſelf, valuable or deſpicable, deſireable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that theſe attributes ariſe from the particular conſtitution and fabric of human ſentiments and affections. What ſeems the moſt delicious food to one animal, appears loathſome to another: What affects the feeling of one with delight, produces uneaſineſs to another. This is confeſſedly the caſe with regard to all the bodily ſenſes: But if we examine the matter more accurately, we ſhall find, that the ſame obſervation holds even where the mind concurs with the body, and mingles its ſentiments with the exterior appetites.

DESIRE this paſſionate lover to give you a character of his miſtreſs: He will tell you that he is at a loſs for words to deſcribe her charms, and will aſk you very ſeriouſly, If ever you was acquainted with a goddeſs or an angel? If you anſwer, that you never was: He will then ſay, That 'tis impoſſible for you to form a conception of ſuch divine beauties as thoſe which his charmer poſſeſſes; ſo complete a ſhape; ſuch proportioned features; ſo engaging an air; ſuch ſweetneſs of diſpoſition; ſuch gaiety of humor. You can infer nothing, however, from all this diſcourſe, but that the poor man is in love; and that the general appetite between the ſexes, which nature has infuſed into all animals, is in him determined to a particular object by ſome qualities, which gave him pleaſure. The ſame divine creature, not only to a different animal, but alſo to a different man, appears a mere mortal being, and is beheld with the utmoſt indifference.

NATURE has given all animals a like prejudice in favor of their offſpring. As ſoon as the helpleſs infant ſees the light, tho' in every other eye it appears a deſpicable and a miſerable creature, it is regarded by its fond parent with the utmoſt affection, and is preferred to every other object, however perfect or accompliſhed.

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The paſſion alone, ariſing from the original ſtructure and formation of human nature, beſtows a value on the moſt inſignificant object.

We may puſh the ſame obſervation further, and may conclude, that even when the mind operates alone, and feeling the ſentiments of blame or approbation, pronounces one object deformed and odious, another beautiful and amiable; I ſay, that even in this caſe, theſe qualities are not really in the objects, but belong entirely to the ſentiments of that mind which blames or praiſes. I grant, that it will be more difficult to make this propoſition evident, and as it were, palpable, to negligent thinkers, becauſe nature is more uniform in the ſentiments of the mind than in moſt feelings of the body, and produces a nearer reſemblance in the inward than in the outward part of human kind. There is ſomething approaching to principles in mental taſte; and critics can reaſon and diſpute much more plauſibly than cooks or perfumers. We may obſerve, however, That this uniformity among human kind, hinders not, but that there is a conſiderable diverſity in the ſentiments of beauty and worth, and that education, cuſtom, prejudice, caprice, and humor frequently vary our taſte of this kind. You will never convince a man, who is not accuſtomed to Italian muſic, and has not an ear to follow its intricacies, that a Scotch tune is not preferable. You have not even any ſingle argument, beyond your own taſte, which you can employ in your behalf: And to your antagoniſt, his particular taſte will always appear a much more convincing argument to the contrary. If you be wiſe, each of you will allow, that the other may be in the right; and having many other inſtances of this diverſity of taſte, you will both confeſs, that beauty and worth are merely of a relative nature, and conſiſt in an agreeable ſentiment, produced by an object on a particular mind, according to the peculiar ſtructure and conſtitution of that mind.

By this diverſity of ſentiment, obſervable in human kind, nature has, perhaps, intended to make us ſenſible of her authority, and let us ſee what ſurprizing changes ſhe could produce on the paſſions and deſires of mankind, merely by the change of their inward fabric, without any alteration on the objects. The vulgar may even be convinced by this argument: But men accuſtomed to thinking may draw a more convincing, at leaſt a more general argument, from the very nature of the ſubject.

In the operation of reaſoning, the mind does nothing but run over its objects, as they are ſuppoſed to ſtand in reality, without adding any thing to them, or diminiſhing any thing from them. If I examine the Ptolomaic and Copernican ſyſtems, I endeavor only, by my enquiries, to know the real ſituation of the planets; that is, in other words, I endeavor to give them, in my mind or conception, the ſame relations which they bear towards each other in the heavens. To this operation of the mind, therefore, there ſeems to be always a real, tho' often an unknown ſtandard, in the nature of things; nor is truth or falſhood variable by the various apprehenſions of mankind. Tho' all human race ſhould for ever conclude, that the ſun moves, and the earth remains at reſt, the ſun ſtirs not an inch from his place for all theſe reaſonings; and ſuch concluſions are eternally falſe and erroneous.

But the caſe is not the ſame with the qualities of *beautiful and deformed, deſirable and odious*, as with truth and falſhood. In the former caſe, the mind is not contented

contented with merely ſurveying its objects, as they ſtand in themſelves: It alſo feels a ſentiment of delight or uneaſineſs, approbation or blame, conſequent to that ſurvey; and this ſentiment determines it to pronounce the object *beautiful or deformed, deſirable or odious*. Now, 'tis evident, that this ſentiment muſt depend upon the particular fabric or ſtructure of the mind, which enables ſuch particular objects to operate in ſuch a particular manner, and produces a ſympathy or conformity between the mind and the objects. Vary the ſtructure of the mind or inward organs, the ſentiment no longer follows, tho' the objects remain the ſame. The ſentiment being different from the object, and ariſing from its operation upon the organs of the mind, an alteration upon the latter muſt vary the effect, nor can the ſame object, preſented to a mind totally different, produce the ſame ſentiment.

THIS concluſion every one is apt to form of himſelf, without much philoſophy, where the ſentiment is evidently diſtinguiſhable from the object. Who is not ſenſible, that power, and glory, and vengeance, are not deſirable of themſelves, but derive all their value from the ſtructure of human paſſions, which begets a deſire towards ſuch particular objects? But with regard to beauty, either natural or moral, the caſe is commonly ſuppoſed to be different. The agreeable quality is thought to lie in the object, not in the ſentiment; and that merely becauſe the ſentiment is not ſo turbulent and violent as to diſtinguiſh itſelf, in an evident manner, from the perception of the object.

BUT a very little reflection ſuffices to diſtinguiſh them. A man may know exactly all the circles and ellipſes of the COPERNICAN ſyſtem, and all the irregular ſpirals of the PTOLOMAIC, without perceiving that the former is more beautiful than the latter. EUCLID has very fully explained every quality of the circle, but has not, in any propoſition, ſaid a word of its beauty. The reaſon is evident. Beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line *whoſe* parts are all equally diſtant from a common center. It is only the effect, which that figure operates upon the mind, whoſe particular fabric or ſtructure renders it ſuſceptible of ſuch ſentiments. In vain would you look for it in the circle, or ſeek it, either by your ſenſes, or by mathematical reaſonings, in all the properties of that figure.

THE mathematician, who took no other pleaſure in reading VIRGIL, but that of examining ENEAS's voyage by the map, might underſtand perfectly the meaning of every Latin word, imployed by that divine author; and conſequently, might have a diſtinct idea of the whole narration. He would even have a more diſtinct idea of it, than they could have who had not ſtudied ſo exactly the geography of the poem. He knew, therefore, every thing in the poem: But he was ignorant of its beauty; becauſe the beauty, properly ſpeaking, lies not in the poem, but in the ſentiment or taſte of the reader. And where a man has no ſuch delicacy of temper, as to make him feel this ſentiment, he muſt be ignorant of the beauty, tho' poſſeſſed of the ſcience and underſtanding of an angel *.

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* WERE I not afraid of appearing top philoſophical, I would remind my reader of that famous doctrine, ſuppoſed to be fully proved in modern times, "That taſtes and colors, and all other "ſenſible qualities, lie not in the bodies, but "merely in the ſenſes." The caſe is the ſame with

THE inference upon the whole is, that it is not from the value or worth of the object, which any perſon purſues, that we can determine his enjoyment, but merely from the paſſion with which he purſues it, and the ſucceſs which he meets with in his purſuit. Objects have abſolutely no worth or value in themſelves. They derive their worth merely from the paſſion. If that be ſtrong, and ſteady, and ſucceſsful, the perſon is happy. It cannot reaſonably be doubted, but a little miſs, dreſt in a new gown for a dancing-ſchool ball, receives as compleat enjoyment as the greateſt orator, who triumphs in the ſplendor of his eloquence, while he governs the paſſions and reſolutions of a numerous aſſembly.

ALL the difference, therefore, betwixt one man and another, with regard to life, conſiſts either in the *paſſion*, or in the *enjoyment*: And theſe differences are ſufficient to produce the wide extremes of happineſs and miſery.

To be happy, the *paſſion* muſt neither be too violent nor too remiſs. In the firſt caſe, the mind is in a perpetual hurry and tumult; in the ſecond, it ſinks into a diſagreeable indolence and lethargy.

To be happy, the paſſion muſt be benign and ſocial; not rough or fierce. The affections of the latter kind are not near ſo agreeable, to the feeling, as thoſe of the former. Who will compare rancor and animoſity, envy and revenge, to friendſhip, benignity, clemency and gratitude?

To be happy, the paſſion muſt be chearful and gay, not gloomy and melancholy. A propenſity to hope and joy is real riches: One to fear and ſorrow, real poverty.

SOME paſſions or inclinations, in the *enjoyment* of their object, are not ſo ſteady or conſtant as others, nor convey ſuch durable pleaſure and ſatisfaction. *Philoſophical devotion*, for inſtance, like the enthuſiaſm of a poet, is the tranſitory effect of high ſpirits, great leiſure, a fine genius, and a habit of ſtudy and contemplation: But notwithſtanding all theſe circumſtances, an abſtracted, inviſible object, like that which *natural* religion alone preſents to us, cannot long actuate the mind, or be of any moment in life. To render the paſſion of continuance, we muſt find ſome method of affecting the ſenſes and imagination, and muſt embrace ſome *hiſtorical* as well as *philoſophical* accounts of the divinity. Popular ſuperſtitions and obſervances are even found to be of uſe in this particular.

THO' the tempers of men be very different, yet we may ſafely pronounce in general, that a life of pleaſure cannot ſupport itſelf ſo long as one of buſineſs, but is much more ſubject to ſatiety and diſguſt. The amuſements, which are the moſt durable, have all a mixture of application and attention in them; ſuch as gaming and hunting. And in general, buſineſs and action fill up all the great vacancies of human life.

with beauty and deformity, virtue and vice. This doctrine, however, takes off no more from the reality of the latter qualities, than from that of the former; nor need it give any umbrage either to critics or moraliſts. Tho' colors were allowed to lie only in the eye, would dyers or painters ever be leſs regarded or eſteemed? There is a ſufficient uniformity in the ſenſes and feelings of mankind, to make all theſe qualities the objects of art and reaſoning, and to have the greateſt influence on life and manners. And as 'tis certain, that the diſcovery above-mentioned in natural philoſophy, makes no alteration on action and conduct; why ſhould a like diſcovery in moral philoſophy make any alteration?

BUT

But where the temper is the beſt diſpoſed for any *enjoyment*, the object is often wanting: And in this reſpect, the paſſions, which purſue *external* objects, contribute not ſo much to happineſs, as thoſe which reſt in ourſelves; ſince we are neither ſo certain of attaining ſuch objects, nor ſo ſecure of poſſeſſing them. A paſſion for learning is preferable, with regard to happineſs, to one for riches.

Some men are poſſeſſed of great ſtrength of mind; and even when they purſue *external* objects, are not much affected by a diſappointment, but renew their application and induſtry with the greateſt chearfulneſs. Nothing contributes more to happineſs than this turn of mind.

According to this ſhort and imperfect ſketch of human life, the happieſt diſpoſition of mind is the *virtuous*; or, in other words, that which leads to action and employment, renders us ſenſible to the ſocial paſſions, ſteals the heart againſt the aſſaults of fortune, reduces the affections to a juſt moderation, makes our own thoughts an entertainment to us, and inclines us rather to the pleaſures of ſociety and converſation, than to thoſe of the ſenſes. This, in the mean time, muſt be obvious to the moſt careleſs reaſoner, that all diſpoſitions of mind are not alike favorable to happineſs, and that one paſſion or humor may be extremely deſirable, while another is equally diſagreeable. And indeed, all the difference between the conditions of life depends upon the mind; nor is there any one ſituation of affairs, in itſelf, preferable to another. Good and ill, both natural and moral, are entirely relative to human ſentiment and affection. No man would ever be unhappy, could he alter his feelings. Proteus-like, he would elude all attacks, by the continual alterations of his ſhape and form.

But of this reſource nature has, in a great meaſure, deprived us. The fabric and conſtitution of our mind no more depends on our choice, than that of our body. The generality of men have not even the ſmalleſt notion, that any alteration in this reſpect can ever be deſirable. As a ſtream neceſſarily follows the ſeveral inclinations of the ground, on which it runs; ſo are the ignorant and thoughtleſs part of mankind actuated by their natural propenſities. Such are effectually excluded from all pretenſions to philoſophy, and the *medicine of the mind*, ſo much boaſted. But even upon the wiſe and thoughtful, nature has a prodigious influence; nor is it always in a man's power, by the utmoſt art and induſtry, to correct his temper, and attain that virtuous character, to which he aſpires. The empire of philoſophy extends over a few; and with regard to theſe too, her authority is very weak and limited. Men may well be ſenſible of the value of virtue, and may deſire to attain it; but 'tis not always certain, that they will be ſucceſsful in their wiſhes.

Whoever conſiders, without prejudice, the courſe of human actions, will find, that mankind are almoſt entirely guided by conſtitution and temper, and that general maxims have little influence, but ſo far as they affect our taſte or ſentiment. If a man have a lively ſenſe of honor and virtue, with moderate paſſions, his conduct will always be conformable to the rules of morality; or if he depart from them, his return will be eaſy and expeditious. But on the other hand, where one is born of ſo perverſe a frame of mind, of ſo callous and inſenſible a diſpoſition, as to have no reliſh for virtue and humanity, no ſympathy with his fellow-creatures, no deſire of eſteem and applauſe; ſuch a one muſt be allowed entirely incurable, nor is there any remedy in philoſophy. He reaps no ſatisfaction but from low and ſenſual objects,

objects, or from the indulgence of malignant paſſions: He feels no remorſe to controul his vicious inclinations: He has not even that ſenſe or taſte, which is requiſite to make him deſire a better character: For my part, I know not how I ſhould addreſs myſelf to ſuch a one, or by what arguments I ſhould endeavor to reform him. Should I tell him of the inward ſatisfaction which reſults from laudable and humane actions, the delicate pleaſures of diſintereſted love and friendſhip, the laſting enjoyments of a good name and an eſtabliſhed character, he might ſtill reply, that theſe were, perhaps, pleaſures to ſuch as were ſuſceptible of them; but that, for his part, he finds himſelf of a quite different turn and diſpoſition. I muſt repeat it; my philoſophy affords no remedy in ſuch a caſe, nor could I do any thing but lament this perſon's unhappy condition. But then I aſk, If any other philoſophy can afford a remedy; or if it be poſſible, by any ſyſtem, to render all mankind virtuous, however perverſe may be their natural frame of mind? Experience will ſoon convince us of the contrary; and I will venture to affirm, that, perhaps, the chief benefit, which reſults from philoſophy, ariſes in an indirect manner, and proceeds more from its ſecret, inſenſible influence, than from its immediate application.

'Tis certain, that a ſerious attention to the ſciences and liberal arts, ſoftens and humanizes the temper, and cheriſhes thoſe fine emotions, in which true virtue and honor conſiſts. It rarely, very rarely happens, that a man of taſte and learning is not, at leaſt, an honeſt man, whatever frailties may attend him. The bent of his mind to ſpeculative ſtudies muſt mortify in him the paſſions of intereſt and ambition, and muſt, at the ſame time, give him a greater ſenſibility of all the decencies and duties of life. He feels more fully a moral diſtinction in characters and manners; nor is his ſenſe of this kind diminiſhed, but, on the contrary, it is much encreaſed, by his ſpeculations.

Besides ſuch inſenſible changes upon the temper and diſpoſition, 'tis highly probable, that others may be produced by ſtudy and application. The prodigious effects of education may convince us, that the mind is not altogether ſtubborn and inflexible, but will admit of many alterations from its original make and ſtructure. Let a man propoſe to himſelf the model of a character, which he approves of; let him be well acquainted with thoſe particulars, in which his own character deviates from this model: Let him keep a conſtant watch over himſelf, and bend his mind, by a continual effort, from the vices, towards the virtues; and I doubt not but, in time, he will find, in his temper, an alteration, to the better.

Habit is another powerful means of reforming the mind, and implanting in it good diſpoſitions and inclinations. A man who continues in a courſe of ſobriety and temperance, will hate riot and diſorder: If he engage in buſineſs or ſtudy, indolence will ſeem a puniſhment to him: If he conſtrain himſelf to practiſe beneficence and affability, he will ſoon abhor all inſtances of pride and violence. Where one is thorowly convinced, that the virtuous courſe of life is preferable; if he has but reſolution enough, for ſome time, to impoſe a violence on himſelf; his reformation need not be deſpaired of. The misfortune is, that this conviction and this reſolution never can have place, unleſs a man be, before-hand, tolerably virtuous.

HERE then is the chief triumph of art and philoſophy: It inſenſibly refines the temper, and it points out to us thoſe diſpoſitions which we ſhould endeavor to attain, by a conſtant *bent* of mind, and by repeated *habit*. Beyond this I cannot acknowlege it to have great influence; and I muſt entertain doubts concerning all thoſe exhortations and conſolations, which are in ſuch vogue among all ſpeculative reaſoners.

WE have already obſerved, that no objects are, of themſelves, deſirable or odious, valuable or deſpicable; but that objects acquire theſe qualities from the particular character and conſtitution of the mind, which ſurveys them. To diminiſh therefore, or augment any perſon's value for an object, to excite or moderate his paſſions, there are no direct arguments or reaſons, which can be employed with any force or influence. The catching flies, like DOMITIAN, if it give more pleaſure, is preferable to the hunting wild beaſts, like WILLIAM RUFUS, or conquering kingdoms, like ALEXANDER.

BUT tho' the value of every object can be determined only by the ſentiments or paſſions of every individual, we may obſerve, that the paſſions, in pronouncing their verdict, conſider not the object ſimply, as it is in itſelf, but ſurvey it with all the circumſtances, which attend it. A man tranſported with joy, on account of his poſſeſſing a diamond, confines not his view to the gliſtering ſtone before him: He alſo conſiders its rarity, and from thence chiefly ariſes his pleaſure and exultation. Here therefore a philoſopher may ſtep in, and ſuggeſt particular views and conſiderations, and circumſtances, which otherwiſe would have eſcaped us; and, by that means, he may either moderate or excite any particular paſſion.

IT may ſeem unreaſonable abſolutely to deny the authority of philoſophy in this reſpect: But it muſt be confeſſed, that there lies this ſtrong preſumption againſt it, that if theſe views be natural and obvious, they would have occurred of themſelves, without the aſſiſtance of philoſophy; if they be not natural, they never can have any influence on the affections. *Theſe* are of a very delicate nature, and cannot be forced or conſtrained by the utmoſt art and induſtry. A conſideration, which we ſeek for on purpoſe, which we enter into with difficulty, which we retain with care and attention, can never produce thoſe genuine and durable movements of paſſion, which are the reſult of nature, and the conſtitution of the mind. A man may as well pretend to cure himſelf of love, by viewing his miſtreſs thro' the *artificial* medium of a microſcope, or proſpect, and beholding there the coarſeneſs of her ſkin, and monſtrous diſproportion of her features, as hope to excite or moderate any paſſion by the *artificial* arguments of a SENECA or an EPICTETUS. The remembrance of the natural aſpect and ſituation of the objects will, in both caſes, ſtill return upon him. The reflections of philoſophy are too ſubtile and diſtant to take place in common life, or eradicate any affection. The air is too fine to breathe in, where it is above the winds and clouds of the atmoſphere.

ANOTHER defect of thoſe refined reflections, which philoſophy preſents to us, is, that commonly they cannot diminiſh or extinguiſh our vicious paſſions, without diminiſhing or extinguiſhing ſuch as are virtuous, and rendering the mind totally indifferent and inactive. They are for the moſt part, general, and are applicable to all our affections. In vain do we hope to direct their influence only to one ſide. If by inceſſant ſtudy and meditation we have rendered them very intimate and preſent to us, they will operate thro'out, and ſpred an univerſal inſenſi-

bility over the mind. When we deſtroy the nerves, we extinguiſh the ſenſe of pleaſure, together with that of pain.

IT will be eaſy, by one glance of the eye, to find one or other of theſe defects in moſt of thoſe philoſophical reflections, ſo much celebrated both in ancient and modern times. *Let not the injuries or violence of men*, ſay the philoſophers *, *ever diſcompoſe you by anger or hatred. Would you be angry at the ape for its malice, or the tyger for its ferocity?* This reflection leads us into a bad opinion of human nature, and muſt extinguiſh the ſocial affections. It tends alſo to remove all remorſe for a man's own crimes, when he conſiders, that vice is as natural to mankind, as the particular inſtinct to brute-creatures.

ALL ills ariſe from the order of the univerſe, which is abſolutely perfect. Would you wiſh to diſturb ſo divine an order for the ſake of your own particular intereſt? What if the ills I ſuffer ariſe from malice or oppreſſion? *But the vices and imperfections of men are alſo comprehended in the order of the univerſe.*

If plagues and earthquakes break not heav'n's deſign,
Why then a BORGIA *or a* CATILINE?

Let this be allowed; and my own vices will alſo be a part of the ſame order.

To one who ſaid, that none was happy, who was not above opinion, a SPARTAN replied, *then none are happy but knaves and robbers* †.

MAN is born to be miſerable; and is he ſurprized at any particular misfortune? And can he give way to ſorrow and lamentation upon account of any diſaſter? Yes: He very reaſonably laments, that he ſhould be born to be miſerable. Your conſolation preſents a hundred ills for one, that you pretend to eaſe him of.

YOU ſhould always have before your eyes death, diſeaſe, poverty, blindneſs, exile, calumny, and infamy, as ills which are incident to human nature. When any one of theſe ills falls to your lot, you will bear it the better that you have laid your account with it. I anſwer, If we confine ourſelves to a general and diſtant reflection on the ills of human life, *that* can have no effect to prepare us for them. If by cloſe and intenſe meditation we render them preſent and intimate to us, *that* is the true ſecret to poiſon all our pleaſures, and render us perpetually miſerable.

YOUR ſorrow is fruitleſs, and will not change the courſe of deſtiny. Very true: And for that very reaſon I am ſorry.

CICERO's conſolation for deafneſs is ſomewhat curious. *How many languages are there*, ſays he, *which you do not underſtand? The* PUNIC, SPANISH, GALLIC, ÆGYPTIAN, *&c. With regard to all theſe, you are as if you were deaf, and yet you are indifferent about the matter. Is it then ſo great a misfortune to be deaf to one language more* ‡?

I LIKE better the repartee of ANTIPATER the CYRENIAC, when ſome women were condoling with him for his blindneſs? *What!* ſays he, *Do you think there are no pleaſures in the dark?*

NOTHING can be more deſtructive, ſays FONTENELLE, *to ambition, and the paſſion for conqueſts, than the true ſyſtem of aſtronomy. What a poor thing is even the whole globe in compariſon of the infinite extent of nature?* This conſidera-

* PLUT. *de ira cohibenda.* † PLUT. *Lacon. Apophtheg.* ‡ TUSC. *Quæſt.* Lib. V.

tion is evidently too diſtant ever to have any effect. And if it had any, would it not deſtroy patriotiſm as well as ambition? The ſame gallant author adds with ſome reaſon, that the bright eyes of the ladies are the only objects, which loſe nothing of their luſtre or value from the moſt extenſive views of aſtronomy and philoſophy, but ſtand proof againſt every ſyſtem. Would philoſophers adviſe us to limit our affection to them?

EXILE, ſays PLUTARCH to a friend in baniſhment, *is no evil: Mathematicians tell us, that the whole earth is but as a point, compared to the heavens. To change one's country, then, is little more than to remove from one ſtreet to another. Man is not a plant, rooted to a certain ſpot of earth: All ſoils and all climates are alike ſuited to him* *. Theſe topics are admirable, could they fall only into the hands of baniſhed perſons. But what if they come alſo to the knowlege of thoſe employed in public affairs, and deſtroy all their attachment to their native country? Or will they operate like the quack's medicine, which is equally good for a diabetes and a dropſy?

'TIS certain, were a ſuperior being thruſt into a human body, that the whole of life would to him appear ſo mean, contemptible and puerile, that he never could be induced to take party in any thing, and would ſcarcely give attention to what paſſes around him. To engage him to ſuch condeſcenſion as to play even the part of a PHILIP with zeal and alacrity, would be much more difficult than to conſtrain the ſame PHILIP, after having been a king and conqueror during fifty years, to mend old ſhoes with proper care and attention; the occupation which LUCIAN aſſigns him in the infernal regions. Now all the ſame topics of diſdain towards human affairs, which could operate on this ſuppoſed being, occur alſo to a philoſopher; but being, in ſome meaſure, diſproportioned to human capacity, and not being fortified with the experience of any thing better, they make not a full impreſſion on him. He ſees, but he feels not ſufficiently their truth; and is always a ſublime philoſopher, when he needs not; that is, as long as nothing diſturbs him, or rouzes his affections. While others play, he wonders at their keenneſs and ardor; but he no ſooner puts in his own ſtake, than he is commonly tranſported with the ſame paſſions, which he had ſo much condemned while he remained a ſimple ſpectator.

THERE are chiefly two conſiderations to be met with in books of philoſophy, from which any conſiderable effect is to be expected, and that becauſe theſe two conſiderations are drawn from common life, and occur upon the moſt ſuperficial view of human affairs. When we reflect on the ſhortneſs and uncertainty of life, how deſpicable ſeem all our purſuits of happineſs? And even, if we would extend our concern beyond our own life, how frivolous appear our moſt enlarged and moſt generous projects; when we conſider the inceſſant changes and revolutions of human affairs, by which laws and learning, books and governments are hurried away by time, as by a rapid ſtream, and are loſt in the immenſe ocean of matter? Such a reflection certainly tends to mortify all our paſſions: But does it not thereby counterwork the artifice of nature, who has happily deceived us into an opinion, that human life is of ſome importance? And may not ſuch a reflection

* *De exilio.*

be employed with ſucceſs by voluptuous reaſoners, in order to lead us from the paths of action and virtue, into the flowery fields of indolence and pleaſure?

We are informed by Thucydides, that, during the famous plague of Athens, when death ſeemed preſent to every one, a diſſolute mirth and gaiety prevailed among the people, who exhorted one another to make the moſt of life as long as it endured. The ſame obſervation is made by Boccace with regard to the plague of Florence. A like principle makes ſoldiers, during war, to be more addicted to riot and expence, than any other race of men. Preſent pleaſure is always of importance; and whatever diminiſhes the importance of all other objects muſt beſtow on it an additional influence and value.

The *ſecond* philoſophical conſideration, which may often have an influence on the affections, is derived from a compariſon of our own condition with the condition of others. This compariſon we are continually making, even in common life; but the misfortune is, that we are apt rather to compare our ſituation with that of our ſuperiors, than with that of our inferiors. A philoſopher corrects this natural infirmity, by turning his view to the other ſide, in order to render himſelf eaſy in the ſituation in which fortune has placed him. There are few people, who are not ſuſceptible of ſome conſolation from this reflection, tho' to a very good natured man, the view of human miſeries ſhould rather produce ſorrow than comfort, and add to his lamentations for his own misfortunes a deep compaſſion for thoſe of others. Such is the imperfection, even of the beſt of theſe philoſophical topics of conſolation *.

I shall

* The ſceptic, perhaps, carries the matter too far, when he limits all philoſophical topics and reflections to theſe two. There ſeem to be others, whoſe truth is undeniable, and whoſe natural tendency is to tranquilize and ſoften all the paſſions. Philoſophy greedily ſeizes theſe, ſtudies them, weighs them, commits them to the memory, and familiarizes them to the mind: and their influence on tempers, which are thoughtful, gentle, and moderate, may be conſiderable. But what is their influence, you will ſay, if the temper be antecedently diſpoſed after the ſame manner which they pretend to form it? They may, at leaſt, fortify that temper, and furniſh it with views, by which it may entertain and nouriſh itſelf. Here are a few examples of ſuch philoſophical reflections.

1. Is it not certain, that every condition has concealed ills? Then why envy any body?

2. Every one has known ills; and there is a compenſation throughout. Why not be contented with the preſent?

3. Cuſtom deadens the ſenſe both of the good and the ill, and levels every thing.

4. Health and humor all. The reſt of little conſequence, except theſe be affected.

5. How many other goods have I? Then why be vexed for one ill?

6. How many are happy in the condition of which I complain? How many envy me?

7. Every good muſt be paid for: Fortune by labor, favor by flattery. Would I keep the price, yet have the commodity?

8. Expect not too great happineſs in life. Human nature admits it not.

9. Propoſe not a happineſs too complicated. But does that depend on me? Yes: The firſt choice does. Life is like a game: One may chooſe the game: And paſſion, by degrees, ſeizes the proper object.

10. Anticipate by your hopes and fancy future conſolation, which time infallibly brings to every affliction.

11. I deſire to be rich? Why? That I may poſſeſs many fine objects; houſes, gardens, equipage, &c. How many fine objects does nature offer to every one without expence? If enjoyed, ſufficient. If not: See the effect of cuſtom or of temper, which would ſoon take off the reliſh of the riches.

12. I deſire fame. Let this occur: If I act well, I ſhall have the eſteem of all my acquaintance. And what is all the reſt to me?

Theſe reflections are ſo obvious, that 'tis a wonder they occur not to every man: So convincing, that 'tis a wonder they perſuade not every man. But perhaps they do occur to and perſuade moſt men; when they conſider human life, by a general and calm ſurvey: But where any real, affecting incident

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, That tho' virtue be undoubtedly the beſt choice, when it is attainable; yet ſuch is the diſorder and confuſion of human affairs, that no perfect oeconomy or regular diſtribution of happineſs and miſery is ever, in this life, to be expected. Not only the goods of fortune, and the endowments of the body (both which are of great importance) not only theſe advantages, I ſay, are unequally divided betwixt the virtuous and vicious, but even the mind itſelf partakes, in ſome degree, of this diſorder, and the moſt worthy character, by the very oeconomy of the paſſions, enjoys not always the higheſt felicity.

'TIS obſervable, that tho' every bodily diſeaſe or pain proceeds from ſome diſorder in the parts, yet the pain is not always proportioned to the diſorder; but is greater or leſs, according to the greater or leſs ſenſibility of the part, upon which the noxious humors exert their influence. A *tooth-ach* produces more violent convulſions of pain than a *phthiſis* or a *dropſy*. In like manner, with regard to the conſtitution of the mind, we may obſerve, that all vice is indeed pernicious; but yet the diſturbance or pain is not meaſured out by nature with exact proportion to the degrees of vice, nor is the man of higheſt virtue, even abſtracting from external accidents, always the moſt happy. A gloomy and melancholy diſpoſition is certainly, *to our ſentiments*, a vice or imperfection; but as it may be accompanied with great ſenſe of honor and great integrity, it may be found in very worthy characters; tho' 'tis ſufficient alone to imbitter life, and render the perſon affected with it compleatly miſerable. On the other hand, a ſelfiſh villain may poſſeſs a ſpring and alacrity of temper, a certain *gaiety of heart*, which is indeed a good quality, but which is rewarded much beyond its merit, and when attended with good fortune, will compenſate the uneaſineſs and remorſe ariſing from all the other vices.

I SHALL add, as an obſervation to the ſame purpoſe, that if a man be liable to a vice or imperfection, it may often happen, that a good quality, which he poſſeſſes with it, will render him more miſerable, than if he were compleatly vicious. A perſon of ſuch imbecillity of temper, as to be eaſily broke by affliction, is more unhappy for being endowed with a generous and friendly diſpoſition, which gives him a lively concern for others, and expoſes him the more to fortune and accidents. A ſenſe of ſhame, in an imperfect character, is certainly a virtue, but produces great uneaſineſs and remorſe, from which the abandoned villain is entirely free. A very amorous complexion, with a heart incapable of friendſhip, is happier than the ſame exceſs in love, with a generoſity of temper,

incident happens; when paſſion is awakened, fancy agitated, example draws, and counſel urges; the philoſopher is loſt in the man, and he ſearches in vain for that perſuaſion, which before ſeemed ſo firm and unſhaken. What remedy for this inconvenience? Aſſiſt yourſelf by a frequent peruſal of the entertaining moraliſts: Have recourſe to the learning of PLUTARCH, the imagination of LUCIAN, the eloquence of CICERO, the wit of SENECA, the gaiety of MONTAIGNE, the ſublimity of SHAFTSBURY. Moral precepts, ſo couched, ſtrike deep, and fortify the mind againſt the illuſions of paſſion. But truſt not altogether to external aid: By habit and ſtudy acquire that philoſophic temper, which both gives force to reflection, and by rendering a great part of your happineſs independent, takes off the edge from all diſorderly paſſions, and tranquilizes the mind. Deſpiſe not theſe helps; but confide not too much in them neither; unleſs nature has been favorable in the temper, with which ſhe has endowed you.

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which tranſports a man beyond himſelf, and renders him a total ſlave to the object of his paſſion.

In a word, human life is more governed by fortune than by reaſon; is to be regarded more as a dull paſtime than as a ſerious occupation; and is more influenced by particular humor than by general principles. Shall we engage ourſelves in it with paſſion and anxiety? It is not worthy of ſo much concern. Shall we be indifferent about what happens? We loſe all the pleaſure of the game by our phlegm and careleſſneſs. While we are reaſoning concerning life, life is gone; and death, tho' *perhaps* they receive him differently, yet treats alike the fool and the philoſopher. To reduce life to exact rule and method, is commonly a painful, oft a fruitleſs occupation: And is it not alſo a proof, that we overvalue the prize for which we contend? Even to reaſon ſo carefully concerning it, and to fix with accuracy its juſt idea, would be over-valuing it, were it not that, to ſome tempers, this occupation is one of the moſt amuſing, in which life could poſſibly be employed.

ESSAY XXII.

OF POLYGAMY AND DIVORCES.

AS marriage is an engagement entered into by mutual conſent, and has for its end the propagation of the ſpecies, 'tis evident, that it muſt be ſuſceptible of all the variety of conditions, which conſent eſtabliſhes, provided they be not contrary to this end.

A MAN, in conjoining himſelf to a woman, is bound to her according to the terms of his engagement: In begetting children, he is bound, by all the ties of nature and humanity, to provide for their ſubſiſtence and education. When he has performed theſe two parts of duty, no being can reproach him with injuſtice or injury. And as the terms of his engagement, as well as the methods of ſubſiſting his offspring, may be very various; 'tis mere ſuperſtition to imagine, that marriage can be entirely uniform, and will admit only of one mode or form. Did not human laws reſtrain the natural liberty of men, every particular marriage would be as different, as contracts or bargains of any other kind or ſpecies.

As circumſtances vary, and the laws propoſe different advantages, we find, that, in different times and places, they impoſe different conditions on this important contract. In TONQUIN 'tis uſual for the ſailors, when the ſhips come into the harbor, to marry for the ſeaſon; and, notwithſtanding this precarious engagement, they are aſſured, 'tis ſaid, of the ſtricteſt fidelity to their bed, as well as in the whole management of their affairs, from thoſe temporary ſpouſes.

I CANNOT, at preſent, recollect my authorities; but I have ſomewhere read, That the republic of ATHENS having loſt many of its citizens by war and peſtilence, allowed every man to marry two wives, in order the ſooner to repair the waſte which had been made by theſe calamities. The poet EURIPIDES happened to be coupled to two noiſy Vixons, who ſo plagued him with their jealouſies and quar-

quarrels, that he became ever after a profeſſed *woman-hater*; and is the only theatrical writer, perhaps the only poet, who ever entertained an averſion againſt the whole ſex.

In that agreeable romance, called *the Hiſtory of the* Sevarambians, where a great many men and a few women are ſuppoſed to be ſhipwrecked on a deſert coaſt; the captain of the troop, in order to obviate thoſe endleſs quarrels which aroſe, regulates their marriages after the following manner: he takes a handſome female to himſelf alone; aſſigns one to every couple of inferior officers; and to five of the loweſt rank he gives one wife in common. Could the greateſt legiſlator, in ſuch circumſtances, have contrived matters with greater wiſdom?

The ancient Britons had a very ſingular kind of marriage, which is to be met with among no other people. Any number of them, as ten or a dozen, joined in a ſociety together, which was perhaps requiſite for mutual defence in thoſe barbarous times. In order to link this ſociety the cloſer, they took an equal number of wives in common, and whatever children were born, were reputed to belong to all of them, and were accordingly provided for by the whole community.

Among the inferior creatures, nature herſelf, being the ſupreme legiſlator, preſcribes all the laws which regulate their marriages, and varies thoſe laws according to the different circumſtances of the creature. Where ſhe furniſhes, with eaſe, food and defence to the new-born animal, the preſent embrace terminates the marriage; and the care of the offſpring is committed intirely to the female. Where the food is of more difficult purchaſe, the marriage continues for one ſeaſon, till the common progeny can provide for itſelf; and then the union immediately diſſolves, and leaves each of the parties free to enter into a new engagement at the enſuing ſeaſon. But nature having endowed man with reaſon, has not ſo exactly regulated every article of his marriage contract, but has left him to adjuſt them, by his own prudence, according to his particular circumſtances and ſituation. Municipal laws are a ſupply to the wiſdom of each individual; and, at the ſame time, by reſtraining the natural liberty of men, make the private intereſt ſubmit to the intereſt of the public. All regulations, therefore, on this head are equally lawful, and equally conformable to the principles of nature; tho' they are not all equally convenient, or equally uſeful to ſociety. The laws may allow of polygamy, as among the *Eaſtern* nations; or of voluntary divorces, as among the Greeks and Romans; or they may confine one man to one woman, during the whole courſe of their lives, as among the modern Europeans. It may not be diſagreeable to conſider the advantages and diſadvantages which reſult from each of theſe inſtitutions.

The advocates for polygamy may recommend it as the only effectual remedy for the furies and diſorders of love, and the only expedient for freeing men from that ſlavery to the females, which the natural violence of our paſſions has impoſed on us. By this means alone can we regain our right of ſovereignty; and, ſating our appetite, re-eſtabliſh the authority of reaſon in our minds, and, of conſequence, our own authority in our families. Man, like a weak ſovereign, being unable to ſupport himſelf againſt the wiles and intrigues of his ſubjects, muſt play one faction againſt another, and become abſolute by the mutual jealouſies of the females. *To divide and to govern* is an univerſal maxim; and, by neglecting it,

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the EUROPEANS undergo a more grievous and a more ignominious ſlavery than the TURKS or PERSIANS, who are ſubjected indeed to a ſovereign, who lies at a diſtance from them, but in their domeſtic affairs rule with an uncontrolable ſway. An honeſt TURK, who ſhould come from his ſeraglio, where every one trembles before him, would be ſurpriſed to ſee SYLVIA in her drawing room, adored by all the beaus and pretty fellows about town, and he would certainly take her for ſome mighty and deſpotic queen, ſurrounded by her guard of obſequious ſlaves and eunuchs.

ON the other hand, it may be urged with better reaſon, that this ſovereignty of the male is a real uſurpation, and deſtroys that nearneſs of rank, not to ſay equality, which nature has eſtabliſhed betwixt the ſexes. We are, by nature, their lovers, their friends, their patrons: Would we willingly change ſuch endearing appellations, for the barbarous titles of maſter and tyrant?

IN what capacity ſhall we gain by this inhuman proceeding? As lovers, or as huſbands? The *lover*, is totally annihilated; and courtſhip, the moſt agreeable ſcene in human life, can no longer have place, where women have not the free diſpoſal of themſelves, but are bought and ſold, like the meaneſt animals. The *huſband* is as little a gainer, having found the admirable ſecret of extinguiſhing every part of love, except its jealouſy. There is no roſe without its thorn; but he muſt be a fooliſh wretch indeed, who throws away the roſe and preſerves only the thorn.

I WOULD not willingly inſiſt upon it as an advantage in our EUROPEAN cuſtoms, what was obſerved by MEHEMET EFFENDI the laſt TURKISH ambaſſador in FRANCE. *We* TURKS, ſays he, *are great ſimpletons in compariſon of the chriſtians. We are at the expence and trouble of keeping a ſeraglio, each in his own houſe: But you eaſe yourſelves of this burden, and have your ſeraglio in your friends houſes.* The known virtue of our BRITISH ladies frees them ſufficiently from this imputation: And the TURK himſelf, had he travelled among us, muſt have owned, that our free commerce with the fair ſex, more than any other invention, embelliſhes, enlivens, and poliſhes ſociety.

BUT the ASIATIC manners are as deſtructive to friendſhip as to love. Jealouſy excludes men from all intimacies and familiarities with each other. No man dares bring his friend to his houſe or table, leſt he bring a lover to his numerous wives. Hence all over the eaſt, each family is as ſeparate from another, as if they were ſo many diſtinct kingdoms. No wonder then, that SOLOMON, living like an eaſtern prince, with his ſeven hundred wives, and three hundred concubines, without one friend, could write ſo pathetically concerning the vanity of the world. Had he tried the ſecret of one wife or miſtreſs, a few friends, and a great many companions, he might have found life ſomewhat more agreeable. Deſtroy love and friendſhip; what remains in the world worth accepting?

THE bad education of children, eſpecially children of condition, is another unavoidable conſequence of theſe inſtitutions. Thoſe, who paſs all the early part of their life among ſlaves, are only qualified to be, themſelves, ſlaves and tyrants; and in every future intercourſe, either with their inferiors or ſuperiors, are apt to forget the natural equality of mankind. What attention, too, can it be ſuppoſed a parent, whoſe ſeraglio affords him fifty ſons, will give to the inſtilling prin-

ciples of morality or ſcience into a progeny, with whom he himſelf is ſcarcely acquainted, and whom he loves with ſo divided an affection? Barbariſm, therefore, appears, from reaſon as well as experience, to be the inſeparable concomitant of polygamy.

To render polygamy more odious, I need not recount the frightful effects of jealouſy, and the conſtraint in which it holds the fair-ſex all over the eaſt. In thoſe countries men are not allowed to have any commerce with the females, not even phyſicians, when ſickneſs may be ſuppoſed to have extinguiſhed all wanton paſſions in the boſoms of the fair, and, at the ſame time, has rendered them unfit objects of deſire. TOURNEFORT tells us, That when he was brought into the *grand ſignior*'s ſeraglio as a phyſician, he was not a little ſurprized, in looking along a gallery, to ſee a great number of naked arms, ſtanding out from the ſides of the room. He could not imagine what this could mean; till he was told, that thoſe arms belonged to bodies, which he muſt cure, without knowing any more about them, than what he could learn from the arms. He was not allowed to aſk a queſtion of the patient, or even of her attendants, leſt he might find it neceſſary to enquire concerning circumſtances, which the delicacy of the ſeraglio allows not to be revealed. Hence the phyſicians in the eaſtern countries pretend to know all diſeaſes from the pulſe; as our quacks in EUROPE undertake to cure a perſon merely from ſeeing his water. I ſuppoſe, had *Monſieur* TOURNEFORT been of this latter kind, he would not, in CONSTANTINOPLE, have been allowed by the jealous TURKS to be furniſhed with materials requiſite for exerciſing his art.

IN another country, where polygamy is alſo allowed, they render their wives cripples, and make their feet of no uſe to them, in order to confine them to their own houſes. But it will, perhaps, appear ſtrange, that in an EUROPEAN country, where polygamy is not allowed, jealouſy can yet be carried to ſuch a height, that 'tis indecent ſo much as to ſuppoſe, that a woman of rank can have feet or legs. A SPANIARD is jealous of the very thoughts of thoſe who approach his wife; and, if poſſible, will prevent his being diſhonored, even by the wantonneſs of imagination. Witneſs the following ſtory, which we have from very good authority *. When the mother of the late king of SPAIN was on her road towards MADRID, ſhe paſſed thro' a little town in SPAIN, famous for its manufactory of gloves and ſtockings. The honeſt magiſtrates of the place thought they could not better expreſs their joy for the reception of their new queen, than by preſenting her with a ſample of thoſe commodities, for which alone their town was remarkable. The *major-domo*, who conducted the queen, received the gloves very graciouſly: But when the ſtockings were preſented, he flung them away with great indignation, and ſeverely reprimanded the magiſtrates for this egregious piece of indecency. *Know*, ſays he, *That a queen of* SPAIN *has no legs.* The poor young queen, who, at that time, underſtood the language but very imperfectly, and had been often frightened with ſtories of SPANISH jealouſy, imagined that they were to cut off her legs. Upon which ſhe fell a crying, and begged them to conduct her back to GERMANY; for that ſhe never could endure that operation: And it was with ſome difficulty they could appeaſe her. PHI-

* *Memoires de la cour d'*ESPAGNE *par Madame d'*AUNOY.

LIP IV. is ſaid never in his life to have laughed heartily, but at the recital of this ſtory.

IF a SPANISH lady muſt not be ſuppoſed to have legs, what muſt be ſuppoſed of a TURKISH lady? She muſt not be ſuppoſed to have a being at all. Accordingly, 'tis eſteemed a piece of rudeneſs and indecency at CONSTANTINOPLE, ever to make mention of a man's wives before him *. In EUROPE, 'tis true, fine bred people make it alſo a rule never to talk of their wives: But the reaſon is not founded on our jealouſy. I ſuppoſe it is becauſe we ſhould be apt, were it not for this rule, to become troubleſome to company, by talking too much of them.

THE author of the PERSIAN letters has given a different reaſon for this polite maxim. *Men*, ſays he, *never care to mention their wives in company, leſt they ſhould talk of them before people, who are better acquainted with them than themſelves.*

HAVING rejected polygamy, and matched one man with one woman, let us now conſider what duration we ſhall aſſign to their union, and whether we ſhall admit of thoſe voluntary divorces, which were in uſe among the GREEKS and ROMANS. They who would defend this practice, may employ the following reaſons.

How often does diſguſt and averſion ariſe after marriage, from the moſt trivial accidents, or from an incompatibility of humor; where time, inſtead of curing the wounds proceeding from mutual injuries, feſters them every day the more, by new quarrels and reproaches? Let us ſeparate hearts, which are not made for each other. Each of them may, perhaps, find another, for which it is better fitted. At leaſt, nothing can be more cruel, than to preſerve, by violence, an union, which, at firſt, was made by mutual love, and is now, in effect, diſſolved by mutual hatred.

BUT the liberty of divorces is not only a cure to hatred and domeſtic quarrels: It is alſo an admirable preſervative againſt them, and the only ſecret for keeping alive that love, which firſt united the married couple. The heart of man delights in liberty: The very image of conſtraint is grievous to it: When you would confine it by violence, to what would otherwiſe have been its choice, the inclination immediately changes, and deſire is turned into averſion. If the public intereſt will not allow us to enjoy in polygamy that *variety*, which is ſo agreeable in love; at leaſt, deprive us not of that liberty, which is ſo eſſentially requiſite. In vain you tell me, that I had my choice of the perſon, with whom I would conjoin myſelf. I had my choice, 'tis true, of my priſon; but this is but a ſmall comfort, ſince it muſt ſtill be a priſon.

SUCH are the arguments, which may be urged in favor of divorces: But there ſeem to be theſe three unanſwerable objections againſt them: *Firſt*, What muſt become of the children, upon the ſeparation of the parents? Muſt they be committed to the care of a ſtepmother; and inſtead of the fond attention and concern of a parent, feel all the indifference or hatred of a ſtranger or an enemy? Theſe inconveniences are ſufficiently felt, where nature has made the divorce by the doom inevitable to all mortals: And ſhall we ſeek to multiply theſe inconveniences, by multiplying divorces, and putting it in the power of parents, upon every caprice, to render their poſterity miſerable?

* *Memoires de Marquis d'*ARGENS.

Secondly, If it be true, on the one hand, that the heart of man naturally delights in liberty, and hates every thing to which it is confined; 'tis alſo true, on the other hand, that the heart of man naturally ſubmits to neceſſity, and ſoon loſes an inclination, when there appears an abſolute impoſſibility of gratifying it. Theſe principles of human nature, you will ſay, are contradictory: But what is man but a heap of contradictions? Tho' 'tis remarkable, that where principles are, after this manner, contrary in their operation, they do not always deſtroy each other; but the one or the other may predominate on any particular occaſion, according as circumſtances are more or leſs favorable to it. For inſtance, love is a reſtleſs and impatient paſſion, full of caprices and variations; ariſing in a moment from a feature, from an air, from nothing, and ſuddenly extinguiſhing after the ſame manner. Such a paſſion requires liberty above all things; and therefore ELOISA had reaſon, when, in order to preſerve this paſſion, ſhe refuſed to marry her beloved ABELARD.

How oft, when preſt to marriage, have I ſaid,
Curſe on all laws but thoſe which love has made:
Love, free as air, at ſight of human ties,
Spreds his light wing, and in a moment flies.

But *friendſhip* is a calm and ſedate affection, conducted by reaſon, and cemented by habit; ſpringing from long acquaintance and mutual obligations; without jealouſies or fears, and without thoſe feveriſh fits of heat and cold, which cauſe ſuch an agreeable torment in the amorous paſſion. So ſober an affection, therefore, as friendſhip, rather thrives under conſtraint, and never riſes to ſuch a height, as when any ſtrong intereſt or neceſſity binds two perſons together, and gives them ſome common object of purſuit. Let us conſider then, whether love or friendſhip ſhould moſt predominate in marriage; and we ſhall ſoon determine whether liberty or conſtraint be moſt favorable to it. The happieſt marriages, to be ſure, are found where love, by long acquaintance, is conſolidated into friendſhip. Whoever dreams of raptures and extaſies beyond the honey-moon, is a fool. Even romances themſelves, with all their liberty of fiction, are obliged to drop their lovers the very day of their marriage, and find it eaſier to ſupport the paſſion for a dozen years under coldneſs, diſdain and difficulties, than a week under poſſeſſion and ſecurity. We need not, therefore, be afraid of drawing the marriage-knot the cloſeſt poſſible. The friendſhip between the perſons, where it is ſolid and ſincere, will rather gain by it: And where it is wavering and uncertain, this is the beſt expedient for fixing it. How many frivolous quarrels and diſguſts are there, which people of common prudence endeavor to forget, when they lye under a neceſſity of paſſing their lives together; but which would ſoon inflame into the moſt deadly hatred, were they purſued to the utmoſt, under the proſpect of an eaſy ſeparation?

In the *third* place, we muſt conſider, that nothing is more dangerous than to unite two perſons ſo cloſely in all their intereſts and concerns, as man and wife, without rendering the union intire and total. The leaſt poſſibility of a ſeparate intereſt muſt be the ſource of endleſs quarrels and jealouſies. What Dr. PARNEL calls,

The little pilf'ring temper of a wife,

will be doubly ruinous; and the huſband's ſelfiſhneſs, being accompanied with more power, may be ſtill more dangerous.

SHOULD theſe reaſons againſt voluntary divorces be eſteemed inſufficient, I hope no body will pretend to refuſe the teſtimony of experience. At the time when divorces were moſt frequent among the ROMANS, marriages were moſt rare; and AUGUSTUS was obliged, by penal laws, to force the men of faſhion into the married ſtate: A circumſtance which is ſcarce to be found in any other age or nation. The more ancient laws of ROME which prohibited divorces, are extremely praiſed by DIONYSIUS HALYCARNASSÆUS *. Wonderful was the harmony, ſays the hiſtorian, which this inſeparable union of intereſts produced between married perſons; while each of them conſidered the inevitable neceſſity by which they were linked together, and abandoned all proſpect of any other choice or eſtabliſhment.

THE excluſion of polygamy and divorces ſufficiently recommends our preſent EUROPEAN practice with regard to marriage.

ESSAY XXIII.

OF SIMPLICITY AND REFINEMENT IN WRITING.

FINE writing, according to Mr. ADDISON, conſiſts of ſentiments, which are natural, without being obvious. There cannot be a juſter, and more conciſe definition of fine writing.

SENTIMENTS, which are merely natural, affect not the mind with any pleaſure, and ſeem not worthy of our attention. The pleaſantries of a waterman, the obſervations of a peaſant, the ribaldry of a porter or hackney coachman; all theſe are natural, and diſagreeable. What an inſipid comedy ſhould we make of the chit-chat of the tea-table, copied faithfully and at full length? Nothing can pleaſe perſons of taſte, but nature drawn with all her graces and ornaments, *la belle nature*; or if we copy low life, the ſtrokes muſt be ſtrong and remarkable, and muſt convey a lively image to the mind. The abſurd naivety of *Sancho Pancho* is repreſented in ſuch inimitable colors by CERVANTES, that it entertains as much as the picture of the moſt magnanimous hero or ſofteſt lover.

THE caſe is the ſame with orators, philoſophers, critics, or any author who ſpeaks in his own perſon, without introducing other ſpeakers or actors. If his language be not elegant, his obſervations uncommon, his ſenſe ſtrong and maſculine, he will in vain boaſt his nature and ſimplicity. He may be correct; but he never will be agreeable. 'Tis the unhappineſs of ſuch authors, that they are never blamed nor cenſured. The good fortune of a book, and that of a man, are not the ſame. The ſecret deceiving path of life, which HORACE talks of, *fallentis ſemita vitæ*, may be the happieſt lot of the one; but is the greateſt misfortune, which the other poſſibly can fall into.

* Lib. 2.

ON

toilettes of PARIS, than to the foreſts of ARCADIA. But this it is impoſſible to diſcover from his critical reaſonings. He blames all exceſſive painting and ornament as much as VIRGIL could have done, had *he* wrote a diſſertation on that ſpecies of poetry. However different the taſtes of men may be, their general diſcourſes on theſe ſubjects are commonly the ſame. No criticiſm can be very inſtructive, which deſcends not to particulars, and is not full of examples and illuſtrations. 'Tis allowed on all hands, that beauty, as well as virtue, lies always in a medium; but where this medium is placed, is the great queſtion, and can never be ſufficiently explained by general reaſonings.

I SHALL deliver it as a *third* obſervation on this ſubject, *that we ought to be more on our guard againſt the exceſs of refinement than that of ſimplicity; and that becauſe the former exceſs is both leſs* beautiful, *and more* dangerous *than the latter.*

'TIS a certain rule, that wit and paſſion are intirely inconſiſtent. When the affections are moved, there is no place for the imagination. The mind of man being naturally limited, 'tis impoſſible, that all its faculties can operate at once: And the more any one predominates, the leſs room is there for the others to exert their vigor. For this reaſon, a greater degree of ſimplicity is required in all compoſitions, where men, and actions, and paſſions are painted, than in ſuch as conſiſt of reflections and obſervations. And as the former ſpecies of writing is the more engaging and beautiful, one may ſafely, upon this account, give the preference to the extreme of ſimplicity above that of refinement.

WE may alſo obſerve, that thoſe compoſitions, which we read the oftneſt, and which every man of taſte has got by heart, have the recommendation of ſimplicity, and have nothing ſurprizing in the thought, when diveſted of that elegance of expreſſion, and harmony of numbers, with which it is cloathed. If the merit of the compoſition lies in a point of wit; it may ſtrike at firſt; but the mind anticipates the thought in the ſecond peruſal, and is no longer affected by it. When I read an epigram of MARTIAL, the firſt line recalls the whole; and I have no pleaſure in repeating to myſelf what I know already. But each line, each word in CATULLUS has its merit; and I am never tired with the peruſal of him. 'Tis ſufficient to run over COWLEY once: But PARNEL, after the fiftieth reading, is as freſh as at the firſt. Beſides, 'tis with books, as with women, where a certain plainneſs of manner and of dreſs is more engaging than that glare of paint and airs and apparel, which may dazzle the eye, but reaches not the affections. TERENCE is a modeſt and baſhful beauty, to whom we grant every thing, becauſe he aſſumes nothing, and whoſe purity and nature make a durable, tho' not a violent, impreſſion on us.

BUT refinement, as it is the leſs *beautiful*, ſo is it the more *dangerous* extreme, and what we are the apteſt to fall into. Simplicity paſſes for dulneſs, when it is not accompanied with great elegance and propriety. On the contrary, there is ſomething ſurprizing in a blaze of wit and conceit. Ordinary readers are mightily ſtruck with it, and falſely imagine it to be the moſt difficult, as well as moſt excellent way of writing. SENECA abounds with agreeable faults, ſays QUINTILIAN, *abundat dulcibus vitiis*; and for that reaſon is the more dangerous, and the more apt to pervert the taſte of the young and inconſiderate.

I SHALL add, that the exceſs of refinement is now more to be guarded againſt than ever; becauſe 'tis the extreme, which men are the moſt apt to fall into, after

ter learning has made great progreſs, and after eminent writers have appeared in every ſpecies of compoſition. The endeavor to pleaſe by novelty leads men wide of ſimplicity and nature, and fills their writings with affectation and conceit. It was thus the ASIATIC eloquence degenerated ſo much from the ATTIC. It was thus the age of CLAUDIUS and NERO became ſo much inferior to that of AUGUSTUS in taſte and genius: And perhaps there are, at preſent, ſome ſymptoms of a like degeneracy of taſte, in FRANCE as well as in ENGLAND.

ESSAY XXIV.

OF NATIONAL CHARACTERS.

THE vulgar are very apt to carry all *national characters* to extremes; and having once eſtabliſhed it as a principle, that any people are knaviſh, or cowardly, or ignorant, they will admit of no exception, but comprehend every individual under the ſame character. Men of ſenſe condemn theſe undiſtinguiſhing judgments: tho' at the ſame time, they allow, that each nation has a peculiar ſet of manners, and that ſome particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one people than among their neighbors. The common people in SWISSERLAND have ſurely more probity than thoſe of the ſame rank in IRELAND; and every prudent man will, from that circumſtance alone, make a difference in the truſt which he repoſes in each. We have reaſon to expect greater wit and gaiety in a FRENCHMAN than in a SPANIARD; tho' CERVANTES was born in SPAIN. An ENGLISHMAN will naturally be ſuppoſed to have more knowlege than a DANE; tho' TYCHO BRAHE was a native of DENMARK.

DIFFERENT reaſons are aſſigned for theſe *national characters*; while ſome account for them from *moral* and others from *phyſical* cauſes. By *moral* cauſes, I mean all circumſtances, which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reaſons, and which render a peculiar ſet of manners habitual to us. Of this kind are, the nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the ſituation of the nation with regard to its neighbors, and ſuch like circumſtances. By *phyſical* cauſes, I mean thoſe qualities of the air and climate, which are ſuppoſed to work inſenſibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving a particular complexion, which tho' reflection and reaſon may ſometimes overcome, yet will it prevail among the generality of mankind, and have an influence on their manners.

THAT the character of a nation will very much depend on *moral* cauſes muſt be evident to the moſt ſuperficial obſerver; ſince a nation is nothing but a collection of individuals, and the manners of individuals are frequently determined by theſe cauſes. As poverty and hard labor debaſe the minds of the common people, and render them unfit for any ſcience and ingenious profeſſion; ſo where any government becomes very oppreſſive to all its ſubjects, it muſt have a proportional effect on their temper and genius, and muſt baniſh all the liberal arts from among them. Inſtances of this nature are very frequent in the world.

THE

THE ſame principle of moral cauſes fixes the character of different profeſſions, and alters even that diſpoſition, which the particular members receive from the hand of nature. A *ſoldier* and a *prieſt* are different characters, in all nations, and all ages; and this difference is founded on circumſtances, whoſe operation is eternal and unalterable.

THE uncertainty of their life makes ſoldiers laviſh and generous as well as brave: Their idleneſs, as well as the large ſocieties, which they form in camps or garriſons, inclines them to pleaſure and gallantry: By their frequent change of company, they acquire good breeding and an openneſs of behavior: Being employed only againſt a public and an open enemy, they become candid, honeſt, and undeſigning: And as they uſe more the labor of the body than that of the mind, they are commonly thoughtleſs and ignorant *.

'TIS a trite, but not altogether a falſe maxim, that *prieſts of all religions are the ſame*; and tho' the character of the profeſſion will not, in every inſtance, prevail over the perſonal character, yet is it ſure always to predominate with the greater number. For as chymiſts obſerve, that ſpirits, when raiſed to a certain height, are all the ſame, from whatever materials they be extracted; ſo theſe men, being elevated above humanity, acquire a uniform character, which is entirely their own, and which, in my opinion, is, generally ſpeaking, not the moſt amiable, that is to be met with in human ſociety. It is, in moſt points, oppoſite to that of a ſoldier; as is the way of life, from which it is derived †.

As

* 'Tis a ſaying of MENANDER, Κομψὸς στρατιώτης, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ πλάττοι Θεὸς Οὐθεὶς γένοιτ' ἄν. MEN. apud STOBÆUM. *'Tis not in the power even of God to make a polite ſoldier.* The contrary obſervation with regard to the manners of ſoldiers takes place in our days. This ſeems to me a preſumption, that the ancients owed all their refinement and civility to books and ſtudy; for which, indeed, a ſoldier's life is not ſo well calculated. Company and the world is their ſphere. And if there be any politeneſs to be learned from company, they will certainly have a conſiderable ſhare of it.

† Tho' all mankind have a ſtrong propenſity to religion at certain times and in certain diſpoſitions; yet are there few or none, who have it to that degree, and with that conſtancy, which is requiſite to ſupport the character of this profeſſion. It muſt, therefore, happen, that clergymen, being drawn from the common maſs of mankind, as people are to other employments, by the views of profit, the greateſt part, tho' no atheiſts or free-thinkers, will find it neceſſary, on particular occaſions, to feign more devotion than they are, at that time, poſſeſſed of, and to maintain the appearance of fervor and ſerioufneſs, even when jaded with the exerciſes of their religion, or when they have their minds engaged in the common occupations of life. They muſt not, like the reſt of the world, give ſcope to their natural movements and ſentiments: They muſt ſet a guard over their looks and words and actions: And in order to ſupport the veneration paid them by the ignorant vulgar, they muſt not only keep a remarkable reſerve, but muſt promote the ſpirit of ſuperſtition, by a continued grimace and hypocriſy. This diſſimulation often deſtroys the candor and ingenuity of their temper, and makes an irreparable breach in their character

If by chance any of them be poſſeſſed of a temper more ſuſceptible of devotion than uſual, ſo that he has but little occaſion for hypocriſy to ſupport the character of his profeſſion; 'tis ſo natural for him to over-rate this advantage, and to think that it atones for every violation of morality, that frequently he is not more virtuous than the hypocrite. And tho' few dare openly avow thoſe exploded opinions, *that every thing is lawful to the ſaints, and that they alone have property in their goods*; yet may we obſerve, that theſe principles lurk in every boſom, and repreſent a zeal for religious obſervances as ſo great a merit, that it may compenſate for many vices and enormities. This obſervation is ſo common, that all prudent men are on their guard, when they meet with any extraordinary appearance of religion; tho' at the ſame time, they confeſs, that there are many exceptions to this general rule, and that probity and ſuperſtition are not altogether incompatible.

Moſt men are ambitious; but the ambition of other men may commonly be ſatisfied, by excelling in their particular profeſſion, and thereby promoting the intereſts of ſociety. The ambition of the

THERE are few queſtions more curious than this, or which will occur oftener in our enquiries concerning human affairs; and therefore it may be proper to give it a ſerious examination.

THE human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it poſſible for any ſet of men to converſe often together, without acquiring a ſimilitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propenſity to company and ſociety is ſtrong in all rational creatures; and the ſame diſpoſition, which gives us this propenſity, makes us enter deeply into each other's ſentiments, and cauſes like paſſions and inclinations to run, as it were by contagion, thro' the whole club or knot of companions. Where a number of men are united into one political body, the occaſions of their intercourſe muſt be ſo frequent, for defence, commerce, and government, that, together with the ſame ſpeech or language, they muſt contract a reſemblance in their manners, and have a common or national character, as well as a perſonal one, peculiar to each individual. Now tho' nature produces all kinds of temper and underſtanding in great abundance, it follows not that ſhe always produces them in like proportions, and that in every ſociety the ingredients of induſtry and indolence, valor and cowardice, humanity and brutality, wiſdom and folly, will be mixed after the ſame manner. In the infancy of ſociety, if any of theſe diſpoſitions be found in greater abundance than the reſt, it will naturally prevail in the compoſition, and give a tincture to the national character. Or ſhould it be aſſerted, that no ſpecies of temper can reaſonably be preſumed to predominate, even in thoſe contracted ſocieties, and that the ſame proportions will always be preſerved in the mixture; yet ſurely the perſons in credit and authority, being a more contracted body, cannot always be preſumed to be of the ſame character; and their influence on the manners of the people, muſt, at all times, be very conſiderable. If on the firſt eſtabliſhment of a republic, a BRUTUS ſhould be placed in authority, and be tranſported with ſuch an enthuſiaſm for liberty and public good, as to overlook all the ties of nature, as well as private intereſt; ſuch an illuſtrious example will naturally have an effect on the whole ſociety, and kindle the ſame paſſion in every boſom. Whatever it be that forms the manners of one generation, the next muſt imbibe a deeper tincture of the ſame dye; men being more ſuſceptible of all impreſſions during infancy, and retaining theſe impreſſions as long as they remain in the world. I aſſert, then, that all national characters, where they depend not on fixed *moral* cauſes, proceed from ſuch accidents as theſe, and that phyſical cauſes have no diſcernible operation on the human mind.

IF we run over the whole globe, or revolve all the annals of hiſtory, we ſhall diſcover every where ſigns of this ſympathy or contagion of manners, none of the influence of air or climate.

Firſt. WE may obſerve, that where a very extenſive government has been eſtabliſhed for many centuries, it ſpreads a national character over the whole empire, and communicates to every part a ſimilitude of manners. Thus the CHINESE

of any kind are to be met with. STRABO, lib. 2. rejects, in a great meaſure, the influence of climate upon men. All is cuſtom and education, ſays he. It is not from nature, that the ATHENIANS are learned, the LACEDEMONIANS ignorant, and the THEBANS too, who are ſtill nearer neighbors to the former. Even the difference of animals, he adds, depends not on climate.

have

NIARDS were reſtleſs, turbulent, and ſo addicted to war, that many of them killed themſelves, when deprived of their arms by the ROMANS *. One would find an equal difficulty, at preſent, (at leaſt one would have found it fifty years ago) to rouze up the modern SPANIARDS to arms. The BATAVIANS were all ſoldiers of fortune, and hired themſelves into the ROMAN armies. Their poſterity make uſe of foreigners for the ſame purpoſe that the ROMANS did their anceſtors. Tho' ſome ſtrokes of the FRENCH character be the ſame with that, which CÆSAR has aſcribed to the GAULS; yet what compariſon between the civility, humanity and knowlege of the modern inhabitants of that country, and the ignorance, barbarity and groſſneſs of the ancient? Not to inſiſt upon the great difference betwixt the preſent poſſeſſors of BRITAIN, and thoſe before the ROMAN conqueſt; we may obſerve, that our anceſtors, a few centuries ago, were ſunk into the moſt abject ſuperſtition, laſt century they were inflamed with the moſt furious enthuſiaſm, and are now ſettled into the moſt cool indifference with regard to religious matters, that is to be found in any nation of the world.

Eightbly. Where ſeveral neighboring nations have a very cloſe communication together, either by policy, commerce, or travelling, they acquire a ſimilitude of manners, proportioned to the communication. Thus all the FRANKS appear to have a uniform character to the eaſtern nations. The differences among them are like the particular accents of different provinces, which are not diſtinguiſhable, except by an ear accuſtomed to them, and which commonly eſcape a foreigner.

Ninthly. WE may often remark a wonderful mixture of manners and character in the ſame nation, ſpeaking the ſame language, and ſubject to the ſame government: And in this particular, the ENGLISH are the moſt remarkable of any people, that ever were in the world. Nor is this to be aſcribed to the mutability and uncertainty of their climate, or to any other *phyſical* cauſes; ſince all theſe cauſes take place in their neighboring kingdom of SCOTLAND, without having the ſame effect. Where the government of a nation is altogether republican, it is apt to beget a particular ſet of manners. Where it is altogether monarchical, it is more apt to have the ſame effect; the imitation of ſuperiors ſpreading the national manners faſter among the people. If a ſtate conſiſts altogether of merchants, ſuch as HOLLAND, their uniform way of life will fix their character. If it conſiſts chiefly of nobles and landed gentry, like GERMANY, FRANCE, and SPAIN, the ſame effect follows. The genius of a particular ſect or religion is alſo apt to mould the manners of a people. But the ENGLISH government is a mixture of monarchy, ariſtocracy, and democracy. The people are compoſed of gentry and merchants. All ſects of religion are to be found among them. And the great liberty and independency, which they enjoy, allows every one to diſplay the manners, peculiar to him. Hence the ENGLISH, of any people in the univerſe, have the leaſt of a national character; unleſs this very ſingularity may ſtand for ſuch.

IF the characters of men depended on the air and climate, the degrees of heat and cold ſhould naturally be expected to have a mighty influence; ſince nothing has a greater effect on all plants and irrational animals. And indeed there is ſome

* TIT. LIVII, Lib. 34. Cap. 17.

reaſon

and knowlege to a whole people, and produce the greateſt improvements: But they fix the tongue by their writings, and prevent, in ſome degree, its farther changes.

LORD BACON has obſerved, that the inhabitants of the ſouth are, in general, more ingenious than thoſe of the north; but that, where the native of a cold climate has genius, he riſes to a higher pitch than can be reached by the ſouthern wits. This obſervation a late writer * confirms, by comparing the ſouthern wits to cucumbers, which are commonly all good of their kind; but at beſt are an inſipid fruit: While the northern geniuſes are like melons, of which not one in fifty is good; but when it is good, it has an exquiſite reliſh. I believe this remark may be allowed juſt, when confined to the EUROPEAN nations, and to the preſent age, or rather to the preceding one: But then I think it may be accounted for from moral cauſes. All the ſciences and liberal arts have been imported to us from the ſouth; and 'tis eaſy to imagine, that, in the firſt ardor of application, when excited by emulation and by glory, the few, who were addicted to them, would carry them to the greateſt height, and ſtretch every nerve, and every faculty, to reach the pinnacle of perfection. Such illuſtrious examples ſpred knowlege every where, and begot an univerſal eſteem for the ſciences: After which, 'tis no wonder, that induſtry relaxes; while men meet not with ſuitable encouragement, nor arrive at ſuch diſtinction by their attainments. The univerſal diffuſion of learning among a people, and the entire baniſhment of groſs ignorance and ruſticity is, therefore, ſeldom attended with any remarkable perfection in particular perſons. It ſeems to be taken for granted in the dialogue *de Oratoribus*, that knowlege was much more common in VESPASIAN's age than in that of CICERO or AUGUSTUS. QUINCTILIAN alſo complains of the profanation of learning, by its becoming too vulgar. "Formerly, ſays JUVENAL, ſci-"ence was confined to GREECE and ITALY. Now the whole world emulate "ATHENS and ROME. Eloquent GAUL has taught BRITAIN, knowing in the "laws. Even THULE entertains thoughts of hiring rhetoricians for its inſtruc-"tion †." This ſtate of learning is remarkable; becauſe JUVENAL is himſelf the laſt of the ROMAN writers, who poſſeſſed any degree of genius. Thoſe, who ſucceeded, are valued for nothing but the matters of fact, of which they give us information. I hope the late converſion of MUSCOVY to the ſtudy of the ſciences will not prove a like prognoſtic to the preſent period of learning.

CARDINAL BENTIVOGLIO gives the preference to the northern nations above the ſouthern with regard to candor and ſincerity; and mentions, on the one hand, the SPANIARDS and ITALIANS, and on the other, the FLEMISH and GERMANS. But I am apt to think, that this has happened by accident. The ancient ROMANS ſeem to have been a candid ſincere people as are the modern TURKS. But if we muſt needs ſuppoſe, that this event has ariſen from fixed cauſes, we may only conclude from it, that all extremes are apt to concur, and are commonly at-

* Dr. BERKELY: Minute philoſopher.

" † Sed Cantaber unde
Stoicus? antiqui præſertim ætate Metelli.
Nunc totus GRAIAS, noſtraſque habet orbis ATHENAS.
GALLIA cauſidicos docuit facunda BRITANNOS:
De conducendo loquitur jam rhetore THULE."

Satyr. 15.

tended

tells us, that the GAULS, in his time, were great drunkards, and much addicted to wine; chiefly, I ſuppoſe, from its rarity and novelty. On the other hand, the heat in the ſouthern climates, obliging men and women to go half naked, thereby renders their frequent commerce more dangerous, and inflames their mutual paſſion. This makes parents and huſbands more jealous and reſerved; which ſtill farther inflames the paſſion. Not to mention, that as women ripen ſooner in the ſouthern regions, 'tis neceſſary to obſerve greater jealouſy and care in their education; it being evident that a girl of twelve cannot poſſeſs equal diſcretion to govern this paſſion, with one, who feels not its violence till ſhe be ſeventeen or eighteen.

PERHAPS too, the fact is falſe, that nature has, either from moral or phyſical cauſes, diſtributed theſe different inclinations to the different climates. The antient GREEKS, tho' born in a warm climate, ſeem to have been much addicted to the bottle; nor were their parties of pleaſure any thing but matches of drinking among the men, who paſſed their time altogether apart from the fair-ſex. Yet when ALEXANDER led the GREEKS into PERSIA, a ſtill more ſouthern climate, they multiplied their debauches of this kind, in imitation of the PERSIAN manners *. So honorable was the character of a drunkard among the PERSIANS, that CYRUS the younger, ſoliciting the ſober LACEDEMONIANS for ſuccor againſt his brother, ARTAXERXES, claims it chiefly on account of his ſuperior endowments, as more valorous, more bountiful, and a better drinker †. DARIUS HYSTASPES made it be inſcribed on his tombſtone, among his other virtues and princely qualities, that no one could bear a greater quantity of liquor. You may obtain any thing of the NEGROES by offering them ſtrong drink; and may eaſily prevail with them to ſell, not only their parents, but their wives and miſtreſſes, for a caſk of brandy. In FRANCE and ITALY few drink pure wine, except in the greateſt heats of ſummer; and indeed, it is then almoſt as neceſſary, in order to recruit the ſpirits, evaporated by heat, as it is in SWEDEN, during the winter, in order to warm the bodies congealed by the rigor of the ſeaſon.

IF jealouſy be regarded as a proof of an amorous diſpoſition, no people were more jealous than the MUSCOVITES, before their communication with EUROPE had ſomewhat altered their manners in this particular.

BUT ſuppoſing the fact true, that nature, by phyſical principles, has regularly diſtributed theſe two paſſions, the one to the northern, the other to the ſouthern regions; we can only infer, that the climate may affect the groſſer and more bodily organs of our frame; not that it can work upon thoſe finer organs, on which the operations of the mind and underſtanding depend. And this is agreeable to the analogy of nature. The races of animals never degenerate when carefully tended; and horſes, in particular, always ſhow their blood in their ſhape, ſpirit, and ſwiftneſs: But a coxcomb may beget a philoſopher, as a man of virtue may leave a worthleſs progeny.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that tho' the paſſion for liquor be much more brutal and debaſing than love, which, when properly managed, is the ſource of all politeneſs and refinement; yet this gives not ſo great an advan-

* BABYLONII *maxime in vinum & quæ ebrietatem ſequuntur, effuſi ſunt.* CAP. 1. QUINT. CUR. Lib. 5.

† PLUT. SYMP. Lib. 1. Quæſt. 4.

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the time paſs the eaſier with them, and is ſome relief to that oppreſſion, under which men commonly labor, when left entirely to their own thoughts and meditations.

We find, that common lyars always magnify, in their narrations, all kinds of danger, pain, diſtreſs, ſickneſs, deaths, murders, and cruelties; as well as joy, beauty, mirth, and magnificence. It is an abſurd ſecret, which they have for pleaſing their company, fixing their attention, and attaching them to ſuch marvellous relations, by the paſſions and emotions, which they excite.

There is, however, a difficulty of applying to the preſent ſubject, in its full extent, this ſolution, however ingenious and ſatisfactory it may appear. It is certain, that the ſame object of diſtreſs which pleaſes in a tragedy, were it really ſet before us, would give the moſt unfeigned uneaſineſs, tho' it be then the moſt effectual cure of languor and indolence. Monſieur Fontenelle ſeems to have been ſenſible of this difficulty; and accordingly attempts another ſolution of the phænomenon; at leaſt, makes ſome addition to the theory abovementioned *.

"Pleasure and pain," ſays he, "which are two ſentiments ſo different in "themſelves, differ not ſo much in their cauſe. From the inſtance of tickling, "it appears, that the movement of pleaſure puſhed a little too far, becomes pain; "and that the movement of pain, a little moderated, becomes pleaſure. Hence "it proceeds, that there is ſuch a thing as a ſorrow, ſoft and agreeable: It is a "pain weakened and diminiſhed. The heart likes naturally to be moved and af"fected. Melancholy objects ſuit it, and even diſaſtrous and ſorrowful, pro"vided they are ſoftened by ſome circumſtance. It is certain, that on the theatre, "the repreſentation has almoſt the effect of reality; but yet it has not altogether "that effect. However we may be hurried away by the ſpectacle; whatever "dominion the ſenſes and imagination may uſurp over the reaſon, there ſtill "lurks at the bottom a certain idea of falſhood in the whole of what we ſee. This "idea, tho' weak and diſguiſed, ſuffices to diminiſh the pain which we ſuffer "from the misfortunes of thoſe whom we love, and to reduce that affliction to "ſuch a pitch as converts it into a pleaſure. We weep for the misfortune of a "hero, to whom we are attached: In the ſame inſtant we comfort ourſelves, by "reflecting, that it is nothing but a fiction: And it is preciſely, that mixture "of ſentiments, which compoſes an agreeable ſorrow, and tears that delight us. "But as that affliction, which is cauſed by exterior and ſenſible objects, is ſtronger "than the conſolation which ariſes from an internal reflection, they are the ef"fects and ſymptoms of ſorrow, which ought to prevail in the compoſition."

This ſolution ſeems juſt and convincing; but perhaps it wants ſtill ſome new addition, in order to make it anſwer fully the phænomenon, which we here examine. All the paſſions, excited by eloquence, are agreeable in the higheſt degree, as well as thoſe which are moved by painting and the theatre. The epilogues of Cicero are, on this account chiefly, the delight of every reader of taſte; and it is difficult to read ſome of them without the deepeſt ſympathy and ſorrow. His merit as an orator, no doubt, depends much on his ſucceſs in this particular. When he had raiſed tears in his judges and all his audience, they were then the moſt highly delighted, and expreſſed the greateſt ſatisfaction with the pleader.

* Reflexions ſur la poetique. §. 36.

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The pathetic deſcription of the butchery made by VERRES of the SICILIAN captains is a maſter-piece of this kind: But I believe none will affirm, that the being preſent at a melancholy ſcene of that nature would afford any entertainment. Neither is the ſorrow here ſoftened by fiction: For the audience were convinced of the reality of every circumſtance. What is it then, which in this caſe raiſes a pleaſure from the boſom of uneaſineſs, ſo to ſpeak; and a pleaſure, which ſtill retains all the features and outward ſymptoms of diſtreſs and ſorrow?

I ANSWER: This extraordinary effect proceeds from that very eloquence, with which the melancholy ſcene is repreſented. The genius required to paint objects in a lively manner, the art employed in collecting all the pathetic circumſtances, the judgment diſplayed in diſpoſing them; the exerciſe, I ſay, of theſe noble talents, along with the force of expreſſion, and beauty of oratorial numbers, diffuſe the higheſt ſatisfaction on the audience, and excite the moſt delightful movements. By this means, the uneaſineſs of the melancholy paſſions is not only overpowered and effaced by ſomething ſtronger of an oppoſite kind; but the whole movement of thoſe paſſions is converted into pleaſure, and ſwells the delight which the eloquence raiſes in us. The ſame force of oratory, employed on an unintereſting ſubject, would not pleaſe half ſo much, or rather would appear altogether ridiculous; and the mind, being left in abſolute calmneſs and indifference, would reliſh none of thoſe beauties of imagination or expreſſion, which, if joined to paſſion, give it ſuch exquiſite entertainment. The impulſe or vehemence, ariſing from ſorrow, compaſſion, indignation, receives a new direction from the ſentiments of beauty. The latter, being the predominant emotion, ſeize the whole mind, and convert the former into themſelves, or at leaſt, tincture them ſo ſtrongly as totally to alter their nature: And the ſoul, being, at the ſame time, rouzed by paſſion, and charmed by eloquence, feels on the whole a ſtrong movement, which is altogether delightful.

THE ſame principle takes place in tragedy; with this addition, that tragedy is an imitation, and imitation is always of itſelf agreeable. This circumſtance ſerves ſtill farther to ſmooth the motions of paſſion, and convert the whole feeling into one uniform and ſtrong enjoyment. Objects of the greateſt terror and diſtreſs pleaſe in painting, and pleaſe more than the moſt beautiful objects, that appear calm and indifferent *. The affection, rouzing the mind, excites a large ſtock of ſpirit and vehemence; which is all transformed into pleaſure by the force of the prevailing movement. It is thus the fiction of tragedy ſoftens the paſſion, by an infuſion of a new feeling, not merely by weakening or diminiſhing the ſorrow. You may by degrees weaken a real ſorrow, till it totally diſappears; yet in none of its gradations will it ever give pleaſure; except, perhaps, by accident, to a man ſunk under lethargic indolence, whom it rouzes from that languid ſtate.

* Painters make no ſcruple of repreſenting diſtreſs and ſorrow as well as any other paſſion: But they ſeem not to dwell ſo much on theſe melancholy affections as the poets, who, tho' they copy every emotion of the human breaſt, yet paſs very quickly over the agreeable ſentiments. A painter repreſents only one inſtant; and if that be paſſionate enough, it is ſure to affect and delight the ſpectator: But nothing can furniſh to the poet a variety of ſcenes and incidents and ſentiments, except diſtreſs, terror, or anxiety. Compleat joy and ſatisfaction is attended with ſecurity, and leaves no farther room for action.

To confirm this theory, it will be ſufficient to produce other inſtances, where the ſubordinate movement is converted into the predominant, and gives force to it, tho' of a different, and even ſometimes tho' of a contrary nature.

NOVELTY naturally excites the mind and attracts our attention; and the movements, which it cauſes, are always converted into any paſſion, belonging to the object, and join their force to it. Whether an event excites joy or ſorrow, pride or ſhame, anger or good-will, it is ſure to produce a ſtronger affection, when new and unuſual. And tho' novelty, of itſelf, be agreeable, it enforces the painful, as well as agreeable paſſions.

HAD you any intention to move a perſon extremely by the narration of any event, the beſt method of encreaſing its effect would be artfully to delay informing him of it, and firſt excite his curioſity and impatience before you let him into the ſecret. This is the artifice, practiſed by IAGO in the famous ſcene of SHAKESPEARE; and every ſpectator is ſenſible, that OTHELLO's jealouſy acquires additional force from his preceding impatience, and that the ſubordinate paſſion is here readily transformed into the predominant.

DIFFICULTIES encreaſe paſſions of every kind; and by rouſing our attention, and exciting our active powers, they produce an emotion, which nouriſhes the prevailing affection.

PARENTS commonly love that child moſt, whoſe ſickly infirm frame of body has occaſioned them the greateſt pains, trouble, and anxiety in rearing him. The agreeable ſentiment of affection here acquires force from ſentiments of uneaſineſs.

NOTHING endears ſo much a friend as ſorrow for his death. The pleaſure of his company has not ſo powerful an influence.

JEALOUSY is a painful paſſion, yet without ſome ſhare of it, the agreeable affection of love has difficulty to ſubſiſt in its full force and violence. Abſence is alſo a great ſource of complaint amongſt lovers, and gives them the greateſt uneaſineſs: Yet nothing is more favorable to their mutual paſſion than ſhort intervals of that kind. And if long intervals be pernicious, it is only becauſe, thro' time, men are accuſtomed to them, and they ceaſe to give uneaſineſs. Jealouſy and abſence in love compoſe the *dolce piccante* of the ITALIANS, which they ſuppoſe ſo eſſential to all pleaſure.

THERE is a fine obſervation of the elder PLINY, which illuſtrates the principle here inſiſted on. *It is very remarkable*, ſays he, *that the laſt works of celebrated artiſts, which they left imperfect, are always the moſt prized, ſuch as the* IRIS *of* ARISTIDES, *the* TYNDARIDES *of* NICOMACHUS, *the* MEDEA *of* TIMOMACHUS, *and the* VENUS *of* APELLES. *Theſe are valued even above their finiſhed productions: The broken lineaments of the piece and the half formed idea of the painter are carefully ſtudied; and our very grief for that curious hand, which had been ſtopped by death, is an additional encreaſe to our pleaſure* *.

THESE inſtances (and many more might be collected) are ſufficient to afford us ſome inſight into the analogy of nature, and to ſhow us, that the pleaſure, which

* Illud vero perquam rarum ac memoria dignum, etiam ſuprema opera artificum, imperfectaſque tabulas, ſicut, IRIN ARISTIDIS, TYNDARIDAS NICHOMACHI, MEDEAM TIMOMACHI, & quam diximus VENEREM APELLIS, in majori admiratione eſſe quam perfecta. Quippe in iis lineamenta reliqua, ipſæque cogitationes artificum ſpectantur, atque in lenocinio commendationis dolor eſt manus, cum id ageret, extinctæ. Lib. xxxv. Cap. LI.

poets,

poets, orators, and muſicians give us, by exciting grief, ſorrow, indignation, compaſſion, is not ſo extraordinary nor paradoxical, as it may at firſt ſight appear. The force of imagination, the energy of expreſſion, the power of numbers, the charms of imitation; all theſe are naturally of themſelves, delightful to the mind; and when the object preſented lays alſo hold of ſome affection, the pleaſure ſtill riſes upon us, by the converſion of this ſubordinate movement, into that which is predominant. The paſſion, tho', perhaps, naturally, and when excited by the ſimple appearance of a real object, it may be painful; yet is ſo ſmoothed, and ſoftened, and mollified, when raiſed by the finer arts, that it affords the higheſt entertainment.

To confirm this reaſoning, we may obſerve, that if the movements of the imagination be not predominant above thoſe of the paſſion, a contrary effect follows; and the former, being now ſubordinate, is converted into the latter, and ſtill farther encreaſes the pain and affliction of the ſufferer.

WHO could ever think of it as a good expedient for comforting an afflicted parent to exaggerate, with all the force of oratory, the irreparable loſs, which he has met with by the death of a favorite child? The more power of imagination and expreſſion you here employ, the more you encreaſe his deſpair and affliction.

THE ſhame, confuſion, and terror of VERRES, no doubt, roſe in proportion to the noble eloquence and vehemence of CICERO: So alſo did his pain and uneaſineſs. Theſe former paſſions were too ſtrong for the pleaſure ariſing from the beauties of elocution; and operated, tho' from the ſame principle, yet in a contrary manner, to the ſympathy, compaſſion, and indignation of the audience.

LORD CLARENDON, when he approaches the cataſtrophe of the royal party, ſuppoſes, that his narration muſt then become infinitely diſagreeable; and he hurries over the King's death, without giving us one circumſtance of it. He conſiders it as too horrid a ſcene to be contemplated with any ſatisfaction, or even without the utmoſt pain and averſion. He himſelf, as well as the readers of that age, were too deeply concerned in the events, and felt a pain from ſubjects, which an hiſtorian and a reader of another age would regard as the moſt pathetic and moſt intereſting, and by conſequence, the moſt agreeable.

AN action, repreſented in tragedy, may be too bloody and atrocious. It may excite ſuch movements of horror as will not ſoften into pleaſure; and the greateſt energy of expreſſion beſtowed on deſcriptions of that nature, ſerves only to augment our uneaſineſs. Such is that action, repreſented in the *ambitious Stepmother*, where a venerable old man, raiſed to the height of fury and deſpair, ruſhes againſt a pillar, and ſtriking his head upon it, beſmears it all over with mingled brains and gore. The ENGLISH theatre abounds too much with ſuch images.

EVEN the common ſentiments of compaſſion require to be ſoftened by ſome agreeable affection, in order to give a thorough ſatisfaction to the audience. The mere ſuffering of plaintive virtue, under the triumphant tyranny and oppreſſion of vice, forms a diſagreeable ſpectacle, and is carefully avoided by all maſters of the theatre. In order to diſmiſs the audience with entire ſatisfaction and contentment, the virtue muſt either convert itſelf into a noble courageous deſpair, or the vice receive its proper puniſhment.

MOST painters appear in this light to have been very unhappy in their ſubjects. As they wrought for churches and convents, they have chiefly repreſented ſuch horrible ſubjects as crucifixions and martyrdoms, where nothing appears but tor-

tures, wounds, executions, and paſſive ſuffering, without any action or affection. When they turned their pencil from this ghaſtly mythology, they had recourſe commonly to OVID, whoſe fictions, tho' paſſionate and agreeable, are ſcarce natural or probable enough for painting.

THE ſame inverſion of that principle, which is here inſiſted on, diſplays itſelf in common life, as in the effects of oratory and poetry. Raiſe ſo the ſubordinate paſſion that it becomes the predominant, it ſwallows up that affection, which it before nouriſhed and encreaſed. Too much jealouſy extinguiſhes love: Too much difficulty renders us indifferent: Too much ſickneſs and infirmity diſguſts a ſelfiſh and unkind parent.

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ESSAY XXVI.

OF THE STANDARD OF TASTE.

THE great variety of Taſtes, as well as of opinions, which prevail in the world, is too obvious not to have fallen under every one's obſervation. Men of the moſt confined knowlege are able to remark a difference in the narrow circle of their acquaintance, even where the perſons have been educated under the ſame government, and have early imbibed the ſame prejudices. But thoſe who can enlarge their view to contemplate diſtant nations and remote ages, are ſtill more ſurprized at the great inconſiſtence and contradiction. We are apt to call *barbarous* whatever departs widely from our own taſte and apprehenſion: But ſoon find the epithet of reproach retorted on us. And the higheſt arrogance and ſelf-conceit is at laſt ſtartled, on obſerving an equal aſſurance on all ſides, and ſcruples, amidſt ſuch a conteſt of ſentiments, to pronounce poſitively in its own favor.

AS this variety of taſte is obvious to the moſt careleſs enquirer; ſo will it be found, on examination, to be ſtill greater in reality than in appearance. The ſentiments of men often differ with regard to beauty and deformity of all kinds, even while their general diſcourſe is the ſame. There are certain terms in every language, which import blame, and others praiſe; and all men, who uſe the ſame tongue, muſt agree in their application of them. Every voice is united in applauding elegance, propriety, ſimplicity, ſpirit in writing; and in blaming fuſtian, affectation, coldneſs, and a falſe brilliant: But when critics come to particulars, this ſeeming unanimity vaniſhes; and it is found, that they had affixed a very different meaning to their expreſſions. In all matters of opinion and ſcience, the caſe is oppoſite: The difference among men is there oftner found to lie in generals than in particulars; and to be leſs in reality than in appearance. An explication of the terms commonly ends the controverſy; and the diſputants are ſur-

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prized to find, that they had been quarrelling, while at bottom they agreed in their judgment.

THOSE who found morality on ſentiment, more than on reaſon, are inclined to comprehend ethics under the former obſervation, and to ſuppoſe, that in all queſtions, which regard conduct and manners, the difference among men is really greater than at firſt ſight it appears. It is indeed obvious, that writers of all nations and all ages concur in applauding juſtice, humanity, magnanimity, prudence, veracity; and in blaming the oppoſite qualities. Even poets and other authors, whoſe compoſitions are chiefly calculated to pleaſe the imagination, are yet found, from HOMER down to FENELON, to inculcate the ſame moral precepts, and to beſtow their applauſe and blame on the ſame virtues and vices. This great unanimity is uſually aſcribed to the influence of plain reaſon; which, in all theſe caſes, maintains ſimilar ſentiments in all men, and prevents thoſe controverſies, to which the abſtract ſciences are ſo much expoſed. So far as the unanimity is real, the account may be admitted as ſatisfactory: But it muſt alſo be allowed, that ſome part of the ſeeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the very nature of language. The word, *virtue*, with its equivalent in every tongue, implies praiſe; as that of *vice* does blame: And no one, without the moſt obvious and groſſeſt impropriety, could affix reproach to a term, which in general uſe is underſtood in a good ſenſe; or beſtow applauſe, where the idiom requires diſapprobation. HOMER's general precepts, where he delivers any ſuch, will never be controverted; but it is very obvious, that when he draws particular pictures of manners, and repreſents heroiſm in ACHILLES and prudence in ULYSSES, he intermixes a much greater degree of ferocity in the former, and of cunning and fraud in the latter, than FENELON would admit of. The ſage ULYSSES in the GREEK poet ſeems to delight in lies and fictions, and often employs them without any neceſſity or even advantage: But his more ſcrupulous ſon in the FRENCH epic writer expoſes himſelf to the moſt imminent perils, rather than depart from the exacteſt line of truth and veracity.

THE admirers and followers of the ALCORAN inſiſt very much on the excellent moral precepts, which are interſperſed throughout that wild performance. But it is to be ſuppoſed, that the ARABIC words, which correſpond to the ENGLISH, equity, juſtice, temperance, meekneſs, charity, were ſuch as, from the conſtant uſe of that tongue, muſt always be taken in a good ſenſe; and it would have argued the greateſt ignorance, not of morals, but of language, to have mentioned them with any epithets, beſides thoſe of applauſe and approbation. But would we know, whether the pretended prophet had really attained a juſt ſentiment of morals? Let us attend to his narration; and we ſhall ſoon find, that he beſtows praiſe on ſuch inſtances of treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry, as are utterly incompatible with civilized ſociety. No ſteddy rule of right ſeems there to be attended to; and every action is blamed or praiſed, ſo far only as it is beneficial or hurtful to the true believers.

THE merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics is indeed very ſmall. Whoever recommends any moral virtues, really does no more than is implied in the terms themſelves. The people, who invented the word *charity*, and uſed it in a good ſenſe, inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciouſly, the precept, *be charitable*, than any pretended legiſlator or prophet, who ſhould inſert ſuch a *maxim*

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prized to find, that they had been quarrelling, while at bottom they agreed in their judgment.

THOSE who found morality on ſentiment, more than on reaſon, are inclined to comprehend ethics under the former obſervation, and to ſuppoſe, that in all queſtions, which regard conduct and manners, the difference among men is really greater than at firſt ſight it appears. It is indeed obvious, that writers of all nations and all ages concur in applauding juſtice, humanity, magnanimity, prudence, veracity; and in blaming the oppoſite qualities. Even poets and other authors, whoſe compoſitions are chiefly calculated to pleaſe the imagination, are yet found, from HOMER down to FENELON, to inculcate the ſame moral precepts, and to beſtow their applauſe and blame on the ſame virtues and vices. This great unanimity is uſually aſcribed to the influence of plain reaſon; which, in all theſe caſes, maintains ſimilar ſentiments in all men, and prevents thoſe controverſies, to which the abſtract ſciences are ſo much expoſed. So far as the unanimity is real, the account may be admitted as ſatisfactory: But it muſt alſo be allowed, that ſome part of the ſeeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the very nature of language. The word, *virtue*, with its equivalent in every tongue, implies praiſe; as that of *vice* does blame: And no one, without the moſt obvious and groſſeſt impropriety, could affix reproach to a term, which in general uſe is underſtood in a good ſenſe; or beſtow applauſe, where the idiom requires diſapprobation. HOMER's general precepts, where he delivers any ſuch, will never be controverted; but it is very obvious, that when he draws particular pictures of manners, and repreſents heroiſm in ACHILLES and prudence in ULYSSES, he intermixes a much greater degree of ferocity in the former, and of cunning and fraud in the latter, than FENELON would admit of. The ſage ULYSSES in the GREEK poet ſeems to delight in lies and fictions, and often employs them without any neceſſity or even advantage: But his more ſcrupulous ſon in the FRENCH epic writer expoſes himſelf to the moſt imminent perils, rather than depart from the exacteſt line of truth and veracity.

THE admirers and followers of the ALCORAN inſiſt very much on the excellent moral precepts, which are interſperſed throughout that wild performance. But it is to be ſuppoſed, that the ARABIC words, which correſpond to the ENGLISH, equity, juſtice, temperance, meekneſs, charity, were ſuch as, from the conſtant uſe of that tongue, muſt always be taken in a good ſenſe; and it would have argued the greateſt ignorance, not of morals, but of language, to have mentioned them with any epithets, beſides thoſe of applauſe and approbation. But would we know, whether the pretended prophet had really attained a juſt ſentiment of morals? Let us attend to his narration; and we ſhall ſoon find, that he beſtows praiſe on ſuch inſtances of treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry, as are utterly incompatible with civilized ſociety. No ſteddy rule of right ſeems there to be attended to; and every action is blamed or praiſed, ſo far only as it is beneficial or hurtful to the true believers.

THE merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics is indeed very ſmall. Whoever recommends any moral virtues, really does no more than is implied in the terms themſelves. The people, who invented the word *charity*, and uſed it in a good ſenſe, inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciouſly, the precept, *be charitable*, than any pretended legiſlator or prophet, who ſhould inſert ſuch a *max-*

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im in his writings. Of all expreſſions, thoſe, which, together with their other meaning, imply a degree either of blame or approbation, are the leaſt liable to be perverted or miſtaken.

It is natural for us to ſeek a *Standard of Taſte*; a rule, by which the various ſentiments of men may be reconciled; or at leaſt, a deciſion afforded, confirming one ſentiment, and condemning another.

There is a ſpecies of philoſophy, which cuts off all hopes of ſucceſs in ſuch an attempt, and repreſents the impoſſibility of ever attaining any ſtandard of taſte. The difference, it is ſaid, is very wide between judgment and ſentiment. All ſentiment is right; becauſe ſentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itſelf, and is always real, wherever a man is conſcious of it. But all determinations of the underſtanding are not right; becauſe they have a reference to ſomething beyond themſelves, to wit, real matter of fact; and are not always conformable to that ſtandard. Among a thouſand different opinions which different men may entertain of the ſame ſubject, there is one, and but one, that is juſt and true; and the only difficulty is to fix and aſcertain it. On the contrary, a thouſand different ſentiments, excited by the ſame object, are all right: Becauſe no ſentiment repreſents what is really in the object. It only marks a certain conformity or relation betwixt the object and the organs or faculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not really exiſt, the ſentiment could never poſſibly have a being. Beauty is no quality in things themſelves: It exiſts merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One perſon may even perceive deformity, where another is ſenſible of beauty; and every individual ought to acquieſce in his own ſentiment, without pretending to regulate thoſe of others. To ſeek the real beauty, or real deformity is as fruitleſs an enquiry, as to pretend to aſcertain the real ſweet or real bitter. According to the diſpoſition of the organs, the ſame object may be both ſweet and bitter; and the proverb has juſtly determined it to be fruitleſs to diſpute concerning taſtes. It is very natural, and even quite neceſſary, to extend this axiom to mental, as well as bodily taſte; and thus common ſenſe, which is ſo often at variance with philoſophy, eſpecially with the ſceptical kind, is found, in one inſtance at leaſt, to agree in pronouncing the ſame deciſion.

But though this axiom, by paſſing into a proverb, ſeems to have attained the ſanction of common ſenſe; there is certainly a ſpecies of common ſenſe which oppoſes it, or at leaſt ſerves to modify and reſtrain it. Whoever would aſſert an equality of genius and elegance betwixt Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison, would be thought to defend no leſs an extravagance, than if he had maintained a molehill to be as high as Teneriffe, or a pond as extenſive as the ocean. Tho' there may be found perſons, who give the preference to the former authors; no one pays attention to ſuch a taſte; and we pronounce without ſcruple the ſentiment of theſe pretended critics to be abſurd and ridiculous. The principle of the natural equality of taſtes is then totally forgot; and while we admit of it on ſome occaſions, where the objects ſeem near an equality, it appears an extravagant paradox, or rather a palpable abſurdity, where objects ſo diſproportioned are compared together.

It is evident, that none of the rules of compoſition are fixed by reaſonings *a priori*, or can be eſteemed abſtract concluſions of the underſtanding, from comparing thoſe habitudes and relations of ideas, which are eternal and immutable. Their

Their foundation is the ſame with that of all the practical ſciences, experience; nor are they any thing but general obſervations, concerning what has been univerſally found to pleaſe in all countries and in all ages. Many of the beauties of poetry and even of eloquence are founded on falſhood and fiction, on hyperboles, metaphors, and an abuſe or perverſion of expreſſions from their natural meaning. To check the ſallies of the imagination, and to reduce every expreſſion to geometrical truth and exactneſs, would be the moſt contrary to the laws of criticiſm; becauſe it would produce a work, which, by univerſal experience, has been found the moſt inſipid and diſagreeable. But tho' poetry can never ſubmit to exact truth, it muſt be confined by rules of art, diſcovered to the author either by genius or obſervation. If ſome negligent or irregular writers have pleaſed, they have not pleaſed by their tranſgreſſions of rule or order, but in ſpite of theſe tranſgreſſions: They have poſſeſſed other beauties, which were conformable to juſt criticiſm; and the force of theſe beauties has been able to overpower cenſure, and give the mind a ſatisfaction ſuperior to the diſguſt ariſing from the blemiſhes. ARIOSTO pleaſes; but not by his monſtrous and improbable fictions, by his bizarre mixture of the ſerious and comic ſtyles, by the want of coherence in his ſtories, or by the continual interruptions of his narration. He charms by the force and clearneſs of his expreſſion, by the readineſs and variety of his inventions, and by his natural pictures of the paſſions, eſpecially thoſe of the gay and amorous kind: And however his faults may diminiſh our ſatisfaction, they are not able entirely to deſtroy it. Did our pleaſure really ariſe from thoſe parts of his poem, which we denominate faults, this would be no objection to criticiſm in general: It would only be an objection to thoſe particular rules of criticiſm, which would eſtabliſh ſuch circumſtances to be faults, and would repreſent them as univerſally blameable. If they are found to pleaſe, they cannot be faults; let the pleaſure, which they produce, be ever ſo unexpected and unaccountable.

BUT though all the general rules of art are founded only on experience and on the obſervation of the common ſentiments of human nature, we muſt not imagine, that, on every occaſion, the feelings of men will be conformable to theſe rules. Thoſe finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature, and require the concurrence of many favorable circumſtances to make them play with facility and exactneſs, according to their general and eſtabliſhed principles. The leaſt exterior hindrance to ſuch ſmall ſprings, or the leaſt internal diſorder, diſturbs their motion, and confounds the operation of the whole machine. When we would make an experiment of this nature, and would try the force of any beauty or deformity, we muſt chooſe with care a proper time and place, and bring the fancy to a ſuitable ſituation and diſpoſition. A perfect ſerenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of theſe circumſtances be wanting our experiment will be fallacious, and we ſhall be unable to judge of the catholic and univerſal beauty. The relation, which nature has placed betwixt the form and the ſentiment, will at leaſt be more obſcure; and it will require greater accuracy to trace and diſcern it. We ſhall be able to aſcertain its influence not ſo much from the operation of each particular beauty, as from the durable admiration, which attends thoſe works, that have ſurvived all the caprices of mode and faſhion, all the miſtakes of ignorance and envy.

THE ſame HOMER, who pleaſed at ATHENS and ROME two thouſand years ago, is ſtill admired at PARIS and at LONDON. All the changes of climate, government, religion, and language have not been able to obſcure his glory. Authority or prejudice may give a temporary vogue to a bad poet or orator; but his reputation will never be durable or general. When his compoſitions are examined by poſterity or by foreigners, the enchantment is diſſipated, and his faults appear in their true colors. On the contrary, a real genius, the longer his works endure, and the more wide they are ſpread, the more ſincere is the admiration which he meets with. Envy and jealouſy have too much place in a narrow circle; and even familiar acquaintance with his perſon may diminiſh the applauſe due to his performances: But when theſe obſtructions are removed, the beauties, which are naturally fitted to excite agreeable ſentiments, immediately diſplay their energy; and while the world endures, they maintain their authority over the minds of men.

IT appears then, that amidſt all the variety and caprices of taſte, there are certain general principles of approbation or blame, whoſe influence a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind. Some particular forms or qualities, from the original ſtructure of the internal fabric, are calculated to pleaſe, and others to diſpleaſe; and if they fail of their effect in any particular inſtance, it is from ſome apparent defect or imperfection in the organ. A man in a fever would not inſiſt on his palate as able to decide concerning flavors; nor would one, affected with the jaundice, pretend to give a verdict with regard to colors. In each creature, there is a ſound and a defective ſtate; and the former alone can be ſuppoſed to afford us a true ſtandard of taſte and ſentiment. If in the ſound ſtate of the organs, there be an entire or a conſiderable uniformity of ſentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the perfect and univerſal beauty; in like manner as the appearance of objects in day-light to the eye of a man in health is denominated their true and real color, even while color is allowed to be merely a phantaſm of the ſenſes.

MANY and frequent are the defects in the internal organs, which prevent or weaken the influence of thoſe general principles, on which depends our ſentiment of beauty or deformity. Tho' ſome objects, by the ſtructure of the mind, be naturally calculated to give pleaſure, it is not to be expected, that in every individual the pleaſure will be equally felt. Particular incidents and ſituations occur, which either throw a falſe light on the objects, or hinder the true from conveying to the imagination the proper ſentiment and perception.

ONE obvious cauſe, why many feel not the proper ſentiment of beauty, is the want of that *delicacy* of imagination, which is requiſite to convey a ſenſibility of thoſe finer emotions. This delicacy every one pretends to: Every one talks of it; and would reduce every kind of taſte or ſentiment to its ſtandard. But as our intention in this diſſertation is to mingle ſome light of the underſtanding with the feelings of ſentiment, it will be proper to give a more accurate definition of delicacy, than has hitherto been attempted. And not to draw our philoſophy from too profound a ſource, we ſhall have recourſe to a noted ſtory in DON QUIXOTE.

'TIS with good reaſon, ſays SANCHO to the ſquire with the great noſe, that I pretend to have a judgment in wine: This is a quality hereditary in our family.

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finer is that organ, and the more elaborate its make and compoſition. A good palate is not tried by ſtrong flavors; but by a mixture of ſmall ingredients, where we are ſtill ſenſible of each part, notwithſtanding its minuteneſs and its confuſion with the reſt. In like manner, a quick and acute perception of beauty and deformity muſt be the perfection of our mental taſte, nor can a man be ſatisfied with himſelf, while he ſuſpects, that any excellence or blemiſh in a diſcourſe has paſſed him unobſerved. In this caſe, the perfection of the man, and the perfection of the ſenſe or feeling, are found to be united. A very delicate palate, on many occaſions, may be a great inconvenience both to a man himſelf and to his friends; but a delicate taſte of wit or beauty muſt always be a deſirable quality; becauſe it is the ſource of all the fineſt and moſt innocent enjoyments, of which human nature is ſuſceptible. In this deciſion the ſentiments of all mankind are agreed. Wherever you can fix or aſcertain a delicacy of taſte, it is ſure to be approved of; and the beſt way of fixing it is to appeal to thoſe models and principles, which have been eſtabliſhed by the uniform approbation and experience of nations and ages.

But tho' there be naturally a very wide difference in point of delicacy between one perſon and another, nothing tends further to encreaſe and improve this talent, than *practice* in a particular art, and the frequent ſurvey or contemplation of a particular ſpecies of beauty. When objects of any kind are firſt preſented to the eye or imagination, the ſentiment, which attends them, is obſcure and confuſed: and the mind is, in a great meaſure, incapable of pronouncing concerning their merits or defects. The taſte cannot perceive the ſeveral excellencies of the performance; much leſs diſtinguiſh the particular character of each excellency, and aſcertain its quality and degree. If it pronounce the whole in general to be beautiful or deformed, 'tis the utmoſt which can be expected; and even this judgment a perſon, ſo unpractiſed, will be apt to deliver with great heſitation and reſerve. But allow him to acquire experience in thoſe objects, his feeling becomes more exact and nice: He not only perceives the beauties and defects of each part, but marks the diſtinguiſhing ſpecies of each quality, and aſſigns it ſuitable praiſe or blame. A clear and diſtinct ſentiment attends him through the whole ſurvey of the objects; and he diſcerns that very degree and kind of approbation or diſpleaſure, which each part is naturally fitted to produce. The miſt diſſipates, which ſeemed formerly to hang over the object: The organ acquires greater perfection in its operations; and can pronounce, without danger of miſtake, concerning the merits of each performance. In a word, the ſame addreſs and dexterity, which practice gives to the execution of any work, is alſo acquired, by the ſame means, in the judging of it.

So advantageous is practice to the diſcernment of beauty, that before we can pronounce judgment on any work of importance, it will even be requiſite, that that very individual performance be more than once peruſed by us, and be ſurveyed in different lights, with attention and deliberation. There is a flutter or hurry of thought, which attends the firſt peruſal of any piece, and which confounds the genuin ſentiment of beauty. The reference of the parts is not diſcerned: The true characters of ſtyle are little diſtinguiſhed: The ſeveral perfections and defects ſeem wrapped up in a ſpecies of confuſion, and preſent themſelves indiſtinctly to the imagination. Not to mention, that there is a ſpecies of beauty, which,

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as it is florid and ſuperficial, pleaſes at firſt; but being found incompatible with a juſt expreſſion either of reaſon or paſſion, ſoon palls upon the taſte, and is then rejected with diſdain, at leaſt rated at a much lower value.

It is impoſſible to continue in the practice of contemplating any order of beauty, without being frequently obliged to form *compariſons* between the ſeveral ſpecies and degrees of excellency, and eſtimating their proportion to each other. A man, who has had no opportunity of comparing the different kinds of beauty, is indeed totally unqualified to pronounce an opinion with regard to any object preſented to him. By compariſon alone we fix the epithets of praiſe or blame, and learn how to aſſign the due degree of each. The coarſeſt dawbing of a ſign-poſt contains a certain luſtre of colors and exactneſs of imitation, which are ſo far beauties, and would affect the mind of a peaſant or Indian with the higheſt admiration. The moſt vulgar ballads are not entirely deſtitute of harmony or nature; and none but a perſon, familiarized to ſuperior beauties, would pronounce their numbers harſh, or narration unintereſting. A great inferiority of beauty gives pain to a perſon converſant in the higheſt excellency of the kind, and is for that reaſon pronounced a deformity: As the moſt finiſhed object, with which we are acquainted, is naturally ſuppoſed to have reached the pinnacle of perfection, and to be entitled to the higheſt applauſe. A man, who has had opportunities of ſeeing, and examining and weighing the ſeveral performances, admired in different ages and nations, can alone rate the merits of a work exhibited to his view, and aſſign its proper rank among the productions of genius.

But to enable him the more fully to execute this undertaking, he muſt preſerve his mind free from all *prejudice*, and allow nothing to enter into his conſideration, but the very object, which is ſubmitted to his examination. We may obſerve, that every work of art, in order to produce its due effect on the mind, muſt be ſurveyed in a certain point of view, and cannot be fully reliſhed by perſons, whoſe ſituation, real or imaginary, is not conformable to that required by the performance. An orator addreſſes himſelf to a particular audience, and muſt have a regard to their particular genius, intereſts, opinions, paſſions, and prejudices; otherwiſe he hopes in vain to govern their reſolutions, and inflame their affections. Should they even have entertained ſome prepoſſeſſions againſt him, however unreaſonable, he muſt not overlook this diſadvantage; but before he enters upon the ſubject, muſt endeavor to conciliate their affection, and acquire their good graces. A critic of a different age or nation, who ſhould peruſe this diſcourſe, muſt have all theſe circumſtances in his eye, and muſt place himſelf in the ſame ſituation as the audience, in order to form a true judgment of the oration. In like manner, when any work is addreſſed to the public, tho' I ſhould have a friendſhip or enmity with the author, I muſt depart from this particular ſituation; and conſidering myſelf as a man in general, forget, if poſſible, my individual being and my peculiar circumſtances. A perſon, influenced by prejudice, complies not with this condition; but obſtinately maintains his natural poſition, without entering into that required by the performance. If the work be addreſſed to perſons of a different age or nation, he makes no allowance for their peculiar views and prejudices; but full of the manners of his own times, raſhly condemns what ſeemed admirable in the eyes of thoſe for whom alone the diſcourſe was calculated. If the work be executed for the public, he never ſufficiently enlarges his compre-

comprehenſion, or forgets his intereſt as a friend or enemy, as a rival or commentator. By this means, his ſentiments are perverted; nor have the ſame beauties and blemiſhes the ſame influence upon him, as if he had impoſed a proper violence on his imagination, and had forgot himſelf for a moment. So far his taſte evidently departs from the true ſtandard; and of conſequence loſes all credit and authority.

It is well known, that, in all queſtions, ſubmitted to the underſtanding, prejudice is moſt deſtructive of ſound judgment, and perverts all operations of the intellectual faculties: It is no leſs contrary to good taſte; nor has it leſs influence to corrupt our ſentiments of beauty. It belongs to *good ſenſe* to check its influence in both caſes; and in this reſpect, as well as in many others, reaſon, if not an eſſential part of taſte, is at leaſt requiſite to the operations of this latter faculty. In all the nobler productions of genius, there is a mutual relation and correſpondence of parts; nor can either the beauties or blemiſhes be perceived by him, whoſe thought is not capacious enough to comprehend all thoſe parts, and compare them with each other, in order to perceive the conſiſtence and uniformity of the whole. Every work of art has alſo a certain end or purpoſe, for which it is calculated; and is to be deemed more or leſs perfect, as it is more or leſs fitted to attain this end. The object of eloquence is to perſuade, of hiſtory to inſtruct, of poetry to pleaſe by means of the paſſions and the imagination. Theſe ends we muſt carry conſtantly in our view, when we peruſe any performance; and we muſt be able to judge how far the means employed are adapted to their reſpective purpoſes. Beſides, every kind of compoſition, even the moſt poetical, is nothing but a chain of propoſitions and reaſonings; not always indeed the juſteſt and moſt exact, but ſtill plauſible and ſpecious, however diſguiſed by the coloring of the imagination. The perſons, introduced in tragedy and epic poetry, muſt be repreſented as reaſoning and thinking, and concluding and acting, ſuitable to their characters and circumſtances; and without judgment, as well as taſte and invention, a poet can never hope to ſucceed in ſo delicate an undertaking. Not to mention, that the ſame excellence of faculties which contributes to the improvement of reaſon, the ſame clearneſs of conception, the ſame exactneſs of diſtinction, the ſame vivacity of apprehenſion, are eſſential to the operations of true taſte, and are its infallible concomitants. It ſeldom, or never happens, that a man of ſenſe, who has experience in any art, cannot judge of its beauty; and it is no leſs rare to meet with a man, who has a juſt taſte, without a ſound underſtanding.

Thus, tho' the principles of taſte be univerſal, and nearly, if not entirely the ſame in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or eſtabliſh their own ſentiment as the ſtandard of beauty. The organs of internal ſenſation are ſeldom ſo perfect as to allow the general principles their full play, and produce a feeling correſpondent to thoſe principles. They either labor under ſome defect, or are vitiated by ſome diſorder; and by that means, excite a ſentiment, which may be pronounced erroneous. When the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any diſtinction, and is only affected by the groſſer and more palpable qualities of the object: The finer touches paſs unnoticed and diſregarded. Where he is not aided by practice, his verdict is attended with confuſion and heſitation. Where no compariſon has been employed, the moſt frivolous beauties, ſuch as rather merit the name of defects, are the objects of his admira-

have but a faint and dubious perception of beauty, who yet are capable of reliſhing any fine ſtroke, which is pointed out to them. Every convert to the admiration of the real poet or orator is the cauſe of ſome new converſion. And tho' prejudices may prevail for a time, they never unite in celebrating any rival to the true genius, but yield at laſt to the force of nature and juſt ſentiment. And thus tho' a civilized nation may eaſily be miſtaken in the choice of their admired philoſopher, they never have been found long to err, in their affection for a favorite epic or tragic author.

But notwithſtanding all our endeavors to fix a ſtandard of taſte, and reconcile the various apprehenſions of men, there ſtill remain two ſources of variation, which are not ſufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, but will often ſerve to vary the degrees of our approbation or blame. The one is the different humors of particular men; the other, the particular manners and opinions of our age and country. The general principles of taſte are uniform in human nature: Where men vary in their judgments, ſome defect or perverſion in the faculties may commonly be remarked; proceeding either from prejudice, from want of practice, or want of delicacy; and there is juſt reaſon for approving one taſte, and condemning another. But where there is ſuch a diverſity in the internal frame or external ſituation as is entirely blameleſs on both ſides, and leaves no room to give one the preference above the other; in that caſe a certain diverſity of judgment is unavoidable, and we ſeek in vain for a ſtandard, by which we can reconcile the contrary ſentiments.

A young man, whoſe paſſions are warm, will be more ſenſibly touched with amorous and tender images, than a man more advanced in years, who takes pleaſure in wiſe and philoſophical reflections concerning the conduct of life and moderation of the paſſions. At twenty, Ovid may be the favorite author; Horace at forty; and perhaps Tacitus at fifty. Vainly would we, in ſuch caſes, endeavor to enter into the ſentiments of others, and diveſt ourſelves of thoſe propenſities, which are natural to us. We chuſe our favorite author as we do our friend, from a conformity of humors and diſpoſitions. Mirth or paſſion, ſentiment or reflection; which ever of theſe moſt predominates in our temper, it gives us a peculiar ſympathy with the writer, who reſembles us.

One perſon is more pleaſed with the ſublime; another with the tender; a third with raillery. One has a ſtrong ſenſibility to blemiſhes, and is extremely ſtudious of correctneſs: Another has a more lively feeling of beauties, and pardons twenty abſurdities and defects for one elevated or pathetic ſtroke. The ear of this man is entirely turned towards conciſeneſs and energy; that man is delighted with a copious, rich, and harmonious expreſſion. Simplicity is affected by one; ornament by another. Comedy, tragedy, ſatire, odes have each their partizans, who prefer that particular ſpecies of writing to all others. It is plainly an error in a critic, to confine his approbation to one ſpecies or ſtyle of writing, and condemn all the reſt. But it is almoſt impoſſible not to feel a predilection for that which ſuits our particular turn and diſpoſition. Such preferences are innocent and unavoidable, and can never reaſonably be the object of diſpute, becauſe there is no ſtandard, by which they can be decided.

For a like reaſon, we are more pleaſed with pictures of characters, which reſemble ſuch as are found in our own age or country, than with thoſe which deſcribe a different ſet of cuſtoms. 'Tis not without ſome effort, that we reconcile

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ourſelves to the ſimplicity of antient manners, and behold princeſſes drawing water from a ſpring, and kings and heroes dreſſing their own victuals. We may allow in general, that the repreſentation of ſuch manners is no fault in the author, nor deformity in the piece; but we are not ſo ſenſibly touched with them. For this reaſon, comedy is not transferred eaſily from one age or nation to another. A FRENCHMAN or ENGLISHMAN is not pleaſed with the ANDRIA of TERENCE, or CLITIA of MACHIAVEL, where the fine lady, upon whom all the play turns, never once appears to the ſpectators, but is always kept behind the ſcenes, ſuitable to the reſerved humor of the antient GREEKS and modern ITALIANS. A man of learning and reflection can make allowance for theſe peculiarities of manners; but a common audience can never diveſt themſelves ſo far of their uſual ideas and ſentiments as to reliſh pictures which no way reſemble them.

AND here there occurs a reflection, which may, perhaps, be uſeful in examining the celebrated controverſy concerning antient and modern learning; where we often find the one ſide excuſing any ſeeming abſurdity in the antients from the manners of the age, and the others refuſing to admit this excuſe, or at leaſt, admitting it only as an apology for the author, not for the performance. In my opinion, the proper bounds in this ſubject have ſeldom been fixed between the contending parties. Where any innocent peculiarities of manners are repreſented, ſuch as thoſe abovementioned, they ought certainly to be admitted; and a man who is ſhocked with them, gives an evident proof of falſe delicacy and refinement. The poets *monument more durable than braſs*, muſt fall to the ground like common brick or clay, were men to make no allowance for the continual revolutions of manners and cuſtoms, and would admit nothing but what was ſuitable to the prevailing faſhion. Muſt we throw aſide the pictures of our anceſtors, becauſe of their ruffs and fardingales? But where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious manners are deſcribed, without being marked with the proper characters of blame and diſapprobation; this muſt be allowed to diſfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I ſhould, enter into ſuch ſentiments; and however I may excuſe the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never can reliſh the compoſition. The want of humanity and of decency, ſo conſpicuous in the characters drawn by ſeveral of the antient poets, even ſometimes by HOMER and the GREEK tragedians, diminiſhes conſiderably the merit of their noble performances, and gives modern authors a great advantage over them. We are not intereſted in the fortunes and ſentiments of ſuch rough heroes: We are diſpleaſed to find the limits of vice and virtue ſo confounded: And whatever indulgence we may give the writer on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourſelves to enter into his ſentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly diſcover to be blameable.

THE caſe is not the ſame with moral principles as with ſpeculative opinions of any kind. Theſe are in continual flux and revolution. The ſon embraces a different ſyſtem from the father. Nay, there ſcarce is any man, who can boaſt of great conſtancy and uniformity in this particular. Whatever ſpeculative errors may be found in the polite writings of any age or country, they detract but little from the value of thoſe compoſitions. There needs but a certain turn of thought or imagination to make us enter into all the opinions, which then prevailed, and reliſh the ſentiments or concluſions derived from them. But a very violent effort is requiſite to change our judgment of manners, and excite ſentiments of ap-

probation or blame, love or hatred, different from thoſe to which the mind from long cuſtom has been familiarized. And where a man is confident of the rectitude of that moral ſtandard, by which he judges, he is juſtly jealous of it, and will not pervert the ſentiments of his heart for a moment, in complaiſance to any writer whatever.

Of all ſpeculative errors, thoſe which regard religion, are the moſt excuſable in compoſitions of genius; nor is it ever permitted to judge of the civility or wiſdom of any people, or even of ſingle perſons, by the groſſneſs or refinement of their theological principles. The ſame good ſenſe, that directs men in the ordinary occurrences of life, is not hearkened to in religious matters, which are ſuppoſed to be placed entirely above the cognizance of human reaſon. Upon this account, all the abſurdities of the pagan ſyſtem of theology muſt be overlooked by every critic, who would pretend to form a juſt notion of antient poetry; and our poſterity, in their turn, muſt have the ſame indulgence to their forefathers. No religious principles can ever be imputed as a fault to any poet, while they remain merely principles, and take not ſuch ſtrong poſſeſſion of his heart, as to lay him under the imputation of *bigotry* or *ſuperſtition*. Where that happens, they confound the ſentiments of morality, and alter the natural boundaries of vice and virtue. They are therefore eternal blemiſhes, according to the principle abovementioned; nor are the prejudices and falſe opinions of the age ſufficient to juſtify them.

'Tis eſſential to the Roman catholic religion to inſpire a violent hatred to every other worſhip, and repreſent all pagans, mahometans, and heretics as the objects of divine wrath and vengeance. Such ſentiments, tho' they are in reality extremely blameable, are conſidered as virtues by the zealots of that communion, and are repreſented in their tragedies and epic poems as a kind of divine heroiſm. This bigotry has disfigured two very fine tragedies of the French theatre, Polieucte and Athalia; where an intemperate zeal for particular modes of worſhip is ſet off with all the pomp imaginable, and forms the predominant character of the heroes. "What is this," ſays the heroic Joad to Josabet, finding her in diſcourſe with Mathan, the prieſt of Baal, "Does the daughter of David ſpeak to this "traitor? Are you not afraid, leſt the earth ſhould open and pour forth flames "to devour you both? Or leſt theſe holy walls ſhould fall and cruſh you toge-"ther? What is his purpoſe? Why comes that enemy of God hither to poiſon "the air, which we breathe, with his horrid preſence?" Such ſentiments are received with great applauſe on the theatre of Paris; but at London the ſpectators would be full as much pleaſed to hear Achilles tell Agamemnon, that he was a dog in his forehead, and a deer in his heart, or Jupiter threaten Juno with a ſound drubbing, if ſhe will not be quiet.

Religious principles are alſo a blemiſh in any polite compoſition, when they riſe up to ſuperſtition, and intrude themſelves into every ſentiment, however remote from any connection with religion. 'Tis no excuſe for the poet, that the cuſtoms of his country had burthened life with ſo many religious ceremonies and obſervances, that no part of it was exempt from that yoak. It muſt be for ever ridiculous in Petrarch to compare his miſtreſs, Laura, to Jesus Christ. Nor is it leſs ridiculous in that agreeable libertine, Boccace, very ſeriouſly to give thanks to God Almighty, and the ladies, for their aſſiſtance in defending him againſt his enemies.

ESSAYS,

MORAL, POLITICAL,

AND

LITERARY.

PART II *.

* PUBLISHED in 1752.

cular caſes; and 'tis the chief buſineſs of philoſophers to regard the general courſe of things. I may add, that 'tis alſo the chief buſineſs of politicians; eſpecially in the domeſtic government of the ſtate, where the public good, which is, or ought to be their object, depends on the concurrence of a multitude of caſes; not, as in foreign politics, on accidents, and chances, and the caprices of a few perſons. This therefore makes the difference betwixt *particular* deliberations and *general* reaſonings, and renders ſubtilty and refinement much more ſuitable to the latter than to the former.

I THOUGHT this introduction neceſſary before the following diſcourſes on *commerce*, *luxury*, *money*, *intereſt*, *&c.* where, perhaps, there will occur ſome principles, which are uncommon, and which may ſeem too refined and ſubtile for ſuch vulgar ſubjects. If falſe, let them be rejected: But no one ought to entertain a prejudice againſt them, merely becauſe they are out of the common road.

THE greatneſs of a ſtate, and the happineſs of its ſubjects, however independent they may be ſuppoſed in ſome reſpects, are commonly allowed to be inſeparable with regard to commerce; and as private men receive greater ſecurity, in the poſſeſſion of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, ſo the public becomes powerful in proportion to the riches and extenſive commerce of private men. This maxim is true in general; tho' I cannot forbear thinking, that it may poſſibly admit of ſome exceptions, and that we often eſtabliſh it with too little reſerve and limitation. There may be ſome circumſtances, where the commerce, and riches, and luxury of individuals, inſtead of adding ſtrength to the public, will ſerve only to thin its armies, and diminiſh its authority among the neigboring nations. Man is a very variable being, and ſuſceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of conduct. What may be true while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found falſe when he has embraced an oppoſite ſet of manners and opinions.

THE bulk of every ſtate may be divided into *huſbandmen* and *manufacturers*. The former are employed in the culture of the land: The latter work up the materials furniſhed by the former, into all the commodities which are neceſſary or ornamental to human life. As ſoon as men quit their ſavage ſtate, where they live chiefly by hunting and fiſhing, they muſt fall into theſe two claſſes; tho' the arts of agriculture employ *at firſt* the moſt numerous part of the ſociety *. Time and experience improve ſo much theſe arts, that the land may eaſily maintain a much greater number of men, than thoſe who are immediately employed in its cultivation, or who furniſh the more neceſſary manufactures to ſuch as are ſo employed.

IF theſe ſuperfluous hands apply themſelves to the finer arts, which are commonly denominated the arts of *luxury*, they add to the happineſs of the ſtate; ſince they afford to many the opportunity of receiving enjoyments, with which they would otherwiſe have been unacquainted. But may not another ſcheme be pro-

* Monſ. MELON in his political eſſay on commerce aſſerts, that even at preſent, if you divide FRANCE into 20 parts, 16 are laborers or peaſants; 2 only artizans; one belonging to the law, church, and military; and one merchants, financiers, and bourgeois. This calculation is certainly very erroneous. In FRANCE, ENGLAND, and indeed moſt parts of EUROPE, half of the inhabitants live in cities; and even of thoſe who live in the country, a very great number are artiſans, perhaps above a third.

poſed

days, ſhe ſent out againſt the GAULS and LATINS*. Inſtead of thoſe ſoldiers who fought for liberty and empire in CAMILLUS's time, there were in AUGUSTUS's days, muſicians, painters, cooks, players, and tailors, and if the land was equally cultivated at both periods, 'tis evident it could maintain equal numbers in the one profeſſion as in the other. They added nothing to the mere neceſſaries of life, in the latter period more than in the former.

'TIS natural on this occaſion to aſk, whether ſovereigns may not return to the maxims of antient policy, and conſult their own intereſt, in this reſpect, more than the happineſs of their ſubjects? I anſwer, that it appears to me almoſt impoſſible; and that becauſe antient policy was violent, and contrary to the more natural and uſual courſe of things. 'Tis well known with what peculiar laws SPARTA was governed, and what a prodigy that republic is juſtly eſteemed by every one, who has conſidered human nature, as it has diſplayed itſelf on other nations and other ages. Were the teſtimony of hiſtory leſs poſitive and circumſtantial, ſuch a government would appear a mere philoſophical whim or fiction, and impoſſible ever to be reduced to practice. And tho' the ROMAN and other antient republics were ſupported on principles ſomewhat more natural, yet was there a very extraordinary concurrence of circumſtances to make them ſubmit to ſuch grievous burthens. They were free ſtates; they were ſmall ones; and the age being martial, all the neighboring ſtates were continually in arms. Freedom naturally begets public ſpirit, eſpecially in ſmall ſtates; and this public ſpirit, this *amor patriæ*, muſt increaſe, when the public is almoſt in continual alarm, and men are obliged, every moment, to expoſe themſelves to the greateſt dangers for its defence. A continual ſucceſſion of wars makes every citizen a ſoldier: He takes the field in his turn; and during his ſervice is chiefly maintained by himſelf. And, notwithſtanding that this ſervice is equivalent to a very ſevere tax, 'tis leſs felt by a people addicted to arms, who fight for honor and revenge more than pay, and are unacquainted with gain and induſtry as well as pleaſure†. Not to mention the great equality of fortunes amongſt the inhabitants of the antient republics, where every field belonging to a different proprietor, was able to maintain a family, and rendered the numbers of citizens very conſiderable, even without trade and manufactures.

BUT tho' the want of trade and manufactures, amongſt a free and very martial people, may *ſometimes* have no other effect than to render the public more powerful, 'tis certain, that in the common courſe of human affairs, it will have a quite

* TITI LIVII lib. 7. cap. 24. "Adeo in quæ laboramus," ſays he, "ſola crevimus, divitias luxuriemque."

† The more antient ROMANS lived in perpetual war with all their neighbors: and in old LATIN, the term, *hoſtis*, expreſſed both a ſtranger and an enemy. This is remarked by CICERO; but by him is aſcribed to the humanity of his anceſtors, who ſoftened, as much as poſſible, the denomination of an enemy, by calling him by the ſame appellation which ſignified a ſtranger. *De off.* lib. 2. 'Tis however much more probable, from the manners of the times, that the ferocity of thoſe people was ſo great as to make them regard all ſtrangers as enemies, and call them by the ſame name. It is not, beſides, conſiſtent with the moſt common maxims of policy or of nature, that any ſtate ſhould regard its public enemies with a friendly eye, or preſerve any ſuch ſentiments for them as the ROMAN orator would aſcribe to his anceſtors. Not to mention, that the early ROMANS really exerciſed piracy, as we learn from their firſt treaties with CARTHAGE, preſerved by POLYBIUS, lib. 3. and conſequently like the SALLEE and ALGERINE rovers, were actually at war with moſt nations, and a ſtranger and an enemy were with them almoſt ſynonymous.

without depriving any one of the neceſſaries of life. The more labor, therefore, is employed beyond mere neceſſaries, the more powerful is any ſtate; ſince the perſons engaged in that labor may eaſily be converted to the public ſervice. In a ſtate without manufactures, there may be the ſame number of hands; but there is not the ſame quantity of labor, nor of the ſame kind. All the labor is there beſtowed upon neceſſaries, which can admit of little or no abatement.

THUS the greatneſs of the ſovereign and the happineſs of the ſtate are, in a great meaſure, united with regard to trade and manufactures. 'Tis a violent method, and in moſt caſes impracticable, to oblige the laborer to toil, in order to raiſe from the land more than what ſubſiſts himſelf and family. Furniſh him with manufactures and commodities, and he will do it of himſelf. Afterwards, you will find it eaſy to ſeize ſome part of his ſuperfluous labor, and employ it in the public ſervice, without giving him his wonted return. Being accuſtomed to induſtry, he will think this leſs grievous, than if, at once, you obliged him to an augmentation of labour without any reward. The caſe is the ſame with regard to the other members of the ſtate. The greater is the ſtock of labor of all kinds, the greater quantity may be taken from the heap, without making any ſenſible alteration upon it.

A PUBLIC granary of corn, a ſtorehouſe of cloth, a magazine of arms; all theſe muſt be allowed real riches and ſtrength in any ſtate. Trade and induſtry are really nothing but a ſtock of labor, which, in time of peace and tranquility, is employed for the eaſe and ſatisfaction of individuals; but in the exigencies of ſtate, may, in part, be turned to public advantage. Could we convert a city into a kind of fortified camp, and infuſe into each breaſt ſo martial a genius, and ſuch a paſſion for public good, as to make every one willing to undergo the greateſt hardſhips for the ſake of the public; theſe affections might now, as in antient times, prove alone a ſufficient ſpur to induſtry, and ſupport the community. It would then be advantageous, as in camps, to baniſh all arts and luxury; and, by reſtrictions on equipage and tables, make the proviſions and forage laſt longer than if the army were loaded with a number of ſuperfluous retainers. But as theſe principles are too diſintereſted and too difficult to ſupport, 'tis requiſite to govern men by other paſſions, and animate them with a ſpirit of avarice and induſtry, art and luxury. The camp is, in this caſe, loaded with a ſuperfluous retinue; but the proviſions flow in proportionably larger. The harmony of the whole is ſtill ſupported; and the natural bent of the mind, being more complied with, individuals, as well as the public, find their account in the obſervance of thoſe maxims.

THE ſame method of reaſoning will let us ſee the advantage of *foreign* commerce, in augmenting the power of the ſtate, as well as the riches and happineſs of the ſubjects. It increaſes the ſtock of labor in the nation; and the ſovereign may convert what ſhare of it he finds neceſſary to the ſervice of the public. Foreign trade, by its imports, furniſhes materials for new manufactures; and by its exports, it produces labour in particular commodities, which could not be conſumed at home. In ſhort, a kingdom, that has a large import and export, muſt abound more with induſtry, and that employed upon delicacies and luxuries, than a kingdom which reſts contented with its native commodities. It is, therefore, more powerful, as well as richer and happier. The individuals reap the benefit of theſe commodities,

public neceſſities. But when the riches are diſperſed among multitudes,
then feels light on every ſhoulder, and the taxes make not a very ſenſible
nce on any one's way of living.

D to this, that where the riches are in few hands, theſe muſt enjoy all the
R, and will readily conſpire to lay the whole burthen on the poor, and oppreſs
ſtill farther, to the diſcouragement of all induſtry.

N this circumſtance conſiſts the great advantage of ENGLAND above any nation
preſent in the world, or that appears in the records of any ſtory. 'Tis true, the
NGLISH feel ſome diſadvantages in foreign trade by the high price of labor, which
in part the effect of the riches of their artiſans, as well as of the plenty of mo-
ney: But as foreign trade is not the moſt material circumſtance, 'tis not to be put
in competition with the happineſs of ſo many millions. And if there were no
more to endear to them that free government under which they live, this alone
were ſufficient. The poverty of the common people is a natural, if not an infal-
lible effect of abſolute monarchy; tho' I doubt, whether it be always true, on the
other hand, that their riches are an infallible reſult of liberty. Liberty muſt be at-
tended with particular accidents, and a certain turn of thinking, in order to pro-
duce that effect. Lord BACON, accounting for the great advantages obtained
by the ENGLISH in their wars with FRANCE, aſcribes them chiefly to the ſuperior
eaſe and plenty of the common people amongſt the former; yet the governments
of the two kingdoms were, at that time, pretty much alike. Where the laborers
and artiſans are accuſtomed to work for low wages, and to retain but a ſmall part
of the fruits of their labor, 'tis difficult for them, even in a free government, to
better their condition, or conſpire among themſelves to heighten their wages. But
even where they are accuſtomed to a more plentiful way of life, 'tis eaſy for the
rich, in a deſpotic government, to conſpire againſt *them*, and throw the whole
burthen of the taxes on their ſhoulders.

IT may ſeem an odd poſition, that the poverty of the common people in
FRANCE, ITALY, and SPAIN, is, in ſome meaſure, owing to the ſuperior riches
of the ſoil and happineſs of the climate; and yet there want not many reaſons to
juſtify this paradox. In ſuch a fine mold or ſoil as that of thoſe more ſouthern
regions, agriculture is an eaſy art; and one man, with a couple of ſorry horſes,
will be able, in a ſeaſon, to cultivate as much land as will pay a pretty conſider-
able rent to the proprietor. All the art, which the farmer knows, is to leave his
ground fallow for a year, ſo ſoon as it is exhauſted; and the warmth of the ſun
alone and temperature of the climate enrich it, and reſtore its fertility. Such
poor peaſants, therefore, require only a ſimple maintenance for their labor. They
have no ſtock nor riches, which claim more; and at the ſame time, they are for
ever dependant on their landlord, who gives no leaſes, nor fears that his land will
be ſpoiled by the ill methods of cultivation. In ENGLAND, the land is rich,
but coarſe; muſt be cultivated at a great expence; and produces ſlender crops,
when not carefully managed, and by a method which gives not the full profit but
in a courſe of ſeveral years. A farmer, therefore, in ENGLAND muſt have a con-
ſiderable ſtock and a long leaſe; which beget proportional profits. The fine
vineyards of CHAMPAGNE and BURGUNDY, that oft yield to the landlord above
five pounds *per* acre, are cultivated by peaſants, who have ſcarce bread: And the
reaſon is, that ſuch peaſants need no ſtock but their own limbs, with inſtruments
of

of husbandry, which they can buy for twenty shillings. The farmers are commonly in some better circumstances in those countries. But the graziers are most at their ease of all those who cultivate the land. The reason is still the same. Men must have profits proportionable to their expence and hazard. Where so considerable a number of the laboring poor as the peasants and farmers, are in very low circumstances, all the rest must partake of their poverty, whether the government of that nation be monarchical or republican.

We may form a similar remark with regard to the general history of mankind. What is the reason, why no people living betwixt the tropics could ever yet attain to any art or civility, or reach even any police in their government, and any military discipline; while few nations in the temperate climates have been altogether deprived of these advantages? 'Tis probable, that one cause of this phænomenon is the warmth and equality of weather in the torrid zone, which render cloaths and houses less requisite for the inhabitants, and thereby remove, in part, that necessity, which is the great spur to industry and invention. *Curis acuens mortalia corda.* Not to mention, that the fewer goods or possessions of this kind any people enjoy, the fewer quarrels are likely to arise amongst them, and the less necessity will there be for a settled police or regular authority to protect and defend them from foreign enemies, or from each other.

ESSAY II.

OF LUXURY.

LUXURY is a word of a very uncertain signification, and may be taken in a good as well as a bad sense. In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the senses; and any degree of it may be innocent or blameable, according to the age, or country, or condition of the person. The bounds between the virtue and the vice cannot here be fixed exactly, more than in other moral subjects. To imagine, that the gratifying any of the senses, or the indulging any delicacy in meats, drinks, or apparel, is of itself a vice, can never enter into a head, that is not disordered by the frenzies of enthusiasm. I have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad, who, because the windows of his cell opened upon a very noble prospect, made a *covenant with his eyes* never to turn that way, or receive so sensual a gratification. And such is the crime of drinking CHAMPAGNE or BURGUNDY, preferably to small beer or porter. These indulgences are only vices, when they are pursued at the expence of some virtue, as liberality or charity; in like manner as they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himself to want and beggary. Where they entrench upon no virtue, but leave ample subject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generosity or compassion, they are entirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowleged such by almost all moralists. To be entirely occupied with the luxury of the table, for instance, without any relish for the pleasures of ambition, study, or conversation, is a mark of gross stupidity, and is incompatible

ble with any vigor of temper or genius. To confine one's expence entirely to ſuch a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an indication of a heart entirely devoid of humanity or benevolence. But if a man reſerve time ſufficient for all laudable purſuits, and money ſufficient for all generous purpoſes, he is free from every ſhadow of blame or reproach.

SINCE luxury may be conſidered either as innocent or blameable, one may be ſurprized at thoſe prepoſterous opinions which have been entertained concerning it; while men of libertine principles beſtow praiſes even on vitious luxury, and repreſent it as highly advantageous to ſociety; and on the other hand, men of ſevere morals blame even the moſt innocent luxury, and repreſent it as the ſource of all the corruptions, diſorders, and factions, incident to civil government. We ſhall here endeavor to correct both theſe extremes, by proving, *firſt*, that the ages of refinement and luxury are both the happieſt and moſt virtuous; *ſecondly*, that where-ever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial; and when carried a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, tho' perhaps not the moſt pernicious, to political ſociety.

To prove the firſt point, we need but conſider the effects of luxury both on *private* and on *public* life. Human happineſs, according to the moſt received notions, ſeems to conſiſt in three ingredients; action, pleaſure, and indolence: and tho' theſe ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular diſpoſitions of the perſon; yet no one ingredient can be entirely wanting, without deſtroying, in ſome meaſure, the reliſh of the whole compoſition. Indolence or repoſe, indeed, ſeems not of itſelf to contribute much to our enjoyment; but, like ſleep, is requiſite as an indulgence to the weakneſs of human nature, which cannot ſupport an uninterrupted courſe of buſineſs or pleaſure. That quick march of the ſpirits, which takes a man from himſelf, and chiefly gives ſatisfaction, does in the end exhauſt the mind, and requires ſome intervals of repoſe, which, tho' agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolonged, beget a languor and lethargy, that deſtroy all enjoyment. Education, cuſtom, and example, have a mighty influence in turning the mind to any of theſe purſuits; and it muſt be owned, that where they promote a reliſh for action and pleaſure, they are ſo far favorable to human happineſs. In times when induſtry and arts flouriſh, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, the occupation itſelf, as well as thoſe pleaſures which are the fruits of their labor. The mind acquires new vigor; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by an aſſiduity in honeſt induſtry, both ſatisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly ſpring up, when nouriſhed with eaſe and idleneſs. Baniſh thoſe arts from ſociety, you deprive men both of action and of pleaſure; and leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even deſtroy the reliſh of indolence, which never is agreeable, but when it ſucceeds to labor, and recruits the ſpirits, exhauſted by too much application and fatigue.

ANOTHER advantage of induſtry and of refinements in the mechanical arts, is, that they commonly produce ſome refinements in the liberal arts; nor can the one be carried to perfection, without being accompanied, in ſome degree, with the other. The ſame age which produces great philoſophers and politicians, renowned generals and poets, uſually abounds with ſkilful weavers and ſhip-carpenters. We cannot reaſonably expect, that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought

to

to perfection in a nation which is ignorant of aſtronomy, or where ethics are neglected. The ſpirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once rouſed from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themſelves on all ſides, and carry improvements into every art and ſcience. Profound ignorance is totally baniſhed, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleaſures of the mind as well as thoſe of the body.

THE more theſe refined arts advance, the more ſociable do men become; nor is it poſſible, that, when enriched with ſcience, and poſſeſſed of a fund of converſation, they ſhould be contented to remain in ſolitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that diſtant manner which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowlege; to ſhow their wit or their breeding; their taſte in converſation or living, in cloaths or furniture. Curioſity allures the wiſe; vanity the fooliſh; and pleaſure both. Particular clubs and ſocieties are every where formed: Both ſexes meet in an eaſy and ſociable manner; and the tempers of men, as well as their behavior, refine apace. So that, beſide the improvements which they receive from knowlege and the liberal arts, 'tis impoſſible but they muſt feel an increaſe of humanity, from the very habit of converſing together, and contributing to each other's pleaſure and entertainment. Thus *induſtry*, *knowlege*, and *humanity*, are linked together by an indiſſoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well as reaſon, to be peculiar to the more poliſhed and luxurious ages.

NOR are theſe advantages attended with diſadvantages which bear any proportion to them. The more men refine upon pleaſure, the leſs will they indulge in exceſſes of any kind; becauſe nothing is more deſtructive to true pleaſure than ſuch exceſſes. One may ſafely affirm, that the TARTARS are oftener guilty of beaſtly gluttony, when they feaſt on their dead horſes, than EUROPEAN courtiers with all their refinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed, be more frequent in polite ages, when it is often regarded only as a piece of gallantry; drunkenneſs, on the other hand, is much leſs common: A vice more odious and more pernicious both to mind and body. And in this matter I would appeal, not only to an OVID or a PETRONIUS, but to a SENECA or a CATO. We know, that CÆSAR, during CATALINE's conſpiracy, being neceſſitated to put into CATO's hands a *billet-doux*, which diſcovered an intrigue with SERVILIA, CATO's own ſiſter, that ſtern philoſopher drew it back to him with indignation; and, in the bitterneſs of his wrath, gave him the appellation of drunkard, as a term more opprobrious than that with which he could more juſtly have reproached him.

BUT induſtry, knowlege, and humanity, are not advantageous in private life alone: They diffuſe their beneficial influence on the *public*, and render the government as great and flouriſhing as they make individuals happy and proſperous. The increaſe and conſumption of all the commodities which ſerve to the ornament and pleaſure of life, are advantageous to ſociety; becauſe at the ſame time that they multiply thoſe innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of *ſtore-houſe* of labor, which, in the exigencies of ſtate, may be turned to the public ſervice. In a nation, where there is no demand for ſuch ſuperfluities, men ſink into indolence, loſe all the enjoyment of life, and are uſeleſs to the public, which cannot

cannot maintain nor ſupport its fleets and armies, from the induſtry of ſuch ſlothful members.

THE bounds of all the EUROPEAN kingdoms are, at preſent, pretty near the ſame they were two hundred years ago: But what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of thoſe kingdoms? Which can be aſcribed to nothing but the increaſe of art and induſtry. When CHARLES VIII. of FRANCE invaded ITALY, he carried with him about 20,000 men: And yet this armament ſo exhauſted the nation, as we learn from GUICCIARDIN, that for ſome years it was not able to make ſo great an effort. The late king of FRANCE, in time of war, kept in pay above 400,000 men *; tho', from MAZARINE's death to his own, he was engaged in a courſe of wars that laſted near thirty years.

THIS induſtry is much promoted by the knowlege inſeparable from the ages of arts and luxury; as, on the other hand, this knowlege enables the public to make the beſt advantage of the induſtry of its ſubjects. Laws, order, police, diſcipline; theſe can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reaſon has refined itſelf by exerciſe, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at leaſt, of commerce and manufactures. Can we expect, that a government will be well modelled by a people, who know not how to make a ſpinning-wheel, or to employ a loom to advantage? Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infeſted with ſuperſtition, which throws the government off its bias, and diſturbs men in the purſuit of their intereſt and happineſs.

KNOWLEGE in the arts of government naturally begets mildneſs and moderation, by inſtructing men in the advantages of humane maxims above rigor and ſeverity, which drive ſubjects into rebellion, and render the return to ſubmiſſion impracticable, by cutting off all hopes of pardon. When the tempers of men are ſoftened as well as their knowlege improved, this humanity appears ſtill more conſpicuous, and is the chief characteriſtic which diſtinguiſhes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance. Factions are then leſs inveterate, revolutions leſs tragical, authority leſs ſevere, and ſeditions leſs frequent. Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honor and intereſt ſteel men againſt compaſſion as well as fear, the combatants diveſt themſelves of the brute, and reſume the man.

NOR need we fear, that men, by loſing their ferocity, will loſe their martial ſpirit, or become leſs undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty. The arts have no ſuch effect in enervating either the mind or body. On the contrary, induſtry, their inſeparable attendant, adds new force to both. And if anger, which is ſaid to be the whetſtone of courage, loſes ſomewhat of its aſperity, by politeneſs and refinement; a ſenſe of honor, which is a ſtronger, more conſtant, and more governable principle, acquires freſh vigor by that elevation of genius, which ariſes from knowlege and a good education. Add to this, that courage can neither have any duration, nor be of any uſe, when not accompanied with diſcipline and martial ſkill, which are ſeldom found among a barbarous people. The antients remarked, that DATAMES was the only barbarian that ever knew the art of war. And PYRRHUS ſeeing the ROMANS marſhal their army with ſome art and ſkill, ſaid with ſurpriſe, *Theſe barbarians have nothing barbarous in their*

* The inſcription on the PLACE-DE-VENDOME ſays 440,000.

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diſcipline! 'Tis obſervable, that as the old ROMANS, by applying themſelves ſolely to war, were the only civilized people that ever poſſeſſed military diſcipline; ſo the modern ITALIANS are the only civilized people, among EUROPEANS, that ever wanted courage and a martial ſpirit. Thoſe who would aſcribe this effeminacy of the ITALIANS to their luxury or politeneſs, or application to the arts, need but conſider the FRENCH and ENGLISH, whoſe bravery is as unconteſtable, as their love of luxury, and their aſſiduity in commerce. The ITALIAN hiſtorians give us a more ſatisfactory reaſon for this degeneracy of their countrymen. They ſhew us how the ſword was dropt at once by all the ITALIAN ſovereigns; while the VENETIAN ariſtocracy was jealous of its ſubjects, the FLORENTINE democracy applied itſelf entirely to commerce; ROME was governed by prieſts, and NAPLES by women. War then became the buſineſs of ſoldiers of fortune, who ſpared one another, and, to the aſtoniſhment of the world, could engage a whole day in what they called a battle, and return at night to their camp, without the leaſt bloodſhed.

WHAT has chiefly induced ſevere moraliſts to declaim againſt luxury and refinement in pleaſure, is the example of antient ROME, which, joining to its poverty and ruſticity, virtue and public ſpirit, roſe to ſuch a ſurpriſing height of grandeur and liberty; but having learned from its conquered provinces the ASIATIC luxury, fell into every kind of corruption; whence aroſe ſedition and civil wars, attended at laſt with the total loſs of liberty. All the LATIN claſſics, whom we peruſe in our infancy, are full of theſe ſentiments, and univerſally aſcribe the ruin of their ſtate to the arts and riches imported from the Eaſt: Inſomuch that SALLUST repreſents a taſte for painting as a vice no leſs than lewdneſs and drinking. And ſo popular were theſe ſentiments during the latter ages of the republic, that this author abounds in praiſes of the old rigid ROMAN virtue, tho' himſelf the moſt egregious inſtance of modern luxury and corruption; ſpeaks contemptuouſly of GRECIAN eloquence, tho' the moſt elegant writer in the world; nay, employs prepoſterous digreſſions and declamations to this purpoſe, tho' a model of taſte and correctneſs.

BUT it would be eaſy to prove, that theſe writers miſtook the cauſe of the diſorders in the ROMAN ſtate, and aſcribed to luxury and the arts, what really proceeded from an ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent of conqueſts. Luxury or refinement on pleaſure has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption. The value which all men put upon any particular pleaſure, depends on compariſon and experience; nor is a porter leſs greedy of money, which he ſpends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier, who purchaſes champagne, and ortolans. Riches are valuable at all times and to all men, becauſe they always purchaſe pleaſures, ſuch as men are accuſtomed to, and deſire: nor can any thing reſtrain or regulate the love of money but a ſenſe of honour and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound moſt in ages of luxury and knowlege.

OF all EUROPEAN kingdoms POLAND ſeems the moſt defective in the arts of war as well as peace, mechanical as well as liberal; and yet 'tis there that venality and corruption do moſt prevail. The nobles ſeem to have preſerved their crown elective for no other purpoſe, but regularly to ſell it to the higheſt bidder. This is almoſt the only ſpecies of commerce with which that people are acquainted.

THE liberties of ENGLAND, ſo far from decaying ſince the origin of luxury and the arts, have never flouriſhed ſo much as during that period. And tho' corruption may ſeem to increaſe of late years; this is chiefly to be aſcribed to our eſtabliſhed liberty, when our princes have found the impoſſibility of governing without parliaments, or of terrifying parliaments by the phantom of prerogative. Not to mention, that this corruption or venality prevails infinitely more among the electors than the elected; and therefore cannot juſtly be aſcribed to any refinements in luxury.

IF we conſider the matter in a proper light, we ſhall find, that luxury and the arts are rather favorable to liberty, and have a natural tendency to preſerve, if not produce a free government. In rude unpoliſhed nations, where the arts are neglected, all the labor is beſtowed on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole ſociety divides into two claſſes, proprietors of land, and their vaſſals or tenants. The latter are neceſſarily dependent, and fitted for ſlavery and ſubjection; eſpecially where they poſſeſs no riches, and are not valued for their knowlege in agriculture; as muſt always be the caſe where the arts are neglected. The former naturally erect themſelves into petty tyrants; and muſt either ſubmit to an abſolute maſter for the ſake of peace and order; or if they will preſerve their independency, like the GOTHIC barons, they muſt fall into feuds and conteſts among themſelves, and throw the whole ſociety into ſuch confuſion, as is perhaps worſe than the moſt deſpotic government. But where luxury nouriſhes commerce and induſtry, the peaſants, by a proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradeſmen and merchants acquire a ſhare of the property, and draw authority and conſideration to that middling rank of men, who are the beſt and firmeſt baſis of public liberty. Theſe ſubmit not to ſlavery, like the poor peaſants, from poverty and meanneſs of ſpirit; and having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the ſake of that gratification, to ſubmit to the tyranny of their ſovereign. They covet equal laws, which may ſecure their property, and preſerve them from monarchical, as well as ariſtocratical tyranny.

THE houſe of Commons is the ſupport of our popular government; and all the world acknowlege, that it owed its chief influence and conſideration to the increaſe of commerce, which threw ſuch a balance of property into the hands of the Commons. How inconſiſtent then, is it to blame ſo violently luxury, or a refinement in the arts, and to repreſent it as the bane of liberty and public ſpirit?

TO declaim againſt preſent times, and magnify the virtue of remote anceſtors, is a propenſity almoſt inherent in human nature: and as the ſentiments and opinions of civilized ages alone are tranſmitted to poſterity, hence it is that we meet with ſo many ſevere judgments pronounced againſt luxury, and even ſcience; and hence it is that at preſent we give ſo ready an aſſent to them. But the fallacy is eaſily perceived from comparing different nations that are contemporaries; where we both judge more impartially, and can better ſet in oppoſition thoſe manners with which we are ſufficiently acquainted. Treachery and cruelty, the moſt pernicious and moſt odious of all vices, ſeem peculiar to uncivilized ages; and by the refined GREEKS and ROMANS were aſcribed to all the barbarous nations, which ſurrounded them. They might juſtly, therefore, have preſumed, that their own anceſtors, ſo highly celebrated, poſſeſſed no greater virtue, and were as much infe-

inferior to their poſterity in honor and humanity as in taſte and ſcience. An antient FRANK or SAXON may be highly extolled: But I believe every man would think his life or fortune much leſs ſecure in the hands of a MOOR or TARTAR, than in thoſe of a FRENCH or ENGLISH gentleman, the rank of men the moſt civilized in the moſt civilized nations.

WE come now to the *ſecond* poſition which we propoſed to illuſtrate, *viz.* that as innocent luxury, or a refinement in pleaſure, is advantageous to the public; ſo where-ever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial; and when carried a degree farther, begins to be a quality pernicious, tho', perhaps, not the moſt pernicious, to political ſociety.

LET us conſider what we call vicious luxury. No gratification, however ſenſual, can of itſelf be eſteemed vicious. A gratification is only vicious, when it engroſſes all a man's expence, and leaves no ability for ſuch acts of duty and generoſity as are required by his ſituation and fortune. Suppoſe, that he correct the vice, and employ part of his expence in the education of his children, in the ſupport of his friends, and in relieving the poor; would any prejudice reſult to ſociety? On the contrary, the ſame conſumption would ariſe; and that labor, which, at preſent, is employed only in producing a ſlender gratification to one man, would relieve the neceſſitous, and beſtow ſatisfaction on hundreds. The ſame care and toil which raiſe a diſh of peas at CHRISTMAS, would give bread to a whole family during ſix months. To ſay, that, without a vicious luxury, the labor would not have been employed at all, is only to ſay, that there is ſome other defect in human nature, ſuch as indolence, ſelfiſhneſs, inattention to others, for which luxury in ſome meaſure provides a remedy; as one poiſon may be an antidote to another. But virtue, like wholſome food, is better than poiſons, however corrected.

SUPPOSE the ſame number of men that are at preſent in BRITAIN, with the ſame ſoil and climate; I aſk, is it not poſſible for them to be happier, by the moſt perfect way of life which can be imagined, and by the greateſt reformation which Omnipotence itſelf could work in their temper and diſpoſition? To aſſert, that they cannot, appears evidently ridiculous. As the land is able to maintain more than all its inhabitants, they could never, in ſuch an UTOPIAN ſtate, feel any other ills than thoſe which ariſe from bodily ſickneſs; and theſe are not the half of human miſeries. All other ills ſpring from ſome vice, either in ourſelves or others; and even many of our diſeaſes proceed from the ſame origin. Remove the vices, and the ills follow. You muſt only take care to remove all the vices. If you remove part, you may render the matter worſe. By baniſhing *vicious* luxury, without curing ſloth and an indifference to others, you only diminiſh induſtry in the ſtate, and add nothing to mens charity or their generoſity. Let us, therefore, reſt contented with aſſerting, that two oppoſite vices in a ſtate may be more advantageous than either of them alone; but let us never pronounce vice in itſelf advantageous. Is it not very inconſiſtent for an author to aſſert in one page, that moral diſtinctions are inventions of politicians for public intereſt; and in the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public *? And indeed it ſeems, upon any ſyſtem of morality, little leſs than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice which is in general beneficial to ſociety.

* Fable of the bees.

I THOUGHT this reaſoning neceſſary, in order to give ſome light to a philoſophical queſtion, which has been much diſputed in BRITAIN. I call it a *philoſophical* queſtion, not a *political* one. For whatever may be the conſequence of ſuch a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would endow them with every ſpecies of virtue, and free them from every ſpecies of vice; this concerns not the magiſtrate, who aims only at poſſibilities. He cannot cure every vice, by ſubſtituting a virtue in its place. Very often he can only cure one vice by another; and in that caſe, he ought to prefer what is leaſt pernicious to ſociety. Luxury, when exceſſive, is the ſource of many ills; but is in general preferable to ſloth and idleneſs, which would commonly ſucceed in its place, and are more pernicious both to private perſons and to the public. When ſloth reigns, a mean uncultivated way of life prevails amongſt individuals, without ſociety, without enjoyment. And if the ſovereign, in ſuch a ſituation, demands the ſervice of his ſubjects, the labor of the ſtate ſuffices only to furniſh the neceſſaries of life to the laborers, and can afford nothing to thoſe who are employed in the public ſervice.

ESSAY III.

OF MONEY.

MONEY is not, properly ſpeaking, one of the ſubjects of commerce; but only the inſtrument which men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. 'Tis none of the wheels of trade: 'Tis the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more ſmooth and eaſy. If we conſider any one kingdom by itſelf, 'tis evident, that the greater or leſs plenty of money is of no conſequence; ſince the prices of commodities are always proportioned to the plenty of money, and a crown in HARRY VII.'s time ſerved the ſame purpoſe as a pound does at preſent. 'Tis only the *public* which draws any advantage from the greater plenty of money; and that only in its wars and negotiations with foreign ſtates. And this is the reaſon, why all rich and trading countries, from CARTHAGE to BRITAIN and HOLLAND, have employed mercenary troops, which they hired from their poorer neighbours. Were they to make uſe of their native ſubjects, they would find leſs advantage from their ſuperior riches, and from their great plenty of gold and ſilver; ſince the pay of all their ſervants muſt riſe in proportion to the public opulence. Our ſmall army in BRITAIN of 20,000 men are maintained at as great expence as a FRENCH army thrice as numerous. The ENGLISH fleet, during the late war, required as much money to ſupport it as all the ROMAN legions, which kept the whole world in ſubjection, during the time of the emperors *.

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* A private ſoldier in the ROMAN infantry had a denarius a-day, ſomewhat leſs than eight pence. The Roman emperors had commonly 25 legions in pay, which, allowing 5000 men to a legion, makes 125,000 TACIT. *ann. lib.* 4. 'Tis true, there were alſo auxiliaries to the legions; but their numbers are

THE greater number of people and their greater induſtry are ſerviceable in all caſes; at home and abroad, in private and in public. But the greater plenty of money is very limited in its uſe, and may even ſometimes be a loſs to a nation in its commerce with foreigners.

THERE ſeems to be a happy concurrence of cauſes in human affairs, which check the growth of trade and riches, and hinder them from being confined entirely to one people; as might naturally at firſt be dreaded from the advantages of an eſtabliſhed commerce. Where one nation has got the ſtart of another in trade, 'tis very difficult for the latter to regain the ground it has loſt; becauſe of the ſuperior induſtry and ſkill of the former, and the greater ſtocks, of which its merchants are poſſeſſed, and which enable them to trade for ſo much ſmaller profits. But theſe advantages are compenſated, in ſome meaſure, by the low price of labor in every nation, which has not an extenſive commerce, and does not very much abound in gold and ſilver. Manufactures, therefore, gradually ſhift their places, leaving thoſe countries and provinces which they have already enriched, and flying to others, whither they are allured by the cheapneſs of proviſions and labor; till they have enriched theſe alſo, and are again baniſhed by the ſame cauſes. And, in general, we may obſerve, that the dearneſs of every thing, from plenty of money, is a diſadvantage, which attends an eſtabliſhed commerce, and ſets bounds to it in every country, by enabling the poorer ſtates to underſel the richer in all foreign markets.

THIS has made me entertain a great doubt concerning the benefit of *banks* and *paper-credit*, which are ſo generally eſteemed advantageous to every nation. That proviſions and labor ſhould become dear by the increaſe of trade and money, is, in many reſpects, an inconvenience; but an inconvenience that is unavoidable, and the effect of that public wealth and proſperity which are the end of all our wiſhes. 'Tis compenſated by the advantages which we reap, from the poſſeſſion of theſe precious metals, and the weight which they give the nation in all foreign wars and negotiations. But there appears no reaſon for increaſing that inconvenience by a counterfeit money, which foreigners will not accept in any payment, and which any great diſorder in the ſtate will reduce to nothing. There are, 'tis true, many people in every rich ſtate, who, having large ſums of money, would prefer paper with good ſecurity; as being of more eaſy tranſport and more ſafe cuſtody. If the public provide not a bank, private bankers will take advantage of this circumſtance; as the goldſmiths formerly did in LONDON, or as the bankers do at preſent in DUBLIN: and therefore 'tis better, it may be thought, that a public company ſhould enjoy the benefit of that paper-credit, which always will have place

are uncertain, as well as their pay. To conſider only the legionaries, the pay of the private men could not exceed 1,600,000 pound. Now, the parliament in the laſt war commonly allowed for the fleet 2,500,000. We have therefore 900,000 over for the officers and other expences of the ROMAN legions. There ſeem to have been but few officers in the ROMAN armies, in compariſon of what are employed in all our modern troops, except ſome SWISS corps. And theſe officers had very ſmall pay: A centurion, for inſtance, only double a common ſoldier. And as the ſoldiers from their pay (TACIT. *ann. lib.* 1.) bought their own cloaths, arms, tents, and baggage; this muſt alſo diminiſh conſiderably the other charges of the army. So little expenſive was that mighty government, and ſo eaſy was its yoke over the world. And, indeed, this is the more natural concluſion from the foregoing calculations. For money, after the conqueſt of EGYPT, ſeems to have been nearly in as great plenty at ROME, as it is at preſent in the richeſt of the EUROPEAN kingdoms.

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in every opulent kingdom. But to endeavor artificially to increaſe ſuch a credit, can never be the intereſt of any trading nation; but muſt lay them under diſadvantages, by increaſing money beyond its natural proportion to labor and commodities, and thereby heightening their price to the merchant and manufacturer. And in this view, it muſt be allowed, that no bank could be more advantageous than ſuch a one as locked up all the money it received *, and never augmented the circulating coin, as is uſual, by returning part of its treaſure into commerce. A public bank, by this expedient, might cut off much of the dealings of private bankers and money-jobbers; and tho' the ſtate bore the charge of ſalaries to the directors and tellers of this bank, (for, according to the preceding ſuppoſition, it would have no profit from its dealings,) the national advantage, reſulting from the low price of labor and the deſtruction of paper-credit, would be a ſufficient compenſation. Not to mention, that ſo large a ſum, lying ready at command, would be a great convenience in times of public danger and diſtreſs; and what part of it was uſed might be replaced at leiſure, when peace and tranquillity were reſtored to the nation.

But of this ſubject of paper-credit, we ſhall treat more largely hereafter. And I ſhall finiſh this eſſay on money, by propoſing and explaining two obſervations, which may, perhaps, ſerve to employ the thoughts of our ſpeculative politicians. For to theſe only I all along addreſs myſelf. 'Tis enough, that I ſubmit to the ridicule ſometimes, in this age, attached to the character of a philoſopher, without adding to it that which belongs to a projector.

It was a ſhrewd obſervation of Anacharsis † the Scythian, who had never ſeen money in his own country, that gold and ſilver ſeemed to him of no uſe to the Greeks, but to aſſiſt them in numeration and arithmetic. 'Tis indeed evident, that money is nothing but the repreſentation of labor and commodities, and ſerves only as a method of rating or eſtimating them. Where coin is in greater plenty; as a greater quantity of it is required to repreſent the ſame quantity of goods; it can have no effect, either good or bad, taking a nation within itſelf; no more than it would make any alteration on a merchant's books, if inſtead of the Arabian method of notation, which requires few characters, he ſhould make uſe of the Roman, which requires a great many. Nay, the greater quantity of money, like the Roman characters, is rather inconvenient, and requires greater trouble both to keep and tranſport it. But notwithſtanding this concluſion, which muſt be allowed juſt, 'tis certain, that, ſince the diſcovery of the mines in America, induſtry has increaſed in all the nations of Europe, except in the poſſeſſors of thoſe mines; and this may juſtly be aſcribed, amongſt other reaſons, to the increaſe of gold and ſilver. Accordingly we find, that in every kingdom, into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, every thing takes a new face; labor and induſtry gain life; the merchant becomes more enterpriſing, the manufacturer more diligent and ſkilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with greater alacrity and attention. This is not eaſily to be accounted for, if we conſider only the influence which a greater abundance of coin has in the kingdom itſelf, by heightening the price of commodities, and obliging every one to pay a greater number of theſe little yellow or white pieces

* This is the caſe with the bank of Amsterdam.

† Plut. *Quomodo quis ſuos profectus in virtute ſentire poſſit.*

for

FROM the whole of this reaſoning we may conclude, that 'tis of no manner of conſequence, with regard to the domeſtic happineſs of a ſtate, whether money be in a greater or leſs quantity. The good policy of the magiſtrate conſiſts only in keeping it, if poſſible, ſtill increaſing; becauſe, by that means, he keeps alive a ſpirit of induſtry in the nation, and increaſes the ſtock of labor, in which conſiſts all real power and riches. A nation whoſe money decreaſes, is actually, at that time, much weaker and more miſerable than another nation, who poſſeſſes no more money, but is on the increaſing hand. This will be eaſily accounted for, if we conſider, that the alterations in the quantity of money, either on the one ſide or the other, are not immediately attended with proportionable alterations in the prices of commodities. There is always an interval before matters be adjuſted to their new ſituation; and this interval is as pernicious to induſtry when gold and ſilver are diminiſhing, as it is advantageous when theſe metals are increaſing. The workman has not the ſame employment from the manufacturer and merchant; tho' he pays the ſame price for every thing in the market. The farmer cannot diſpoſe of his corn and cattle; tho' he muſt pay the ſame rent to his landlord. The poverty, and beggary, and ſloth, which muſt enſue, are eaſily foreſeen.

II. THE ſecond obſervation which I propoſed to make with regard to money, may be explained after the following manner. There are ſome kingdoms, and many provinces in EUROPE, (and all of them were once in the ſame condition) where money is ſo ſcarce, that the landlord can get none at all from his tenants; but is obliged to take his rent in kind, and either to conſume it himſelf, or tranſport it to places where he may find a market. In thoſe countries, the prince can levy few or no taxes, but in the ſame manner: And as he will receive very ſmall benefit from impoſitions ſo paid, 'tis evident that ſuch a kingdom has very little force even at home; and cannot maintain fleets and armies to the ſame extent, as if every part of it abounded in gold and ſilver. There is ſurely a greater diſproportion betwixt the force of GERMANY at preſent and what it was three centuries ago †, than there is in its induſtry, people, and manufactures. The AUSTRIAN dominions in the empire, are in general well peopled and well cultivated, and are of great extent; but have not a proportionable weight in the balance of EUROPE; proceeding, as is commonly ſuppoſed, from the ſcarcity of money. How do all theſe facts agree with that principle of reaſon, that the quantity of gold and ſilver is in itſelf altogether indifferent? According to that principle, where-ever a ſovereign has numbers of ſubjects, and theſe have plenty of commodities, he ſhould

LON, du TOT, and PARIS de VERNEY. Were all our money, for inſtance, recoined, and a penny's worth of ſilver taken from every ſhilling, the new ſhilling would probably purchaſe every thing that could have been bought by the old; the prices of every thing would thereby be inſenſibly diminiſhed; foreign trade enlivened; and domeſtic induſtry, by the circulation of a greater number of pounds and ſhillings, would receive ſome increaſe and encouragement. In executing ſuch a project, 'twould be better to make the new ſhilling paſs for 24 half-pence, in order to preſerve the illuſion, and make it be taken for the ſame. And as a recoinage of our ſilver begins to be requiſite, by the continual wearing of our ſhillings and ſixpences, 'tis doubtful, whether we ought to imitate the example in king WILLIAM's reign, when the clipt money was raiſed to the old ſtandard.

† The ITALIANS gave to the emperor MAXIMILIAN, the nick-name of POCCHI-DANARI. None of the enterpriſes of that prince ever ſucceeded, for want of money.

of courſe be great and powerful, and they rich and happy, independent of the greater or leſs abundance of the precious metals. Theſe admit of diviſions and ſubdiviſions to a great extent; and where they would become ſo ſmall as to be in danger of being loſt, 'tis eaſy to mix them with a baſer metal, as is practiſed in ſome countries of EUROPE; and by that means raiſe them to a bulk more ſenſible and convenient. They ſtill ſerve the ſame purpoſes of exchange, whatever their number may be, or whatever color they may be ſuppoſed to have.

To theſe difficulties I anſwer, that the effect here ſuppoſed to flow from ſcarcity of money, really ariſes from the manners and cuſtoms of the inhabitants; and that we miſtake, as is too uſual, a collateral effect for a cauſe. The contradiction is only apparent; but it requires ſome thought and reflection to diſcover the principles, by which we can reconcile *reaſon* to *experience*.

IT ſeems a maxim almoſt ſelf-evident, That the prices of every thing depend on the proportion between commodities and money, and that any conſiderable alteration on either of theſe has the ſame effect, either of heightening or lowering the prices. Increaſe the commodities, they become cheaper; increaſe the money, they riſe in their value. As, on the other hand, a diminution of the former and that of the latter have contrary tendencies.

'TIS alſo evident, that the prices do not ſo much depend on the abſolute quantity of commodities and that of money, which are in a nation, as on that of the commodities, which come or may come to market, and of the money which circulates. If the coin be locked up in cheſts, 'tis the ſame thing with regard to prices, as if it were annihilated: If the commodities be hoarded in granaries, a like effect follows. As the money and commodities, in theſe caſes, never meet, they cannot affect each other. Were we, at any time, to form conjectures concerning the price of proviſions, the corn which the farmer muſt reſerve for the maintenance of himſelf and family, ought never to enter into the eſtimation. 'Tis only the overplus, compared to the demand, that determines the value.

To apply theſe principles, we muſt conſider, that in the firſt and more uncultivated ages of any ſtate, ere fancy has confounded her wants with thoſe of nature, men, contented with the productions of their own fields, or with thoſe rude preparations which they themſelves can work upon them, have little occaſion for exchange, or at leaſt for money, which, by agreement, is the common meaſure of exchange. The wool of the farmer's own flock, ſpun in his own family, and wrought by a neighboring weaver, who receives his payment in corn or wool, ſuffices for furniture and cloathing. The carpenter, the ſmith, the maſon, the tailor, are retained by wages of a like nature; and the landlord himſelf, dwelling in the neighborhood, is contented to receive his rent in the commodities raiſed by the farmer. The greateſt part of theſe he conſumes at home, in ruſtic hoſpitality: The reſt, perhaps, he diſpoſes of for money to the neighboring town, whence he draws the few materials of his expence and luxury.

BUT after men begin to refine on all theſe enjoyments, and live not always at home, nor are contented with what can be raiſed in their neighborhood, there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, and more money enters into that exchange. The tradeſmen will not be paid in corn; becauſe they want ſomething more than barely to eat. The farmer goes beyond his own pariſh for the commodities he purchaſes, and cannot always carry his commodities to the merchant

who ſupplies him. The landlord lives in the capital, or in a foreign country; and demands his rent in gold and ſilver, which can eaſily be tranſported to him. Great undertakers, and manufacturers, and merchants ariſe in every commodity; and theſe can conveniently deal in nothing but in ſpecie. And conſequently, in this ſituation of ſociety, the coin enters into many more contracts, and by that means is much more employed than in the former.

THE neceſſary effect is, that, provided the money does not increaſe in the nation, every thing muſt become much cheaper in times of induſtry and refinement, than in rude, uncultivated ages. 'Tis the proportion between the circulating money, and the commodities in the market, which determines the prices. Goods that are conſumed at home, or exchanged with other goods in the neighborhood, never come to market; they affect not in the leaſt the current ſpecie; with regard to it they are as if totally annihilated; and conſequently this method of uſing them ſinks the proportion on the ſide of the commodities, and increaſes the prices. But after money enters into all contracts and ſales, and is every where the meaſure of exchange, the ſame national caſh has a much greater taſk to perform; all commodities are then in the market; the ſphere of circulation is enlarged; 'tis the ſame caſe as if that individual ſum were to ſerve a larger kingdom; and therefore, the proportion being here leſſened on the ſide of the money, every thing muſt become cheaper, and the prices gradually fall.

BY the moſt exact computations that have been formed all over EUROPE, after making allowance for the alteration in the numerary value or the denomination, 'tis found, that the prices of all things have only riſen three, or at moſt, four times, ſince the diſcovery of the WEST INDIES. But will any one aſſert, that there is not four times the coin in EUROPE, that was in the fifteenth century, and the centuries preceding it? The SPANIARDS and PORTUGUESE from their mines, the ENGLISH, FRENCH, and DUTCH, by their AFRICAN trade, and by their interlopers in the WEST INDIES, bring home about ſix millions a-year, of which not above a third part goes to the EAST INDIES. This ſum alone in ten years would probably double the antient ſtock of money in EUROPE. And no other ſatisfactory reaſon can be given, why all prices have not riſen to a much more exorbitant height, except that derived from a change of cuſtoms and manners. Beſides that more commodities are produced by additional induſtry, the ſame commodities come more to market, after men depart from their antient ſimplicity of manners. And tho' this increaſe has not been equal to that of money, it has, however, been conſiderable, and has preſerved the proportion betwixt coin and commodities nearer the antient ſtandard.

WERE the queſtion propoſed, Which of theſe methods of living in the people, the ſimple or the refined, is the moſt advantageous to the ſtate or public? I ſhould, without much ſcruple, prefer the latter, in a view to politics at leaſt; and ſhould produce this as an additional reaſon for the encouragement of trade and manufactures.

WHEN men live in the antient ſimple manner, and ſupply all their neceſſaries from domeſtic induſtry or from the neighborhood, the ſovereign can levy no taxes in money from a conſiderable part of his ſubjects; and if he will impoſe on them any burthens, he muſt take his payment in commodities, with which alone they abound; a method attended with ſuch great and obvious inconveniencies,

that they need not here be inſiſted on. All the money he can pretend to raiſe, muſt be from his principal cities, where alone it circulates; and theſe, 'tis evident, cannot afford him ſo much as the whole ſtate could, did gold and ſilver circulate thro' the whole. But beſides this obvious diminution of the revenue, there is alſo another cauſe of the poverty of the public in ſuch a ſituation. Not only the ſovereign receives leſs money, but the ſame money goes not ſo far as in times of induſtry and general commerce. Every thing is dearer, where the gold and ſilver are ſuppoſed equal; and that becauſe fewer commodities come to market, and the whole coin bears a higher proportion to what is to be purchaſed by it; whence alone the prices of every thing are fixed and determined.

HERE then we may learn the fallacy of the remark, often to be met with in hiſtorians, and even in common converſation, that any particular ſtate is weak, tho' fertile, populous, and well cultivated, merely becauſe it wants money. It appears, that the want of money can never injure any ſtate within itſelf: For men and commodities are the real ſtrength of any community. 'Tis the ſimple manner of living which here hurts the public, by confining the gold and ſilver to few hands, and preventing its univerſal diffuſion and circulation. On the contrary, induſtry and refinements of all kinds incorporate it with the whole ſtate, however ſmall its quantity may be: They digeſt it into every vein, ſo to ſpeak; and make it enter into every tranſaction and contract. No hand is entirely empty of it. And as the prices of every thing fall by that means, the ſovereign has a double advantage: He may draw money by his taxes from every part of the ſtate; and what he receives, goes farther in every purchaſe and payment.

WE may infer, from a compariſon of prices, that money is not more plentiful in CHINA, than it was in EUROPE three centuries ago: But what immenſe power is that empire poſſeſſed of, if we may judge by the civil and military liſt maintained by it? POLYBIUS * tells us, that proviſions were ſo cheap in ITALY during his time, that in ſome places the ſtated club in the inns was a *ſemis* a-head, little more than a farthing? Yet the ROMAN power had even then ſubdued the whole known world. About a century before that period, the CARTHAGINIAN ambaſſador ſaid, by way of raillery, that no people lived more ſociably amongſt themſelves than the ROMANS; for that in every entertainment, which, as foreign miniſters, they received, they ſtill obſerved the ſame plate at every table †. The abſolute quantity of the precious metals is a matter of great indifference. There are only two circumſtances of any importance, *viz.* their gradual increaſe, and their thorow concoction and circulation thro' the ſtate; and the influence of both theſe circumſtances has been here explained.

IN the following Eſſay we ſhall ſee an inſtance of a like fallacy as that abovementioned; where a collateral effect is taken for a cauſe, and where a conſequence is aſcribed to the plenty of money; tho' it be really owing to a change in the manners and cuſtoms of the people.

* Lib. 2. cap. 15. † PLIN. lib. 33. cap. 11.

ESSAY IV.

OF INTEREST.

NOTHING is eſteemed a more certain ſign of the flouriſhing condition of any nation than the lowneſs of intereſt: and with reaſon; tho' I believe the cauſe is ſomewhat different from what is commonly apprehended. The lowneſs of intereſt is generally aſcribed to the plenty of money. But money, however plentiful, has no other effect, *if fixed*, than to raiſe the price of labor. Silver is more common than gold; and therefore you receive a greater quantity of it for the ſame commodities. But do you pay leſs intereſt for it? Intereſt in BATAVIA and JAMAICA is at 10 *per cent.* in PORTUGAL at 6; tho' theſe places, as we may learn from the prices of every thing, abound much more in gold and ſilver than either LONDON or AMSTERDAM.

WERE all the gold in ENGLAND annihilated at once, and one and twenty ſhillings ſubſtituted in the place of every guinea, would money be more plentiful or intereſt lower? No ſurely: We ſhould only uſe ſilver inſtead of gold. Were gold rendered as common as ſilver, and ſilver as common as copper; would money be more plentiful or intereſt lower? We may aſſuredly give the ſame anſwer. Our ſhillings would then be yellow, and our halfpence white; and we ſhould have no guineas. No other difference would ever be obſerved; no alteration on commerce, manufactures, navigation, or intereſt; unleſs we imagine, that the color of the metal is of any conſequence.

Now, what is ſo viſible in theſe greater variations of ſcarcity or abundance of the precious metals, muſt hold in all inferior changes. If the multiplying gold and ſilver fifteen times makes no difference, much leſs can the doubling or tripling them. All augmentation has no other effect than to heighten the price of labor and commodities; and even this variation is little more than that of a name. In the progreſs towards theſe changes, the augmentation may have ſome influence, by exciting induſtry; but after the prices are ſettled, ſuitable to the new abundance of gold and ſilver, it has no manner of influence.

AN effect always holds proportion with its cauſe. Prices have riſen about four times ſince the diſcovery of the INDIES; and 'tis probable gold and ſilver have multiplied much more: But intereſt has not fallen much above half. The rate of intereſt, therefore, is not derived from the quantity of the precious metals.

MONEY having merely a fictitious value, ariſing from the agreement and convention of men, the greater or leſs plenty of it is of no conſequence, if we conſider a nation within itſelf; and the quantity of ſpecie, when once fixed, tho' never ſo large, has no other effect, than to oblige every one to tell out a greater number of thoſe ſhining bits of metal, for cloaths, furniture, or equipage, without increaſing any one convenience of life. If a man borrows money to build a houſe, he then carries home a greater load; becauſe the ſtone, timber, lead, glaſs, *&c.* with the labor of the maſons and carpenters, are repreſented by a greater quantity of gold and ſilver. But as theſe metals are conſidered merely as repreſentations, there can no alteration ariſe, from their bulk or quantity, their weight

weight or color, either upon their real value or their intereſt. The ſame intereſt, in all caſes, bears the ſame proportion to the ſum. And if you lent me ſo much labor and ſo many commodities; by receiving five *per cent.* you receive always proportional labor and commodities, however repreſented, whether by yellow or white coin, whether by a pound or an ounce. 'Tis in vain, therefore, to look for the cauſe of the fall or riſe of intereſt in the greater or leſs quantity of gold and ſilver, which is fixed in any nation.

HIGH intereſt ariſes from *three* circumſtances: A great demand for borrowing; little riches to ſupply that demand; and great profits ariſing from commerce. And theſe circumſtances are a clear proof of the ſmall advance of commerce and induſtry, not of the ſcarcity of gold and ſilver. Low intereſt, on the other hand, proceeds from the three oppoſite circumſtances: A ſmall demand for borrowing; great riches to ſupply that demand; and ſmall profits ariſing from commerce. And theſe circumſtances are all connected together, and proceed from the increaſe of induſtry and commerce, not of gold and ſilver. We ſhall endeavor to prove theſe points as fully and diſtinctly as poſſible; and ſhall begin with the cauſes and the effects of a great or ſmall demand for borrowing.

WHEN a people have emerged ever ſo little from a ſavage ſtate, and their numbers have increaſed beyond the original multitude, there muſt immediately ariſe an inequality of property; and while ſome poſſeſs large tracts of land, others are confined within narrow limits, and ſome are entirely without any landed property. Thoſe who poſſeſs more land than they can labor, employ thoſe who poſſeſs none, and agree to receive a determinate part of the product. Thus the *landed* intereſt is immediately eſtabliſhed; nor is there any ſettled government, however rude, in which affairs are not on this footing. Of theſe proprietors of land, ſome muſt preſently diſcover themſelves to be of different tempers from others; and while one would willingly ſtore up the product of his land for futurity, another deſires to conſume at preſent what ſhould ſuffice for many years. But as the ſpending a ſettled revenue is a way of life entirely without occupation; men have ſo much need of ſomewhat to fix and engage them, that pleaſures, ſuch as they are, will be the purſuit of the greateſt part of the landholders, and the prodigals amongſt them will always be more numerous than the miſers. In a ſtate, therefore, where there is nothing but a landed intereſt, as there is little frugality, the borrowers muſt be very numerous, and the rate of intereſt muſt hold proportion to it. The difference depends not on the quantity of money, but on the habits and manners which prevail. By this alone the demand for borrowing is increaſed or diminiſhed. Were money ſo plentiful as to make an egg be ſold for ſixpence; ſo long as there are only landed gentry and peaſants in the ſtate, the borrowers muſt be numerous, and intereſt high. The rent for the ſame farm would be heavier and more bulky: But the ſame idleneſs of the landlord, with the higher prices of commodities, would diſſipate it in the ſame time, and produce the ſame neceſſity and demand for borrowing*.

NOR

* I have been informed by a very eminent lawyer, and a man of great knowlege and obſervation, that it appears from antient papers and records, that, about four centuries ago, money, in SCOTLAND, and probably in other parts in EUROPE, was only at five *per cent.* and afterwards roſe to ten before the diſcovery of the WEST-INDIES. This fact is curious; but might eaſily be reconciled

NOR is the caſe different with regard to the *ſecond* circumſtance which we propoſed to conſider, *viz.* the great or little riches to ſupply this demand. This effect alſo depends on the habits and ways of living of the people, not on the quantity of gold and ſilver. In order to have, in any ſtate, a great number of lenders, 'tis not ſufficient nor requiſite that there be great abundance of the precious metals. 'Tis only requiſite that the property or command of that quantity, which is in the ſtate, whether great or ſmall, ſhould be collected in particular hands, ſo as to form conſiderable ſums, or compoſe a great monied intereſt. This begets a number of lenders, and ſinks the rate of uſury; and this, I ſhall venture to affirm, depends not on the quantity of ſpecie, but on particular manners and cuſtoms, which make the ſpecie gather into ſeparate ſums or maſſes of conſiderable value.

For ſuppoſe, that, by miracle, every man in BRITAIN ſhould have five pounds ſlipt into his pocket in one night; this would much more than double the whole money that is at preſent in the kingdom; and yet there would not next day, nor for ſome time, be any more lenders, nor any variation on the intereſt. And were there nothing but landlords and peaſants in the ſtate, this money, however abundant, could never gather into ſums; and would only ſerve to increaſe the prices of every thing, without any farther conſequence. The prodigal landlord diſſipates it, as faſt as he receives it; and the beggarly peaſant has no means, nor view, nor ambition of obtaining above a bare livelihood. The overplus of borrowers above that of lenders continuing ſtill the ſame, there will follow no reduction of intereſt. That depends upon another principle; and muſt proceed from an increaſe of induſtry and frugality, of arts and commerce.

EVERY thing uſeful to the life of man, ariſes from the ground; but few things ariſe in that condition which is requiſite to render them uſeful. There muſt, therefore, beſide the peaſants, and the proprietors of land, be another rank of men, who, receiving from the former, the rude materials, work them into their proper form, and retain part for their own uſe and ſubſiſtence. In the infancy of ſociety, theſe contracts betwixt the artiſans and the peaſants, and betwixt one ſpecies of artiſan and another, are commonly entered into immediately by the perſons themſelves, who, being neighbors, are really acquainted with each other's neceſſities, and can lend their mutual aſſiſtance to ſupply them. But when mens induſtry increaſes, and their views enlarge, 'tis found, that the moſt remote parts of the ſtate can aſſiſt each other as well as the more contiguous, and that this intercourſe of good offices may be carried on to the greateſt extent and intricacy. Hence the origin of *merchants*, the moſt uſeful race of men in the whole ſociety, who ſerve as agents between thoſe parts of the ſtate, that are wholly unacquainted, and are ignorant of each other's neceſſities. Here are in a city fifty workmen in ſilk and linen, and a thouſand cuſtomers; and theſe two ranks of men, ſo neceſſary to each other can never rightly meet, till one man erects a ſhop, to which all the workmen and all the cuſtomers repair. In this province, graſs riſes in abundance: The inhabitants abound in cheeſe, and butter, and cattle; but want bread and

reconciled to the foregoing reaſoning. Men, in that age, lived ſo much at home, and in ſo very ſimple and frugal a manner, that they had no occaſion for money; and tho' the lenders were then few, the borrowers were ſtill fewer. The high rate of intereſt among the early ROMANS is accounted for by hiſtorians from the frequent loſſes ſuſtained by the inroads of the enemy.

corn,

corn, which, in a neighboring province, are in too great abundance for the uſe of the inhabitants. One man diſcovers this. He brings corn from the one province, and returns with cattle; and ſupplying the wants of both, he is, ſo far, a common benefactor. As the people increaſe in numbers and induſtry, the difficulty of their mutual intercourſe increaſes: The buſineſs of the agency or merchandize becomes more intricate; and divides, ſubdivides, compounds, and mixes to a greater variety. In all theſe tranſactions, 'tis neceſſary, and reaſonable, that a conſiderable part of the commodities and labor ſhould belong to the merchant, to whom, in a great meaſure, they are owing. And theſe commodities he will ſometimes preſerve in kind, or more commonly convert into money, which is their common repreſentation. If gold and ſilver have increaſed in the ſtate together with the induſtry, it will require a great quantity of theſe metals to repreſent a great quantity of commodities and labor. If induſtry alone has increaſed, the prices of every thing muſt ſink, and a very ſmall quantity of ſpecie will ſerve as a repreſentation.

THERE is no craving or demand of the human mind more conſtant and inſatiable than that for exercise and employment; and this deſire ſeems the foundation of moſt of our paſſions and purſuits. Deprive a man of all buſineſs and ſerious occupation, he runs reſtleſs from one amuſement to another; and the weight and oppreſſion which he feels from idleneſs, is ſo great, that he forgets the ruin which muſt follow from his immoderate expences. Give him a more harmleſs way of employing his mind or body, he is ſatisfied, and feels no longer that inſatiable thirſt after pleaſure. But if the employment you give him be profitable, eſpecially if the profit be attached to every particular exertion of induſtry, he has gain ſo often in his eye, that he acquires, by degrees, a paſſion for it, and knows no ſuch pleaſure as that of ſeeing the daily increaſe of his fortune. And this is the reaſon why trade increaſes frugality, and why, among merchants, there is the ſame overplus of miſers above prodigals, as, among the poſſeſſors of land, there is the contrary.

COMMERCE increaſes induſtry, by conveying it readily from one member of the ſtate to another, and allowing none of it to periſh or become uſeleſs. It increaſes frugality, by giving occupation to men, and employing them in the arts of gain, which ſoon engage their affection, and remove all reliſh for pleaſure and expence. 'Tis an infallible conſequence of all induſtrious profeſſions, to beget frugality, and make the love of gain prevail over the love of pleaſure. Among lawyers and phyſicians who have any practice, there are many more who live within their income, than who exceed it, or even live up to it. But lawyers and phyſicians beget no induſtry; and 'tis even at the expence of others they acquire their riches; ſo that they are ſure to diminiſh the poſſeſſions of ſome of their fellow-citizens as faſt as they increaſe their own. Merchants, on the contrary, beget induſtry, by ſerving as canals to convey it thro' every corner of the ſtate; and at the ſame time, by their frugality, they acquire great power over that induſtry, and collect a large property in the labor and commodities, which they are the chief inſtruments in producing. There is no other profeſſion, therefore, except merchandize, which can make the monied intereſt conſiderable, or, in other words, can increaſe induſtry, and, by alſo increaſing frugality, give a great command of that induſtry to particular members of the ſociety. Without com-

commerce, the ſtate muſt conſiſt chiefly of landed gentry, whoſe prodigality and expence make a continual demand for borrowing; and of peaſants, who have no ſums to ſupply that demand. The money never gathers into large ſtocks or ſums, which can be lent at intereſt. It is diſperſed into numberleſs hands, who either ſquander it in idle ſhow and magnificence, or employ it in the purchaſe of the common neceſſaries of life. Commerce alone aſſembles it into conſiderable ſums; and this effect it has merely from the induſtry which it begets, and the frugality which it inſpires, independent of that particular quantity of precious metal which may circulate in the ſtate.

THUS an increaſe of commerce, by a neceſſary conſequence, raiſes a great number of lenders, and by that means produces a lowneſs of intereſt. We muſt now conſider how far this increaſe of commerce diminiſhes the profits ariſing from that profeſſion, and gives riſe to the *third* circumſtance requiſite to produce a lowneſs of intereſt.

IT may be proper to obſerve on this head, that low intereſt and low profits of merchandize are two events, that mutually forward each other, and are both originally derived from that extenſive commerce, which produces opulent merchants, and renders the monied intereſt conſiderable. Where merchants poſſeſs great ſtocks, whether repreſented by few or many pieces of metal, it muſt frequently happen, that when they either become tired of buſineſs, or have heirs unwilling or unfit to engage in commerce, a great deal of theſe riches naturally ſeeks an annual and ſecure revenue. The plenty diminiſhes the price, and makes the lenders accept of a low intereſt. This conſideration obliges many to keep their ſtocks in trade, and rather be content with low profit than diſpoſe of their money at an under-value. On the other hand, when commerce has become very extenſive, and employs very large ſtocks, there muſt ariſe rivalſhips among the merchants, which diminiſh the profits of trade, at the ſame time that they increaſe the trade itſelf. The low profits of merchandize induce the merchants to accept more willingly of a low intereſt, when they leave off buſineſs, and begin to indulge themſelves in eaſe and indolence. It is needleſs, therefore, to enquire, which of theſe circumſtances, *viz. low intereſts* or *low profits*, is the cauſe, and which the effect? They both ariſe from an extenſive commerce, and mutually forward each other. No man will accept of low profits, where he can have high intereſt; and no man will accept of low intereſt, where he can have high profits. An extenſive commerce, by producing large ſtocks, diminiſhes both intereſt and profit; and is always aſſiſted, in its diminution of the one, by the proportional ſinking of the other. I may add, that as low profits ariſe from the increaſe of commerce and induſtry, they ſerve in their turn to the farther increaſe of commerce, by rendering the commodities cheaper, encouraging the conſumption, and heightening the induſtry. And thus, if we conſider the whole connection of cauſes and effects, intereſt is the true barometer of the ſtate, and its lowneſs is a ſign almoſt infallible of the flouriſhing of a people. It proves the increaſe of induſtry, and its prompt circulation thro' the whole ſtate, little inferior to a demonſtration. And tho', perhaps, it may not be impoſſible but a ſudden and a great check to commerce may have a momentary effect of the ſame kind, by throwing ſo many ſtocks out of trade; it muſt be attended with ſuch miſery and want of employment in the poor, that, beſides its ſhort duration, it will not be poſſible to miſtake the one caſe for the other.

THOSE

THOSE who have aſſerted, that the plenty of money was the cauſe of low intereſt, ſeem to have taken a collateral effect for a cauſe; ſince the ſame induſtry which ſinks the intereſt, does commonly acquire great abundance of the precious metals. A variety of fine manufactures, with vigilant enterpriſing merchants, will ſoon draw money to a ſtate, if it be any where to be found in the world. The ſame cauſe, by multiplying the conveniencies of life, and increaſing induſtry, collects great riches into the hands of perſons, who are not proprietors of land, and produces by that means a lowneſs of intereſt. But tho' both theſe effects, plenty of money and low intereſt, naturally ariſe from commerce and induſtry, they are altogether independent of each other. For, ſuppoſe a nation removed into the *Pacific* ocean, without any foreign commerce, or any knowlege of navigation: Suppoſe, that this nation poſſeſſes always the ſame ſtock of coin, but is continually increaſing in its numbers and induſtry: 'Tis evident, that the price of every commodity muſt gradually diminiſh in that kingdom; ſince 'tis the proportion betwixt money and any ſpecies of goods, which fixes their mutual value; and, upon the preſent ſuppoſition, the conveniencies of life become every day more abundant, without any alteration on the current ſpecie. A leſs quantity of money, therefore, amongſt this people, will make a rich man, during the times of induſtry, than would ſerve to that purpoſe, in ignorant and ſlothful ages. Leſs money will build a houſe, portion a daughter, buy an eſtate, ſupport a manufactory, or maintain a family and equipage. Theſe are the uſes for which men borrow money; and therefore, the greater or leſs quantity of it in a ſtate has no influence on the intereſt. But 'tis evident, that the greater or leſs ſtock of labor and commodities muſt have a great influence; ſince we really and in effect borrow theſe, when we take money upon intereſt. 'Tis true, when commerce is extended all over the globe, the moſt induſtrious nations always abound moſt with the precious metals: So that low intereſt and plenty of money are in fact almoſt inſeparable. But ſtill 'tis of conſequence to know the principle whence any phaenomenon ariſes, and to diſtinguiſh betwixt a cauſe and a concomitant effect. Beſides that the ſpeculation is curious, it may frequently be of uſe in the conduct of public affairs. At leaſt, it muſt be owned, that nothing can be of more uſe than to improve, by practice, the method of reaſoning on theſe ſubjects, which of all others are the moſt important; tho' they are commonly treated in the looſeſt and moſt careleſs manner.

ANOTHER reaſon of this popular miſtake with regard to the cauſe of low intereſt, ſeems to be the inſtance of ſome nations; where, after a ſudden acquiſition of money or of the precious metals, by means of foreign conqueſt, the intereſt has fallen, not only among them, but in all the neighboring ſtates, as ſoon as that money was diſperſed, and had inſinuated itſelf into every corner. Thus, intereſt in SPAIN fell near a half immediately after the diſcovery of the WEST INDIES, as we are informed by GARCILASSO DE LA VEGA: And it has been ever ſince gradually ſinking in every kingdom of EUROPE. Intereſt in ROME, after the conqueſt of EGYPT, fell from 6 to 4 *per cent.* as we learn from DION *.

THE cauſes of the ſinking of intereſt upon ſuch an event, ſeem different in the conquering country and in the neighboring ſtates; but in neither of them can we juſtly aſcribe that effect merely to the increaſe of gold and ſilver.

* Lib. 51.

In the conquering country, 'tis natural to imagine, that this new acquiſition of money will fall into a few hands, and be gathered into large ſums, which ſeek a ſecure revenue, either by the purchaſe of land or by intereſt; and conſequently the ſame effect follows, for a little time, as if there had been a great acceſſion of induſtry and commerce. The increaſe of lenders above the borrowers ſinks the intereſt; and ſo much the faſter, if thoſe who have acquired thoſe large ſums, find no induſtry or commerce in the ſtate, and no method of employing their money but by lending it at intereſt. But after this new maſs of gold and ſilver has been digeſted, and has circulated, thro' the whole ſtate, affairs will ſoon return to their former ſituation: while the landlords and new money-holders, living idly, ſquander above their income; and the former daily contract debt, and the latter incroach on their ſtock till its final extinction. The whole money may ſtill be in the ſtate, and make itſelf felt by the increaſe of prices: But not being now collected into any large maſſes or ſtocks, the diſproportion between the borrowers and lenders is the ſame as formerly, and conſequently the high intereſt returns.

Accordingly we find, in Rome, that ſo early as Tiberius's time, intereſt had again mounted to 6 *per cent.* * tho' no accident had happened to drain the empire of money. In Trajan's time, money lent on mortgages in Italy, bore 6 *per cent.* †; on common ſecurities in Bithynia, 12 ‡. And if intereſt in Spain has not riſen to its old pitch; this can be aſcribed to nothing but the continuance of the ſame cauſe that ſunk it, *viz.* the large fortunes continually made in the Indies, which come over to Spain from time to time, and ſupply the demand of the borrowers. By this accidental and extraneous cauſe, more money is to be lent in Spain, that is, more money is collected into large ſums, than would otherwiſe be found in a ſtate, where there are ſo little commerce and induſtry.

As to the reduction of intereſt, which has followed in England, France, and other kingdoms of Europe, that have no mines, it has been gradual; and has not proceeded from the increaſe of money, conſidered merely in itſelf; but from the increaſe of induſtry, which is the natural effect of the former increaſe, in that interval, before it raiſes the price of labor and proviſions. For to return to the foregoing ſuppoſition; if the induſtry of England had riſen as much from other cauſes, (and that riſe might eaſily have happened, tho' the ſtock of money had remained the ſame) muſt not all the ſame conſequences have followed, which we obſerve at preſent? The ſame people would, in that caſe, be found in the kingdom, the ſame commodities, the ſame induſtry, manufactures, and commerce; and conſequently the ſame merchants, with the ſame ſtocks, that is, with the ſame command over labor and commodities, only repreſented by a ſmaller number of white or yellow pieces; which being a circumſtance of no moment, would only affect the waggoner, porter, and trunk-maker. Luxury, therefore, manufactures, arts, induſtry, frugality, flouriſhing equally as at preſent, 'tis evident that intereſt muſt alſo have been as low; ſince that is the neceſſary reſult of all theſe circumſtances; ſo far as they determine the profits of commerce, and the proportion betwixt the borrowers and lenders in any ſtate.

* Columella, lib. 3. cap. 3. † Plinii epiſt. lib. 7. ep. 18. ‡ Id. lib. 10. ep. 62.

that had they not firſt inſtructed us, we ſhould have been at preſent barbarians; and did they not ſtill continue their inſtructions, the arts muſt fall into a ſtate of languor, and loſe that emulation and novelty which contribute ſo much to their advancement.

THE increaſe of domeſtic induſtry lays the foundation of foreign commerce. Where a great number of commodities are raiſed and perfected for the home-market, there will always be found ſome which can be exported with advantage. But if our neighbours have no art nor cultivation, they cannot take them; becauſe they will have nothing to give in exchange. In this reſpect, ſtates are in the ſame condition as individuals. A ſingle man can ſcarce be induſtrious, where all his fellow-citizens are idle. The riches of the ſeveral members of a community contribute to increaſe my riches, whatever profeſſion I may follow. They conſume the product of my induſtry, and afford me the product of theirs in return.

NOR need any ſtate entertain apprehenſions, that their neighbours will improve to ſuch a degree in every art and manufacture, as to have no demand from them. Nature, by giving a diverſity of geniuſes, climates, and ſoils to different nations, has ſecured their mutual intercourſe and commerce, as long as they all remain induſtrious and civilized. Nay, the more the arts increaſe in any ſtate, the more will be its demands from its induſtrious neighbours. The inhabitants having become opulent and ſkilful, deſire to have every commodity in the utmoſt perfection; and as they have plenty of commodities to give in exchange, they make large importations from every foreign nation. The induſtry of the nations from whom they import it, receives encouragement: Their own is alſo increaſed, by the ſale of the commodities which they give in exchange.

BUT what if a nation has any ſtaple commodity, ſuch as the woollen manufacture is to England? Muſt not the interfering of their neighbours in that manufacture be a loſs to them? I anſwer, that when any commodity is denominated the ſtaple of a kingdom, it is ſuppoſed that that kingdom has ſome peculiar and natural advantages for raiſing the commodity; and if, notwithſtanding theſe advantages, they loſe ſuch a manufactory, they ought to blame their own idleneſs, or bad government, not the induſtry of their neighbours. It ought alſo to be conſidered, that by the increaſe of induſtry among the neighbouring nations, the conſumption of every particular ſpecies of commodity is alſo encreaſed; and though foreign manufactures interfere with us in the market, the demand for our product may ſtill continue, or even encreaſe. And even ſhould it diminiſh, ought the conſequence to be eſteemed ſo fatal? If the ſpirit of induſtry be preſerved, it may eaſily be diverted from one branch to another; and the manufacturers of wool, for inſtance, be employed in linen, ſilk, iron, or any other commodities, for which there appears to be a demand. We need not apprehend, that all the objects of induſtry will be exhauſted, or that our manufacturers, while they remain on an equal footing with thoſe of our neighbours, will be in danger of wanting employment. The emulation among rival nations ſerves rather to keep induſtry alive in all of them: And any people is happier who poſſeſs a variety of manufactures, than if they enjoyed one ſingle great manufactory, in which they are all employed. Their ſituation is leſs precarious, and they will feel leſs ſenſibly thoſe revolutions and uncertainties to which every particular ſpecies of commerce will always be expoſed.

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THE only commercial ſtate which ought to dread the improvements and induſtry of their neighbours, is ſuch a one as Holland, which enjoying no extent of land, nor poſſeſſing any native commodity, flouriſh only by being the brokers, and factors, and carriers of others. Such a people may naturally apprehend, that as ſoon as the neighbouring ſtates come to know and purſue their intereſt, they will take into their own hands the management of their affairs, and deprive their brokers of that profit, which they formerly reaped from it. But though this conſequence may naturally be dreaded, it is very long before it takes place; and by art and induſtry it may be warded for many generations, if not wholly eluded. The advantage of ſuperior ſtock and correſpondence is ſo great, that it is not eaſily overcome; and as all the tranſactions increaſe by the increaſe of induſtry in the neighbouring ſtates, even a people whoſe commerce ſtands on this precarious baſis, may at firſt reap a conſiderable profit from the flouriſhing condition of their neighbours. The Dutch, having mortgaged all their revenues, make not ſuch a figure in political tranſactions as formerly; but their commerce is ſurely equal to what it was in the middle of the laſt century, when they were reckoned among the great powers of Europe.

WERE our narrow and malignant politics to meet with ſucceſs, we ſhould reduce all our neighbouring nations to the ſame ſtate of ſloth and ignorance that prevails in Morocco and the coaſt of Barbary. But what would be the conſequence? They could ſend us no commodities: They could take none from us: Our domeſtic commerce itſelf would languiſh for want of emulation, example, and inſtruction: And we ourſelves ſhould ſoon fall into the ſame abject condition to which we had reduced them. I ſhall therefore venture to acknowledge, that not only as a man, but as a Britiſh ſubject, I pray for the flouriſhing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy, and even France itſelf. I am at leaſt certain, that Great Britain, and all theſe nations, would flouriſh more, did their ſovereigns and miniſters adopt ſuch enlarged and benevolent ſentiments towards each other.

ESSAY XIV.*

OF THE COALITION OF PARTIES.

TO aboliſh all diſtinctions of party, may not be practicable, perhaps not deſirable, in a free government. The only parties, which are dangerous, are ſuch as entertain oppoſite views with regard to the eſſentials of government, the ſucceſſion of the crown, or the more conſiderable privileges belonging to the ſeveral members of the conſtitution; where there is no room for any compromize or accommodation, and where the controverſy may appear ſo momentous as to juſtify even an oppoſition by arms to the pretenſions of antagoniſts. Of this nature was the animoſity which broke out ſometimes into civil war, which occaſioned ENGLAND; an animoſity which continued for above a century between the parties in violent revolutions, and which continually endangered the peace and tranquillity of the nation. But as there has appeared of late the ſtrongeſt ſymptoms of an univerſal deſire to aboliſh theſe party-diſtinctions; this tendency to a coalition affords the moſt agreeable proſpect of future happineſs, and ought to be carefully cheriſhed and promoted by every lover of his country.

THERE is not a more effectual method of promoting ſo good an end, than to prevent all unreaſonable inſult and triumph of the one party over the other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper medium in all diſputes, to perſuade each that its antagoniſt may poſſibly be ſometimes in the right, and to keep a balance in the praiſe and blame which we beſtow on either ſide. The two former Eſſays, concerning the *original contract* and *paſſive obedience*, are calculated for this purpoſe with regard to the *philoſophical* controverſies between the parties, and tend to ſhow that neither ſide are in theſe reſpects ſo fully ſupported by reaſon as they endeavour to flatter themſelves. We ſhall proceed to exerciſe the ſame moderation with regard to the *hiſtorical* diſputes between the parties, and to keep each of them was juſtified by plauſible topics; that there were on both ſides wiſe men who meant well to their country, and that the paſt animoſity between the parties had no better foundation than narrow prejudice or intereſted paſſion.

THE popular party, who afterwards acquired the name of whigs, might juſtify by very ſpecious arguments, that oppoſition to the crown, from which our preſent free conſtitution is derived. Tho' obliged to acknowledge, that precedents in favour of prerogative had uniformly taken place during many reigns before CHARLES the First, they thought, that there was no reaſon for ſubmitting any longer to ſo dangerous an authority. Such might have been their reaſoning: The rights of mankind are ſo ſacred, that no preſcription of tyranny or arbitrary power can have autho-

* To be placed after the *Eſſay on Paſſive Obedience*, Page 264.

authority ſufficient to aboliſh them. Liberty is ſo ineſtimable a bleſſing, that, wherever there appears any probability of recovering it, a nation may willingly run many hazards, and ought not even to repine at the greateſt effuſion of blood or treaſure. All human inſtitutions, and none more than government, are in continual fluctuation. Kings are ſure to embrace every opportunity of extending their prerogatives: And if favourable incidents be not alſo laid hold of to extend and ſecure the privileges of the people, an univerſal deſpotiſm muſt for ever prevail amongſt mankind. The example of all the neighbouring nations prove, that it is no longer ſafe to entruſt with the crown the ſame exorbitant prerogatives which had formerly been exerciſed during rude and ſimple ages And tho' the example of many late reigns may be pleaded in favour of a power in the prince ſomewhat arbitrary, more remote reigns afford inſtances of ſtricter limitations impoſed on the crown; and thoſe pretenſions of the parliament, now branded with the title of innovations, are only a recovery of the juſt rights of the people.

THESE views, far from being odious, are ſurely large, and generous, and noble: To their prevalence and ſucceſs the kingdom owes its liberty; perhaps its learning, its induſtry, commerce, and naval power: By them chiefly the ENGLISH name is diſtinguiſhed among the ſociety of nations, and aſpires to a rivalſhip with that of the freeſt and moſt illuſtrious commonwealths of antiquity. But as all theſe mighty conſequences could not reaſonably be foreſeen at the time when the conteſt began, the royaliſts of that age wanted not ſpecious arguments on their ſide, by which they could juſtify their defence of the then eſtabliſhed prerogatives of the crown. We ſhall ſtate the queſtion, as it might appear to them at the aſſembling of that parliament, which by their violent encroachments on the crown, began the civil wars.

THE only rule of government, they might have ſaid, known and acknowleged among men, is uſe and practice: Reaſon is ſo uncertain a guide that it will always be expoſed to doubt and controverſy: Could it ever render itſelf prevalent over the people, men had always retained it as their ſole rule of conduct: They had ſtill continued in the primitive, unconnected ſtate of nature, without ſubmitting to political government, whoſe ſole baſis is, not pure reaſon, but authority and precedent. Diſſolve theſe tyes, and you break all the bonds of civil ſociety, and leave every man at liberty to conſult his particular intereſt, by thoſe expedients, which his appetite, diſguiſed under the appearance of reaſon, ſhall dictate to him. The ſpirit of innovation is in itſelf pernicious, however favourable its particular object may ſometimes appear: A truth ſo obvious, that the popular party themſelves are ſenſible of it, and therefore cover their encroachments on the crown by the plauſible pretence of their recovering the antient liberties of the people.

BUT the preſent prerogatives of the crown, granting all the ſuppoſitions of that party, have been inconteſtibly eſtabliſhed ever ſince the acceſſion of the Houſe of TUDOR; a period, which, as it now comprehends an hundred and ſixty years, may be allowed ſufficient to give ſtability to any conſtitution. Would it not have appeared ridiculous, in the reign of the Emperor ADRIAN, to talk of the conſtitution of the republic as the rule of government; or to ſuppoſe that the former rights of the ſenate, and conſuls and tribunes were ſtill ſubſiſting?

BUT the preſent claims of the ENGLISH monarchs are infinitely more favourable than thoſe of the ROMAN emperors during that age. The authority of AUGUSTUS was a plain uſurpation, grounded only on military violence, and forms ſuch an æra in the ROMAN hiſtory, as is obvious to every reader. But if HENRY VII. really, as ſome pretend, enlarged the power of the crown, it was only by inſenſible acquiſitions, which eſcaped the apprehenſion of the people, and have ſcarcely been remarked even by hiſtorians and politicians. The new government, if it deſerves the name, is an imperceptible tranſition from the former; is entirely engraſted on it; derives its title fully from that root; and is to be conſidered only as one of thoſe gradual revolutions, to which human affairs, in every nation, will be for ever ſubject.

THE Houſe of TUDOR, and after them that of STUART, exerciſed no prerogatives, but what had been claimed and exerciſed by the PLANTAGENETS. Not a ſingle branch of their authority can be ſaid to be altogether an innovation. The only difference is, that perhaps the former kings exerted theſe powers only by intervals, and were not able by reaſon of the oppoſition of their barons, to render them ſo ſteddy a rule of adminiſtration *. But the ſole inference from this fact is, that theſe antient times were more turbulent and ſeditious; and that royal authority, the conſtitution, and the laws have happily of late gained the aſcendant.

UNDER what pretence can the popular party now talk of recovering the antient conſtitution? The former controul over the kings was not placed in the commons, but in the barons: The people had no authority, and even little or no liberty, till the crown, by ſuppreſſing theſe factious tyrants, enforced the execution of the laws, and obliged all the ſubjects equally to reſpect each others rights, privileges, and properties. If we muſt return to the antient barbarous and GOTHIC conſtitution; let thoſe gentlemen, who now behave themſelves with ſo much inſolence to their ſovereign, ſet the firſt example. Let them make court to be admitted as retainers on a neighbouring baron; and by ſubmitting to ſlavery under him acquire ſome protection to themſelves; together with the power of exerciſing rapine and oppreſſion over their inferior ſlaves and villains. This was the condition of the commons among their remote anceſtors.

BUT how far back ſhall we go, in having recourſe to antient conſtitutions and governments? There was a conſtitution ſtill more antient than that to which their innovators affect ſo much to appeal. During that period there was no *magna charta*: The barons themſelves poſſeſſed few regular, ſtated privileges: And the houſe of commons probably had not an exiſtence.

IT is pleaſant to hear a houſe, while they are uſurping the whole power of government, talk of reviving antient inſtitutions. Is it not known, that, tho' the repreſentatives received wages from their conſtituents; to be a member of their houſe was always conſidered as a burthen, and a freedom from it as a privilege? Will they perſuade us, that power, which of all human acquiſitions is the moſt

* The author believes that he was the firſt writer who advanced that the family of TUDOR poſſeſſed in general more authority than their immediate predeceſſors: An opinion, which, he hopes, will be ſupported by hiſtory, but which he propoſes with ſome diffidence. There are ſtrong ſymptoms of arbitrary power in ſome former reigns, even after ſigning of the charters. The power of the crown in that age depended leſs on the conſtitution than on the capacity and vigour of the prince who wore it.

coveted,

coveted, and in compariſon of which even reputation and pleaſure and riches are ſlighted, could ever be regarded as a burthen by any man?

THE property acquired of late by the commons, it is ſaid, entitles them to more power than their anceſtors enjoyed. But to what is this encreaſe of their property owing, but to an encreaſe of their liberty and their ſecurity? Let them therefore acknowledge, that their anceſtors, while the crown was reſtrained by the ſeditious barons, really enjoyed leſs liberty than they themſelves have attained, after the ſovereign acquired the aſcendant: And let them enjoy that liberty with moderation; and not forfeit it by new exorbitant claims, and by rendering it a pretence for endleſs innovations.

THE true rule of government is the preſent eſtabliſhed practice of the age. That has moſt authority, becauſe it is recent: It is alſo better known, for the ſame reaſon. Who has aſſured thoſe tribunes, that the PLANTAGENETS did not exerciſe as high acts of authority as the TUDORS? The hiſtorians, they ſay, do not mention them. But the hiſtorians are alſo ſilent with regard to the chief exertions of prerogative by the TUDORS. Where any power or prerogative is fully and undoubtedly eſtabliſhed, the exerciſe of it paſſes for a thing of courſe, and readily eſcapes the notice of hiſtory and annals. Had we no other monuments of ELIZABETH's reign, than what are preſerved even by CAMDEN, the moſt copious, judicious, and exact of our hiſtorians, we ſhould be entirely ignorant of the moſt important maxims of her government.

Was not the preſent monarchical government, to its full extent, authorized by lawyers, recommended by divines, acknowledged by politicians, acquieſced in, nay paſſionately cheriſhed, by the people in general; and all this during a period of at leaſt a hundred and ſixty years, and till of late, without the leaſt murmur or controverſy? This general conſent ſurely, during ſo long a time, muſt be ſufficient to render a conſtitution legal and valid. If the origin of all power be derived, as is pretended, from the people; here is their conſent in the fulleſt and moſt ample terms that can be deſired or imagined.

BUT the people muſt not pretend, becauſe they can, by their conſent, lay the foundations of government, that therefore they are to be permitted, at their pleaſure, to overthrow and ſubvert them. There is no end of theſe ſeditious and arrogant claims. The power of the crown is now openly ſtruck at: The nobility are alſo in viſible peril: The gentry will ſoon follow: The popular leaders, who will then aſſume the name of gentry, will next be expoſed to danger: And the people themſelves, become incapable of civil government, and lying under the reſtraint of no authority, muſt, for the ſake of peace, admit, inſtead of their legal and mild monarchs, a ſucceſſion of military and deſpotic tyrants.

THESE conſequences are the more to be dreaded, that the preſent fury of the people, tho' gloſſed over by pretenſions to civil liberty, is in reality incited by the fanaticiſms of religion; a principle the moſt blind, headſtrong and ungovernable, by which human nature can ever poſſibly be actuated. Popular rage is dreadful from whatever motive derived: But muſt be attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences, when it ariſes from a principle, which diſclaims all controul by human law, reaſon, or authority.

THESE are the arguments, which each party may make uſe of to juſtify the conduct of their predeceſſors, during that great criſis. The event has ſhown, that the

the reaſonings of the popular party were better founded; but perhaps, according to the eſtabliſhed maxims of lawyers and politicians, the views of the royaliſts ought, beforehand, to have appeared more ſolid, more ſafe, and more legal. But this is certain, that the greater moderation we now employ in repreſenting paſt events; the nearer we ſhall be to produce a full coalition of the parties, and an entire acquieſcence in our preſent happy eſtabliſhment. Moderation is of advantage to every eſtabliſhment: Nothing but zeal can overturn a ſettled power: And an over-active zeal in friends is apt to beget a like ſpirit in antagoniſts. The tranſition from a moderate oppoſition againſt an eſtabliſhment, to an entire acquieſcence in it is eaſy and inſenſible.

THERE are many invincible arguments, which ſhould induce the malecontent party to acquieſce entirely in the preſent ſettlement of the conſtitution. They now find, that the ſpirit of civil liberty, tho' at firſt connected with religious fanaticiſm, could purge itſelf from that pollution, and appear under a more genuine and engaging aſpect; a friend to toleration, and an encourager of all the enlarged and generous ſentiments, that do honour to human nature. They may obſerve, that the popular claims could ſtop at a proper period; and after retrenching the exorbitant prerogatives of the crown, could ſtill maintain a due reſpect to monarchy, to nobility, and to all antient inſtitutions. Above all, they muſt be ſenſible, that the very principle, which made the ſtrength of their party, and from which it derived its chief authority, has now deſerted them, and gone over to their antagoniſts. The plan of liberty is ſettled; its happy effects are proved by experience; a long tract of time has given it ſtability; and whoever would attempt to overturn it, and to recall the paſt government or abdicated family, would, beſides other more criminal imputations, be expoſed in their turn to the reproach of faction and innovation. While they peruſe the hiſtory of paſt events, they ought to reflect, both that theſe rights of the crown are long ſince annihilated, and that the tyranny, and violence, and oppreſſion, to which they often gave riſe, are ills, from which the eſtabliſhed liberty of the conſtitution has now at laſt happily protected the people. Theſe reflections will prove a better ſecurity to our freedom and privileges, than to deny, contrary to the cleareſt evidence of facts, that ſuch regal powers ever had any exiſtence. There is not a more effectual method of betraying a cauſe, than to lay the ſtreſs of the argument on a wrong place, and by diſputing an untenable poſt, enure the adverſaries to ſucceſs and victory.

ESSAY

ESSAY V.

OF THE BALANCE OF TRADE.

'TIS very uſual, in nations ignorant of the nature of commerce, to prohibit the exportation of commodities, and to preſerve among themſelves whatever they think valuable and uſeful. They conſider not, that, in this prohibition, they act directly contrary to their intention; and that the more is exported of any commodity, the more will be raiſed at home, of which they themſelves will always have the firſt offer.

'TIS well known to the learned, that the antient laws of ATHENS rendered the exportation of figs criminal; that being ſuppoſed a ſpecies of fruit ſo excellent in ATTICA, that the ATHENIANS eſteemed it too delicious for the palate of any foreigner. And in this ridiculous prohibition they were ſo much in earneſt, that informers were thence called *ſycophants* among them, from two GREEK words, which ſignify *figs* and *diſcoverer* *. I have been told, that many old acts of parliament ſhow the ſame ignorance in the nature of commerce. And to this day, in a neighboring kingdom, the exportation of corn is almoſt always prohibited; in order, as they ſay, to prevent famines; tho' 'tis evident, that nothing contributes more to the frequent famines which ſo much diſtreſs that fertile country.

THE ſame jealous fear, with regard to money, has alſo prevailed among ſeveral nations; and it required both reaſon and experience to convince any people, that theſe prohibitions ſerve to no other purpoſe than to raiſe the exchange againſt them, and produce a ſtill greater exportation.

THESE errors, one may ſay, are groſs and palpable: But there ſtill prevails, even in nations well acquainted with commerce, a ſtrong jealouſy with regard to the balance of trade, and a fear, that all their gold and ſilver may be leaving them. This ſeems to me, almoſt in every caſe, a very groundleſs apprehenſion; and I ſhould as ſoon dread, that all our ſprings and rivers would be exhauſted, as that money ſhould abandon a kingdom where there are people and induſtry. Let us carefully preſerve theſe latter advantages; and we need never be apprehenſive of loſing the former.

'TIS eaſy to obſerve, that all calculations concerning the balance of trade are founded on very uncertain facts and ſuppoſitions. The cuſtomhouſe-books are owned to be an inſufficient ground of reaſoning; nor is the rate of exchange much better; unleſs we conſider it with all nations, and know alſo the proportions of the ſeveral ſums remitted; which one may ſafely pronounce impoſſible. Every man who has ever reaſoned on this ſubject, has always proved his theory, whatever it was, by facts and calculations, and by an enumeration of all the commodities ſent to all foreign kingdoms.

THE writings of Mr. GEE ſtruck the nation with an univerſal panic, when they ſaw it plainly demonſtrated, by a detail of particulars, that the balance was againſt them for ſo conſiderable a ſum as muſt leave them without a ſingle ſhilling in

* PLUT. *De curioſitate.*

five or ſix years. But, luckily, twenty years have ſince elapſed, with an expenſive foreign war; and yet it is commonly ſuppoſed, that money is ſtill more plentiful among us than in any former period.

NOTHING can be more entertaining on this head than Dr. SWIFT; an author ſo quick in diſcerning the miſtakes or abſurdities of others. He ſays, in his *ſhort view of the ſtate of* IRELAND, that the whole caſh of that kingdom amounted but to 500,000 *l.*; that out of this they remitted every year a neat million to ENGLAND, and had ſcarce any other ſource from which they could compenſate themſelves, and little other foreign trade but the importation of FRENCH wines, for which they paid ready money. The conſequence of this ſituation, which muſt be owned diſadvantageous, was, that, in a courſe of three years, the current money of IRELAND, from 500,000 *l.* was reduced to leſs than two. And at preſent, I ſuppoſe, in a courſe of near 30 years, it is abſolutely nothing. Yet I know not how, that opinion of the advance of riches in IRELAND, which gave the Doctor ſo much indignation, ſeems ſtill to continue, and gain ground with every body.

IN ſhort, this apprehenſion of the wrong balance of trade, appears of ſuch a nature, that it diſcovers itſelf, where-ever one is out of humor with the miniſtry, or is in low ſpirits; and as it can never be refuted by a particular detail of all the exports, which counterbalance the imports, it may here be proper to form a general argument, which may prove the impoſſibility of that event, as long as we preſerve our people and our induſtry.

SUPPOSE four fifths of all the money in BRITAIN to be annihilated in one night, and the nation reduced to the ſame condition, with regard to ſpecie, as in the reigns of the HARRYS and EDWARDS, what would be the conſequence? Muſt not the price of all labor and commodities ſink in proportion, and every thing be ſold as cheap as they were in thoſe ages? What nation could then diſpute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or to ſell manufactures at the ſame price, which to us would afford ſufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, muſt this bring back the money which we had loſt, and raiſe us to the level of all the neighboring nations? Where, after we have arrived, we immediately loſe the advantage of the cheapneſs of labor and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is ſtopped by our fulneſs and repletion.

AGAIN, ſuppoſe, that all the money in BRITAIN were multiplied fivefold in a night, muſt not the contrary effect follow? Muſt not all labor and commodities riſe to ſuch an exorbitant height, that no neighboring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became ſo cheap in compariſon, that, in ſpite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and loſe that great ſuperiority of riches, which had laid us under ſuch diſadvantages?

NOW, 'tis evident, that the ſame cauſes which would correct theſe exorbitant inequalities, were they to happen miraculouſly, muſt prevent their happening in the common courſe of nature, and muſt for ever in all neighboring nations, preſerve money nearly proportionable to the art and induſtry of each nation. All water, where-ever it communicates, remains always at a level. Aſk naturaliſts the reaſon; they tell you, that were it to be raiſed in any one place, the ſuperior gravity of that part, not being balanced, muſt depreſs it, till it meets a counterpoiſe; and

and that the ſame cauſe which redreſſes the inequality, when it happens, muſt for ever prevent it, without ſome violent external operation *.

CAN one imagine, that it had ever been poſſible, by any laws, or even by any art or induſtry, to have kept all the money in SPAIN, which the galleons have brought from the INDIES? or that all commodities could be ſold in FRANCE for a tenth of the price which they would yield on the other ſide of the PYRENEES, without finding their way thither, and draining from that immenſe treaſure? What other reaſon, indeed, is there, why all nations, at preſent, gain in their trade with SPAIN and PORTUGAL; but becauſe it is impoſſible to heap up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level? The ſovereigns of theſe countries have ſhown, that they wanted not inclination to keep their gold and ſilver to themſelves, had it been in any degree practicable.

BUT as any body of water may be raiſed above the level of the ſurrounding element, if the former has no communication with the latter; ſo in money, if the communication be cut off, by any material or phyſical impediment, (for all laws alone are ineffectual) there may, in ſuch a caſe, be a very great inequality of money. Thus the immenſe diſtance of CHINA, together with the monopolies of our INDIA companies, obſtructing the communication, preſerve in EUROPE the gold and ſilver, eſpecially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom. But, notwithſtanding this great obſtruction, the force of the cauſes above-mentioned is ſtill evident. The ſkill and ingenuity of EUROPE in general much ſurpaſſes that of CHINA, with regard to manual arts and manufactures; yet are we never able to trade thither without great diſadvantage. And were it not for the continual recruits which we receive from AMERICA, money would very ſoon ſink in EUROPE, and riſe in CHINA, till it came nearly to a level in both places. Nor can any reaſonable man doubt, but that induſtrious nation, were they as near us as POLAND or BARBARY, would drain us of the overplus of our ſpecie, and draw to themſelves a larger ſhare of the WEST-INDIAN treaſures. We need have no recourſe to a phyſical attraction, to explain the neceſſity of this operation. There is a moral attraction, ariſing from the intereſts and paſſions of men, which is full as potent and infallible.

How is the balance kept in the provinces of every kingdom among themſelves, but by the force of this principle, which makes it impoſſible for money to loſe its level, and either to riſe or ſink beyond the proportion of the labor and commodities which is in each province? Did not long experience make people eaſy on this head, what a fund of gloomy reflections might calculations afford a melancholy YORKSHIREMAN, while he computed and magnified the ſums drawn to LONDON by taxes, abſentees, commodities, and found on compariſon the oppoſite articles ſo much inferior? And no doubt, had the *Heptarchy* ſubſiſted in ENGLAND, the legiſlature of each ſtate had been continually alarmed by the fear of a wrong balance; and as 'tis probable that the mutual hatred of theſe ſtates would have been extremely violent on account of their cloſe neighborhood, they would

* There is another cauſe, tho' more limited in its operation, which checks the wrong balance of trade, to every particular nation to which the kingdom trades. When we import more goods than we export, the exchange turns againſt us, and this becomes a new encouragement to export; as much as the charge of carriage and inſurance of the money which becomes due would amount to. For the exchange can never riſe higher than that ſum.

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have loaded and oppreſſed all commerce, by a jealous and ſuperfluous caution. Since the union has removed the barriers between SCOTLAND and ENGLAND, which of theſe nations gains from the other by this free commerce? Or if the former kingdom has received any increaſe of riches, can it be reaſonably accounted for by any thing but the increaſe of its art and induſtry? It was a common apprehenſion in ENGLAND, before the union, as we learn from L'ABBE DU BOS *, that SCOTLAND would ſoon drain them of their treaſure, were an open trade allowed; and on the other ſide the TWEED a contrary apprehenſion prevailed: With what juſtice in both, time has ſhown.

WHAT happens in ſmall portions of mankind, muſt take place in greater. The provinces of the ROMAN empire, no doubt, kept their balance with each other, and with ITALY, independent of the legiſlature; as much as the ſeveral counties of BRITAIN, or the ſeveral pariſhes of each county. And any man who travels over EUROPE at this day, may ſee by the prices of commodities, that money, in ſpite of the abſurd jealouſy of princes and ſtates, has brought itſelf nearly to a level; and that the difference between one kingdom and another is not greater in this reſpect, than it is often between different provinces of the ſame kingdom. Men naturally flock to capital cities, ſea-ports, and navigable rivers. There we find more men, more induſtry, more commodities, and conſequently more money; but ſtill the latter difference holds proportion with the former, and the level is preſerved †.

OUR jealouſy, and our hatred of FRANCE, are without bounds; and the former ſentiment, at leaſt, muſt be acknowleged very reaſonable and well-grounded. Theſe paſſions have occaſioned innumerable barriers and obſtructions upon commerce, where we are accuſed of being commonly the aggreſſors. But what have we gained by the bargain? We loſt the FRENCH market for our woollen manufactures, and transferred the commerce of wine to SPAIN and PORTUGAL, where we buy much worſe liquor at a higher price. There are few ENGLISHMEN who would not think their country abſolutely ruined, were FRENCH wines ſold in ENGLAND ſo cheap and in ſuch abundance as to ſupplant, in ſome meaſure, all ale and home-brewed liquors: But would we lay aſide prejudice, it would not be difficult to prove, that nothing could be more innocent, perhaps advantageous. Each new acre of vineyard planted in FRANCE, in order to ſupply ENGLAND with wine, would make it requiſite for the FRENCH to take the product of an ENGLISH acre, ſown in wheat or barley, in order to ſubſiſt themſelves; and 'tis evident, that we have thereby got command of the better commodity.

THERE are many edicts of the FRENCH King, prohibiting the planting of new vineyards, and ordering all thoſe lately planted to be grubbed up: So ſenſible

* *Les intere'ts d'*ANGLETERRE *mal-entendus.*

† It muſt carefully be remarked, that, thro'out this diſcourſe, where-ever I ſpeak of the level of money, I mean always its proportional level to the commodities, labor, induſtry, and ſkill, which is in the ſeveral ſtates. And I aſſert, that where theſe advantages are double, triple, quadruple, to what they are in the neighboring ſtates, the money infallibly will alſo be double, triple, quadruple. The only circumſtance that can obſtruct the exactneſs of theſe proportions, is the expence of tranſporting the commodities from one place to another; and this expence is ſometimes unequal. Thus the corn, cattle, cheeſe, butter, of DERBYSHIRE, cannot draw the money of LONDON, ſo much as the manufactures of LONDON draw the money of DERBYSHIRE. But this objection is only a ſeeming one: For ſo far as the tranſport of commodities is expenſive, ſo far is the communication betwixt the place obſtructed and imperfect.

are they in that country, of the ſuperior value of corn, above every other product.

MARESCHAL VAUBAN complains often, and with reaſon, of the abſurd duties which load the entry of thoſe wines of LANGUEDOC, GUIENNE, and other ſouthern provinces, that are imported into BRITANY and NORMANDY. He entertained no doubt, but theſe latter provinces could preſerve their balance, notwithſtanding the open commerce which he recommends. And 'tis evident, that a few leagues more navigation to ENGLAND would make no difference; or if it did, that it muſt operate alike on the commodities of both kingdoms.

THERE is indeed one expedient by which it is poſſible to ſink, and another by which we may raiſe, money beyond its natural level in any kingdom; but theſe caſes, when examined, will be found to reſolve into our general theory, and to bring additional authority to it.

I SCARCE know any method of ſinking money below its level, but thoſe inſtitutions of banks, funds, and paper-credit, with which we are in this kingdom ſo much infatuated. Theſe render paper equivalent to money, circulate it thro' the whole ſtate, make it ſupply the place of gold and ſilver, raiſe proportionably the price of labor and commodities, and by that means either baniſh a great part of thoſe precious metals, or prevent their farther increaſe. What can be more ſhort-ſighted than our reaſonings on this head? We fancy, becauſe an individual would be much richer, were his ſtock of money doubled, that the ſame good effect would follow were the money of every one increaſed; not conſidering, that this would raiſe as much the price of every commodity, and reduce every man, in time, to the ſame condition as before. 'Tis only in our public negotiations and tranſactions with foreigners, that a greater ſtock of money is advantageous; and as our paper is there abſolutely inſignificant, we feel, by its means, all the ill effects ariſing from a great abundance of money, without reaping any of the advantages *.

SUPPOSE that there are 12 millions of paper, which circulate in the kingdom as money, (for we are not to imagine, that all our enormous funds are employed in that ſhape), and ſuppoſe the real caſh of the kingdom to be 18 millions: Here is a ſtate which is found by experience able to hold a ſtock of 30 millions. I ſay, if it be able to hold it, it muſt of neceſſity have acquired it in gold and ſilver, had we not obſtructed the entrance of theſe metals by this new invention of paper. *Whence would it have acquired that ſum?* From all the kingdoms of the world. *But why?* Becauſe, if you remove theſe 12 millions, money in this ſtate is below its level, compared with our neighbors; and we muſt immediately draw from all of them, till we be full and ſaturate, ſo to ſpeak, and can hold no more. By our wiſe politics, we are as careful to ſtuff the nation with this fine commodity of bank bills and chequer-notes, as if we were afraid of being overburthened with the precious metals.

* We obſerved in Eſſay III. that money, when increaſing, gives encouragement to induſtry, during the interval betwixt the increaſe of money and riſe of the prices. A good effect of this nature may follow too from paper credit; but 'tis dangerous to precipitate matters, at the riſk of loſing all by the failing of that credit, as muſt happen upon any violent ſhock in public affairs.

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'Tis not to be doubted, but the great plenty of bullion in FRANCE is, in a great meaſure, owing to the want of paper-credit. The FRENCH have no banks: Merchants bills do not there circulate as with us: Uſury or lending on intereſt is not directly permitted; ſo that many have large ſums in their coffers: Great quantities of plate are uſed in private houſes; and all the churches are full of it. By this means, proviſions and labor ſtill remain much cheaper among them, than in nations that are not half ſo rich in gold and ſilver. The advantage of this ſituation in point of trade, as well as in great public emergencies, is too evident to be diſputed.

THE ſame faſhion a few years ago prevailed in GENOA, which ſtill has place in ENGLAND and HOLLAND, of uſing ſervices of CHINA ware inſtead of plate; but the ſenate, wiſely foreſeeing the conſequences, prohibited the uſe of that brittle commodity beyond a certain extent; while the uſe of ſilver plate was left unlimited. And I ſuppoſe, in their late diſtreſſes, they felt the good effect of this ordinance. Our tax on plate is, perhaps, in this view, ſomewhat impolitic.

BEFORE the introduction of paper-money into our colonies, they had gold and ſilver ſufficient for their circulation. Since the introduction of that commodity, the leaſt of the inconveniencies that has followed is the total baniſhment of the precious metals. And after the abolition of paper, can it be doubted but money will return, while theſe colonies poſſeſs manufactures and commodities, the only thing valuable in commerce, and for whoſe ſake alone all men deſire money?

WHAT pity LYCURGUS did not think of paper-credit, when he wanted to baniſh gold and ſilver from SPARTA! It would have ſerved his purpoſe better than the lumps of iron he made uſe of as money; and would alſo have prevented more effectually all commerce with ſtrangers, as being of ſo much leſs real and intrinſic value.

BUT as our darling projects of paper-credit are pernicious, being almoſt the only expedient by which we can ſink money below its level; ſo, in my opinion, the only expedient by which we can raiſe money above its level, is a practice which we would all exclaim againſt as deſtructive, *viz.* the gathering large ſums into a public treaſure, locking them up, and abſolutely preventing their circulation. The fluid, not communicating with the neighboring element, may, by ſuch an artifice, be raiſed to what height we pleaſe. To prove this, we need only return to our firſt ſuppoſition, of the annihilating the half or any part of our caſh; where we found, that the immediate conſequence of ſuch an event would be, the attraction of an equal ſum from all the neighboring kingdoms. Nor does there ſeem to be any neceſſary bounds ſet, by the nature of things, to this practice of hoarding. A ſmall city, like GENEVA, continuing this policy for ages, might ingroſs nine tenths of the money of EUROPE. There ſeems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invincible obſtacle to that immenſe growth of riches. A weak ſtate, with an enormous treaſure, would ſoon become a prey to ſome of its poorer, but more powerful neighbors. A great ſtate would diſſipate its wealth on dangerous and ill-concerted projects; and probably deſtroy, with it, what is much more valuable, the induſtry, morals, and numbers of its people. The fluid, in this caſe, raiſed to too great a height, burſts and deſtroys the veſſel that con-

at ſhould naturally circulate in ſuch a petty ſtate; and yet [illegible]
o the PAIS DE VAUX, or any part of that canton, obſerves any want of
ore than could be ſuppoſed in a country of that extent, ſoil, and ſituation.
n the contrary, there are ſcarce any inland provinces in the continent of FRANCE
r GERMANY, where the inhabitants are at this time ſo opulent, tho' that can-
ton has vaſtly increaſed its treaſure ſince 1714, the time when STANYAN wrote
his judicious account of SWITZERLAND *.

THE account given by APPIAN † of the treaſure of the PTOLOMIES, is ſo pro-
digious, that one cannot admit of it; and ſo much the leſs, that the hiſtorian
ſays, the other ſucceſſors of ALEXANDER were alſo frugal, and had many of them
treaſures not much inferior. For this ſaving humor of the neighboring princes
muſt neceſſarily have checked the frugality of the ÆGYPTIAN monarchs, accord-
ing to the foregoing theory. The ſum he mentions is 740,000 talents, or
191,166,666 pounds 13 ſhillings and 4 pence, according to Dr. ARBUTHNOT's
computation. And yet APPIAN ſays, that he extracted his account from the
public records; and he was himſelf a native of ALEXANDRIA.

FROM theſe principles we may learn what judgment we ought to form of thoſe
numberleſs bars, obſtructions, and impoſts, which all nations of EUROPE, and
none more than ENGLAND, have put upon trade; from an exorbitant deſire of
amaſſing money, which never will heap up beyond its level, while it circulates;
or from an ill-grounded apprehenſion of loſing their ſpecie, which never will ſink
below it. Could any thing ſcatter our riches, it would be ſuch impolitic contriv-
ances. But this general ill effect, however, reſults from them, that they deprive
neighboring nations of that free communication and exchange, which the author
of the world has intended, by giving them ſoils, climates, and geniuſes, ſo dif-
ferent from each other.

OUR modern politics embrace the only method of baniſhing money, the uſing
paper-credit; they reject the only method of amaſſing it, the practice of hoarding;
and they adopt a hundred contrivances, which ſerve to no purpoſe but to check
induſtry, and rob ourſelves and our neighbors of the common benefits of art and
nature.

ALL taxes, however, upon foreign commodities, are not to be regarded as
prejudicial or uſeleſs, but thoſe only which are founded on the jealouſy above-
mentioned. A tax on GERMAN linen encourages home manufactures, and there-
by multiplies our people and induſtry. A tax on brandy increaſes the ſale of rum,
and ſupports our ſouthern colonies. And as 'tis neceſſary impoſts ſhould be le-
vied, for the ſupport of government, it may be thought more convenient to
lay them on foreign commodities, which can eaſily be intercepted at the port,
and ſubjected to the impoſt. We ought, however, always to remember the maxim
of Dr. SWIFT, That, in the arithmetic of the cuſtoms, two and two make not
four, but often make only one. It can ſcarcely be doubted, but if the duties on
wine were lowered to a third, they would yield much more to the government
than at preſent: Our people might thereby afford to drink commonly a better and

* The poverty which STANYAN ſpeaks of, is only to be ſeen in the moſt mountainous cantons, where there is no commodity to bring money: And even there the people are not poorer than in the dioceſs of SALTZBURG on the one hand, or SAVOY on the other.

† *Proem.*

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ſhould be ſuppoſed altogether a romance, this ſentiment, aſcribed by the author to the Eaſtern princes, is at leaſt a proof of the prevailing notions of antient times.

In the whole politics of GREECE, the anxiety with regard to the balance of power, is moſt apparent, and is expreſsly pointed out to us, even by the antient hiſtorians. THUCYDIDES * repreſents the league which was formed againſt ATHENS, and which produced the PELOPONNESIAN war, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of ATHENS, when the THEBANS and LACEDEMONIANS diſputed for ſovereignty, we find, that the ATHENIANS (as well as many other republics) threw themſelves always into the lighter ſcale, and endeavored to preſerve the balance. They ſupported THEBES againſt SPARTA, till the great victory gained by EPAMINONDAS at LEUCTRA; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generoſity, as they pretended, but, in reality, from their jealouſy of the conquerors †.

WHOEVER will read DEMOSTHENES's oration for the MEGALOPOLITANS, may ſee the utmoſt refinements on this principle, which ever entered into the head of a VENETIAN or ENGLISH ſpeculatiſt. And upon the firſt riſe of the MACEDONIAN power, this orator immediately diſcovered the danger, ſounded the alarm thro' all GREECE, and at laſt aſſembled that confederacy under the banners of ATHENS, which fought the great and deciſive battle of CHAERONEA.

'TIS true, the GRECIAN wars are regarded by hiſtorians as wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each ſtate ſeems to have had more in view the honor of leading the reſt, than any well-grounded hopes of authority and dominion. If we conſider, indeed, the ſmall number of inhabitants in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming ſieges in thoſe times, and the extraordinary bravery and diſcipline of every freeman among that noble people; we ſhall conclude, that the balance of power was of itſelf ſufficiently ſecured in GREECE, and needed not to be guarded with that caution which may be requiſite in other ages. But whether we aſcribe the ſhifting ſides in all the GRECIAN republics to *jealous emulation* or *cautious politics*, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was ſure to meet with a confederacy againſt it, and that often compoſed of its former friends and allies.

THE ſame principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the *Oſtraciſm* of ATHENS and *Petaliſm* of SYRACUSE, and expelled every citizen whoſe fame or power overtopped the reſt; the ſame principle, I ſay, naturally diſcovered itſelf in foreign politics, and ſoon raiſed enemies to the leading ſtate, however moderate in the exerciſe of its authority.

THE PERSIAN monarch was really, in his force, a petty prince, compared to the GRECIAN republics; and therefore it behoved him, from views of ſafety more than from emulation, to intereſt himſelf in their quarrels, and to ſupport the weaker ſide in every conteſt. This was the advice given by ALCIBIADES to TISSAPHERNES ‡, and it prolonged near a century the date of the PERSIAN empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the firſt appearance of the aſpiring genius of PHILIP, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with a rapidity of which there are few inſtances in the hiſtory of mankind.

* Lib. 1. † XENOPH. Hiſt. GRAEC. lib. 6 & 7. ‡ THUCYD. lib. 8.

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conqueſts of their ally. A ſimple treaty and agreement betwixt MASSINISSA and the CARTHAGINIANS, ſo much required by mutual intereſt, barred the ROMANS from all entrance into AFRICA, and preſerved liberty to mankind.

THE only prince we meet with in the ROMAN hiſtory, who ſeems to have underſtood the balance of power, is HIERO king of SYRACUSE. Tho' the ally of ROME, he ſent aſſiſtance to the CARTHAGINIANS, during the war of the auxiliaries: "Eſteeming it requiſite," ſays POLYBIUS *, "both in order to retain his "dominions in SICILY, and to preſerve the ROMAN friendſhip, that CARTHAGE "ſhould be ſafe; leſt by its fall the remaining power ſhould be able, without "contraſt or oppoſition, to execute every purpoſe and undertaking. And here he "acted with great wiſdom and prudence. For that is never, on any account, to "be overlooked; nor ought ſuch a force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to "incapacitate the neighboring ſtates from defending their rights againſt it." Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in expreſs terms.

IN ſhort, the maxim of preſerving the balance of power is founded ſo much on common ſenſe and obvious reaſoning, that 'tis impoſſible it could altogether have eſcaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, ſo many marks of deep penetration and diſcernment. If it was not ſo generally known and acknowleged as at preſent, it had, at leaſt, an influence on all the wiſer and more experienced princes and politicians. And indeed, even at preſent, however generally known and acknowleged among ſpeculative reaſoners, it has not, in practice, an authority much more extenſive among thoſe who govern the world.

AFTER the fall of the ROMAN empire, the form of government eſtabliſhed by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great meaſure, from farther conqueſts, and long maintained each ſtate in its proper boundaries. But when vaſſalage and the feudal militia were aboliſhed, mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of univerſal monarchy, from the union of ſo many kingdoms and principalities in the perſon of the emperor CHARLES. But the power of the houſe of AUSTRIA, founded on extenſive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from mines of gold and ſilver, were more likely to decay, of themſelves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raiſed againſt them. In leſs than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was ſhattered, their opulence diſſipated, their ſplendor eclipſed. A new power ſucceeded, more formidable to the liberties of EUROPE, poſſeſſing all the advantages of the former, and laboring under none of its defects; except a ſhare of that ſpirit of bigotry and perſecution, with which the houſe of AUSTRIA were ſo long, and ſtill are ſo much infatuated.

EUROPE has now, for above a century, remained on the defenſive againſt the greateſt force that ever, perhaps, was formed by the civil or political combination of mankind. And ſuch is the influence of the maxim here treated of, that tho' that ambitious nation, in the five laſt general wars, have been victorious in four †, and unſucceſsful only in one ‡, they have not much enlarged their dominions, nor acquired a total aſcendant over EUROPE. There remains rather room

* Lib. 1. Cap. 83.

† Thoſe concluded by the peace of the PYRENEES, NIMEGUEN, RYSWICK, and AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

‡ That concluded by the peace of UTRECHT.

ever took party on either ſide, except by their flatteries and complaiſance to the victor.

ENORMOUS monarchies, ſuch as EUROPE at preſent is threatened with, are, probably, deſtructive to human nature; in their progreſs, in their continuance *, and even in their downfal, which never can be very diſtant from their eſtabliſhment. The military genius which aggrandized the monarchy, ſoon leaves the court, the capital, and the center of ſuch a government; while the wars are carried on at a great diſtance, and intereſt ſo ſmall a part of the ſtate. The antient nobility, whoſe affections attach them to their ſovereign, live all at court; and never will accept of military employments, which would carry them to remote and barbarous frontiers, where they are diſtant both from their pleaſure and their fortune. The arms of the ſtate muſt, therefore, be truſted to mercenary ſtrangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour; ready on every occaſion to turn them againſt the prince, and join each deſperate malecontent, who offers pay and plunder. This is the neceſſary progreſs of human affairs: Thus human nature checks itſelf in its airy elevations: Thus ambition blindly labors for the deſtruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear to him. The BOURBONS, truſting to the ſupport of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would puſh their advantage, without reſerve or limitation. Theſe, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues and dangers of war; but never would ſubmit to languiſh in the garriſons of HUNGARY or LITHUANIA, forgot at court, and ſacrificed to the intrigues of every minion or miſtreſs, who approaches the prince. The troops are filled with CRAVATES and TARTARS, HUSSARS and COSSACS; intermingled, perhaps, with a few ſoldiers of fortune from the better provinces: And the melancholy fate of the ROMAN emperors, from the ſame cauſe, is renewed over and over again, till the final diſſolution of the monarchy.

ESSAY VII.

OF TAXES.

THERE is a maxim, that prevails among thoſe whom in this country we call *ways and means men*, and who are denominated *Financiers* and *Maltotiers* in FRANCE, *That every new tax creates a new ability in the ſubject to bear it, and that each increaſe of public burthens increaſes proportionably the induſtry of the people.* This maxim is of ſuch a nature as is moſt likely to be extremely abuſed; and is ſo much the more dangerous, that its truth cannot be altogether denied; but it muſt be owned, when kept within certain bounds, to have ſome foundation in reaſon and experience.

* If the ROMAN empire was of advantage, it could only proceed from this, that mankind were generally in a very diſorderly, uncivilized condition, before its eſtabliſhment.

WHEN

When a tax is laid upon commodities, which are conſumed by the common people, the neceſſary conſequence may ſeem to be, that either the poor muſt retrench ſomething from their way of living, or raiſe their wages, ſo as to make the burthen of the tax fall entirely upon the rich. But there is a third conſequence, which very often follows upon taxes, *viz.* that the poor increaſe their induſtry, perform more work, and live as well as before, without demanding more for their labor. Where taxes are moderate, are laid on gradually, and affect not the neceſſaries of life, this conſequence naturally follows; and 'tis certain that ſuch difficulties often ſerve to excite the induſtry of a people, and render them more opulent and laborious, than others, who enjoy the greateſt advantages. For we may obſerve, as a parallel inſtance, that the moſt commercial nations have not always poſſeſſed the greateſt extent of fertile land; but, on the contrary, that they have labored under many natural diſadvantages. Tyre, Athens, Carthage, Rhodes, Genoa, Venice, Holland, are ſtrong examples to this purpoſe. And in all hiſtory, we find only three inſtances of large and fertile countries, which have poſſeſſed much trade; the Netherlands, England, and France. The two former ſeem to have been allured by the advantages of their maritime ſituation, and the neceſſity they lay under of frequenting foreign ports, in order to procure what their own climate refuſed them. And as to France, trade has come very late into that kingdom, and ſeems to have been the effect of reflection and obſervation in an ingenious and enterpriſing people, who remarked the immenſe riches acquired by ſuch of the neighboring nations as cultivated navigation and commerce.

The places mentioned by Cicero*, as poſſeſſed of the greateſt commerce in his time, are Alexandria, Colchos, Tyre, Sidon, Andros, Cyprus, Pamphilia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Lesbos, Smyrna, Miletum, Coos. All theſe, except Alexandria, were either ſmall iſlands or narrow territories. And that city owed its trade entirely to the happineſs of its ſituation.

Since therefore ſome natural neceſſities or diſadvantages may be thought favorable to induſtry, why may not artificial burthens have the ſame effect? Sir William Temple†, we may obſerve, aſcribes the induſtry of the Dutch entirely to neceſſity, proceeding from their natural diſadvantages; and illuſtrates his doctrine by a very ſtriking compariſon with Ireland; "where," ſays he, "by the "largeneſs and plenty of the ſoil, and ſcarcity of people, all things neceſſary to "life are ſo cheap, that an induſtrious man, by two days labor, may gain enough "to feed him the reſt of the week. Which I take to be a very plain ground of "the lazineſs attributed to the people. For men naturally prefer eaſe before labor, "and will not take pains if they can live idle; tho' when, by neceſſity, they "have been inured to it, they cannot leave it, being grown a cuſtom neceſſary to "their health, and to their very entertainment. Nor perhaps is the change "harder, from conſtant eaſe to labor, than from conſtant labor to eaſe." After which the author proceeds to confirm his doctrine, by enumerating, as above, the places where trade has moſt flouriſhed, in antient and modern times; and

* Epiſt. ad Att. Lib 9. Ep. 11. † Account of the Netherlands, Chap. 6.

which are commonly obſerved to be ſuch narrow confined territories, as beget a neceſſity for induſtry.

'Tis always obſerved, in years of ſcarcity, if it be not extreme, that the poor labor more, and really live better, than in years of great plenty, when they indulge themſelves in idleneſs and riot. I have been told, by a conſiderable manufacturer, that in the year 1740, when bread and proviſions of all kinds were very dear, his workmen not only made a ſhift to live, but paid debts, which they had contracted in former years, that were much more favorable and abundant*.

This doctrine, therefore, with regard to taxes, may be admitted in ſome degree: But beware of the abuſe. Exorbitant taxes, like extreme neceſſity, deſtroy induſtry, by producing deſpair; and even before they reach this pitch, they raiſe the wages of the laborer and manufacturer, and heighten the price of all commodities. An attentive, diſintereſted legiſlature will obſerve the point, when the emolument ceaſes, and the prejudice begins: But as the contrary character is much more common, 'tis to be feared, that taxes, all over Europe, are multiplying to ſuch a degree, as will intirely cruſh all art and induſtry; tho', perhaps, their firſt increaſe, together with other circumſtances, might have contributed to the growth of theſe advantages.

The beſt taxes are thoſe which are levied upon conſumptions, eſpecially thoſe of luxury; becauſe ſuch taxes are leſs felt by the people. They ſeem, in ſome meaſure, voluntary; ſince a man may chuſe how far he will uſe the commodity which is taxed: They are paid gradually and inſenſibly: And being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are ſcarcely perceived by the conſumers. Their only diſadvantage is, that they are expenſive in the levying.

Taxes upon poſſeſſions are levied without expence; but have every other diſadvantage. Moſt ſtates, however, are obliged to have recourſe to them, in order to ſupply the deficiencies of the other.

But the moſt pernicious of all taxes are thoſe which are arbitrary. They are commonly converted, by their management, into puniſhments on induſtry; and alſo, by their unavoidable inequality, are more grievous than by the real burthen which they impoſe. 'Tis ſurpri[illegible]g, therefore, to ſee them have place among any civilized people.

In general, all poll-taxes, even when not arbitrary, which they commonly are, may be eſteemed dangerous: Becauſe it is ſo eaſy for the ſovereign to add a little more, and a little more, to the ſum demanded, that theſe taxes are apt to become altogether oppreſſive and intolerable. On the other hand, a duty upon commodities checks itſelf; and a prince will ſoon find, that an increaſe of the impoſt is no increaſe of his revenue. It is not eaſy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruined by ſuch taxes.

Hiſtorians inform us, that one of the chief cauſes of the deſtruction of the Roman ſtate, was the alteration which Constantine introduced into the finances, by ſubſtituting an univerſal poll-tax, in lieu of almoſt all the tithes, cuſtoms, and exciſes, which formerly compoſed the revenue of the *empire*. The people, in all the provinces, were ſo grinded and oppreſſed by the *publicans*, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians; whoſe dominion, as

* To this purpoſe ſee alſo Eſſay I. at the end.

they

they had fewer neceſſities and leſs art, was found preferable to the refined tyranny of the ROMANS.

THERE is a prevailing opinion, that all taxes, however levied, fall upon the land at laſt. Such an opinion may be uſeful in BRITAIN, by checking the landed gentlemen, in whoſe hands our legiſlature is lodged, and making them preſerve great regard for trade and induſtry. But I muſt confeſs, that this principle, tho' firſt advanced by a celebrated writer, has ſo little appearance of reaſon, that were it not for his authority, it had never been received by any body. Every man, to be ſure, is deſirous of puſhing off from himſelf the burden of any tax, which is impoſed, and laying it upon others: But as every man has the ſame inclination, and is upon the defenſive; no ſet of men can be ſuppoſed to prevail altogether in this conteſt. And why the landed gentleman ſhould be the victim of the whole, and ſhould not be able to defend himſelf, as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradeſmen, indeed, would willingly prey upon him, and divide him among them, if they could: But this inclination they always have, tho' no taxes were levied; and the ſame methods, by which he guards againſt the impoſition of tradeſmen before taxes, will ſerve him afterwards, and make them ſhare the burthen with him.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that we have, with regard to taxes, an inſtance of what frequently happens in political inſtitutions, that the conſequences of things are diametrically oppoſite to what we ſhould expect on the firſt appearance. 'Tis regarded as a fundamental maxim of the TURKISH government, That the *Grand Signior*, tho' abſolute maſter of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impoſe a new tax; and every OTTOMAN prince, who has made ſuch an attempt, either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perſeverance. One would imagine, that this prejudice or eſtabliſhed opinion were the firmeſt barrier in the world againſt oppreſſion; yet 'tis certain, that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of increaſing his revenue, muſt allow all the baſhaws and governors to oppreſs and abuſe the ſubjects: And theſe he ſqueezes after their return from their government. Whereas, if he could impoſe a new tax, like our EUROPEAN princes, his intereſt would ſo far be united with that of his people, that he would immediately feel the bad effects of theſe diſorderly levies of money, and would find, that a pound raiſed by general impoſition, would have leſs pernicious effects, than a a ſhilling taken in ſo unequal and arbitrary a manner.

ESSAY VIII.

OF PUBLIC CREDIT.

IT appears to have been the common practice of antiquity, to make provision, in time of peace, for the neceſſities of war, and to hoard up treaſures, beforehand, as the inſtruments either of conqueſt or defence; without truſting to extraordinary impoſts, much leſs to borrowing, in times of diſorder and confuſion. Beſides the immenſe ſums above-mentioned *, which were amaſſed by ATHENS, and by the PTOLEMIES, and other ſucceſſors of ALEXANDER; we learn from PLATO †, that the frugal LACEDEMONIANS had alſo collected a great treaſure; and ARIAN ‡ and PLUTARCH ‖ ſpecify the riches which ALEXANDER got poſſeſſion of on the conqueſt of SUSA and ECBATANA, and which were reſerved, ſome of them, from the time of CYRUS. If I remember right, the ſcripture alſo mentions the treaſure of HEZEKIAH and the JEWISH princes; as profane hiſtory does that of PHILIP and PERSEUS kings of MACEDON. The antient republics of GAUL had commonly large ſums in reſerve ⸸. Every one knows the treaſure ſeized in ROME by JULIUS CÆSAR, during the civil wars; and we find afterwards, that the wiſer emperors, AUGUSTUS, TIBERIUS, VESPASIAN, SEVERUS, *&c.* always diſcovered the prudent foreſight, of ſaving great ſums againſt any public exigency.

ON the contrary, our modern expedient, which has become very general, is to mortgage the public revenues, and to truſt, that poſterity, during peace, will pay off the incumbrances contracted during the preceding war: And they having before their eyes, ſo good an example of their wiſe fathers, have the ſame prudent reliance on their poſterity; who, at laſt, from neceſſity, more than choice, are obliged to place the ſame confidence in a new poſterity. But not to waſte time in declaiming againſt a practice which appears ruinous, beyond the evidence of a hundred demonſtrations; it ſeems pretty apparent, that the antient maxims are, in this reſpect, much more prudent than the modern; even tho' the latter had been confined within ſome reaſonable bounds, and had ever, in any inſtance, been attended with ſuch frugality, in time of peace, as to diſcharge the debts incurred by an expenſive war. For why ſhould the caſe be ſo very different betwixt the public and an individual, as to make us eſtabliſh ſuch different maxims of conduct for each? If the funds of the former be greater, its neceſſary expences are proportionably larger; if its reſources be more numerous, they are not infinite; and as its frame ſhould be calculated for a much longer duration, than the date of a ſingle life, or even of a family, it ſhould embrace maxims, large, durable, and generous, ſuitable to the ſuppoſed extent of its exiſtence. To truſt to chances and temporary expedients, is, indeed, what the neceſſity of human affairs frequently

* Eſſay V. † ALCIB. I.

‡ Lib. 3.

‖ PLUT. *in vita* ALEX. He makes theſe treaſures amount to 80,000 talents, or about 15 millions ſterling. QUINTUS CURTIUS (Lib. 5. Cap. 2.) ſays, that ALEXANDER found in SUSA above 50,000 talents.

⸸ STRABO, Lib. 4.

reduces

reduces us to; but whoever voluntarily depend on ſuch reſources, have not neceſſity, but their own folly, to accuſe for their misfortunes, when any ſuch befal them.

If the abuſes of treaſures be dangerous, either by engaging the ſtate in raſh enterpriſes, or making it neglect military diſcipline, in confidence of its riches; the abuſes of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, impotence, and ſubjection to foreign powers.

According to modern policy, war is attended with every deſtructive circumſtance; loſs of men, increaſe of taxes, decay of commerce, diſſipation of money, plunder by ſea and land. According to antient maxims, the opening of the public treaſure, as it produced an uncommon affluence of gold and ſilver, ſerved as a temporary encouragement to induſtry, and atoned, in ſome degree, for the inevitable calamities of war.

What then ſhall we ſay to the new paradox, That public incumbrances are, of themſelves, advantageous, independent of the neceſſity of contracting them; and that any ſtate, even tho' it were not preſſed by a foreign enemy, could not poſſibly have embraced a wiſer expedient for promoting commerce and riches, than to create funds, and debts, and taxes, without limitation? Diſcourſes, ſuch as theſe, might naturally have paſſed for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on folly and a fever, on Busiris and Nero, had we not ſeen ſuch abſurd maxims patronized, by great miniſters, and by a whole party among us. And theſe puzzling arguments, (for they deſerve not the name of ſpecious), tho' they could not be the foundation of Lord Orford's conduct, for he had more ſenſe; ſerved at leaſt to keep his partizans in countenance, and perplex the underſtanding of the nation.

Let us examine the conſequences of public debts, both in our domeſtic management, by their influence on commerce and induſtry; and in our foreign tranſactions, by their effect on wars and negotiations.

There is a word, which is here in the mouth of every body, and which, I find, has alſo got abroad, and is much employed by foreign writers *, in imitation of the English; and that is, circulation. This word ſerves as an account of every thing; and tho' I confeſs, that I have ſought for its meaning in the preſent ſubject, ever ſince I was a ſchool-boy, I have never yet been able to diſcover it. What poſſible advantage is there which the nation can reap by the eaſy transference of ſtock from hand to hand? Or is there any parallel to be drawn from the circulation of other commodities, to that of chequer-notes and India bonds? Where a manufacturer has a quick ſale of his goods to the merchant, the merchant to the ſhopkeeper, the ſhopkeeper to his cuſtomers; this enlivens induſtry, and gives new encouragement to the firſt dealer or the manufacturer, and all his tradeſmen, and makes them produce more and better commodities of the ſame ſpecies. A ſtagnation is here pernicious, where-ever it happens; becauſe it operates backwards, and ſtops or benumbs the induſtrious hand in its production of what is uſeful to human life. But what production we owe to Change-alley, or even what conſumption, except that of coffee, and pen, ink, and paper, I have not yet learned; nor can one foreſee the loſs or decay of any one be-

* Melon, Du Tot, Law, in the Pamphlets publiſhed in France.

neficial

neficial commerce or commodity, tho' that place and all its inhabitants were for ever buried in the ocean.

But tho' this term has never been explained by thoſe who inſiſt ſo much on the advantages that reſult from a circulation, there ſeems, however, to be ſome benefit of a ſimilar kind, ariſing from our incumbrances: As indeed, what human evil is there, which is not attended with ſome advantage? This we ſhall endeavor to explain, that we may eſtimate the weight which we ought to allow it.

PUBLIC ſecurities are with us become a kind of money, and paſs as readily at the current price as gold or ſilver. Where-ever any profitable undertaking offers itſelf, however expenſive, there are never wanting hands enough to embrace it; nor need a trader, who has ſums in the public ſtocks, fear to launch out into the moſt extenſive trade; ſince he is poſſeſſed of funds, which will anſwer the moſt ſudden demand that can be made upon him. No merchant thinks it neceſſary to keep by him any conſiderable caſh. Bank-ſtock, or INDIA bonds, eſpecially the latter, ſerve to all the ſame purpoſes; becauſe he can diſpoſe of them or pledge them to a banker, in a quarter of an hour; and at the ſame time they are not idle, even when in his ſcritoire, but bring him in a conſtant revenue. In ſhort, our national debts furniſh merchants with a ſpecies of money, that is continually multiplying in their hands, and produces ſure gain, beſide the profits of their commerce. This muſt enable them to trade upon leſs profit. The ſmall profit of the merchant renders the commodity cheaper, cauſes a greater conſumption, quickens the labor of the common people, and helps to ſpread arts and induſtry thro' the whole ſociety.

THERE are alſo, we may obſerve, in ENGLAND, and in all ſtates, which have both commerce and public debts, a ſet of men, who are half-merchants, half-ſtock-holders, and may be ſuppoſed willing to trade for ſmall profits; becauſe commerce is not their principal or ſole ſupport, and their revenues in the funds are a ſure reſource for themſelves and their families. Were there no funds, great merchants would have no expedient for realizing or ſecuring any part of their profit, but by making purchaſes of land; and land has many diſadvantages in compariſon of funds. Requiring more care and inſpection, it divides the time and attention of the merchant; upon any tempting offer or extraordinary accident in trade, it is not ſo eaſily converted into money; and as it attracts too much, both by the many natural pleaſures it affords, and the authority it gives, it ſoon converts the citizen into the country-gentleman. More men, therefore, with large ſtocks and incomes, may naturally be ſuppoſed to continue in trade, where there are public debts: And this, it muſt be owned, is of ſome advantage to commerce, by diminiſhing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging induſtry *.

BUT, in oppoſition to theſe two favorable circumſtances, perhaps of no very great importance, weigh the many diſadvantages which attend our public debts, in the whole *interior* oeconomy of the ſtate: You will find no compariſon between the ill and the good which reſult from them.

* On this head, I ſhall obſerve, without interrupting the thread of the argument, that the multiplicity of our public debts ſerves rather to ſink the intereſt, and that the more the government borrows, the cheaper may they expect to borrow; contrary to firſt appearance, and contrary to common opinion. The profits of trade have an influence on intereſt. See Eſſay IV.

Firſt,

revenue; becauſe the operations of malting and brewing are very tedious, and are impoſſible to be concealed; and at the ſame time, theſe commodities are not ſo abſolutely neceſſary to life, as that the raiſing their price would very much affect the poorer ſort. Theſe taxes being all mortgaged, what difficulty to find new ones! what vexation and ruin of the poor!

DUTIES upon conſumptions are more equal and eaſy than thoſe upon poſſeſſions. What a loſs to the public, that the former are all exhauſted, and that we muſt have recourſe to the more grievous method of levying taxes!

WERE all the proprietors of land only ſtewards to the public, muſt not neceſſity force them to practiſe all the arts of oppreſſion uſed by ſtewards, where the abſence and negligence of the proprietor render them ſecure againſt inquiry?

IT will ſcarce be aſſerted, that no bounds ought ever to be ſet to national debts; and that the public would be no weaker, were 12 or 15 ſhillings in the pound, land-tax, mortgaged, with all the preſent cuſtoms and exciſes. There is ſomething, therefore, in the caſe, beſide the mere transferring of property from one hand to another. In 500 years, the poſterity of thoſe now in the coaches, and of thoſe upon the boxes, will probably have changed places, without affecting the public by theſe revolutions.

I MUST confeſs, that there is a ſtrange ſupineneſs, from long cuſtom, crept into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts, not unlike what divines ſo vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. We all own, that the moſt ſanguine imagination cannot hope, either that this or any future miniſtry will be poſſeſſed of ſuch rigid and ſteady frugality, as to make any conſiderable progreſs in the payment of our debts; or that the ſituation of foreign affairs will, for any long time, allow them leiſure and tranquility ſufficient for ſuch an undertaking*. *What then is to become of us?* Were we ever ſo good Chriſtians, and ever ſo reſigned to Providence; this, methinks, were a curious queſtion, even conſidered as a ſpeculative one, and what it might not be altogether impoſſible to form ſome conjectural ſolution of. The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negotiations, intrigues, and factions. There ſeems to be a natural progreſs of things, which may guide our reaſoning. As it would have required but a moderate ſhare of prudence, when we firſt began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of men and of miniſters, that things would neceſſarily be carried to the length we ſee; ſo now that they have at laſt happily reached it, it may not be difficult to gueſs at the conſequences. It muſt, indeed, be one of theſe two events; either the nation muſt deſtroy public credit, or public credit will deſtroy the nation. 'Tis impoſſible they can both ſubſiſt, after the manner they have been hitherto managed, in this, as well as in ſome other nations.

* In times of peace and ſecurity, when alone it is poſſible to pay debt, the monied intereſt are averſe to receive partial payments, which they know not how to diſpoſe of to advantage: and the landed intereſt are averſe to continue the taxes requiſite for that purpoſe. Why therefore ſhould a miniſter perſevere in a meaſure ſo diſagreeable to all parties? For the ſake, I ſuppoſe, of a poſterity, which he will never ſee, or of a few reaſonable reflecting people, whoſe united intereſt, perhaps, will not be able to ſecure him the ſmalleſt borough in ENGLAND. 'Tis not likely we ſhall ever find any miniſter ſo bad a politician. With regard to theſe narrow deſtructive maxims of politics, all miniſters are expert enough.

THERE

THERE was, indeed, a ſcheme for the payment of our debts, which was propoſed by an excellent citizen, Mr. HUTCHINSON, above 30 years ago, and which was much approved of by ſome men of ſenſe, but never was likely to take effect. He aſſerted, that there was a fallacy in imagining, that the public owed this debt; for that really every individual owed a proportional ſhare of it, and paid, in his taxes, a proportional ſhare of the intereſt, beſide the expences of levying theſe taxes. Had we not better then, ſays he, make a proportional diſtribution of the debt among us, and each of us contribute a ſum ſuitable to his property, and by that means diſcharge at once all our funds and public mortgages? He ſeems not to have conſidered, that the laborious poor pay a conſiderable part of the taxes by their annual conſumptions, tho' they could not advance, at once, a proportional part of the ſum required. Not to mention, that property in money and ſtock in trade might eaſily be concealed or diſguiſed; and that viſible property in lands and houſes would really at laſt anſwer for the whole: An inequality and oppreſſion which never would be ſubmitted to. But tho' this project is never likely to take place; 'tis not altogether improbable, that when the nation become heartily ſick of their debts, and are cruelly oppreſſed by them, ſome daring projector may ariſe, with viſionary ſchemes for their diſcharge. And as public credit will begin, by that time, to be a little frail, the leaſt touch will deſtroy it, as happened in FRANCE; and in this manner it will *die of the doctor* *.

BUT 'tis more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the neceſſary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even perhaps of victories and conqueſts. I muſt confeſs, when I ſee princes and ſtates fighting and quarrelling, amidſt their debts, funds, and public mortgages, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel-playing fought in a *China* ſhop. How can it be expected, that ſovereigns will ſpare a ſpecies of property, which is pernicious to themſelves and to the public, when they have ſo little compaſſion on lives and properties, which are uſeful to both? Let the time come (and ſurely it will come) when the new funds, created for the exigencies of the year, are not ſubſcribed to, and raiſe not the money projected. Suppoſe, either that the caſh of the nation is exhauſted; or that our faith, which has been hitherto ſo ample, begins to fail us. Suppoſe, that, in this diſtreſs, the nation is threatened with an invaſion; a rebellion is ſuſpected or broke out at home; a ſquadron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a foreign ſubſidy cannot be advanced. What muſt a prince or miniſter do in ſuch an emergence? The right of ſelf-preſervation is unalienable in every individual, much more in every community. And the folly of our ſtateſmen muſt then be greater than the folly of thoſe who firſt contracted debt, or, what is more, than that of thoſe who truſted, or con-

* Some neighboring ſtates practiſe an eaſy expedient, by which they lighten their public debts. The FRENCH have a cuſtom (as the ROMANS formerly had) of augmenting their money; and this the nation has been ſo much familiarized to, that it hurts not public credit, tho' it be really cutting off at once, by an edict, ſo much of their debts. The DUTCH diminiſh the intereſt, without the conſent of their creditors; or, which is the ſame thing, they arbitrarily tax the funds as well as other property. Could we practiſe either of theſe methods, we need never be oppreſſed by the national debt; and 'tis not impoſſible but one of theſe, or ſome other method, may, at all adventures, be tried, on the augmentation of our incumbrances and difficulties. But people in this country are ſo good reaſoners upon whatever regards their intereſt, that ſuch a practice will deceive no body; and public credit will probably tumble at once by ſo dangerous a trial.

tinue to truſt this ſecurity, if theſe ſtateſmen have the means of ſafety in their hands, and do not employ them. The funds, created and mortgaged, will, by that time, bring in a large yearly revenue, ſufficient for the defence and ſecurity of the nation: Money is perhaps lying in the exchequer, ready for the diſcharge of the quarterly intereſt: neceſſity calls, fear urges, reaſon exhorts, compaſſion alone exclaims: The money will immediately be ſeized for the current ſervice, under the moſt ſolemn proteſtations, perhaps, of being immediately replaced. But no more is requiſite. The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thouſands in its ruins. And this, I think, may be called the *natural death* of public credit: For to this period it tends as naturally as an animal body to its diſſolution and deſtruction *.

THESE two events, ſuppoſed above, are calamitous, but not the moſt calamitous. Thouſands are thereby ſacrificed to the ſafety of millions. But we are not without danger, that the contrary event may take place, and that millions may be ſacrificed for ever to the temporary ſafety of thouſands †. Our popular government, perhaps, will render it difficult or dangerous for a miniſter to venture on ſo deſperate an expedient, as that of a voluntary bankruptcy. And tho' the houſe of Lords be altogether compoſed of the proprietors of lands, and the houſe of Commons chiefly; and conſequently neither of them can be ſup-

* So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that, notwithſtanding ſuch a violent ſhock to public credit, as a voluntary bankruptcy in ENGLAND would occaſion, it would not probably be long, ere credit would again revive in as flouriſhing a condition as before. The preſent king of FRANCE, during the late war, borrowed money at lower intereſt than ever his grandfather did: and as low as the BRITISH parliament, comparing the natural rate of intereſt in both kingdoms. And tho' men are commonly more governed by what they have ſeen, than by what they foreſee, with whatever certainty; yet promiſes, proteſtations, fair appearances, with the allurements of preſent intereſt, have ſuch powerful influence as few are able to reſiſt. Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the ſame baits: The ſame tricks, played over and over again, ſtill trepan them. The heights of popularity and patriotiſm are ſtill the beaten road to power and tyranny; flattery to treachery; ſtanding armies to arbitrary government; and the glory of God to the temporal intereſt of the clergy. The fear of an everlaſting deſtruction of credit, allowing it to be an evil, is a needleſs bugbear. A prudent man, in reality, would rather lend to the public immediately after they had taken a ſpunge to their debts, than at preſent; as much as an opulent knave, even tho' one could not force him to pay, is a preferable debtor to an honeſt bankrupt: For the former, in order to carry on buſineſs, may find it his intereſt to diſcharge his debts, where they are not exorbitant: The latter has it not in his power. The reaſoning of TACITUS, *Hiſt. lib.* 3. as it is eternally true, is very applicable to our preſent caſe. *Sed vulgus ad magnitudinem beneficiorum aderat: Stultiſſimus quiſque pecuniis mercabatur: Apud ſapientes caſſa habebantur, quæ neque dari neque accipi, ſalva republica, poterant.* The public is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to pay. The only check which the creditors have on it, is the intereſt of preſerving credit; an intereſt, which may eaſily be overbalanced by a very great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even ſuppoſing that credit irrecoverable. Not to mention, that a preſent neceſſity often forces ſtates into meaſures which are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, againſt their intereſt.

† I have heard it has been computed, that the whole creditors of the public, natives and foreigners, amount only to 17,000. Theſe make a figure at preſent on their income; but in caſe of a public bankruptcy, would, in an inſtant, become the loweſt, as well as the moſt wretched of the people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility is much better rooted; and would render the contention very unequal, if ever we come to that extremity. One would incline to aſſign to this event a very near period, ſuch as half a century, had not our fathers' prophecies of this kind been already found fallacious, by the duration of our public credit, ſo much beyond all reaſonable expectation. When the aſtrologers in FRANCE were every year foretelling the death of HARRY IV. *Theſe fellows*, ſays he, *muſt be right at laſt.* We ſhall therefore, be more cautious than to aſſign any preciſe date; and ſhall content ourſelves with pointing out the event in general.

poſed

By the γραφη παρανομων or *indictment of illegality*, (tho' it has not been remarked by antiquaries or commentators) any man was tried and puniſhed, in a common court of judicature, for any law which had paſſed upon his motion, in the aſſembly of the people, if that law appeared to the court unjuſt, or prejudicial to the public. Thus DEMOSTHENES, finding that ſhip-money was levied irregularly, and that the poor bore the ſame burden as the rich in equipping the gallies, corrected this inequality by a very uſeful law, which proportioned the expence to the revenue and income of each individual. He moved for this law in the aſſembly; he proved its advantages *; he convinced the people, the only legiſlature in ATHENS; the law paſſed, and was carried into execution: And yet he was tried in a criminal court for that law, upon the complaint of the rich, who reſented the alteration he had introduced into the finances †. He was indeed acquitted, upon proving anew the uſefulneſs of this law.

CTESIPHON moved in the aſſembly of the people, that particular honors ſhould be conferred on DEMOSTHENES, as on a citizen affectionate and uſeful to the commonwealth: The people, convinced of this truth, voted thoſe honors: Yet was CTESIPHON tried by the γραφη παρανομων. It was aſſerted, among other topics, that DEMOSTHENES was not a good citizen, nor affectionate to the commonwealth: And the orator was called upon to defend his friend, and conſequently himſelf; which he executed by that ſublime piece of eloquence, that has ever ſince been the admiration of mankind.

AFTER the fatal battle of CHÆRONEA, a law was paſſed, upon the motion of HYPERIDES, giving liberty to ſlaves, and inrolling them in the troops ‡. On account of this law, the orator was afterwards tried by the indictment abovementioned; and defended himſelf, among other topics, by that ſtroke celebrated by PLUTARCH and LONGINUS. *It was not I*, ſaid he, *that moved for this law: It was the neceſſities of war; it was the battle of* CHÆRONEA. The orations of DEMOSTHENES abound with many inſtances of trials of this nature; and prove clearly, that nothing was more commonly practiſed.

THE ATHENIAN Democracy was ſuch a mobbiſh government, as we can ſcarce form a notion of in the preſent age of the world. The whole collective body of the people voted in every law, without any limitation of property, without any diſtinction of rank, without control from any magiſtracy or ſenate ‖; and conſequently with little regard to order, juſtice, or prudence. The ATHENIANS ſoon became ſenſible of the miſchiefs attending this conſtitution: But being averſe to the checking themſelves by any rule or reſtriction, they reſolved, at leaſt, to check their demagogues or counſellors, by the fear of future puniſhment and inquiry. They accordingly inſtituted this remarkable law; a law eſteemed ſo eſſential to their government, that ÆSCHINES inſiſts on it as a known truth, that were it aboliſhed or neglected, it were impoſſible for the Democracy to ſubſiſt †.

THE

* His harangue for it is ſtill extant; περι Συμμοριας.

† *Pro* CTESIPHONTE.

‡ PLUTARCHUS *in vita decem oratorum*. DEMOSTHENES gives a different account of this law. *Contra* ARISTOGITON. *orat.* II. He ſays, That its purport was, to render the ατιμοι επιτιμοι, or to reſtore the privilege of bearing offices to thoſe who had been declared incapable. Perhaps theſe were both clauſes of the ſame law.

‖ The ſenate of the Bean was only a leſs numerous mob, choſen by lot from among the people; and their authority was not great.

† *In* CTESIPHONTEM. 'Tis remarkable, that the

with the authority of the ſenate, eſtabliſhed a law. In the latter, every vote was alike; and as the authority of the ſenate was not there requiſite, the lower people entirely prevailed, and gave law to the whole ſtate. In all party-diviſions, at firſt betwixt the PATRICIANS and PLEBEIANS, afterwards betwixt the nobles and the people, the intereſt of the Ariſtocracy was predominant in the firſt legiſlature; that of the Democracy in the ſecond: The one could always deſtroy what the other had eſtabliſhed: Nay, the one, by a ſudden and unforeſeen motion, might take the ſtart of the other, and totally annihilate its rival, by a vote, which, from the nature of the conſtitution, had the full authority of a law. But no ſuch conteſt or ſtruggle is obſerved in the hiſtory of ROME: No inſtance of a quarrel betwixt theſe two legiſlatures; tho' many betwixt the parties that governed in each. Whence aroſe this concord, which may ſeem ſo extraordinary?

THE legiſlature eſtabliſhed at ROME, by the authority of SERVIUS TULLIUS, was the *comitia centuriata*, which, after the expulſion of the kings, rendered the government, for ſome time, altogether ariſtocratical. But the people, having numbers and force on their ſide, and being elated with frequent conqueſts and victories in their foreign wars, always prevailed when puſhed to extremities, and firſt extorted from the ſenate the magiſtracy of the tribunes, and then the legiſlative power of the *comitia tributa*. It then behoved the nobles to be more careful than ever not to provoke the people. For beſide the force which the latter were always poſſeſſed of, they had now got poſſeſſion of legal authority, and could inſtantly break in pieces any order or inſtitution which directly oppoſed them. By intrigue, by influence, by money, by combination, and by the reſpect paid their character, the nobles might often prevail, and direct the whole machine of government: But had they openly ſet their *comitia centuriata* in oppoſition to the *tributa*, they had ſoon loſt the advantage of that inſtitution, together with their conſuls, praetors, ediles, and all the magiſtrates elected by it. But the *comitia tributa*, not having the ſame reaſon for reſpecting the *centuriata*, frequently repealed laws favorable to the Ariſtocracy: They limited the authority of the nobles, protected the people from oppreſſion, and controlled the actions of the ſenate and magiſtracy. The *centuriata* found it convenient always to ſubmit; and tho' equal in authority, yet being inferior in power, durſt never directly give any ſhock to the other legiſlature, either by repealing its laws, or eſtabliſhing laws, which, it foreſaw, would ſoon be repealed by it.

NO inſtance is found of any oppoſition or ſtruggle between theſe *comitia*; except one ſlight attempt of this kind, mentioned by APPIAN in the 3d book of his civil wars. MARK ANTHONY, reſolving to deprive DECIMUS BRUTUS of the government of CISALPINE GAUL, railed in the *Forum*, and called one of the *comitia*, in order to prevent the meeting of the other, which had been ordered by the ſenate. But affairs were then fallen into ſuch confuſion, and the ROMAN conſtitution was ſo near its final diſſolution, that no inference can be drawn from ſuch an expedient. This conteſt, beſides, was founded more on form than party. It was the ſenate who ordered the *comitia tributa*, that they might obſtruct the meeting of the *centuriata*, which, by the conſtitution, or at leaſt forms of the government, could alone diſpoſe of provinces.

CICERO was recalled by the *comitia centuriata*, tho' baniſhed by the *tributa*, that is, by a *plebiſcitum*. But his baniſhment, we may obſerve, never was conſidered as

as a legal deed, ariſing from the free choice and inclination of the people. It was always aſcribed to the violence alone of CLODIUS, and the diſorders introduced by him into the government.

III. THE *third* cuſtom which we propoſed to obſerve, regards ENGLAND; and tho' it be not ſo important as thoſe which we have pointed out in ATHENS and ROME, it is no leſs ſingular and remarkable. 'Tis a maxim in politics, which we readily admit as undiſputed and univerſal, That a power, however great, when granted by law to an eminent magiſtrate, is not ſo dangerous to liberty, as an authority, however inconſiderable, which he acquires from violence and uſurpation. For, beſides that the law always limits every power which it beſtows, the very receiving it as a conceſſion eſtabliſhes the authority whence it is derived, and preſerves the harmony of the conſtitution. By the ſame right that one prerogative is aſſumed without law, another may alſo be claimed, and another, with ſtill greater facility; while the firſt uſurpations both ſerve as precedents to the following, and give force to maintain them. Hence the heroiſm of HAMPDEN, who ſuſtained the whole violence of royal proſecution, rather than pay a tax of 20 ſhillings not impoſed by parliament; hence the care of all ENGLISH patriots to guard againſt the firſt encroachments of the crown; and hence alone the exiſtence, at this day, of ENGLISH liberty.

THERE is, however, one occaſion, where the parliament has departed from this maxim; and that is, in the *preſſing of ſeamen*. The exerciſe of an illegal power is here tacitly permitted in the crown; and tho' it has frequently been under deliberation, how that power might be rendered legal, and granted, under proper reſtrictions, to the ſovereign, no ſafe expedient could ever be propoſed for that purpoſe, and the danger to liberty always appeared greater from law than from uſurpation. While this power is exerciſed to no other end than to man the navy, men willingly ſubmit to it, from a ſenſe of its uſe and neceſſity; and the ſailors, who are alone affected by it, find no body to ſupport them, in claiming the rights and privileges which the law grants, without diſtinction, to all ENGLISH ſubjects. But were this power, on any occaſion, made an inſtrument of faction or miniſterial tyranny, the oppoſite faction, and indeed all lovers of their country, would immediately take the alarm, and ſupport the injured party; the liberty of ENGLISHMEN would be aſſerted; juries would be implacable; and the tools of tyranny, acting both againſt law and equity, would meet with the ſevereſt vengeance. On the other hand, were the parliament to grant ſuch an authority, they would probably fall into one of theſe two inconveniencies: They would either beſtow it under ſo many reſtrictions as would make it loſe its effects, by cramping the authority of the crown; or they would render it ſo large and comprehenſive, as might give occaſion to great abuſes, for which we could, in that caſe, have no remedy. The very illegality of the power, at preſent, prevents its abuſes, by affording ſo eaſy a remedy againſt them.

I PRETEND not, by this reaſoning, to exclude all poſſibility of contriving a regiſter for ſeamen, which might man the navy, without being dangerous to liberty. I only obſerve, that no ſatisfactory ſcheme of that nature has yet been propoſed. Rather than adopt any project hitherto invented, we continue a practice ſeemingly the moſt abſurd and unaccountable. Authority, in times of full internal peace and concord, is armed againſt law: A continued and open uſurpation in

the crown is permitted, amidſt the greateſt jealouſy and watchfulneſs in the people; nay proceeding from thoſe very principles: Liberty, in a country of the higheſt liberty, is left entirely to its own defence, without any countenance or protection: The wild ſtate of nature is renewed, in one of the moſt civilized ſocieties of mankind: And great violences and diſorders among the people, the moſt humane and the beſt natured, are committed with impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the ſupreme magiſtrate, the other the ſanction of fundamental laws.

ESSAY X.

OF THE POPULOUSNESS OF ANTIENT NATIONS *.

THERE is very little ground, either from reaſon or experience, to conclude the univerſe eternal or incorruptible. The continual and rapid motion of matter, the violent revolutions with which every part is agitated, the changes remarked in the heavens, the plain traces as well as tradition of an univerſal deluge, or general convulſion of the elements; all theſe prove ſtrongly the mortality of this fabric of the world, and its paſſage, by corruption or diſſolution, from one ſtate or order to another. It muſt, therefore, have its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age, as well as each individual form which it contains; and 'tis probable, that, in all theſe variations, man, equally with every animal and vegetable, will partake. In the flouriſhing age of the world, it may be expected, that the human ſpecies ſhould poſſeſs greater vigor both of mind and body, more proſperous health, higher ſpirits, longer life, and a ſtronger inclination and power of generation. But if the general ſyſtem of things, and human ſociety of courſe, have any ſuch gradual revolutions, they are too ſlow to be diſcernible in that ſhort period which is comprehended by hiſtory and tradition. Stature and force of body, length of life, even courage and extent of genius, ſeem hitherto to have been naturally, in all ages, pretty much the ſame. The arts and ſciences, indeed, have flouriſhed in one period, and have decayed in another: But we may obſerve, that at the time when they roſe to greateſt perfection among one people, they were perhaps totally unknown to all the neighboring nations; and tho' they univerſally decayed in one age, yet in a ſucceeding generation they again revived, and diffuſed themſelves over the world. As far, therefore, as obſervation reaches, there is no

* An ingenious writer has honored this diſcourſe with an anſwer, full of politeneſs, erudition, and good ſenſe. So learned a refutation would have made the author ſuſpect, that his reaſonings were entirely overthrown, had he not uſed the precaution, from the beginning, to keep himſelf on the ſceptical ſide; and having taken this advantage of the ground, he was enabled, tho' with much inferior forces, to preſerve himſelf from a total defeat. That Reverend gentleman will always find, where his antagoniſt is ſo entrenched, that it will be very difficult to force him. VARRO, in ſuch a ſituation, could defend himſelf againſt HANNIBAL. PHARNACES againſt CÆSAR. The author, however, very willingly acknowleges, that his antagoniſt has detected many miſtakes both in his authorities and reaſonings; and it was owing entirely to that gentleman's indulgence, that many more errors were not remarked. In this edition, advantage has been taken of his learned animadverſions, and the Eſſay has been rendered leſs imperfect than formerly.

univerſal

pulous; *secondly*, whether in reality it was ſo. If I can make appear, that the concluſion is not ſo certain as is pretended, in favor of antiquity, 'tis all I aſpire to.

In general, we may obſerve, that the queſtion with regard to the comparative populouſneſs of ages or kingdoms implies very important conſequences, and commonly determines concerning the preference of their whole police, manners, and conſtitution of government. For as there is in all men, both male and female, a deſire and power of generation, more active than is ever univerſally exerted, the reſtraints which they lie under, muſt proceed from ſome difficulties in mens ſituation, which it belongs to a wiſe legiſlature carefully to obſerve and remove. Almoſt every man who thinks he can maintain a family, will have one; and the human ſpecies, at this rate of propagation, would more than double every generation, were every one coupled as ſoon as he comes to the age of puberty. How faſt do mankind multiply in every colony or new ſettlement; where it is an eaſy matter to provide for a family; and where men are no way ſtraitened or confined, as in long eſtabliſhed governments? Hiſtory tells us frequently of plagues, which have ſwept away the third or fourth part of a people: Yet in a generation or two, the deſtruction was not perceived; and the ſociety had again acquired their former number. The lands which were cultivated, the houſes built, the commodities raiſed, the riches acquired, enabled the people who eſcaped, immediately to marry, and to rear families, which ſupplied the place of thoſe who had periſhed [c]. And for a like reaſon, every wiſe, juſt, and mild government, by rendering the condition of its ſubjects eaſy and ſecure, will always abound moſt in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country, indeed, whoſe climate and ſoil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one which produces only corn, and that more populous than one which is only fitted for paſturage. But if every thing elſe be equal, it ſeems natural to expect, that where-ever there are moſt happineſs and virtue, and the wiſeſt inſtitutions, there will alſo be moſt people.

The queſtion, therefore, concerning the populouſneſs of antient and modern times, being allowed of great importance, it will be requiſite, if we would bring it to ſome determination, to compare both the *domeſtic* and *political* ſituation of theſe two periods, in order to judge of the facts by their moral cauſes; which is the *firſt* view in which we propoſed to conſider them.

The chief difference betwixt the *domeſtic* oeconomy of the antients and that of the moderns conſiſts in the practice of ſlavery, which prevailed among the former, and which has been aboliſhed for ſome centuries thro'out the greateſt part of Europe. Some paſſionate admirers of the antients, and zealous partiſans of civil liberty, (for theſe ſentiments, as they are both of them, in the main, extremely juſt, are found to be almoſt inſeparable), cannot forbear regretting the loſs of this inſtitution; and whilſt they brand all ſubmiſſion to the government of a ſingle perſon with the harſh denomination of ſlavery, they would gladly reduce the greateſt part

[c] This too is a good reaſon why the ſmall-pox does not depopulate countries ſo much as may at firſt ſight be imagined. Where there is room for more people, they will always ariſe, even without the aſſiſtance of naturalization-bills. 'Tis remarked by Don Geronimo de Ustariz, that the provinces of Spain which ſend moſt people to the Indies, are moſt populous; which proceeds from their ſuperior riches.

of

friends, at the firſt entrance, with ſuch an image of the ſeverity of the maſter, and miſery of the ſlave?

NOTHING ſo common in all trials, even of civil cauſes, as to call for the evidence of ſlaves; which was always extorted by the moſt exquiſite torments. DEMOSTHENES ſays [k], that where it was poſſible to produce, for the ſame fact, either freemen or ſlaves as witneſſes, the judges always preferred the torturing of ſlaves, as a more certain and infallible evidence [l].

SENECA draws a picture of that diſorderly luxury, which changes day into night, and night into day, and inverts every ſtated hour of every office in life. Among other circumſtances, ſuch as diſplacing the meals and times of bathing, he mentions, that regularly, about the third hour of the night, the neighbors of one who indulges this falſe refinement, hear the noiſe of whips and laſhes; and, upon inquiry, find he is then taking an account of the conduct of his ſervants, and giving them due correction and diſcipline. This is not remarked as an inſtance of cruelty, but only of diſorder, which, even in actions the moſt uſual and methodical, changes the fixed hours that an eſtabliſhed cuſtom had aſſigned them [m].

BUT our preſent buſineſs is only to conſider the influence of ſlavery on the populouſneſs of a ſtate. 'Tis pretended, that, in this particular, the antient practice had infinitely the advantage, and was the chief cauſe of that extreme populouſneſs which is ſuppoſed in thoſe times. At preſent, all maſters diſcourage the marrying of their male ſervants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the female, who are then ſuppoſed altogether incapacitated for their ſervice. But where the property of the ſervants is lodged in the maſter, their marriage and fertility form his riches, and bring him a ſucceſſion of ſlaves, that ſupply the place of thoſe whom age and infirmity have diſabled. He encourages, therefore, their propagation as much as that of his cattle; rears the young with the ſame care; and educates them to ſome art or calling, which may render them more uſeful or valuable to him. The opulent are, by this policy, intereſted in the being at leaſt, tho' not the well-being of the poor; and enrich themſelves, by increaſing the number and induſtry of thoſe who are ſubjected to them. Each man, being a ſovereign in his own family, has the ſame intereſt with regard to it, as the prince with regard to the ſtate; and has not, like the prince, any oppoſite motives of ambition or vain-glory, which may lead him to depopulate his little ſovereignty.

[k] In *Oneterem orat.* 1.

[l] The ſame practice was common in ROME; but CICERO ſeems not to think this evidence ſo certain as the teſtimony of free-citizens. *Pro Coelio.*

[m] *Epiſt.* 122. The inhuman ſports exhibited at ROME, may juſtly be conſidered too as an effect of the people's contempt for ſlaves, and was alſo a great cauſe of the general inhumanity of their princes and rulers. Who can read the accounts of the amphitheatrical entertainments without horror? Or who is ſurprized, that the emperors ſhould treat that people in the ſame way the people treated their inferiors? One's humanity, on that occaſion, is apt to renew the barbarous wiſh of CALIGULA, that the people had but one neck. A man could almoſt be pleaſed, by a ſingle blow, to put an end to ſuch a race of monſters. You may thank God, ſays the author above cited, (*epiſt.* 7.), addreſſing himſelf to the ROMAN people, that you have a maſter, (*viz.* the mild and merciful NERO), who is incapable of learning cruelty from your example. This was ſpoke in the beginning of his reign: But he fitted them very well afterwards; and no doubt was conſiderably improved by the ſight of the barbarous objects, to which he had, from his infancy, been accuſtomed.

All

All of it is, at all times, under his eye; and he has leiſure to inſpect the moſt minute detail of the marriage and education of his ſubjects [n].

Such are the conſequences of domeſtic ſlavery, according to the firſt aſpect and appearance of things: But if we enter more deeply into the ſubject, we ſhall perhaps find reaſon to retract our haſty determinations. The compariſon is ſhocking between the management of human creatures and that of cattle; but being extremely juſt, when applied to the preſent ſubject, it may be proper to trace the conſequences of it. At the capital, near all great cities, in all populous, rich, induſtrious provinces, few cattle are bred. Proviſions, lodging, attendance, labor, are there dear; and men find better their account in buying the cattle, after they come to a certain age, from the remoter and cheaper countries. Theſe are conſequently the only breeding countries for cattle; and, by a parity of reaſon, for men too, when the latter are put on the ſame footing with the former. To rear a child in LONDON till he could be ſerviceable, would coſt much dearer, than to buy one of the ſame age from SCOTLAND or IRELAND; where he had been raiſed in a cottage, covered with rags, and fed on oatmeal or potatoes. Thoſe who had ſlaves, therefore, in all the richer and more populous countries, would diſcourage the pregnancy of the females, and either prevent or deſtroy the birth. The human ſpecies would periſh in thoſe places where it ought to increaſe the faſteſt; and a perpetual recruit be needed from all the poorer and more deſart provinces. Such a continued drain would tend mightily to depopulate the ſtate, and render great cities ten times more deſtructive than with us; where every man is maſter of himſelf, and provides for his children from the powerful inſtinct of nature, not the calculations of ſordid intereſt. If LONDON, at preſent, without much increaſing, needs a yearly recruit from the country of 5000 people, as is commonly computed; what muſt it require, if the greateſt part of the tradeſmen and common people were ſlaves, and were hindered from breeding by their avaricious maſters?

ALL antient authors tell us, that there was a perpetual flux of ſlaves to ITALY from the remoter provinces, particularly SYRIA, CILICIA [o], CAPPADOCIA, the Leſſer ASIA, THRACE, and EGYPT: Yet the number of people increaſed not in ITALY; and writers complain of the continual decay of induſtry and agriculture [p]. Where then is that extreme fertility of the ROMAN ſlaves, which is commonly ſuppoſed? So far from multiplying, they could not, it ſeems, ſo much as keep up the ſtock, without immenſe recruits. And tho' great numbers were continually manumited, and converted into ROMAN citizens, the numbers even of theſe did not increaſe [q], till the freedom of the city was communicated to foreign provinces.

THE term for a ſlave born and bred in the family, was *verna* [r]; and theſe ſlaves ſeem

[n] We may here obſerve, that if domeſtic ſlavery really increaſed populouſneſs, it would be an exception to the general rule, that the happineſs of any ſociety and its populouſneſs are neceſſary attendants. A maſter, from humor or intereſt, may make his ſlaves very unhappy, and yet be careful, from intereſt, to increaſe their number. Their marriage is not a matter of choice with them, no more than any other action of their life.

[o] Ten thouſand ſlaves in a day have been often ſold for the uſe of the ROMANS, at DELUS in CILICIA. STRABO, lib. 14.

[p] COLUMELLA, lib. 1. *proœm.* et cap. 2. et 7. VARRO, lib. 3. cap. 1. HORAT. lib. 2. od. 15. TACIT. *annal.* lib. 3. cap. 54. SUETON. *in vita* AUG. cap. 42. PLIN. lib. 18. cap. 13.

[q] *Minore indies plebe ingenua*, ſays TACITUS, *ann.* lib. 24. cap. 7.

[r] As *ſervus* was the name of the genus, and *verna* of the ſpecies, without any correlative, this forms

ſeem to have been intitled by cuſtom to privileges and indulgences beyond others; a ſufficient reaſon why the maſters would not be fond of rearing many of that kind [s]. Whoever is acquainted with the maxims of our planters, will acknowlege the juſtneſs of this obſervation [t].

ATTICUS is much praiſed by his hiſtorian for the care which he took in recruiting his family from the ſlaves born in it [u]: May we not thence infer, that that practice was not then very common?

THE names of ſlaves in the GREEK comedies, SYRUS, MYSUS, GETA, THRAX, DAVUS, LYDUS, PHRYX, *&c.* afford a preſumption, that at ATHENS, at leaſt, moſt of the ſlaves were imported from foreign nations. The ATHENIANS, ſays STRABO [w], gave to their ſlaves, either the names of the nations whence they were bought, as LYDUS, SYRUS; or the names that were moſt common among thoſe nations, as MANES or MIDAS to a PHRYGIAN, TIBIAS to a PAPHLAGONIAN.

DEMOSTHENES, after having mentioned a law which forbid any man to ſtrike the ſlave of another, praiſes the humanity of this law; and adds, that if the barbarians from whom ſlaves were bought, had information that their countrymen met with ſuch gentle treatment, they would entertain a great eſteem for the ATHENIANS [x]. ISOCRATES [y] too inſinuates, that the ſlaves of the GREEKS were generally or very commonly barbarians. ARISTOTLE in his Politics [z] plainly ſuppoſes, that a ſlave is always a foreigner. The antient comic writers repreſented the ſlaves, as ſpeaking a barbarous language [a]. This was an imitation of nature.

forms a ſtrong preſumption, that the latter were by far the leaſt numerous. 'Tis an univerſal obſervation which we may form upon language, that where two related parts of a whole bear any proportion to each other, in numbers, rank, or conſideration, there are always correlative terms invented, which anſwer to both the parts, and expreſs their mutual relation. If they bear no proportion to each other, the term is only invented for the leſs, and marks its diſtinction from the whole. Thus *man* and *woman*, *maſter* and *ſervant*, *father* and *ſon*, *prince* and *ſubject*, *ſtranger* and *citizen*, are correlative terms. But the words, *ſeaman*, *carpenter*, *ſmith*, *tailor*, &c. have no correſpondent terms, which expreſs thoſe who are no ſeamen, no carpenter, *&c.* Languages differ very much with regard to the particular words where this diſtinction obtains; and may thence afford very ſtrong inferences, concerning the manners and cuſtoms of different nations. The military government of the ROMAN emperors had exalted the ſoldiery ſo high, that they balanced all the other orders of the ſtate: Hence *miles* and *paganus* became relative terms; a thing, till then, unknown to antient, and ſtill ſo to modern languages. Modern ſuperſtition exalted the clergy ſo high, that they overbalanced the whole ſtate: Hence *clergy* and *laity* are terms oppoſed in all modern languages; and in theſe alone. And from the ſame principles I infer, that if the number of ſlaves bought by the ROMANS from foreign countries, had not extremely exceeded thoſe bred at home, *verna* would have had a correlative, which would have expreſſed the former ſpecies of ſlaves. But theſe, it would ſeem, compoſed the main body of the antient ſlaves, and the latter were but a few exceptions.

[s] *Verna* is uſed by ROMAN writers as a word equivalent to *ſcurra*, on account of the petulance and impudence of thoſe ſlaves. MART. lib. 1. ep. 42. HORACE alſo mentions the *vernae procaces*; and PETRONIUS, cap. 24. *vernula urbanitas*. SENECA, *de provid.* cap. 1. *vernularum licentia*.

[t] 'Tis computed in the WEST-INDIES, that a ſtock of ſlaves grow worſe five *per cent.* every year, unleſs new ſlaves be bought to recruit them. They are not able to keep up their own number, even in thoſe warm countries, where cloaths and proviſions are ſo eaſily got. How much more muſt this happen in EUROPEAN countries, and in or near great cities?

[u] CORN. NEPOS in vita ATTICI. We may remark, that ATTICUS's eſtate lay chiefly in EPIRUS, which being a remote, deſolate place, would render it profitable for him to rear ſlaves there.

[w] Lib. 7.

[x] In MIDIAM, p. 221. ex edit. ALDI.

[y] Panegyr. [z] Lib. 7. cap. 10. ſub. fin.

[a] ARISTOPH. Equites, l. 17. The antient ſcholiaſt remarks on this paſſage βαρβαριζει ως δουλος.

'Tis

fore, that this inſtitution was unfavorable to propagation, (and the ſame reaſon, at leaſt in part, holds with regard to antient ſlaves as well as modern ſervants) how deſtructive muſt ſlavery have proved?

HISTORY mentions a ROMAN nobleman, who had 400 ſlaves under the ſame roof with him: and having been aſſaſſinated at home by the furious revenge of one of them, the law was executed with rigor, and all without exception were put to death [f]. Many other ROMAN noblemen had families equally, or more numerous; and I believe every one will allow, that this would ſcarce be practicable, were we to ſuppoſe all the ſlaves married, and the females to be breeders [g].

So early as the poet HESIOD [h], married ſlaves, whether male or female, were eſteemed very inconvenient. How much more, where families had increaſed to ſuch an enormous ſize, as in ROME, and the antient ſimplicity of manners was baniſhed from all ranks of people?

XENOPHON in his oeconomics, where he gives directions for the management of a farm, recommends a ſtrict care and attention of laying the male and the female ſlaves at a diſtance from each other. He ſeems not to ſuppoſe that they are ever married. The only ſlaves among the GREEKS that appear to have continued their own breed, were the HELOTES, who had houſes apart, and were more the ſlaves of the public than of individuals [i].

THE ſame author [k] tells us, that NICIA's overſeer, by agreement with his maſter, was obliged to pay him an obolus a day for each ſlave; beſides maintaining them, and keeping up the number. Had the antient ſlaves been all breeders, this laſt circumſtance of the contract had been ſuperfluous.

THE antients talk ſo frequently of a fixed, ſtated portion of proviſions aſſigned to each ſlave [l], that we are naturally led to conclude, that ſlaves lived almoſt all ſingle, and received that portion as a kind of board-wages.

THE practice, indeed, of marrying the ſlaves ſeems not to have been very common, even among the country-laborers, where it is more naturally to be expected. CATO [m], enumerating the ſlaves requiſite to labor a vineyard of a hundred acres, makes them amount to 15; the overſeer and his wife, *villicus* and *villica*, and 13 male ſlaves; for an olive plantation of 240 acres, the overſeer and his wife, and 11 male ſlaves; and ſo in proportion to a greater or leſs plantation or vineyard.

VARRO [n], citing this paſſage of CATO, allows his computation to be juſt in every reſpect, except the laſt. For as it is requiſite, ſays he, to have an overſeer and his wife, whether the vineyard or plantation be great or ſmall, this muſt alter the exactneſs of the proportion. Had CATO's computation been erroneous in any other reſpect, it had certainly been corrected by VARRO, who ſeems fond of diſcovering ſo trivial an error.

The ſame author [o], as well as COLUMELLA [p], recommends it as requiſite to

[f] TACIT. *ann.* lib. 14. cap. 43.

[g] The ſlaves in the great houſes, had little rooms aſſigned them, called *cellae*. Whence the name of cell was transferred to the monks room in a convent. See farther on this head, JUST. LIPSIUS, Saturn. 1. cap. 14. Theſe form ſtrong preſumptions againſt the marriage and propagation of the family-ſlaves.

[h] Opera et Dies, lib. 2. l. 24. alſo l. 220.

[i] STRABO, lib. 8.

[k] De ratione redituum.

[l] See CATO de re ruſtica, cap. 56. Donatus in Phormion. I. 1. 9. SENECAE epiſt. 80.

[m] De re ruſt. cap. 10, 11.

[n] Lib. 1. cap. 18.

[o] Lib. 1. cap. 17.

[p] Lib. 1. cap. 18.

give

ſtrous priſons, and giving liberty to 60,000 ſlaves. The younger POMPEY augmented his army in SPAIN by the ſame expedient [a]. If the country-laborers, thro'-out the ROMAN empire, were ſo generally in this ſituation, and if it was difficult or impoſſible to find ſeparate lodgings for the families of the city-ſervants, how unfavorable to propagation, as well as humanity, muſt the inſtitution of domeſtic ſlavery be eſteemed?

CONSTANTINOPLE, at preſent, requires the ſame recruits of ſlaves from all the provinces, which ROME did of old; and theſe provinces are of conſequence far from being populous.

EGYPT, according to Monſ. MAILLET, ſends continual colonies of black ſlaves to the other parts of the TURKISH empire; and receives annually an equal return of white: The one brought from the inland parts of AFRICA; the other from MINGRELIA, CIRCASSIA, and TARTARY.

OUR modern convents are, no doubt, very bad inſtitutions: But there is reaſon to ſuſpect, that antiently every great family in ITALY, and probably in other parts of the world, was a ſpecies of convent. And tho' we have reaſon to deteſt all thoſe Popiſh inſtitutions, as nurſeries of the moſt abject ſuperſtition, burthenſome to the public, and oppreſſive to the poor priſoners, male as well as female; yet may it be queſtioned whether they be ſo deſtructive to the populouſneſs of a ſtate as is commonly imagined. Were the land which belongs to a convent, beſtowed on a nobleman, he would ſpend its revenue on dogs, horſes, grooms, footmen, cooks, and houſe-maids; and his family would not furniſh many more citizens than the convent.

THE common reaſon why parents thruſt their daughters into nunneries, is, that they may not be overburdened with too numerous a family; but the antients had a method almoſt as innocent, and more effectual to that purpoſe, *viz.* the expoſing their children in the earlieſt infancy. This practice was very common; and is not mentioned by any author of thoſe times with the horror it deſerves, or ſcarce [a] even with diſapprobation. PLUTARCH, the humane, good-natured PLUTARCH, [b] recommends it as a virtue in ATTALUS, king of PERGAMUS, that he murdered, or, if you will, expoſed all his own children, in order to leave his crown to the ſon of his brother, EUMENES; ſignalizing in this manner his gratitude and affection to EUMENES, who had left him his heir preferable to that ſon. It was SOLON, the moſt celebrated of the ſages of GREECE, who gave parents permiſſion by law to kill their children [c].

SHALL we then allow theſe two circumſtances to compenſate each other, *viz.* monaſtic vows and the expoſing of children, and to be unfavorable, in equal degrees, to the propagation of mankind? I doubt the advantage is here on the ſide of antiquity. Perhaps, by an odd connection of cauſes, the barbarous practice of the antients might rather render thoſe times more populous. By removing the terrors of too numerous a family, it would engage many people in marriage; and ſuch is the force of natural affection, that very few, in compariſon, would have reſolution enough, when it came to the puſh, to carry into execution their former intentions.

[a] Id. lib. 4. cap. 8.
[a] TACITUS blames it: De morib. Germ. SENECA alſo approves of the expoſing of ſickly, infirm children. De ira, lib. 1. cap. 15.
[b] De fraterno amore.
[c] SEXT. EMP. lib. 3. cap. 24.

CHINA,

CHINA, the only country where this barbarous practice of exposing children prevails at preſent, is the moſt populous country we know; and every man is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages could ſcarce be general, had not men the proſpect of ſo eaſy a method of getting rid of their children. I own, that PLUTARCH * ſpeaks of it as a very univerſal maxim of the poor to expoſe their children; and as the rich were then averſe to marriage, on account of the courtſhip they met with from thoſe who expected legacies from them, the public muſt have been in a bad ſituation betwixt them [d].

OF all ſciences there is none, where firſt appearances are more deceitful than in politics. Hoſpitals for foundlings ſeem favorable to the increaſe of numbers; and, perhaps, may be ſo, when kept under proper reſtrictions. But when they open the door to every one, without diſtinction, they have probably a contrary effect, and are pernicious to the ſtate. 'Tis computed, that every ninth child born at PARIS, is ſent to the hoſpital; tho' it ſeems certain, according to the common courſe of human affairs, that 'tis not a hundredth part whoſe parents are altogether incapacitated to rear and educate them. The infinite difference, for health, induſtry, and morals, between an education in an hoſpital and that in a private family, ſhould induce us not to make the entrance into an hoſpital too eaſy and engaging. To kill one's own child is ſhocking to nature, and muſt therefore be pretty unuſual; but to turn over the care of him upon others is very tempting to the natural indolence of mankind.

HAVING conſidered the domeſtic life and manners of the antients, compared to thoſe of the moderns; where, in the main, we ſeem rather ſuperior, ſo far as the preſent queſtion is concerned; we ſhall now examine the *political* cuſtoms and inſtitutions of both ages, and weigh their influence in retarding or forwarding the propagation of mankind.

BEFORE the increaſe of the ROMAN power, or rather till its full eſtabliſhment, almoſt all the nations which are the ſcene of antient hiſtory, were divided into ſmall territories or petty commonwealths, where of courſe a great equality of fortune prevailed, and the center of the government was always very near its frontiers.

THIS was the ſituation of affairs not only in GREECE and ITALY, but alſo in SPAIN, GAUL, GERMANY, AFRIC, and a great part of the LESSER ASIA. And it muſt be owned, that no inſtitution could be more favorable to the propagation of mankind. For tho' a man of an overgrown fortune, not being able to conſume more than another, muſt ſhare it with thoſe who ſerve and attend him; yet their poſſeſſion being precarious, they have not the ſame encouragement to marriage, as if each had a ſmall fortune, ſecure and independent. Enormous cities are, beſides, deſtructive to ſociety, beget vice and diſorder of all kinds, ſtarve the re-

* De amore prolis.

[d] The practice of leaving great ſums of money to friends, tho' one had near relations, was common in GREECE as well as ROME; as we may gather from LUCIAN. This practice prevails much leſs in modern times; and BEN. JOHNSON's VOLPONE is therefore almoſt entirely extracted from antient authors, and ſuits better the manners of thoſe times.

It may juſtly be thought, that the liberty of divorces in ROME was another diſcouragement to marriage. Such a practice prevents not quarrels from *humor*, but rather increaſes them; and occaſions alſo thoſe from *intereſt*, which are much more dangerous and deſtructive. See farther on this head, Eſſays moral, political, and literary, Part I. eſſay XXI. Perhaps too the unnatural luſts of the antients ought to be taken into conſideration, as of ſome moment.

more provinces, and even ſtarve themſelves, by the high prices to which they raiſe all proviſions. Where each man had his little houſe and field to himſelf, and each county had its capital, free and independent; what a happy ſituation of mankind! How favorable to induſtry and agriculture; to marriage and propagation! The prolific virtue of men, were it to act in its full extent, without that reſtraint which poverty and neceſſity impoſes on it, would double the numbers every generation: And nothing ſurely can give it more liberty, than ſuch ſmall commonwealths, and ſuch an equality of fortune among the citizens. All ſmall ſtates naturally produce equality of fortune, becauſe they afford no opportunities of great increaſe; but ſmall commonwealths much more, by that diviſion of power and authority which is eſſential to them.

When Xenophon[a] returned after the famous expedition with Cyrus, he hired himſelf and 6000 of the Greeks into the ſervice of Seuthes, a prince of Thrace; and the articles of his agreement were, that each ſoldier ſhould receive a *daric* a month, each captain two *darics*, and he himſelf, as general, four: A regulation of pay which would not a little ſurpriſe our modern officers.

Demosthenes and Æschines, with eight more, were ſent ambaſſadors to Philip of Macedon, and their appointments for above four months were a thouſand *drachmas*, which is leſs than a *drachma* a-day for each ambaſſador[f]. But a *drachma* a-day, nay ſometimes two[g], was the pay of a common foot-ſoldier.

A centurion among the Romans had only double pay to a private man, in Polybius's time[h], and we accordingly find the gratuities after a triumph regulated by that proportion[i]. But Mark Anthony and the triumvirate gave the centurions five times the reward of the other[k]. So much had the increaſe of the commonwealth increaſed the inequality among the citizens[l].

It muſt be owned, that the ſituation of affairs in modern times, with regard to civil liberty, as well as equality of fortune, is not near ſo favorable, either to the propagation or happineſs of mankind. Europe is ſhared out moſtly into great monarchies; and ſuch parts of it as are divided into ſmall territories, are commonly governed by abſolute princes, who ruin their people by a ridiculous mimickry of the greater monarchs, in the ſplendor of their court and number of their forces. Swisserland alone and Holland reſemble the antient republics; and tho' the former is far from poſſeſſing any advantage either of ſoil, climate, or commerce, yet the numbers of people, with which it abounds, notwithſtanding their inliſting themſelves into every ſervice in Europe, prove ſufficiently the advantages of their political inſtitutions.

The antient republics derived their chief or only ſecurity from the numbers of their citizens. The Trachinians having loſt great numbers of their people, the remainder, inſtead of enriching themſelves by the inheritance of their fellow-citizens, applied to Sparta, their metropolis, for a new ſtock of inhabitants.

[a] *De exp.* Cyr. lib. 7.

[f] Demost. *de falſa leg.* He calls it a conſiderable ſum.

[g] Thucyd. lib. 3.

[h] Lib. 6. cap. 37.

[i] Tit. Liv. lib. 41. cap. 7. 13. & *alibi paſſim.*

[k] Appian. *De bell. civ.* lib. 4.

[l] Cæsar gave the centurions ten times the gratuity of the common ſoldiers, *De bell. Gallico*, lib. 8. In the Rhodian cartel, mentioned afterwards, no diſtinction in the price of ranſom was made on account of ranks in the army.

The

The SPARTANS immediately collected ten thouſand men: among whom the old citizens divided the lands of which the former proprietors had periſhed [m].

AFTER TIMOLEON had baniſhed DIONYSIUS from SYRACUSE, and had ſettled the affairs of SICILY, finding the cities of SYRACUSE and SELLINUNTIUM extremely depopulated by tyranny, war, and faction, he invited over from GREECE ſome new inhabitants to repeople them [n]. Immediately forty thouſand men (PLUTARCH [o] ſays ſixty thouſand) offered themſelves; and he diſtributed ſo many lots of land among them, to the great ſatisfaction of the antient inhabitants: A proof at once of the maxims of antient policy, which affected populouſneſs more than riches; and of the good effects of theſe maxims, in the extreme populouſneſs of that ſmall country, GREECE, which could at once ſupply ſo large a colony. The caſe was not much different with the ROMANS in early times. He is a pernicious citizen, ſaid M. CURIUS, who cannot be contented with ſeven acres [p]. Such ideas of equality could not fail of producing great numbers of people.

WE muſt now conſider what diſadvantages the antients lay under with regard to populouſneſs, and what checks they received from their political maxims and inſtitutions. There are commonly compenſations in every human condition; and tho' theſe compenſations be not always perfectly equal, yet they ſerve, at leaſt, to reſtrain the prevailing principle. To compare them and eſtimate their influence is indeed very difficult, even where they take place in the ſame age and in neighboring countries: But where ſeveral ages have intervened, and only ſcattered lights are afforded us by antient authors; what can we do but amuſe ourſelves by talking, *pro* and *con*, on an intereſting ſubject, and thereby correcting all haſty and violent determinations?

Firſt, WE may obſerve, that the antient republics were almoſt in perpetual war; a natural effect of their martial ſpirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred which generally prevails among nations that live in a cloſe neighborhood. Now, war in a ſmall ſtate is much more deſtructive than in a great one; both becauſe all the inhabitants, in the former caſe, muſt ſerve in the armies; and becauſe the ſtate is all frontier, and all expoſed to the inroads of the enemy.

THE maxims of antient war were much more deſtructive than thoſe of modern; chiefly by the diſtribution of plunder, in which the ſoldiers were indulged. The private men in our armies are ſuch a low raſcally ſet of people, that we find any abundance beyond their ſimple pay, breeds confuſion and diſorder, and a total diſſolution of diſcipline. The very wretchedneſs and meanneſs of thoſe who fill the modern armies, render them leſs deſtructive to the countries which they invade: One inſtance, among many, of the deceitfulneſs of firſt appearances in all political reaſonings [q].

[m] DIOD. SIC. lib. 12. THUCYD. lib. 3.

[n] DIOD. SIC. lib. 16.

[o] *In vita* TIMOL.

[p] PLIN. lib. 18. cap. 3. The ſame author, in cap. 6. ſays, *Verumque fatentibus latifundia perdidere* ITALIAM; *jam vero et provincias. Sex domi ſeptiſſem* AFRICÆ *poſſidebant, cum interfecit eos* NERO *princeps*. In this view, the barbarous butchery committed by the firſt ROMAN emperors was not, perhaps, ſo deſtructive to the public as we may imagine. Theſe never ceaſed till they had extinguiſhed all the illuſtrious families, which had enjoyed the plunder of the world, during the latter ages of the republic. The new nobles who roſe in their place, were leſs ſplendid, as we learn from TACIT. *ann.* lib. 3. cap. 55.

[q] The antient ſoldiers, being free citizens, above the loweſt rank, were all married. Our modern ſoldiers are either forced to live unmarried, or their marriages turn to ſmall account towards the increaſe of mankind. A circumſtance which ought, perhaps, to be taken into conſideration, as of ſome conſequence in favor of the antients.

ANTIENT

ANTIENT battles were much more bloody by the very nature of the weapons employed in them. The antients drew up their men 16 or 20, ſometimes 50 men deep, which made a narrow front; and it was not difficult to find a field, in which both armies might be marſhalled, and might engage with each other. Even where any body of the troops was kept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, or hollow ways, the battle was not ſo ſoon decided betwixt the contending parties, but that the others had time to overcome the difficulties which oppoſed them, and take part in the engagement. And as the whole armies were thus engaged, and each man cloſely buckled to his antagoniſt, the battles were commonly very bloody, and great ſlaughter made on both ſides, but eſpecially on the vanquiſhed. The long thin lines, required by fire-arms, and the quick deciſion of the fray, render our modern engagements but partial rencounters, and enable the general, who is foiled in the beginning of the day, to draw off the greateſt part of his army, ſound and entire. Could FOLARD's project of the column take place, (which ſeems impracticable [r]) it would render modern battles as deſtructive as the antient.

THE battles of antiquity, both by their duration, and their reſemblance of ſingle combats, were wrought up to a degree of fury quite unknown to latter ages. Nothing could then engage the combatants to give quarter, but the hopes of profit, by making ſlaves of their priſoners. In civil wars, as we learn from TACITUS [s], the battles were the moſt bloody, becauſe the priſoners were not ſlaves.

WHAT a ſtout reſiſtance muſt be made, where the vanquiſhed expected ſo hard a fate! How inveterate the rage, where the maxims of war were, in every reſpect, ſo bloody and ſevere!

INSTANCES are very frequent, in antient hiſtory, of cities beſieged, whoſe inhabitants, rather than open their gates, murdered their wives and children, and ruſhed themſelves on a voluntary death, ſweetened perhaps with a little proſpect of revenge upon the enemy. GREEKS [t], as well as BARBARIANS, have been often wrought up to this degree of fury. And the ſame determined ſpirit and cruelty muſt, in many other inſtances, leſs remarkable, have been extremely deſtructive to human ſociety, in thoſe petty commonwealths, which lived in a cloſe neighborhood, and were engaged in perpetual wars and contentions.

SOMETIMES the wars in GREECE, ſays PLUTARCH [u], were carried on entirely by inroads, and robberies, and piracies. Such a method of war muſt be more deſtructive, in ſmall ſtates, than the bloodieſt battles and ſieges.

BY the laws of the twelve tables, poſſeſſion for two years formed a preſcription for land; one year for moveables [w]: An indication, that there was not in ITALY, during that period, much more order, tranquillity, and ſettled police, than there is at preſent among the TARTARS.

[r] What is the advantage of the column after it has broke the enemy's line? only, that it then takes them in flank, and diſſipates whatever ſtands near it by a fire from all ſides. But till it has broke them, does it not preſent a flank to the enemy, and that expoſed to their muſquetry, and, what is much worſe, to their cannon?

[s] Hiſt. lib. 2. cap. 44.

[t] As ABYDUS, mentioned by LIVY, lib. 31. cap. 17. 18. and POLYB. lib. 16. As alſo the XANTHIANS, APPIAN. *de bell. civil.* lib. 4.

[u] *In vita* ARATI.

[w] INST. lib. 2. cap. 6. 'Tis true, the ſame law ſeems to have been continued till the time of JUSTINIAN. But abuſes introduced by barbariſm, are not always corrected by civility.

THE

THE only cartel I remember in antient hiſtory, is that between DEMETRIUS POLIORCETES and the RHODIANS; when it was agreed, that a free citizen ſhould be reſtored for 1000 *drachmas*, a ſlave bearing arms for 500 [x].

BUT, *ſecondly*, it appears that antient manners were more unfavorable than the modern, not only in times of war, but alſo in thoſe of peace; and that too in every reſpect, except the love of civil liberty and equality, which is, I own, of conſiderable importance. To exclude faction from a free government, is very difficult, if not altogether impracticable; but ſuch inveterate rage between the factions, and ſuch bloody maxims, are found, in modern times, amongſt religious parties alone, where bigotted prieſts are the accuſers, judges, and executioners. In antient hiſtory, we may always obſerve, where one party prevailed, whether the nobles or people, (for I can obſerve no difference in this reſpect *) that they immediately butchered all of the oppoſite party who fell into their hands, and baniſhed ſuch as had been ſo fortunate as to eſcape their fury. No form of proceſs, no law, no trial, no pardon. A fourth, a third, perhaps near a half of the city, were ſlaughtered, or expelled, every revolution; and the exiles always joined foreign enemies, and did all the miſchief poſſible to their fellow-citizens; till Fortune put it in their power to take full revenge by a new revolution. And as theſe were very frequent in ſuch violent governments, the diſorder, diffidence, jealouſy, enmity, which muſt prevail, are not eaſy for us to imagine in this age of the world.

THERE are only two revolutions I can recollect in antient hiſtory, which paſſed without great ſeverity, and great effuſion of blood in maſſacres and aſſaſſinations, *viz.* the reſtoration of the ATHENIAN Democracy by THRASYBULUS, and the ſubduing the ROMAN republic by CÆSAR. We learn from antient hiſtory, that THRASYBULUS paſſed a general amneſty for all paſt offences; and firſt introduced that word, as well as practice, into GREECE [y]. It appears, however, from many orations of LYSIAS [z], that the chief, and even ſome of the ſubaltern offenders, in in the preceding tyranny, were tried, and capitally puniſhed. This is a difficulty not cleared up, and even not obſerved by antiquarians and hiſtorians. And as to CÆSAR's clemency, tho' much celebrated, it would not gain great applauſe in the preſent age. He butchered for inſtance, all CATO's ſenate, when he became maſter of UTICA [a]; and theſe, we may readily believe, were not the moſt worthleſs of the party. All thoſe who had borne arms againſt that uſurper, were forfeited; and, by HIRTIUS's law, declared incapable of all public offices.

THESE people were extremely fond of liberty; but ſeem not to have underſtood it very well. When the thirty tyrants firſt eſtabliſhed their dominion at ATHENS, they began with ſeizing all the ſycophants and informers, who had been ſo troubleſome during the Democracy, and putting them to death by an arbitrary ſentence and execution. *Every man*, ſay SALLUST [b] and LYSIAS [c], *was rejoiced at theſe puniſhments*; not conſidering, that liberty was from that moment annihilated.

[x] DIOD. SICUL. lib. 20.

* LYSIAS, who was himſelf of the popular faction, and very narrowly eſcaped from the thirty tyrants, ſays, that the Democracy was as violent a government as the Oligarchy. *Orat.* 24. *de ſtatu popul.*

[y] CICERO, PHILIP. 1.

[z] As *orat.* 11. *contra* ERATOST. *orat.* 12. *contra* AGORAT. *orat.* 15. *pro* MANTITH.

[a] APPIAN. *de bell. civ.* lib. 2.

[b] See CÆSAR's ſpeech *de bell. Catil.*

[c] *Orat.* 24. And in *orat.* 29. he mentions the faction only as the cauſe why theſe illegal puniſhments ſhould diſpleaſe.

THE utmoſt energy of the nervous ſtyle of THUCYDIDES, and the great copiouſneſs and expreſſion of the GREEK language, ſeem to ſink under that hiſtorian, when he attempts to deſcribe the diſorders which aroſe from faction thro'out all the GREEK commonwealths. You would imagine, that he ſtill labors with a thought greater than he can find words to communicate. And he concludes his pathetic deſcription with an obſervation, which is at once very refined and very ſolid. "In theſe conteſts," ſays he, "thoſe who were dulleſt and moſt ſtupid, "and had the leaſt foreſight, commonly prevailed. For being conſcious of this "weakneſs, and dreading to be over-reached by thoſe of greater penetration, "they went to work haſtily, without premeditation, by the ſword and poniard, "and thereby prevented their antagoniſts, who were forming fine ſchemes and "projects for their deſtruction [d]".

NOT to mention DIONYSIUS [e] the elder, who is computed to have butchered in cold blood above 10,000 of his fellow-citizens; nor AGATHOCLES [f], NABIS [g], and others, ſtill more bloody than he; the tranſactions, even in free governments, were extremely violent and deſtructive. At ATHENS, the thirty tyrants and the nobles, in a twelvemonth, murdered, without trial, about 1200 of the people, and baniſhed above the half of the citizens that remained [h]. In ARGOS, near the ſame time, the people killed 1200 of the nobles; and afterwards their own demagogues, becauſe they had refuſed to carry their proſecutions farther [i]. The people alſo in CORCYRA killed 1500 of the nobles, and baniſhed a thouſand [k]. Theſe numbers will appear the more ſurpriſing, if we conſider the extreme ſmallneſs of theſe ſtates. But all antient hiſtory is full of ſuch inſtances [l].

WHERE

[d] Lib. 3. The country in EUROPE in which I have obſerved the factions to be moſt violent, and party-hatred the ſtrongeſt, is IRELAND. This goes ſo far as to cut off even the moſt common intercourſe of civilities betwixt the Proteſtants and Catholics. Their cruel inſurrections, and the ſevere revenges which they have taken of each other, are the cauſes of this mutual ill will, which is the chief ſource of the diſorder, poverty, and depopulation of that country. The GREEK factions I imagine to have been inflamed ſtill to a higher degree of rage; the revolutions being commonly more frequent, and the maxims of aſſaſſination much more avowed and acknowleged.

[e] PLUT. *de virt. & fort.* ALEX.

[f] DIOD. SIC. lib. 18. 19.

[g] TIT. LIV. lib. 31. 33. 34.

[h] DIOD. SIC. lib. 14. ISOCRATES ſays there were only 5000 baniſhed. He makes the number of thoſe killed amount to 1500. AREOP. ÆSCHINES, *contra* CTESIPH. aſſigns preciſely the ſame number. SENECA (*de tranq. anim.* cap. 5.) ſays 1300.

[i] DIOD. SIC. lib. 15.

[k] DIOD. SIC. lib. 13.

[l] We ſhall mention from DIODORUS SICULUS alone a few, which paſſed in the courſe of ſixty years during the moſt ſhining age of GREECE. There were baniſhed from SYRACUSE 500 of the nobles and their partiſans; lib. 12. p. 77. *ed. Rhodomanni.* Of CHIANS, 600 citizens baniſhed; lib. 13. p. 189. At EPHESUS, 340 killed, 1000 baniſhed; lib. 13. p. 223. Of CYRENEANS, 500 nobles killed; all the reſt baniſhed; lib. 14. p. 263. The CORINTHIANS killed 120, baniſhed 500; lib. 14. p. 304. PHARIDAS the SPARTAN baniſhed 300 BARCTIANS; lib. 15. p. 342. Upon the fall of the LACEDEMONIANS, Democracies were reſtored in many cities, and ſevere vengeance taken of the nobles, after the GREEK manner. But matters did not end there. For the baniſhed nobles, returning in many places, butchered their adverſaries, at PHIALAE, in CORINTH, in MEGARA, in PHLIASIA. In this laſt place they killed 300 of the people; but theſe again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, and baniſhed the reſt; lib. 15. p. 357. In ARCADIA 1400 baniſhed, beſides many killed. The baniſhed retired to SPARTA and to PALLANTIUM: The latter delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed; lib. 15. p. 373. Of the baniſhed from ARGOS and THEBES, there were 500 in the SPARTAN army; *id.* p. 374. Here is a detail of the moſt remarkable of AGATHOCLES's cruelties from the

I NEED not inſiſt on the GREEK tyrannies, which were altogether horrible. Even the mixed monarchies, by which moſt of the antient ſtates of GREECE were governed, before the introduction of republics, were very unſettled. Scarce any city, but ATHENS, ſays ISOCRATES, could ſhow a ſucceſſion of kings for four or five generations [q].

BESIDES many other obvious reaſons for the inſtability of antient monarchies, the equal diviſion of property among the brothers in private families, by a neceſſary conſequence, muſt contribute to unſettle and diſturb the ſtate. The univerſal preference given to the elder in modern governments, tho' it increaſes the inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good effect, that it accuſtoms men to the ſame idea of public ſucceſſion, and cuts off all claim and pretenſion of the younger.

THE new ſettled colony of HERACLEA, falling immediately into factions, applied to SPARTA, who ſent HERIPIDAS with full authority to quiet their diſſenſions. This man, not provoked by any oppoſition, not inflamed by party-rage, knew no better expedient than immediately putting to death about 500 of the citizens [r]. A ſtrong proof how deeply rooted theſe violent maxims of government were thro'out all GREECE.

IF ſuch was the diſpoſition of mens minds among that refined people, what may be expected in the commonwealths of ITALY, AFRIC, SPAIN, and GAUL, which were denominated barbarous? Why otherwiſe did the GREEKS ſo much value themſelves on their humanity, gentleneſs and moderation, above all other nations? This reaſoning ſeems very natural. But unluckily the hiſtory of the ROMAN commonwealth, in its earlier times, if we give credit to the received accounts, ſtands againſt us. No blood was ever ſhed in any ſedition at ROME, till the murder of the GRACCHI. DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSÆUS [s], obſerving the ſingular humanity of the ROMAN people in this particular, makes uſe of it as an argument that they were originally of GRECIAN extraction: Whence we may conclude, that the factions and revolutions in the barbarous republics were more violent than even thoſe of GREECE above-mentioned.

IF the ROMANS were ſo late in coming to blows, they made ample compenſation after they had once entered upon the bloody ſcene; and APPIAN's hiſtory of their civil wars contains the moſt frightful picture of maſſacres, proſcriptions, and forfeitures, that ever was preſented to the world. What pleaſes moſt, in that hiſtorian, is, that he ſeems to feel a proper reſentment of theſe barbarous proceedings; and talks not with that provoking coolneſs and indifference, which cuſtom had produced in many of the GREEK hiſtorians [t].

THE

ſon to repent. *Orat.* 30. *contra* PHIL.. You may ſee with what care DEMOSTHENES diſplays his expences of this nature, when he pleads for himſelf *de corona*; and how he exaggerates MIDIAS's ſtingineſs in this particular, in his accuſation of that criminal. All this, by the by, is a mark of a very iniquitous judicature: And yet the ATHENIANS valued themſelves on having the moſt legal and regular adminiſtration of any people in GREECE.

[q] Panath.

[r] DIOD. SIC. lib. 14.

[s] Lib. 1.

[t] The authorities cited above, are all hiſtorians, orators, and philoſophers, whoſe teſtimony is unqueſtioned. 'Tis dangerous to rely upon writers who deal in ridicule and ſatyr. What will poſterity, for inſtance, infer from this paſſage of Dr. SWIFT? "I told him, that in the kingdom of "TRIBNIA (BRITAIN), by the natives called "LANGDON, (LONDON), where I had ſojourned "ſome

THE maxims of antient politics contain, in general, ſo little humanity and moderation, that it ſeems ſuperfluous to give any particular reaſon for the violences committed at any particular period. Yet I cannot forbear obſerving, that the laws, in the latter ages of the ROMAN commonwealth, were ſo abſurdly contrived, that they obliged the heads of parties to have recourſe to theſe extremities. All capital puniſhments were aboliſhed: However criminal, or, what is more, however dangerous, any citizen might be, he could not regularly be puniſhed otherwiſe than by baniſhment: And it became neceſſary, in the revolutions of party, to draw the ſword of private vengeance; nor was it eaſy, when laws were once violated, to ſet bounds to theſe ſanguinary proceedings. Had BRUTUS himſelf prevailed over the *triumvirate*, could he, in common prudence, have allowed OCTAVIUS and ANTHONY to live, and have contented himſelf with baniſhing them to RHODES or MARSEILLES, where they might ſtill have plotted new commotions and rebellions. His executing C. ANTONIUS, brother to the *triumvir*, ſhows evidently his ſenſe of the matter. Did not CICERO, with the approbation of all the wiſe and virtuous of ROME, arbitrarily put to death CATILINE's aſſociates, contrary to law, and without any trial or form of proceſs? And if he moderated his executions, did it not proceed, either from the clemency of his temper, or the conjunctures of the times? A wretched ſecurity in a government which pretends to laws and liberty?

THUS, one extreme produces another. In the ſame manner as exceſſive ſeverity in the laws is apt to beget great relaxation in their execution; ſo their exceſſive lenity naturally produces cruelty and barbarity. 'Tis dangerous to force us, in any caſe, to paſs their ſacred boundaries.

ONE general cauſe of the diſorders ſo frequent in all antient governments, ſeems to have conſiſted in the great difficulty of eſtabliſhing any Ariſtocracy in thoſe ages, and the perpetual diſcontents and ſeditions of the people, whenever even the meaneſt and moſt beggarly were excluded from the legiſlature, and from public offices. The very quality of *freeman* gave ſuch a rank, being oppoſed to that of *ſlave*, that it ſeemed to intitle the poſſeſſor to every power and privilege of the commonwealth. SOLON's [u] laws excluded no freeman from votes or elections, but confined ſome magiſtracies to a particular *cenſus*; yet were the people never ſatisfied till thoſe laws were repealed. By the treaty with ANTIPATER [w], no ATHENIAN had a vote whoſe *cenſus* was leſs than 2000 *drachma*'s, (about 60 l. *Sterling*.) And tho' ſuch a government would to us appear ſufficiently democratical, it was ſo diſagreeable to that people, that above two thirds immediately left their coun-

" ſome time in my travels, the bulk of the people " conſiſt, in a manner, wholly of diſcoverers, wit- " neſſes, informers, accuſers, proſecutors, eviden- " ces, ſwearers, together with their ſeveral ſub- " ſervient and ſubaltern inſtruments, all under the " colors, the conduct, and pay of miniſters of ſtate " and their deputies. The plots in that kingdom are " uſually the workmanſhip of thoſe perſons," &c. GULLIVER's *travels*. Such a repreſentation might ſuit the government of ATHENS; but not that of ENGLAND, which is a prodigy, even in modern times, for humanity, juſtice, and liberty. Yet the Doctor's ſatyr, tho' carried to extremes, as is uſual with him, even beyond other ſatyrical writers, did not altogether want an object. The Biſhop of ROCHESTER, who was his friend, and of the ſame party, had been baniſhed a little before by a bill of attainder, with great juſtice, but without ſuch a proof as was legal, or according to the ſtrict forms of common law.

[u] PLUTARCHUS *in vita* SOLON.

[w] DIOD. SIC lib. 18.

try [x]. CASSANDER reduced that *cenſus* to the half [y]; yet ſtill the government was conſidered as an oligarchical tyranny, and the effect of foreign violence.

SERVIUS TULLIUS's [z] laws ſeem very equal and reaſonable, by fixing the power in proportion to the property: Yet the ROMAN people could never be brought quietly to ſubmit to them.

IN thoſe days there was no medium betwixt a ſevere, jealous Ariſtocracy, over diſcontented ſubjects; and a turbulent, factious, tyrannical Democracy.

BUT, *thirdly*, there are many other circumſtances, in which antient nations ſeem inferior to the modern, both for the happineſs and increaſe of mankind. Trade, manufactures, induſtry, were no where, in former ages, ſo flouriſhing as they are at preſent in EUROPE. The only garb of the antients, both for males and females, ſeems to have been a kind of flannel, which they wore commonly white or grey, and which they ſcoured as often as it grew dirty. TYRE, which carried on, after CARTHAGE, the greateſt commerce of any city in the MEDITERRANEAN, before it was deſtroyed by ALEXANDER, was no mighty city, if we credit ARRIAN's account of its inhabitants [a]. ATHENS is commonly ſuppoſed to have been a trading city: But it was as populous before the MEDIAN war, as at any time after it, according to HERODOTUS [b]; and yet its commerce, at that time, was ſo inconſiderable, that, as the ſame hiſtorian obſerves [c], even the neighboring coaſts of ASIA were as little frequented by the GREEKS as the pillars of HERCULES: For beyond theſe he conceived nothing.

GREAT intereſt of money, and great profits of trade, are an infallible indication, that induſtry and commerce are but in their infancy. We read in LYSIAS [d] of 100 *per cent.* profit made on a cargo of two talents, ſent to no greater diſtance than from ATHENS to the ADRIATIC: Nor is this mentioned as an inſtance of exorbitant profit. ANTIDORUS, ſays DEMOSTHENES [e], paid three talents and a half for a houſe, which he let at a talent a-year: And the orator blames his own tutors for not employing his money to like advantage. My fortune, ſays he, in eleven years minority, ought to have been tripled. The value of 20 of the ſlaves left by his father, he computes at 40 minas, and the yearly profit of their labor at 12 [f]. The moſt moderate intereſt at ATHENS, (for there was higher [g] often paid) was 12 *per cent.* [h], and that paid monthly. Not to inſiſt upon the exorbitant intereſt of 34 *per cent.* to which the vaſt ſums diſtributed in elections had raiſed money [i] at ROME, we find, that VERRES, before that factious period, ſtated 24 *per cent.* for money, which he left in the publicans hands. And tho' CICERO declaims againſt this article, it is not on account of the extravagant uſury; but becauſe it had never been cuſtomary to ſtate any intereſt on ſuch occaſions [k]. Intereſt, in-

[x] Id. ibid.
[y] Id. ibid.
[z] TIT. LIV. lib. 1. cap. 43.
[a] Lib. 2. There were 8000 killed during the ſiege; and the whole captives amounted to 30,000. DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. 17. ſays only 13,000: But he accounts for this ſmall number, by ſaying that the TYRIANS had ſent away beforehand part of their wives and children to CARTHAGE.
[b] Lib. 5. he makes the number of the citizens amount to 30,000.
[c] Ib. 5.
[d] *Orat.* 33. *adverſ.* DIAGIT.
[e] *Contra* APHOB. p. 25. *ex edit.* ALDI.
[f] *Contra* APHOB. p. 19. *ex edit.* ALDI.
[g] Id. *ibid.*
[h] Id. ibid. and ÆSCHINES *contra* CTESIPH.
[i] *Epiſt. ad* ATTIC. lib. 5. epiſt. 21.
[k] *Contra* VERR. *orat.* 3.

deed,

lible and univerſal; and as it prevails more in modern governments than in the antient, it affords a preſumption of the ſuperior populouſneſs of the former.

EVERY man, ſays XENOPHON [p], may be a farmer: No art or ſkill is requiſite: All conſiſts in the induſtry, and attention to the execution. A ſtrong proof, as COLUMELLA hints, that agriculture was but little known in the age of XENOPHON.

ALL our latter improvements and refinements, have they operated nothing towards the eaſy ſubſiſtence of men, and conſequently towards their propagation and increaſe? Our ſuperior ſkill in mechanics, the diſcovery of new worlds, by which commerce has been ſo much enlarged, the eſtabliſhment of poſts, and the uſe of bills of exchange; theſe ſeem all extremely uſeful to the encouragement of art, induſtry, and populouſneſs. Were we to ſtrike off theſe, what a check ſhould we give to every kind of buſineſs and labor, and what multitudes of families would immediately periſh from want and hunger? And it ſeems not probable, that we could ſupply the place of theſe new inventions by any other regulation or inſtitution.

HAVE we reaſon to think, that the police of antient ſtates was any way comparable to that of modern, or that men had then equal ſecurity, either at home, or in their journies by land or water? I queſtion not, but every impartial examiner would give us the preference in this particular [q].

THUS, upon comparing the whole, it ſeems impoſſible to aſſign any juſt reaſon, why the world ſhould have been more populous in antient than in modern times. The equality of property, among the antients, liberty, and the ſmall diviſions of their ſtates, were indeed favorable to the propagation of mankind: But their wars were more bloody and deſtructive, their governments more factious and unſettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and languiſhing, and the general police more looſe and irregular. Theſe latter diſadvantages ſeem to form a ſufficient counterbalance to the former advantages; and rather favor the oppoſite opinion to that which commonly prevails with regard to this ſubject.

BUT there is no reaſoning, it may be ſaid, againſt matter of fact. If it appear, that the world was then more populous than at preſent, we may be aſſured, that our conjectures are falſe, and that we have overlooked ſome material circumſtance in the compariſon. This I readily own: All our preceding reaſonings, I acknowlege to be mere trifling, or, at leaſt, ſmall ſkirmiſhes and frivolous rencounters, which decide nothing. But unluckily the main combat, where we compare facts, cannot be rendered much more deciſive. The facts delivered by antient authors, are either ſo uncertain or ſo imperfect as to afford us nothing certain in this matter. How indeed could it be otherwiſe? The very facts which we muſt oppoſe to them, in computing the greatneſs of modern ſtates, are far from being either certain or compleat. Many grounds of calculation, proceeded on by celebrated writers, are little better than thoſe of the Emperor HELIOGABALUS, who formed an eſtimate of the immenſe greatneſs of ROME, from ten thouſand pound weight of cobwebs which had been found in that city [r].

[p] Oecon.

[q] See Part I. Eſſay XV.

[r] ÆLII LAMPRID. *in vita* HELIOGAB. cap. 26.

'TIS

'Tis to be remarked, that all kinds of numbers are uncertain in antient manuſcripts, and have been ſubject to much greater corruptions than any other part of the text; and that for a very obvious reaſon. Any alteration, in other places commonly affects the ſenſe or grammar, and is more readily perceived by the reader and tranſcriber.

Few enumerations of inhabitants have been made of any tract of country by any antient author of good authority, ſo as to afford us a large enough view for compariſon.

'Tis probable, that there was formerly a good foundation for the number of citizens aſſigned to any free city; becauſe they entered for a ſhare of the government, and there were exact regiſters kept of them. But as the number of ſlaves is ſeldom mentioned, this leaves us in as great uncertainty as ever, with regard to the populouſneſs even of ſingle cities.

The firſt page of Thucydides is, in my opinion, the commencement of real hiſtory. All preceding narrations are ſo intermixed with fable, that philoſophers ought to abandon them, in a great meaſure, to the embelliſhment of poets and orators [s].

With regard to remote times, the numbers of people aſſigned are often ridiculous, and loſe all credit and authority. The free citizens of Sybaris, able to bear arms, and actually drawn out in battle, were 300,000. They encountred at Siagra with 100,000 citizens of Crotona, another Greek city contiguous to them; and were defeated. This is Diodorus Siculus's [t] account; and is very ſeriouſly inſiſted on by that hiſtorian. Strabo [u] alſo mentions the ſame number of Sybarites.

Diodorus Siculus [w], enumerating the inhabitants of Agrigentum, when it was deſtroyed by the Carthaginians, ſays, that they amounted to 20,000 citizens, 200,000 ſtrangers, beſides ſlaves, who, in ſo opulent a city as he repreſents it, would probably be, at leaſt, as numerous. We muſt remark, that the women and the children are not included; and that therefore, upon the whole, the city muſt contain near two millions of inhabitants [x]. And what was the reaſon of ſo immenſe an increaſe? They were very induſtrious in cultivating the neighboring fields, not exceeding a ſmall English county; and they traded with their wine and oil to Africa, which, at that time, had none of theſe commodities.

Ptolemy, ſays Theocritus [y], commands 33,339 cities. I ſuppoſe the ſingularity of the number was the reaſon of aſſigning it. Diodorus Siculus [z] aſ-

[s] In general, there is more candor and ſincerity in antient hiſtorians, but leſs exactneſs and care, than in the moderns. Our ſpeculative factions, eſpecially thoſe of religion, throw ſuch an illuſion over our minds, that men ſeem to regard impartiality to their adverſaries and to heretics, as a vice or weakneſs: But the commonneſs of books, by means of printing, has obliged modern hiſtorians to be more careful in avoiding contradictions and incongruities. Diodorus Siculus is a good writer; but 'tis with pain I ſee his narration contradict, in ſo many particulars, the two moſt authentic pieces of all Greek hiſtory, *viz.* Xenophon's expedition, and Demoſthenes's orations. Plutarch and Appian ſeem ſcarce ever to have read Cicero's epiſtles.

[t] Lib. 12.

[u] Lib. 6.

[w] Lib. 13.

[x] Diogenes Laertius (*in vita* Empedoclis) ſays, that Agrigentum contained only 800,000 inhabitants.

[y] Idyll. 17.

[z] Lib. 1.

ſigns three millions of inhabitants to ÆGYPT, a very ſmall number: But then he makes the number of their cities amount to 18,000: An evident contradiction.

HE ſays [a], the people were formerly ſeven millions. Thus remote times are always moſt envied and admired.

THAT XERXES's army was extremely numerous, I can readily believe; both from the great extent of his empire, and from the fooliſh practice of the Eaſtern nations, of encumbering their camp with a ſuperfluous multitude: But will any reaſonable man cite HERODOTUS's wonderful narrations as an authority? There is ſomething very rational, I own, in LYSIAS's [b] argument upon this ſubject. Had not XERXES's army been incredibly numerous, ſays he, he had never made a bridge over the HELLESPONT: It had been much eaſier to have tranſported his men over ſo ſhort a paſſage, with the numerous ſhipping of which he was maſter.

POLYBIUS [c] ſays, that the ROMANS, between the firſt and ſecond PUNIC wars, being threatened with an invaſion from the GAULS, muſtered all their own forces, and thoſe of their allies, and found them amount to ſeven hundred thouſand men able to bear arms. A great number ſurely, and which, when joined to the ſlaves, is probably not leſs, if not rather more than that extent of country affords at preſent [d]. The enumeration too ſeems to have been made with ſome exactneſs; and POLYBIUS gives us the detail of the particulars. But might not the number be magnified, in order to encourage the people?

DIODORUS SICULUS [e], makes the ſame enumeration amount to near a million. Theſe variations are ſuſpicious. He plainly too ſuppoſes, that ITALY in his time was not ſo populous: Another very ſuſpicious circumſtance. For who can believe, that the inhabitants of that country diminiſhed from the time of the firſt PUNIC war to that of the *triumvirates?*

JULIUS CÆSAR, according to APPIAN [f], encountered four millions of GAULS, killed one million, and took another million priſoners [g]. Suppoſing the numbers of the enemy's army and of the killed could be exactly aſſigned, which never is poſſible; how could it be known how often the ſame man returned into the armies, or how diſtinguiſh the new from the old levied ſoldiers? No attention ought ever to be given to ſuch looſe, exaggerated calculations; eſpecially where the author tells us not the mediums upon which the calculations were formed.

PATERCULUS [h] makes the number killed by CAESAR amount only to 400,000: A much more probable account, and more eaſily reconciled to the hiſtory of theſe wars given by that conqueror himſelf in his commentaries.

ONE would imagine, that every circumſtance of the life and actions of DIONYSIUS the elder might be regarded as authentic, and free from all fabulous exaggeration; both becauſe he lived at a time when letters flouriſhed moſt in GREECE,

[a] Id. ibid.
[b] *Orat. funebris.*
[c] Lib. 2.
[d] The country that ſupplied this number, was not above a third of ITALY, *viz.* the Pope's dominions, TUSCANY, and a part of the kingdom of NAPLES. But perhaps in thoſe early times there were very few ſlaves, except in ROME or the great cities.
[e] Lib. 2.
[f] CELTICA.
[g] PLUTARCH (*in vita* CAES.) makes the number that CAESAR fought with amount only to three millions; JULIAN. (*in* CAESARIBUS) to two.
[h] Lib. 2. cap. 47.

and

and becauſe his chief hiſtorian was PHILISTUS, a man allowed to be of great genius, and who was a courtier and miniſter of that prince. But can we admit, that he had a ſtanding army of 100,000 foot, 10,000 horſe, and a fleet of 400 gallies [i]? Theſe, we may obſerve, were mercenary forces, and ſubſiſted upon their pay, like our armies in EUROPE. For the citizens were all diſarmed; and when DION afterwards invaded SICILY, and called on his countrymen to vindicate their liberty, he was obliged to bring arms along with him, which he diſtributed among thoſe who joined him [k]. In a ſtate where agriculture alone flouriſhes, there may be many inhabitants; and if theſe be all armed and diſciplined, a great force may be called out upon occaſion: But great numbers of mercenary troops can never be maintained, without either trade and manufactures, or very extenſive dominions. The United Provinces never were maſters of ſuch a force by ſea and land, as that which is ſaid to belong to DIONYSIUS; yet they poſſeſs as large a territory, perfectly well cultivated, and have infinitely more reſources from their commerce and induſtry. DIODORUS SICULUS allows, that, even in his time, the army of DIONYSIUS appeared incredible; that is, as I interpret it, it was entirely a fiction, and the opinion aroſe from the exaggerated flattery of the courtiers, and perhaps from the vanity and policy of the tyrant himſelf.

THE critical art may very juſtly be ſuſpected of temerity, when it pretends to correct or diſpute the plain teſtimony of antient hiſtorians by any probable or analogical reaſonings: Yet the licence of authors upon all ſubjects, particularly with regard to numbers, is ſo great, that we ought ſtill to retain a kind of doubt or reſerve, whenever the facts advanced depart, in the leaſt, from the common bounds of nature and experience. I ſhall give an inſtance with regard to modern hiſtory. Sir WILLIAM TEMPLE tells us, in his memoirs, that, having a free converſation with CHARLES II. he took the opportunity of repreſenting to that monarch the impoſſibility of introducing into this iſland the religion and government of FRANCE, chiefly on account of the great force requiſite to ſubdue the ſpirit and liberty of ſo brave a people. "The ROMANS," ſays he "were forced to keep up twelve le-"gions for that purpoſe," a great abſurdity [l]; "and CROMWEL left an army of "near eighty thouſand men." Muſt not this laſt fact be regarded as unqueſtioned by future critics, when they find it aſſerted by a wiſe and learned miniſter of ſtate, cotemporary to the fact, and who addreſſed his diſcourſe, upon an ungrateful ſubject, to a great monarch, who was alſo cotemporary, and who himſelf broke thoſe very forces about fourteen years before? Yet, by the moſt undoubted authority, we may inſiſt, that CROMWEL's army, when he died, did not amount to half the number here mentioned [m].

'TIS

[i] DIOD. SIC. lib. 2.

[k] PLUTARCH. *in vita* DIONIS.

[l] STRABO, lib. 4. ſays, that one legion would be ſufficient, with a few cavalry; but the ROMANS commonly kept up ſomewhat a greater force in this iſland; which they never took the pains entirely to ſubdue.

[m] It appears, that CROMWEL's parliament in 1656, ſettled but 1,300,000 pound a year on him for the conſtant charges of government in all the three kingdoms. See SCOBEL, chap. 31. This was to ſupply fleet, army, and civil liſt. It appears from WHITLOCKE, that, in the year 1649, the ſum of 80,000 pounds a-month was the eſtimate for 40,000 men. We muſt conclude, therefore, that CROMWEL had much leſs than that number upon pay in 1656. In the very inſtrument of government, 20,000 foot, and 10,000 horſe are fixed by CROMWEL himſelf, and afterwards confirmed by the parliament, as the regu-

'Tis a very uſual fallacy, to conſider all the ages of antiquity as one period, and to compute the numbers contained in the great cities mentioned by antient authors, as if theſe cities had been all cotemporary. The GREEK colonies flouriſhed extremely in SICILY during the age of ALEXANDER: But in AUGUSTUS's time they were ſo decayed, that almoſt all the product of that fertile iſland was conſumed in ITALY [n].

LET us now examine the numbers of inhabitants aſſigned to particular cities in antiquity; and omitting the numbers of NINEVEH, BABYLON, and the EGYPTIAN THEBES, let us confine ourſelves to the ſphere of real hiſtory, to the GRECIAN and ROMAN ſtates. I muſt own, the more I conſider this ſubject, the more am I inclined to ſcepticiſm, with regard to the great populouſneſs aſcribed to antient times.

ATHENS is ſaid by PLATO [o] to be a very great city; and it was ſurely the greateſt of all the GREEK [p] cities, except SYRACUSE, which was nearly about the ſame ſize in THUCYDIDES's [q] time, and afterwards increaſed beyond it. For CICERO [r] mentions it as the greateſt of all the GREEK cities in his time; not comprehending, I ſuppoſe, either ANTIOCH or ALEXANDRIA under that denomination. ATHENAEUS [s] ſays, that, by the enumeration of DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS, there were in ATHENS 21,000 citizens, 10,000 ſtrangers, and 400,000 ſlaves. This number is very much inſiſted on by thoſe whoſe opinion I call in queſtion, and is eſteemed a fundamental fact to their purpoſe: But, in my opinion, there is no point, of criticiſm more certain, than that ATHENAEUS, and CTESICLES, whom he cites, are here miſtaken, and that the number of ſlaves is augmented by a whole cypher, and ought not to be regarded as more than 40,000.

Firſt, WHEN the number of citizens is ſaid to be 21,000 by ATHENAEUS [t], men of full age are only underſtood. For (1.) HERODOTUS ſays [u], that ARISTAGORAS, ambaſſador from the IONIANS, found it harder to deceive one SPARTAN than 30,000 ATHENIANS; meaning, in a looſe way, the whole ſtate, ſuppoſed to be met in one popular aſſembly, excluding the women and children. (2.) THUCYDIDES [w] ſays, that, making allowance for all the abſentees in the fleet, army, garriſons, and for people employed in their private affairs, the ATHENIAN aſſembly never roſe to five thouſand. (3.) The forces enumerated by the ſame hiſtorian [x], being all citizens, and amounting to 13,000 heavy-armed infantry, prove the ſame method of calculation; as alſo the whole tenor of the GREEK hiſtorians, who always underſtand men of full age, when they aſſign the number of

lar ſtanding army of the commonwealth. That number, indeed, ſeems not to have been much exceeded, during the whole time of the protectorſhip. See farther, THURLOE, vol. 2. p. 413. 499. 568. We may there ſee, that tho' the Protector had more conſiderable armies in IRELAND and SCOTLAND, he had not ſometimes more than 4 or 5000 men in ENGLAND.

[n] STRABO, lib. 6.

[o] *Apolog.* SOCR.

[p] ARGOS ſeems alſo to have been a great city: For LYSIAS contents himſelf with ſaying that it did not exceed ATHENS. Orat. 34.

[q] Lib. 6. See alſo PLUTARCH *in vita* NICIAE.

[r] *Orat. contra* VERREM, lib. 4. cap. 52. STRABO, lib. 6. ſays it was twenty-two miles in compaſs. But then we are to conſider, that it contained two harbors within it; one of which was a very large one, and might be regarded as a kind of bay.

[s] Lib. 6. cap. 20.

[t] DEMOSTHENES aſſigns 20,000; *contra* ARISTOG.

[u] Lib. 5.

[w] Lib. 8.

[x] Lib. 2. DIODORUS SICULUS's account perfectly agrees, lib. 12.

citizens in any republic. Now, theſe being but the fourth of the inhabitants, the free ATHENIANS were by this account 84,000; the ſtrangers 40,000; and the ſlaves, calculating by the ſmaller number, and allowing that they married and propagated at the ſame rate with freemen, were 160,000; and the whole inhabitants 284,000: A large enough number ſurely. The other number, 1,720,000, makes ATHENS larger than LONDON and PARIS united.

Secondly, THERE were but 10,000 houſes in ATHENS [y].

Thirdly, Tho the extent of the walls, as given us by THUCYDIDES [z], be great, (*viz.* eighteen miles, beſide the ſea coaſt); yet XENOPHON [a] ſays, there was much waſte ground within the walls. They ſeem indeed to have joined four diſtinct and ſeparate cities [b].

Fourthly, No inſurrection of the ſlaves, nor ſuſpicion of inſurrection, are ever mentioned by hiſtorians; except one commotion of the miners [c].

Fifthly, THE ATHENIANS treatment of their ſlaves is ſaid by XENOPHON [d], and DEMOSTHENES [e], and PLAUTUS [f], to have been extremely gentle and indulgent: Which could never have been the caſe, had the diſproportion been twenty to one. The diſproportion is not ſo great in any of our colonies; and yet we are obliged to exerciſe a very rigorous military government over the negroes.

Sixthly, No man is ever eſteemed rich for poſſeſſing what may be reckoned an equal diſtribution of property in any country, or even triple or quadruple that wealth. Thus every perſon in ENGLAND is computed by ſome to ſpend ſixpence a-day: Yet is he eſteemed but poor who has five times that ſum. Now, TIMARCHUS is ſaid by ÆSCHINES [g] to have been left in eaſy circumſtances; but he was maſter only of ten ſlaves employed in manufactures. LYSIAS and his brother, two ſtrangers, were proſcribed by the thirty for their great riches; tho' they had but ſixty a-piece [h]. DEMOSTHENES was left very rich by his father; yet he had no more than fifty-two ſlaves [i]. His workhouſe, of twenty cabinet-makers, is ſaid to be a very conſiderable manufactory [k].

Seventhly, DURING the DECELIAN war, as the GREEK hiſtorians call it, 20,000 ſlaves deſerted, and brought the ATHENIANS to great diſtreſs, as we learn from THUCYDIDES [l]. This could not have happened, had they been only the twentieth part. The beſt ſlaves would not deſert.

Eighthly, XENOPHON [m] propoſes a ſcheme for entertaining by the public 10,000 ſlaves: And that ſo great a number may poſſibly by ſupported, any one will be convinced, ſays he, who conſiders the numbers we poſſeſſed before the DECELIAN

[y] XENOPHON. *Mem.* lib. 2.
[z] Lib. 2.
[a] *De ratione red.*
[b] We are to obſerve, that when DIONYSIUS HALYCARNASAEUS ſays, that if we regard the antient walls of ROME, the extent of the city will not appear greater than that of ATHENS; he muſt mean the ACROPOLIS, and high town, only. No antient author ever ſpeaks of the PIRAEUM, PHALERUS, and MUNYCHIA, as the ſame with ATHENS. Much leſs can it be ſuppoſed, that DIONYSIUS would conſider the matter in that light, after the walls of CIMON and PERICLES were deſtroyed, and ATHENS was entirely ſeparated from theſe other towns. This obſervation deſtroys all Vossius's reaſonings, and introduces common ſenſe into theſe calculations.
[c] ATHEN. lib. 6.
[d] *De rep.* ATHEN.
[e] PHILIP. 3.
[f] STICHO.
[g] *Contra* TIMARCH.
[h] *Orat.* 11.
[i] *Contra* APHOB.
[k] Ibid.
[l] Lib. 7.
[m] *De rat. red.*

war. A way of ſpeaking altogether incompatible with the larger number of ATHENAEUS.

Ninthly, THE whole *cenſus* of the ſtate of ATHENS was leſs than 6000 talents. And tho' numbers in antient manuſcripts be often ſuſpected by critics, yet this is unexceptionable; both becauſe DEMOSTHENES [n], who gives it, gives alſo the detail, which checks him; and becauſe POLYBIUS [o] aſſigns the ſame number, and reaſons upon it. Now, the moſt vulgar ſlave could yield by his labor an *obolus* a-day, over and above his maintenance, as we learn from XENOPHON [p], who ſays, that NICIAS's overſeer paid his maſter ſo much for ſlaves, whom he employed in digging of mines. If you will take the pains to eſtimate an *obolus* a-day, and the ſlaves at 400,000, computing only at four years purchaſe, you will find the ſum above 12,000 talents; even tho' allowance be made for the great number of holidays in ATHENS. Beſides, many of the ſlaves would have a much greater value from their art. The loweſt that DEMOSTHENES [q] eſtimates any of his father's ſlaves, is two minas a-head. And upon this ſuppoſition, it is a little difficult, I confeſs, to reconcile even the number of 40,000 ſlaves with the *cenſus* of 6000 talents.

Tenthly, CHIOS is ſaid by THUCYDIDES [r], to contain more ſlaves than any GREEK city, except SPARTA. SPARTA then had more than ATHENS, in proportion to the number of citizens. The SPARTANS were 9000 in the town, 30,000 in the country [s]. The male ſlaves, therefore, of full age, muſt have been more than 780,000; the whole more than 3,120,000. A number impoſſible to be maintained in a narrow, barren country, ſuch as LACONIA, which had no trade. Had the HELOTES been ſo very numerous, the murder of 2000 mentioned by THUCYDIDES [t], would have irritated them, without weakening them.

BESIDES, we are to conſider, that the number aſſigned by ATHANAEUS [u], whatever it is, comprehends all the inhabitants of ATTICA, as well as thoſe of ATHENS. The ATHENIANS affected much a country life, as we learn from THUCYDIDES [w]; and when they were all chaſed into town, by the invaſion of their territory during the PELOPONNESIAN war, the city was not able to contain them; and they were obliged to lie in the porticoes, temples, and even ſtreets, for want of lodging [x].

THE ſame remark is to be extended to all the other GREEK cities; and when the number of the citizens is aſſigned, we muſt always underſtand it of the inhabitants of the neighboring country, as well as of the city. Yet, even with this allowance, it muſt be confeſſed, that GREECE was a populous country, and exceeded what we could imagine of ſo narrow a territory, naturally not very fertile, and which drew no ſupplies of corn from other places. For excepting ATHENS, which

[n] *De claſſibus.*
[o] Lib. 2. cap. 62.
[p] *De rat. red.*
[q] *Contra* APHOBUM.
[r] Lib. 8.
[s] PLUTARCH. *in vita* LYCURG.
[t] Lib. 4.
[u] The ſame author affirms, that CORINTH had once 460,000 ſlaves, ÆGINA 470,000. But the foregoing arguments hold ſtronger againſt theſe facts. 'Tis however remarkable, that ATHENAEUS cites ſo great an authority as ARISTOTLE for this laſt fact: And the ſcholiaſt on PINDAR mentions the ſame number of ſlaves in ÆGINA.
[w] Lib. 2.
[x] THUCYD. Lib. 2.

according to PUBLIUS VICTOR, was only about forty-three miles. When an enemy invaded the country, the whole inhabitants retired within the walls of the antient cities, with their cattle and furniture, and inſtruments of huſbandry. And the great height to which the walls were raiſed, enabled a ſmall number to defend them with facility.

SPARTA, ſays XENOPHON [i], is one of the cities of GREECE that has the feweſt inhabitants. Yet POLYBIUS [k] ſays, that it was forty-eight ſtadia in circumference, and was round.

ALL the ÆTOLIANS able to bear arms in ANTIPATER's time, deducting ſome few garriſons, were but ten thouſand men [l].

POLYBIUS [m] tells us, that the ACHAEAN league might, without any inconvenience, march 30 or 40,000 men: and this account ſeems very probable: for that league comprehended the greateſt part of PELOPONNESUS. Yet PAUSANIAS [n], ſpeaking of the ſame period ſays, that all the ACHAEANS able to bear arms, even when ſeveral manumitted ſlaves were joined to them, did not amount to fifteen thouſand.

THE THESSALIANS, till their final conqueſt by the ROMANS, were, in all ages, turbulent, factious, ſeditious, diſorderly [o]. 'Tis not therefore natural to ſuppoſe, that that part of GREECE abounded much in people.

WE are told by THUCYCIDES [p], that the part of PELOPONNESUS adjoining to PYLOS, was deſart and uncultivated. HERODOTUS ſays [q], that MACEDONIA was full of lions and wild bulls; animals which can only inhabit vaſt unpeopled foreſts. Theſe were the two extremities of GREECE.

THE whole inhabitants of EPIRUS, of all ages, ſexes and conditions, who were ſold by PAULUS ÆMILIUS, amounted only to 150,000 [r]. Yet EPIRUS might be double the extent of YORKSHIRE.

JUSTIN [s] tells us, that when PHILIP of MACEDON was declared head of the GREEK confederacy, he called a congreſs of all the ſtates, except the LACEDEMONIANS, who refuſed to concur; and he found the force of the whole, upon computation, to amount to 200,000 infantry, and 15,000 cavalry. This muſt be underſtood to be all the citizens capable of bearing arms. For as the GREEK republics maintained no mercenary forces, and had no militia diſtinct from the whole body of the citizens, it is not conceivable what other medium there could be of computation. That ſuch an army could ever by GREECE be brought into the field, and be maintained there, is contrary to all hiſtory. Upon this ſuppoſition, therefore, we may thus reaſon. The free GREEKS of all ages and ſexes were 860,000. The ſlaves, computing them by the number of ATHENIAN ſlaves as above, who ſeldom married or had families, were double the male citizens of full age, *viz.* 430,000. And the whole inhabitants of antient GREECE, excepting LA-

[i] *De rep.* LACED. This paſſage is not eaſily reconciled with that of PLUTARCH above, who ſays, that SPARTA had 9000 citizens.
[k] POLYB. lib. 9. cap. 20.
[l] DIOD. SIC. lib. 18.
[m] LEGAT.
[n] *In* ACHAICIS.
[o] TIT. LIV. lib. 34. cap. 51. PLATO *in* CRITONE.
[p] Lib. 7.
[q] Lib. 7.
[r] TIT. LIV. lib. 45. cap. 34.
[s] Lib. 9. cap. 5.

CONIA,

CONIA, were about one million two hundred and ninety thouſand: No mighty number, nor much exceeding what may be found at preſent in SCOTLAND, a country nearly of the ſame extent, and very indifferently peopled.

WE may now conſider the numbers of people in ROME and ITALY, and collect all the lights afforded us by ſcattered paſſages in antient authors. We ſhall find, upon the whole, a great difficulty in fixing any opinion on that head; and no reaſon to ſupport thoſe exaggerated calculations, ſo much inſiſted on by modern writers.

DIONYSIUS HALLICARNASSÆUS [t] ſays, that the antient walls of ROME were nearly of the ſame compaſs with thoſe of ATHENS, but that the ſuburbs ran out to a great extent; and it was difficult to tell, where the town ended or the country begun. In ſome places of ROME, it appears, from the ſame author [u], from JUVENAL [w], and from other antient writers [x], that the houſes were high, and families lived in ſeparate ſtoreys, one above another: But it is probable, theſe were only the poorer citizens, and only in ſome few ſtreets. If we may judge from the younger PLINY's [y] account of his houſe, and from BARTOLI's plans of antient buildings, the men of quality had very ſpacious palaces; and their buildings were like the CHINESE houſes at this day, where each apartment is ſeparated from the reſt, and riſes no higher than a ſingle ſtorey. To which if we add, that the ROMAN nobility much affected very extenſive porticoes, and even woods [z] in town; we may perhaps allow VOSSIUS (tho' there is no manner of reaſon for it) to read the famous paſſage of the elder PLINY [a] his own way without admitting the extravagant conſequences which he draws from it.

THE

[t] Lib. 4.

[u] Lib. 10.

[w] Satyr 3. l. 269. 270.

[x] STRABO, lib. 5. ſays, that the emperor AUGUSTUS prohibited the raiſing houſes higher than ſeventy foot. In another paſſage, lib. 16. he ſpeaks of the houſes of ROME as remarkably high. See alſo to the ſame purpoſe VITRUVIUS, lib. 2. cap. 8. ARISTIDES the ſophiſt, in his oration εἰς Ῥώμην, ſays, that ROME conſiſted of cities on the top of cities; and that if one were to ſpread it out, and unfold it, it would cover the whole ſurface of ITALY. Where an author indulges himſelf in ſuch extravagant declamations, and gives ſo much into the hyperbolical ſtyle, one knows not how far he muſt be reduced. But this reaſoning ſeems natural: If ROME was built in ſo ſcattered a manner as DIONYSIUS ſays, and ran ſo much into the country, there muſt have been very few ſtreets where the houſes were raiſed ſo high. 'Tis only for want of ground, that any body builds in that inconvenient manner.

[y] Lib. 2. epiſt. 16. lib. 5. epiſt. 6. 'Tis true, PLINY there deſcribes a country-houſe: But ſince that was the idea which the antients formed of a magnificent and convenient building, the great men would certainly build the ſame way in town. "In laxitatem ruris excurrunt," ſays SENECA of the rich and voluptuous, epiſt. 114. VALERIUS MAXIMUS, lib. 4. cap. 4 ſpeaking of CINCINNATUS's field of four acres, ſays, "Auguſte ſe habitare nunc "putat, cujus domus tantum patet quantum Cin"cinnati rura patuerant." To the ſame purpoſe, ſee lib. 36. cap 15. alſo lib. 18. cap. 2.

[z] VITRUV. lib. 5. cap. 11. TACIT. annal. lib. 11. cap. 3. SUETON. *in vita* OCTAV. cap. 72. &c.

[a] "Moenia ejus (ROMAE) collegere ambitu im"peratoribus, cenſoribuſque VESPASIANIS, A. "U. C. 828. paſſ. xiii. MCC. complexa montes "ſeptem, ipſa dividitur in regiones quatuorde"cim, compita earum 265. Ejuſdem ſpatii menſura, currente a Milliario in capite Rom. Fori "ſtatuto, ad ſingulas portas, quae ſunt hodie numero 37, ita ut duodecim portae ſemel numerentur, praetereanturque ex veteribus ſeptem, "quae eſſe deſierunt, efficit paſſuum per directum "30,775. Ad extrema vero tectorum cum caſtris "praetoriis ab eodem Milliario, per vicos omnium viarum, menſura collegit. paulo amplius "ſeptuaginta millia paſſuum. Quo ſi quis altitudinem tectorum addat, dignam profecto aeſtimationem concipiat, fateaturque nullius urbis "magnitudinem in toto orbe potuiſſe ei comparari." PLIN. lib. 3. cap. 5.

All the beſt manuſcripts of PLINY read the paſſage

THE number of citizens who received corn by the public diſtribution in AUGUSTUS's time, were two hundred thouſand [b]. This one would eſteem a pretty certain ground of calculation: Yet it is attended with ſuch circumſtances as throw us back into doubt and uncertainty.

ſage as here cited, and fix the compaſs of the walls of Rome to be thirteen miles. The only queſtion is, What PLINY means by 30,775 paces, and how that number was formed? The manner in which I conceive it, is this. ROME was a ſemicircular area of thirteen miles circumference. The Forum, and conſequently the Milliarium, we know, was ſituated on the banks of the TYBER, and near the center of the circle, or upon the diameter of the ſemicircular area. Tho' there were thirty-ſeven gates to ROME, yet only twelve of them had ſtraight ſtreets, leading from them to the Milliarium. PLINY, therefore, having aſſigned the circumference of ROME, and knowing that that alone was not ſufficient to give us a juſt notion of its ſurface, uſes this farther method. He ſuppoſes all the ſtreets, leading from the Milliarium to the twelve gates, to be laid together into one ſtraight line, and ſuppoſes we run along that line, ſo as to count each gate once: In which caſe, he ſays, that the whole line is 30,775 paces: Or, in other words, that each ſtreet or radius of the ſemicircular area is upon an average two miles and a half; and the whole length of ROME is five miles, and its breadth about half as much, beſides the ſcattered ſuburbs.

PERE HARDOUIN underſtands this paſſage in the ſame manner; with regard to the laying together the ſeveral ſtreets of ROME into one line, in order to compoſe 30,775 paces: But then he ſuppoſes, that ſtreets led from the Milliarium to every gate, and that no ſtreet exceeded 800 paces in length. But (1.) a ſemicircular area, whoſe radius was only 800 paces, could never have a circumference near thirteen miles, the compaſs of ROME as aſſigned by PLINY. A radius of two miles and a half forms very nearly that circumference. (2.) There is an abſurdity in ſuppoſing a city ſo built as to have ſtreets running to its center from every gate in its circumference. Theſe ſtreets muſt interfere as they approach. (3.) This diminiſhes too much from the greatneſs of antient ROME, and reduces that city below even BRISTOL or ROTTERDAM.

The ſenſe which VOSSIUS in his *Obſervationes variæ* puts on this paſſage of PLINY, errs widely in the other extreme. One manuſcript, of no authority, inſtead of thirteen miles, has aſſigned thirty miles for the compaſs of the walls of ROME. And VOSSIUS underſtands this only of the curvilinear part of the circumference; ſuppoſing, that as the TYBER formed the diameter, there were no walls built on that ſide But (1.) this reading is allowed contrary to almoſt all the manuſcripts. (2.) Why ſhould PLINY, a conciſe writer, repeat the compaſs of the walls of ROME in two ſucceſſive ſentences? (3.) Why repeat it with ſo ſenſible a variation? (4.) What is the meaning of PLINY's mentioning twice the MILLIARIUM, if a line was meaſured that had no dependence on the MILLIARIUM? (5.) AURELIAN's wall is ſaid by VOPISCUS to have been drawn *laxiore ambitu*, and to have comprehended all the buildings and ſuburbs on the north ſide of the TYBER; yet its compaſs was only fifty miles; and even here critics ſuſpect ſome miſtake or corruption in the text. It is not probable, that ROME would diminiſh from AUGUSTUS to AURELIAN. It remained ſtill the capital of the ſame empire; and none of the civil wars, in that long period, except the tumults on the death of MAXIMUS and BALBINUS ever affected the city. CARACALLA is ſaid by AURELIUS VICTOR to have increaſed ROME. (6.) There are no remains of antient buildings, which mark any ſuch greatneſs of ROME. VOSSIUS's reply to this objection ſeems abſurd, That the rubbiſh would ſink ſixty or ſeventy foot below ground. It appears from SPARTIAN *(in vita Severi)* that the five mile-ſtone *in via Lavicana* was out of the city. (7.) OLYMPIODORUS and PUBLIUS VICTOR fix the number of houſes in ROME to be betwixt forty and fifty thouſand. (8.) The very extravagance of the conſequences drawn by this critic, as well as LIPSIUS, if they be neceſſary, deſtroys the foundation on which they are grounded; That ROME contained fourteen millions of inhabitants; while the whole kingdom of FRANCE contains only five, according to his computation, &c.

The only objection to the ſenſe which we have affixed above to the paſſage of PLINY, ſeems to lie in this, That PLINY, after mentioning the thirty-ſeven gates of ROME, aſſigns only a reaſon for ſuppreſſing the ſeven old ones, and ſays nothing of the eighteen gates, the ſtreets leading from which terminated, according to my opinion, before they reached the Forum. But as PLINY was writing to the ROMANS, who perfectly knew the diſpoſition of the ſtreets, it is not ſtrange he ſhould take a circumſtance for granted, which was ſo familiar to every body. Perhaps, too, many of theſe gates led to wharfs upon the river.

[b] *Ex monument. Ancyr.*

DID

DID the poorer citizens only receive the diſtribution? It was calculated, to be ſure, chiefly for their benefit. But it appears from a paſſage of CICERO [c], that the rich might alſo take their portion, and that it was eſteemed no reproach in them to apply for it.

To whom was the corn given; whether only to heads of families, or to every man, woman, and child? The portion every month was five *modii* to each [d], (about $\frac{5}{6}$ of a buſhel.) This was too little for a family, and too much for an individual. A very accurate antiquarian [e], therefore, infers, that it was given to every man of full years: But he allows the matter to be uncertain.

WAS it ſtrictly inquired, whether the claimant lived within the precincts of ROME, or was it ſufficient that he preſented himſelf at the monthly diſtribution? This laſt ſeems more probable [f].

WERE there no falſe claimants? We are told [g], that CAESAR ſtruck off at once 170,000, who had crept in without a juſt title; and it is very little probable, that he remedied all abuſes.

BUT, laſtly, what proportion of ſlaves muſt we aſſign to theſe citizens? This is the moſt material queſtion; and the moſt uncertain. 'Tis very doubtful, whether ATHENS can be eſtabliſhed as a rule for ROME. Perhaps the ATHENIANS had more ſlaves, becauſe they employed them in manufactures, for which a capital city like ROME, ſeems not ſo proper. Perhaps, on the other hand, the ROMANS had more ſlaves, on account of their ſuperior luxury and riches.

THERE were exact bills of mortality kept in ROME; but no antient author has given us the number of burials, except SUETONIUS [h], who tells us, that in one ſeaſon there were 30,000 names carried to the temple of LIBITINA: But this was during a plague; which can afford no certain foundation for any inference.

THE public corn, tho' diſtributed only to 200,000 citizens, affected very conſiderably the whole agriculture of ITALY *: A fact no way reconcilable to ſome modern exaggerations with regard to the inhabitants of that country.

THE beſt ground of conjecture I can find concerning the greatneſs of antient ROME, is this: We are told by HERODIAN [i], that ANTIOCH and ALEXANDRIA were very little inferior to ROME. It appears from DIODORUS SICULUS [k], that one ſtraight ſtreet of ALEXANDRIA, reaching from port to port, was five miles long; and as ALEXANDRIA was much more extended in length than breadth, it ſeems to have been a city nearly of the bulk of PARIS [l]; and ROME might be about the ſize of LONDON.

THERE

[c] *Tuſc. quaeſt.* lib. 3. cap. 48.
[d] *Licinius apud Salluſt. hiſt. frag.* lib. 3.
[e] *Nicolaus Hortenſius de re frumentaria Roman.*
[f] Not to take the people too much from their buſineſs, AUGUSTUS ordained the diſtribution of corn to be made only thrice a year: But the people finding the monthly diſtributions more convenient, (as preſerving, I ſuppoſe, a more regular oeconomy in their family) deſired to have them reſtored. SUETON. AUGUST. cap. 40. Had not ſome of the people come from ſome diſtance for their corn, AUGUSTUS's precaution ſeems ſuperfluous.
[g] *Sueton. in Jul.* cap. 41.
[h] *In vita Neronis.* * *Sueton. Aug.* cap. 42.
[i] Lib. 4. cap. 5. [k] Lib. 17.
[l] QUINTUS CURTIUS ſays, its walls were only ten miles in circumference, when founded by ALEXANDER; lib. 4. cap. 8. STRABO, who had travelled to ALEXANDRIA as well as DIODORUS SICULUS, ſays it was ſcarce four miles long, and in moſt places about a mile broad; lib. 17. PLINY ſays it reſembled a MACEDONIAN caſſock, ſtretching out in the corners; lib. 5. cap. 10. Notwithſtanding this bulk of ALEXANDRIA, which ſeems but moderate, DIODORUS SICULUS,

THERE lived in ALEXANDRIA, in DIODORUS SICULUS's time [m], 300,000 free people, comprehending, I ſuppoſe, women and children [n]. But what number of ſlaves? Had we any juſt ground to fix theſe at an equal number with the free inhabitants, it would favor the foregoing calculation.

THERE is a paſſage in HERODIAN, which is a little ſurpriſing. He ſays poſitively, that the palace of the Emperor was as large as all the reſt of the city [o]. This was NERO's golden houſe, which is indeed repreſented by SUETONIUS [p] and PLINY as of an enormous extent [q]; but no power of imagination can make us conceive it to bear any proportion to ſuch a city as LONDON.

WE may obſerve, had the hiſtorian been relating NERO's extravagance, and had he made uſe of ſuch an expreſſion, it would have had much leſs weight; theſe rhetorical exaggerations being ſo apt to creep into an author's ſtyle, even when the moſt chaſte and correct. But 'tis mentioned by HERODIAN only by the by, in relating the quarrels betwixt GETA and CARACALLA.

IT appears from the ſame hiſtorian *, that there was then much land uncultivated, and put to no manner of uſe; and he aſcribes it as a great praiſe to PERTINAX, that he allowed every one to take ſuch land, either in ITALY or elſewhere, and cultivate it as he pleaſed, without paying any taxes. *Lands uncultivated, and put to no manner of uſe!* This is not heard of in any part of CHRISTENDOM; except perhaps in ſome remote parts of HUNGARY, as I have been informed. And it ſurely correſponds very ill with that idea of the extreme populouſneſs of antiquity, ſo much inſiſted on.

ſpeaking of its circuit as drawn by ALEXANDER, (which it never exceeded, as we learn from AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, lib. 22. cap. 16.) ſays it was μεγεθει διαφεροντα, *extremely great*, ibid. The reaſon which he aſſigns for its ſurpaſſing all cities of the world, (for he excepts not ROME) is, that it contained 300,000 free inhabitants. He alſo mentions the revenues of the kings, viz. 6000 talents, as another circumſtance to the ſame purpoſe: No ſuch mighty ſum in our eyes, even tho' we make allowances for the different value of money. What STRABO ſays of the neighboring country, means only that it was well peopled, ευανθρωπα καλως. Might not one affirm, without any great hyperbole, that the whole banks of the river from GRAVESEND to WINDSOR are one city? This is even more than STRABO ſays of the banks of the lake MAREOTIS, and of the canal to CANOPUS. 'Tis a vulgar ſaying in ITALY, that the king of SARDINIA has but one town in PIEDMONT; for it is all a town. AGRIPPA in JOSEPHUS *de bello* JUDAIC. lib. 2. cap. 16. to make his audience comprehend the exceſſive greatneſs of ALEXANDRIA, which he endeavors to magnify, deſcribes only the compaſs of the city as drawn by ALEXANDER: A clear proof that the bulk of the inhabitants were lodged there, and that the neighboring country was no more than what might be expected about all great towns, very well cultivated and well peopled.

[m] Lib. 17.

[n] He ſays ελευθεροι, not πολιται, which laſt expreſſion muſt have been underſtood of citizens alone, and grown men.

[o] Lib. 4. cap. 1. πασης πολεως. POLITIAN interprets it "aedibus majoribus etiam reliqua ur-"be."

[p] He ſays, (in NERONE cap. 30.) that a portico or piazza of it was 3000 feet long; "tanta "laxitas ut porticus triplices milliarias haberet." He cannot mean three miles. For the whole extent of the houſe from the PALATINE to the ESQUILINE was not near ſo great. So when VOPISC. in AURELIANO mentions a portico in SALLUST's gardens, which he calls *porticus milliarenſis*, it muſt be underſtood of a thouſand feet. So alſo HORACE;

"Nulla decempedis
Metata privatis opacam
Porticus excipiebat Arcton." Lib. 2. ode 15.

So alſo in lib. 1. ſatyr. 8.

"Mille pedes in fronte, trecentos cippus in agrum
Hic dabat."

[q] PLINIUS, lib. 36. cap. 15. "Bis vidimus "urbem totam cingi domibus principum, CAII "ac NERONIS."

[*] Lib. 2. cap. 15.

WE

We learn from Vopiscus [r], that there was in Etruria much fertile land uncultivated, which the Emperor Aurelian intended to convert into vineyards, in order to furniſh the Roman people with a gratuitous diſtribution of wine: A very proper expedient to diſpeople ſtill farther that capital, and all the neighboring territories.

It may not be amiſs to take notice of the account which Polybius [s] gives of the great herds of ſwine to be met with in Tuscany and Lombardy, as well as in Greece, and of the method of feeding them which was then practiſed. "There are great herds of ſwine," ſays he, "thro'out all Italy, particularly, "in former times, thro' Etruria and Cisalpine Gaul. And a herd fre-"quently contains a thouſand or more ſwine. When one of theſe herds in feed-"ing meets with another, they mix together; and the ſwine-herds have no other "expedient to ſeparate them than to go to different quarters, where they ſound "their horn; and theſe animals, being accuſtomed to that ſignal, run imme-"diately each to the horn of his own keeper. Whereas in Greece, if the herds "of ſwine happen to mix in the foreſts, he who has the greateſt flock, takes cun-"ningly the opportunity of driving all away. And thieves are very apt to pur-"loin the ſtraggling hogs, which have wandered to a great diſtance from their "keeper, in ſearch of food."

May we not infer from this account, that the North of Italy was then much leſs peopled, and worſe cultivated, than at preſent? How could theſe vaſt herds be fed in a country ſo thick of incloſures, ſo improved by agriculture, ſo divided by farms, ſo planted with vines and corn intermingled together? I muſt confeſs, that Polybius's relation has more the air of that oeconomy which is to be met with in our American colonies, than the management of an European country.

We meet with a reflection in Aristotle's [t] ethics, which ſeems to me unaccountable on any ſuppoſition, and by proving too much in favor of our preſent reaſoning, may be thought really to prove nothing. That philoſopher, treating of friendſhip, and obſerving, that that relation ought neither to be contracted to a very few, nor extended over a great multitude, illuſtrates his opinion by the following argument. "In like manner," ſays he, "as a city cannot ſubſiſt, if it ei-"ther have ſo few inhabitants as ten, or ſo many as a hundred thouſand; ſo is "there a mediocrity required in the number of friends; and you deſtroy the eſſence "of friendſhip by running into either extreme." What! impoſſible, that a city can contain a hundred thouſand inhabitants! Had Aristotle never ſeen nor heard of a city which was near ſo populous? This, I muſt own, paſſes my comprehenſion.

Pliny [u] tells us, that Seleucia, the ſeat of the Greek empire in the Eaſt, was reported to contain 600,000 people. Carthage is ſaid by Strabo [w] to have contained 700,000. The inhabitants of Pekin are not much more numerous. London, Paris, and Constantinople, may admit of nearly the ſame computation; at leaſt, the two latter cities do not exceed it. Rome, Alexandria, An-

[r] In Aurelian. cap. 48.
[s] Lib. 12. cap. 2.
[t] Lib. 9. cap. 10. His expreſſion is ανθρωπος, not πολιτης; inhabitant, not citizen.
[u] Lib. 6. cap. 28.
[w] Lib. 17.

TIOCH, we have already ſpoke of. From the experience of paſt and preſent ages, one might conjecture, that there is a kind of impoſſibility, that any city could ever riſe much beyond this proportion. Whether the grandeur of a city be founded on commerce or on empire, there ſeem to be invincible obſtacles, which prevent its farther progreſs. The ſeats of vaſt monarchies, by introducing extravagant luxury, irregular expence, idleneſs, dependence, and falſe ideas of rank and ſuperiority, are improper for commerce. Extenſive commerce checks itſelf, by raiſing the price of all labor and commodities. When a great court engages the attendance of a numerous nobility, poſſeſſed of overgrown fortunes, the middling gentry remain in their provincial towns, where they can make a figure on a moderate income. And if the dominions of a ſtate arrive at an enormous ſize, there neceſſarily ariſe many capitals, in the remoter provinces, whither all the inhabitants, except a few courtiers, repair, for education, fortune, and amuſement[x]. LONDON, by uniting extenſive commerce and middling empire, has, perhaps, arrived at a greatneſs, which no city will ever be able to exceed.

CHUSE DOVER or CALAIS for a center: Draw a circle of two hundred miles radius: You comprehend LONDON, PARIS, the NETHERLANDS, the UNITED PROVINCES, and ſome of the beſt cultivated counties of FRANCE and ENGLAND. It may ſafely, I think, be affirmed, that no ſpot of ground can be found, in antiquity, of equal extent, which contained near ſo many great and populous cities, and was ſo ſtocked with riches and inhabitants. To balance, in both periods, the ſtates, which poſſeſſed moſt art, knowlege, civility, and the beſt police, ſeems the trueſt method of compariſon.

'TIS an obſervation of L'Abbe DU BOS[y], that ITALY is warmer at preſent than it was in antient times. "The annals of ROME tell us," ſays he, "that in the year "480. *ab U. C.* the winter was ſo ſevere that it deſtroyed the trees. The TYBER "froze in ROME, and the ground was covered with ſnow for forty days. When "JUVENAL[z] deſcribes a ſuperſtitious woman, he repreſents her as breaking the "ice of the TYBER, that ſhe might perform her ablutions."

"*Hybernum fracta glacie deſcendet in amnem,*
"*Ter matutino Tyberi mergetur.*

"He ſpeaks of that river's freezing as a common event. Many paſſages of "HORACE ſuppoſe the ſtreets of ROME full of ſnow and ice. We ſhould have "more certainty with regard to this point, had the antients known the uſe of "thermometers: But their writers, without intending it, give us information, "ſufficient to convince us, that the winters are now much more temperate at "ROME than formerly. At preſent, the TYBER no more freezes at ROME than "the NILE at CAIRO. The ROMANS eſteem the winter very rigorous, if the "ſnow lies two days, and if one ſees for eight and forty hours a few icicles hang "from a fountain that has a north expoſition."

THE obſervation of this ingenious critic may be extended to other EUROPEAN climates. Who could diſcover the mild climate of FRANCE in DIODORUS SICULUS's[a]

[x] Such were ALEXANDRIA, ANTIOCH, CARTHAGE, EPHESUS, LYONS, &c. in the ROMAN empire. Such are even BOURDEAUX, THOLOUSE, DIJON, RENNES, ROUEN, AIX, &c. in FRANCE; DUBLIN, EDINBURGH, YORK, in the BRITISH dominions.

[y] Vol. 2. § 16. [z] Sat. 6. [a] Lib. 4.

deſcription of that of GAUL? "As it is a northern climate," ſays he, "it is infeſted "with cold to an extreme degree. In cloudy weather, inſtead of rain, there fall great "ſnows; and in clear weather it there freezes ſo exceſſive hard, that the rivers "acquire bridges of their own ſubſtance, over which, not only ſingle travellers "may paſs, but large armies, accompanied with all their baggage and loaded "waggons. And there being many rivers in GAUL, the RHONE, the RHINE, "*&c.* almoſt all of them are froze over; and 'tis uſual, in order to prevent fall-"ing, to cover the ice with chaff and ſtraw, at the places where the road "paſſes." *Colder than a* GALLIC *Winter*, is uſed by PETRONIUS, as a proverbial expreſſion.

NORTH of the CEVENNES, ſays STRABO [b], GAUL produces not figs and olives: And the vines, which have been planted, bear not grapes, that will ripen.

OVID poſitively maintains, with all the ſerious affirmation of proſe, that the EUXINE ſea was frozen over every winter in his time; and he appeals to ROMAN governors, whom he names, for the truth of his aſſertion [c]. This ſeldom or never happens at preſent in the latitude of TOMI, whither OVID was baniſhed. All the complaints of the ſame poet ſeem to mark a rigor of the ſeaſons, which is ſcarce experienced at preſent in PETERSBURG or STOCKHOLM.

TOURNEFORT, a *Provencal*, who had travelled into the ſame countries, obſerves, that there is not a finer climate in the world: And he aſſerts, that nothing but OVID's melancholy could have given him ſuch diſmal ideas of it. But the facts mentioned by that poet, are too circumſtantial to bear any ſuch interpretation.

POLYBIUS [d] ſays, that the climate in ARCADIA was very cold, and the air moiſt.

"ITALY," ſays VARRO [e], "is the moſt temperate climate in EUROPE. The "inland parts" (GAUL, GERMANY, and PANNONIA, no doubt) "have almoſt "perpetual winter."

THE northern parts of SPAIN, according to STRABO [f], are but ill inhabited, becauſe of the great cold.

ALLOWING, therefore, this remark to be juſt, that EUROPE is become warmer than formerly; how can we account for it? Plainly, by no other method, but by ſuppoſing, that the land is at preſent much better cultivated, and that the woods are cleared, which formerly threw a ſhade upon the earth, and kept the rays of the ſun from penetrating to it. Our northern colonies in AMERICA become more temperate, in proportion as the woods are felled [g]; but, in general, every one may remark, that cold ſtill makes itſelf much more ſeverely felt, both in North and South AMERICA, than in places under the ſame latitude in EUROPE.

SASERNA, quoted by COLUMELLA [h], affirmed, that the diſpoſition of the heavens was altered before his time, and that the air had become much milder and warmer; as appears hence, ſays he, that many places now abound with vineyards

[b] Lib. 4.

[c] *Triſt.* lib. 3. eleg. 9. *De Ponto*, lib. 4. eleg. 7. 9. 10.

[d] Lib. 4. cap. 21. [e] Lib. 1. cap. 2.

[f] Lib. 3.

[g] The warm ſouthern colonies alſo become more healthful: And 'tis remarkable, that in the SPANISH hiſtories of the firſt diſcovery and conqueſt of theſe countries, they appear to have been very healthful; being then well peopled and cultivated. No account of the ſickneſs or decay of CORTES's or PIZZARRO's ſmall armies.

[h] Lib. 1. cap. 1.

and

and olive-plantations, which formerly, by reaſon of the rigor of the climate, could raiſe none of theſe productions. Such a change, if real, will be allowed an evident ſign of the better cultivation and peopling of countries before the age of SASERNA [l]; and if it be continued to the preſent times, is a proof, that theſe advantages have been continually increaſing thro'out this part of the world.

LET us now caſt our eye over all the countries which were the ſcene of antient and modern hiſtory, and compare their paſt and preſent ſituation. We ſhall not, perhaps, find ſuch foundation for the complaint of the preſent emptineſs and deſolation of the world. ÆGYPT is repreſented by MAILLET, to whom we owe the beſt account of it, as extremely populous; tho' he eſteems the number of its inhabitants to be diminiſhed. SYRIA, and the Leſſer ASIA, as well as the coaſt of BARBARY, I can readily own, to be very deſart in compariſon of their antient condition. The depopulation of GREECE is alſo very obvious. But whether the country now called TURKY in EUROPE may not, in general, contain as many inhabitants as during the flouriſhing period of GREECE, may be a little doubtful. The THRACIANS ſeem then to have lived like the TARTARS at preſent, by paſturage and plunder [k]: The GETES were ſtill more uncivilized [l]: And the ILLYRIANS were no better [m]. Theſe occupy nine tenths of that country: And tho' the government of the TURKS be not very favorable to induſtry and propagation; yet it preſerves, at leaſt, peace and order among the inhabitants; and is preferable to that barbarous, unſettled condition, in which they antiently lived.

POLAND and MUSCOVY in EUROPE are not populous; but are certainly much more ſo than the antient SARMATIA and SCYTHIA; where no huſbandry or agriculture was ever heard of, and paſturage was the ſole art by which the people were maintained. The like obſervation may be extended to DENMARK and SWEDEN. No one ought to eſteem the immenſe ſwarms of people, which formerly came from the North, and over-ran all EUROPE, to be any objection to this opinion. Where a whole nation, or even half it, remove their ſeat; 'tis eaſy to imagine what a prodigious multitude they muſt form; with what deſperate valor they muſt make their attacks; and how the terror they ſtrike into the invaded nations will make theſe magnify, in their imagination, both the courage and multitude of the invaders. SCOTLAND is neither extenſive nor populous; but were the half of its inhabitants to ſeek new ſeats, they would form a colony as large as the TEUTONS and CIMBRI; and would ſhake all EUROPE, ſuppoſing it in no better condition for defence than formerly.

GERMANY has ſurely at preſent twenty times more inhabitants than in antient times, when they cultivated no ground, and each tribe valued itſelf on the extenſive deſolation which it ſpread around; as we learn from CAESAR [n], and TACITUS [o], and STRABO [p]. A proof, that the diviſion into ſmall republics will not alone render a nation populous, unleſs attended with the ſpirit of peace, order, and induſtry.

THE barbarous condition of BRITAIN in former times is well known, and the thinneſs of its inhabitants may eaſily be conjectured, both from their barbarity,

[l] He ſeems to have lived about the time of the younger AFRICANUS; lib. 1. cap. 1.
[k] *Xenoph. exp.* lib. 7. *Polyb.* lib. 4. cap. 45.
[l] *Ovid paſſim, &c. Strabo*; lib. 7.
[m] *Polyb.* lib. 2. cap. 12.
[n] *De bello Gallico*; lib. 6.
[o] *De moribus Germ.*
[p] Lib. 7.

and from a circumſtance mentioned by HERODIAN [q], that all BRITAIN was marſhy, even in SEVERUS's time, after the ROMANS had been fully ſettled in it above a whole century.

'TIS not eaſily imagined that the GAULS were antiently much more advanced in the arts of life than their northern neighbors; ſince they travelled to this iſland for their education in the myſteries of the religion and philoſophy of the DRUIDS [r]. I cannot, therefore, think, that GAUL was then near ſo populous as FRANCE is at preſent.

WERE we to believe, indeed, and join together the teſtimony of APPIAN, and that of DIODORUS SICULUS, we muſt admit an incredible populouſneſs in GAUL. The former hiſtorian [s] ſays, that there were 400 nations in that country; the latter [t] affirms, that the largeſt of the GALLIC nations conſiſted of 200,000 men, beſides women and children, and the leaſt of 50,000. Calculating therefore, at a medium, we muſt admit of near 200 millions of people, in a country, which we eſteem populous at preſent, tho' ſuppoſed to contain little more than twenty [u]. Such calculations, therefore, by their extravagance loſe all manner of authority. We may obſerve, that that equality of property, to which the populouſneſs of antiquity may be aſcribed, had no place among the GAULS [x]. Their inteſtine wars alſo, before CAESAR's time, were almoſt perpetual [y]. And STRABO [z] obſerves, that tho' all GAUL was cultivated, yet it was not cultivated with any ſkill or care; the genius of the inhabitants leading them leſs to arts than arms, till their ſlavery to ROME produced peace among themſelves.

CAESAR [a] enumerates very particularly the great forces which were levied in BELGIUM, to oppoſe his conqueſts; and makes them amount to 208,000. Theſe were not the whole people able to bear arms in BELGIUM: For the ſame hiſtorian tells us, that the BELLOVACI could have brought a hundred thouſand men into the field, tho' they engaged only for ſixty. Taking the whole, therefore, in this proportion of ten to ſix, the ſum of fighting men in all the ſtates of BELGIUM, was about 350,000; the whole inhabitants a million and a half. And BELGIUM being about the fourth of GAUL, that country might contain ſix millions, which is not the third of its preſent inhabitants [b].

THE antient HELVETIA was 250 miles in length, and 180 in breadth, according to CAESAR [c]; yet contained only 360,000 inhabitants. The canton of BERNE alone has, at preſent, as many people.

[q] Lib. 3. cap. 47.

[r] CAESAR *de bello Gallico*; lib. 6. STRABO, lib. 7. ſays, the GAULS were not much more improved than the GERMANS.

[s] Celt. pars 1. [t] Lib. 5.

[u] Antient GAUL was more extenſive than modern FRANCE.

[x] *Caeſar de bello Gallico*; lib. 6.

[y] *Id. ibid.* [z] Lib. 4.

[a] *De bello Gallico*; lib. 2.

[b] It appears from CAESAR's account, that the GAULS had no domeſtic ſlaves, who formed a different order from the *Plebes*. The whole common people were indeed a kind of ſlaves to the nobility, as the people of POLAND are at this day: And a nobleman of GAUL had ſometimes ten thouſand dependants of this kind. Nor can we doubt, that the armies were compoſed of the people as well as of the nobility: An army of 100,000 noblemen from a very ſmall ſtate is incredible. The fighting men amongſt the HELVETII were the fourth part of the whole inhabitants; a clear proof, that all the males of military age bore arms. See CAESAR *de bello Gall* lib. 1.

We may remark, that the numbers in CÆSAR's commentaries can be more depended on than thoſe of any other antient author, becauſe of the GREEK tranſlation, which ſtill remains, and which checks the Latin original.

[c] *De bello Gallico*; lib. 1.

AFTER

ſcarce at preſent furniſh three thouſand warriors; a number which, in the time of the MEDIAN war, were ſupplied by the ſingle city of MEGARA. The gods, therefore, who affect works of dignity and importance, have ſuppreſſed many of their oracles, and deign not to uſe ſo many interpreters of their will to ſo diminutive a people.

I MUST confeſs, that this paſſage contains ſo many difficulties, that I know not what to make of it. You may obſerve, that PLUTARCH aſſigns for a cauſe of the decay of mankind, not the extenſive dominion of the ROMANS, but the former wars and factions of the ſeveral nations; all which were quieted by the ROMAN arms. PLUTARCH's reaſoning, therefore, is directly contrary to the inference which is drawn from the fact he advances.

POLYBIUS ſuppoſes, that GREECE had become more proſperous and floriſhing after the eſtabliſhment of the ROMAN yoke [q]; and tho' that hiſtorian wrote before theſe conquerors had degenerated, from being the patrons, to be the plunderers of mankind; yet as we find from TACITUS [r], that the ſeverity of the emperors afterwards corrected the licence of the governors, we have no reaſon to think that extenſive monarchy ſo deſtructive as it is often repreſented.

WE learn from STRABO [s], that the ROMANS, from their regard to the GREEKS, maintained, to his time, moſt of the privileges and liberties of that celebrated nation; and NERO afterwards rather increaſed them [t]. How therefore can we imagine, that the ROMAN yoke was ſo burthenſome over that part of the world? The oppreſſion of the proconſuls was checked; and the magiſtracies in GREECE being all beſtowed in the ſeveral cities, by the free votes of the people, there was no great neceſſity for the competitors to attend the emperor's court. If great numbers went to ſeek their fortunes in ROME, and advance themſelves by learning or eloquence, the commodities of their native country, many of them would return with the fortunes which they had acquired, and thereby enrich the GRECIAN commonwealths.

BUT PLUTARCH ſays, that the general depopulation had been more ſenſibly felt in GREECE than in any other country. How is this reconcileable to its ſuperior privileges and advantages?

BESIDES, this paſſage, by proving too much, really proves nothing. *Only three thouſand men able to bear arms in all* GREECE! Who can admit ſo ſtrange a propoſition, eſpecially if we conſider the great number of GREEK cities, whoſe names ſtill remain in hiſtory, and which are mentioned by writers long after the age of PLUTARCH? There are there ſurely ten times more people at preſent, when there ſcarce remains a city in all the bounds of antient GREECE. That country is ſtill tolerably cultivated, and furniſhes a ſure ſupply of corn, in caſe of any ſcarcity in SPAIN, ITALY, or the ſouth of FRANCE.

[q] Lib. 2. cap. 62. It may perhaps be imagined, that POLYBIUS being dependent on ROME, would naturally extol the ROMAN dominion. But, in the *firſt* place, POLYBIUS, tho' one ſees ſometimes inſtances of his caution, diſcovers no ſymptoms of flattery. *Secondly*, This opinion is only delivered in a ſingle ſtroke, by the by, while he is intent upon another ſubject; and 'tis allowed, if there be any ſuſpicion of an author's inſincerity, that theſe oblique propoſitions diſcover his real opinion better than his more formal and direct aſſertions.

[r] *Annal.* lib. 1. cap. 2.

[s] Lib. 8. & 9.

[t] PLUTARCH. *De his qui ſero a Numine puniuntur.*

WE

We may obſerve, that the antient frugality of the GREEKS, and their equality of property, ſtill ſubſiſted during the age of PLUTARCH; as appears from LUCIAN [u]. Nor is there any ground to imagine, that that country was poſſeſſed by a few maſters, and a great number of ſlaves.

'TIS probable, indeed, that military diſcipline, being entirely uſeleſs, was extremely neglected in GREECE after the eſtabliſhment of the ROMAN empire; and if theſe commonwealths, formerly ſo warlike and ambitious, maintained each of them a ſmall city-guard, to prevent mobbiſh diſorders, 'tis all they had occaſion for: And theſe, perhaps, did not amount to 3000 men, thro'out all GREECE. I own, that if PLUTARCH had this fact in his eye, he is here guilty of a very groſs paralogiſm, and aſſigns cauſes no way proportioned to the effects. But is it ſo great a prodigy, that an author ſhould fall into a miſtake of this nature [w]?

BUT whatever force may remain in this paſſage of PLUTARCH, we ſhall endeavor to counterbalance it by as remarkable a paſſage in DIODORUS SICULUS, where the hiſtorian, after mentioning NINUS's army of 1,700,000 foot and 200,000 horſe, endeavors to ſupport the credibility of this account, by ſome poſterior facts; and adds, that we muſt not form a notion of the antient populouſneſs of mankind from the preſent emptineſs and depopulation which is ſpred over the world [x]. Thus an author, who lived at that very period of antiquity which is repreſented as moſt populous [y], complains of the deſolation which then prevailed, gives the preference to former times, and has recourſe to antient fables as a foundation for his opinion. The humor of blaming the preſent, and admiring the paſt, is ſtrongly rooted in human nature, and has an influence even on perſons endued with the profoundeſt judgment and moſt extenſive learning.

[u] *De mercede conductis,*

[w] I muſt confeſs, that that diſcourſe of PLUTARCH, concerning the ſilence of the oracles, is in general of ſo odd a texture, and ſo unlike his other productions, that one is at a loſs what judgment to form of it. 'Tis wrote in dialogue, which is a method of compoſition that PLUTARCH commonly little affects. The perſonages he introduces advance very wild, abſurd, and contradictory opinions, more like the viſionary ſyſtems or ravings of PLATO than the ſolid ſenſe of PLUTARCH. There runs alſo thro' the whole an air of ſuperſtition and credulity, which reſembles very little the ſpirit that appears in other philoſophical compoſitions of that author. For 'tis remarkable, that tho' PLUTARCH be an hiſtorian as ſuperſtitious as HERODOTUS or LIVY, yet there is ſcarcely, in all antiquity, a philoſopher leſs ſuperſtitious, excepting CICERO and LUCIAN. I muſt, therefore, confeſs, that a paſſage of PLUTARCH, cited from this diſcourſe, has much leſs authority with me, than if it had been found in moſt of his other compoſitions.

There is only one other diſcourſe of PLUTARCH liable to like objections, *viz.* that *concerning thoſe whoſe puniſhment is delayed by the Deity.* It is alſo wrote in dialogue, contains like ſuperſtitious, wild viſions, and ſeems to have been chiefly compoſed in rivalſhip to PLATO, particularly his laſt book, *de republica.*

And here I cannot but obſerve, that MONſ. FONTENELLE, a writer eminent for candor, ſeems to have departed a little from his uſual character, when he endeavors to throw a ridicule upon PLUTARCH on account of paſſages to be met with in this dialogue concerning oracles. The abſurdities here put into the mouths of the ſeveral perſonages are not to be aſcribed to PLUTARCH. He makes them refute each other; and, in general, he ſeems to intend the ridiculing of thoſe very opinions, which FONTENELLE would ridicule him for maintaining. See *Hiſtoire des oracles.*

[x] Lib. 2.

[y] He was cotemporary with CAESAR and AUGUSTUS.

ESSAY XI.

OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT.

AS no party, in the preſent age, can pretend to ſupport itſelf, without a philoſophical or ſpeculative ſyſtem of principles, annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find, that each of the parties, into which this nation is divided, has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that ſcheme of actions, which it purſues. The people being commonly very rude builders, eſpecially in this ſpeculative way, and more eſpecially ſtill, when actuated by party zeal; 'tis natural to imagine, that their workmanſhip muſt be a little unſhapely, and diſcover evident marks of that violence and hurry, in which it was raiſed. The one party, by tracing up the origin of government to the DEITY, endeavor to render government ſo ſacred and inviolate, that it muſt be little leſs than ſacrilege, however diſorderly it may become, to touch or invade it, in the ſmalleſt article. The other party, by founding government altogether on the conſent of the PEOPLE, ſuppoſe that there is a kind of *original contract*, by which the ſubjects have reſerved the power of reſiſting their ſovereign, whenever they find themſelves aggrieved by that authority, with which they have, for certain purpoſes, voluntarily entruſted him. Theſe are the ſpeculative principles of the two parties; and theſe too are the practical conſequences deduced from them.

I SHALL venture to affirm, *That both theſe* ſyſtems *of ſpeculative principles are juſt; tho' not in the ſenſe, intended by the parties:* And *That both the* ſchemes *of practical conſequences are prudent; tho' not in the extremes, to which each party, in oppoſition to the other, has commonly endeavored to carry them.*

THAT the DEITY is the ultimate author of all government, will never be denied by any one who admits a general providence, and allows, that all events in the univerſe are conducted by an uniform plan and directed to wiſe purpoſes. As 'tis impoſſible for human race to ſubſiſt, at leaſt in any comfortable or ſecure ſtate, without the protection of government; government muſt certainly have been intended by that beneficent Being, who means the good of all his creatures: And as it has univerſally, in fact, taken place, in all countries, and all ages; we may conclude, with ſtill greater certainty, that it was intended by that omniſcient Being, who can never be deceived by any event or operation. But ſince he gave riſe to it, not by any particular or miraculous interpoſition, but by his concealed and univerſal efficacy; a ſovereign cannot, properly ſpeaking, be called his vicegerent, in any other ſenſe than every power or force, being derived from him, may be ſaid to act by his commiſſion. Whatever actually happens is comprehended in the general plan or intention of providence; nor has the greateſt and moſt lawful prince any more reaſon, upon that account, to plead a peculiar ſacredneſs or inviolable authority, than an inferior magiſtrate, or even an uſurper, or even a robber and a pyrate. The ſame divine ſuper-intendant, who, for wiſe pur-

poſes, inveſted an ELIZABETH or a HENRY * with authority, did alſo, for purpoſes, no doubt, equally wiſe, tho' unknown, beſtow power on a BORGIA or an ANGRIA. The ſame cauſes, which gave riſe to the ſovereign power in every ſtate, eſtabliſhed likewiſe every petty juriſdiction in it, and every limited authority. A conſtable therefore, no leſs than a king, acts by a divine commiſſion, and poſſeſſes an indefeaſible right.

WHEN we conſider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education; we muſt neceſſarily allow, that nothing but their own conſent could, at firſt, aſſociate them together, and ſubject them to any authority. The people, if we trace up government to its firſt origin in the woods and deſerts, are the ſource of all power and juriſdiction, and voluntarily, for the ſake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their equal and companion. The conditions, upon which they were willing to ſubmit, were either expreſt, or were ſo clear and obvious, that it might well be eſteemed ſuperfluous to expreſs them. If this, then, be meant by the *original contract*, it cannot be denied, that all government is, at firſt, founded on a contract, and that the moſt ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed entirely by that principle. In vain, are we ſent to the records to ſeek for this charter of our liberties. It was not wrote on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the uſe of writing and all the other civilized arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the equality, which we find in all the individuals of that ſpecies. The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political, and derived from authority, the effect of eſtabliſhed government. A man's natural force conſiſts only in the vigor of his limbs, and the firmneſs of his courage; which could never ſubject multitudes to the command of one. Nothing but their own conſent, and their ſenſe of the advantages of peace and order, could have had that influence.

BUT philoſophers, who have embraced a party (if that be not a contradiction in terms) are not contented with theſe conceſſions. They aſſert, not only that government in its earlieſt infancy aroſe from conſent, or the voluntary combination of the people; but alſo, that, even at preſent, when it has attained its full maturity, it reſts on no other foundation. They affirm, that all men are ſtill born equal, and owe allegiance to no prince or government, unleſs bound by the obligation and ſanction of a *promiſe*. And as no man, without ſome equivalent, would forego the advantages of his native liberty, and ſubject himſelf to the will of another; this promiſe is always underſtood to be conditional, and impoſes on him no obligation, unleſs he meets with juſtice and protection from his ſovereign. Theſe advantages the ſovereign promiſes him in return; and if he fails in the execution, he has broke, on his ſide, the articles of engagement, and has thereby freed his ſubjects from all obligations to allegiance. Such, according to theſe philoſophers, is the foundation of authority in every government; and ſuch the right of reſiſtance, poſſeſt by every ſubject.

BUT would theſe reaſoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with nothing that, in the leaſt, correſponds to their ideas, or can warrant ſo refined and

* HENRY the 4th of FRANCE.

philo-

philoſophical a ſyſtem. On the contrary, we find, every where, princes, who claim their ſubjects as their property, and aſſert their independent right of ſovereignty, from conqueſt or ſucceſſion. We find alſo, every where, ſubjects, who acknowlege this right in their princes, and ſuppoſe themſelves born under obligations of obedience to a certain ſovereign, as much as under the ties of reverence and duty to certain parents. Theſe connexions are always conceived to be equally independent of our conſent, in PERSIA and CHINA; in FRANCE and SPAIN; and even in HOLLAND and ENGLAND, wherever the doctrines abovementioned have not been carefully inculcated. Obedience or ſubjection becomes ſo familiar, that moſt men never make any enquiry about its origin or cauſe, more than about the principle of gravity, reſiſtance, or the moſt univerſal laws of nature. Or if curioſity ever move them; ſo ſoon as they learn, that they themſelves and their anceſtors have, for ſeveral ages, or from time immemorial, been ſubject to ſuch a government or ſuch a family; they immediately acquieſce, and acknowlege their obligation to allegiance. Were you to preach, in moſt parts of the world, that political connexions are founded altogether on voluntary conſent or a mutual promiſe, the magiſtrate would ſoon impriſon you, as ſeditious, for looſening the tyes of obedience; if your friends did not before ſhut you up, as delirious, for advancing ſuch abſurdities. 'Tis ſtrange, that an act of the mind, which every individual is ſuppoſed to have formed, and after he came to the uſe of reaſon too, otherwiſe it could have no authority; that this act, I ſay, ſhould be ſo unknown to all of them, that over the face of the whole earth, there ſcarce remain any traces or memory of it.

BUT the contract, on which government is founded, is ſaid to be the *original contract*; and conſequently may be ſuppoſed too old to fall under the knowlege of the preſent generation. If the agreement, by which ſavage men firſt aſſociated and conjoined their force, be here meant, this is acknowleged to be real; but being ſo antient, and being obliterated by a thouſand changes of government and princes, it cannot now be ſuppoſed to retain any authority. If we would ſay any thing to the purpoſe, we muſt aſſert, that every particular government, which is lawful, and which impoſes any duty of allegiance on the ſubject, was, at firſt, founded on conſent and a voluntary compact. But beſides that this ſuppoſes the conſent of the fathers to bind the children, even to the moſt remote generations (which republican writers will never allow) beſides this, I ſay, it is not juſtified by hiſtory or experience, in any age or country of the world.

ALMOST all the governments, which exiſt at preſent, or of which there remains any record in ſtory, have been founded originally, either on uſurpation or conqueſt, or both, without any pretence of a fair conſent, or voluntary ſubjection of the people. When an artful and bold man is placed at the head of an army or faction, 'tis often eaſy for him, by employing ſometimes violence, ſometimes falſe pretences, to eſtabliſh his dominion over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partizans. He allows no ſuch open communication, that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number or force. He gives them no leiſure to aſſemble together in a body to oppoſe him. Even all thoſe, who are the inſtruments of his uſurpation, may wiſh his fall; but their ignorance of each other's intention keeps them in awe, and is the ſole cauſe of his ſecurity. By ſuch arts

arts as theſe many governments have been eſtabliſhed; and this is all the *original contract*, which they have to boaſt of.

THE face of the earth is continually changing, by the encreaſe of ſmall kingdoms into great empires, by the diſſolution of great empires into ſmaller kingdoms, by the planting of colonies, by the migration of tribes. Is there any thing diſcoverable in all theſe events, but force and violence? Where is the mutual agreement or voluntary aſſociation ſo much talked of?

EVEN the ſmootheſt way, by which a nation may receive a foreign maſter, by marriage or a will, is not extremely honorable for the people; but ſuppoſes them to be diſpoſed of, like a dowry or a legacy, according to the pleaſure or intereſt of their rulers.

BUT where no force interpoſes, and election takes place; what is this election ſo highly vaunted? 'Tis either the combination of a few great men, who decide for the whole, and will allow of no oppoſition: Or 'tis the fury of a rabble, that follow a ſeditious ringleader, who is not known, perhaps, to a dozen among them, and who owes his advancement merely to his own impudence, or to the momentary caprice of his fellows.

ARE theſe diſorderly elections, which are rare too, of ſuch mighty authority, as to be the only lawful foundation of all government and allegiance?

IN reality, there is not a more terrible event, than a total diſſolution of government, which gives liberty to the multitude, and makes the determination or choice of the new eſtabliſhment depend upon a number, which nearly approaches the body of the people: For it never comes entirely to the whole body of them. Every wiſe man, then, wiſhes to ſee, at the head of a powerful and obedient army, a general, who may ſpeedily ſeize the prize, and give to the people a maſter, which they are ſo unfit to chooſe for themſelves. So little correſpondent is fact and reality to thoſe philoſophical notions.

LET not the eſtabliſhment at the *revolution*, deceive us, or make us ſo much in love with a philoſophical origin to government, as to imagine all others monſtrous and irregular. Even that event was far from correſponding to theſe refined ideas. It was only the ſucceſſion, and that only in the regal part of the government, which was then changed: And it was only the majority of ſeven hundred, who determined that change for near ten millions. I doubt not, indeed, but the bulk of theſe ten millions acquieſced willingly in the determination: But was the matter left, in the leaſt, to their choice? Was it not juſtly ſuppoſed to be, from that moment, decided, and every man puniſhed, who refuſed to ſubmit to the new ſovereign? How otherways could the matter have ever been brought to any iſſue or concluſion?

THE republic of ATHENS was, I believe, the moſt extenſive democracy, which we read of in hiſtory: Yet if we make the requiſite allowances for the women, the ſlaves, and the ſtrangers, we ſhall find, that that eſtabliſhment was not, at firſt, made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of thoſe, who were bound to pay obedience to it. Not to mention the iſlands and foreign dominions, which the ATHENIANS claimed as theirs by right of conqueſt. And as 'tis well known, that popular aſſemblies in that city were always full of licence and diſorder, notwithſtanding the forms and laws by which they were checked: How much more diſorderly muſt they be, where they form not the eſtabliſhed conſtitution, but aſ-

ſemble

ſemble tumultuouſly on the diſſolution of the antient government, in order to give riſe to a new one? How chimerical muſt it be to talk of a choice in any ſuch circumſtances?

THE ACHÆANS enjoyed the freeſt and moſt perfect democracy of all antiquity; yet they employed force to oblige ſome cities to enter into their league, as we learn from POLYBIUS[y].

HARRY the IVth and HARRY the VIIth of ENGLAND, had really no other title to the throne but a parliamentary election; yet they never would acknowledge it, for fear of weakening their authority. Strange! if the only real foundation of all authority be conſent and promiſe.

'TIS in vain to ſay, that all governments are, or ſhould be, at firſt, founded on popular conſent, as much as the neceſſity of human affairs will admit. This favors entirely my pretenſion. I maintain, that human affairs never will admit of this conſent; ſeldom of the appearance of it: But that conqueſt or uſurpation, that is, in plain terms, force, by diſſolving the antient governments, is the origin of almoſt all the new ones, which ever were eſtabliſhed in the world. And that in the few caſes, where conſent may ſeem to have taken place, it was commonly ſo irregular, ſo confined, or ſo much intermixed either with fraud or violence, that it cannot have any great authority.

MY intention here is not to exclude the conſent of the people from being one juſt foundation of government where it has place. It is ſurely the beſt and moſt ſacred of any. I only pretend, that it has very ſeldom had place in any degree, and never almoſt in its full extent. And that therefore ſome other foundation of government muſt alſo be admitted.

WERE all men poſſeſt of ſo inflexible a regard to juſtice, that, of themſelves, they would totally abſtain from the properties of others; they had for ever remained in a ſtate of abſolute liberty, without ſubjection to any magiſtrates or political ſociety: But this is a ſtate of perfection, of which human nature is juſtly eſteemed incapable. Again; were all men poſſeſt of ſo perfect an underſtanding, as always to know their own intereſt, no form of government had ever been ſubmitted to, but what was eſtabliſhed on conſent, and was fully canvaſt by each member of the ſociety: But this ſtate of perfection is likewiſe much ſuperior to human nature. Reaſon, hiſtory and experience ſhow us, that all political ſocieties have had an origin much leſs accurate and regular; and were one to chooſe a period of time, when the people's conſent was leaſt regarded in public tranſactions, it would be preciſely on the eſtabliſhment of a new government. In a ſettled conſtitution, their inclinations are often ſtudied; but during the fury of revolutions, conqueſts, and public convulſions, military force or political craft uſually decides the controverſy.

WHEN a new government is eſtabliſhed, by whatever means, the people are commonly diſſatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and neceſſity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation. The prince is watchful and jealous, and muſt carefully guard againſt every beginning or appearance of inſurrection. Time, by degrees, removes all theſe difficulties, and accuſtoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family, whom, at

[y] Lib. 2. cap. 38.

firſt,

firſt, they conſidered as uſurpers or foreign conquerors. In order to found this opinion, they have no recourſe to any notion of voluntary conſent or promiſe, which, they know, never was, in this caſe, either expected or demanded. The original eſtabliſhment was formed by violence, and ſubmitted to from neceſſity. The ſubſequent adminiſtration is alſo ſupported by power, and acquieſced in by the people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation. They imagine not, that their conſent gives their prince a title: But they willingly conſent, becauſe they think, that, from long poſſeſſion, he has acquired a title, independent of their choice or inclination.

SHOULD it be ſaid, that by living under the dominion of a prince, which one might leave, every individual has given a *tacit* conſent to his authority, and promiſed him obedience; it may be anſwered, That ſuch implied conſent can only take place, where a man imagines, that the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under eſtabliſhed governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain government; it would be abſurd to infer a conſent or choice, which he expreſly, in this caſe, renounces and abjures.

CAN we ſeriouſly ſay, that a poor peaſant or artizan has a free choice to leave his own country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the ſmall wages which he acquires? We may as well aſſert, that a man, by remaining in a veſſel, freely conſents to the dominion of the maſter; tho' he was carried on board while aſleep, and muſt leap into the ocean, and periſh, the moment he leaves her.

WHAT if the prince forbid his ſubjects to quit his dominions; as in TIBERIUS's time, it was regarded as a crime in a ROMAN knight that he had attempted to fly to the PARTHIANS, in order to eſcape the tyranny of that emperor[a]? Or as the antient MUSCOVITES prohibited all travelling under pain of death? And did a prince obſerve, that many of his ſubjects were ſeized with the frenzy of tranſporting themſelves to foreign nations, he would doubtleſs, with great reaſon and juſtice, reſtrain them, in order to prevent the depopulation of his own country. Would he forfeit the allegiance of all his ſubjects, by ſo wiſe and reaſonable a law? Yet the freedom of their choice is ſurely, in that caſe, raviſhed from them.

A COMPANY of men, who ſhould leave their native country, in order to people ſome uninhabited region, might dream of recovering their native freedom; but they would ſoon find, that their prince ſtill laid claim to them, and called them his ſubjects, even in their new ſettlement. And in this he would but act conformably to the common ideas of mankind.

THE trueſt *tacit* conſent of this kind, which is ever obſerved, is when a foreigner ſettles in any country, and is beforehand acquainted with the prince, and government, and laws, to which he muſt ſubmit: Yet is his allegiance, tho' more voluntary, much leſs expected or depended on, than that of a natural born ſubject. On the contrary, his native prince ſtill aſſerts a right to him. And if he puniſhes not the renegade, when he ſeizes him in war with his new prince's commiſſion; this clemency is not founded on the municipal law, which in all countries condemns the priſoner; but on the conſent of princes, who have agreed to this indulgence, in order to prevent repriſals.

[a] TACIT. Ann. 6. Cap. 14.

SUPPOSE an uſurper, after having baniſhed his lawful prince and royal family, ſhould eſtabliſh his dominion for ten or a dozen years in any country, and ſhould preſerve ſuch exact diſcipline in his troops, and ſo regular a diſpoſition in his garriſons, that no inſurrection had ever been raiſed, or even murmur heard, againſt his adminiſtration: Can it be aſſerted, that the people, who in their hearts abhor his treaſon, have tacitly conſented to his authority, and promiſed him allegiance, merely becauſe, from neceſſity, they live under his dominion? Suppoſe again their natural prince reſtored, by means of an army, which he aſſembles in foreign countries: They receive him with joy and exultation, and ſhew plainly with what reluctance they had ſubmitted to any other yoke. I may now aſk, upon what foundation the prince's title ſtands? Not on popular conſent ſurely: For tho' the people willingly acquieſce in his authority, they never imagine, that their conſent makes him ſovereign. They conſent; becauſe they apprehend him to be already, by birth, their lawful ſovereign. And as to that tacit conſent, which may now be inferred from their living under his dominion, this is no more than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and uſurper.

WHEN we aſſert, that all lawful government ariſes from the people, we certainly do them a great deal more honor than they deſerve, or even expect and deſire from us. After the ROMAN dominions became too unweildy for the republic to govern, the people, over the whole known world, were extremely grateful to AUGUSTUS for that authority, which, by violence, he eſtabliſhed over them; and they ſhewed an equal diſpoſition to ſubmit to the ſucceſſor, whom he left them, by his laſt will and teſtament. It was afterwards their misfortune, that there never was, in one family, any long regular ſucceſſion; but that their line of princes was continually broke, either by private aſſaſſinations or public rebellions. The *prætorian* bands, on the failure of every family, ſet up one emperor; the legions in the Eaſt a ſecond; thoſe in GERMANY, perhaps, a third: And the ſword alone could decide the controverſy. The condition of the people, in that mighty monarchy, was to be lamented, not becauſe the choice of the emperor was never left to them; for that was impracticable: But becauſe they never fell under any ſucceſſion of maſters, who might regularly follow each other. As to the violence and wars and bloodſhed, occaſioned by every new ſettlement; thoſe were not blameable, becauſe they were inevitable.

THE houſe of LANCASTER ruled in this iſland about ſixty years; yet the partizans of the white roſe ſeemed daily to multiply in ENGLAAD. The preſent eſtabliſhment has taken place during a ſtill longer period. Have all views of right in another family been utterly extinguiſhed; even tho' ſcarce any man now alive had arrived at years of diſcretion, when it was expelled, or could have conſented to its dominion, or have promiſed it allegiance? A ſufficient indication ſurely of the general ſentiment of mankind on this head. For we blame not the partizans of the abdicated family, merely on account of the long time, during which they have preſerved their imaginary fidelity. We blame them for adhering to a family, which, we affirm, has been juſtly expelled, and which, from the moment the new ſettlement took place, had forfeited all title to authority.

BUT would we have a more regular, at leaſt, a more philoſophical refutation of this principle of an original contract or popular conſent; perhaps, the following obſervations may ſuffice.

ALL

ALL *moral* duties may be divided into two kinds. The *firſt* are thoſe, to which men are impelled by a natural inſtinct or immediate propenſity, which operates in them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility. Of this nature are, love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When we reflect on the advantage, which reſults to ſociety from ſuch humane inſtincts, we pay them the juſt tribute of moral approbation and eſteem: But the perſon, actuated by them, feels their power and influence, antecedent to any ſuch reflection.

THE *ſecond* kind of moral duties are ſuch as are not ſupported by any original inſtinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a ſenſe of obligation, when we conſider the neceſſities of human ſociety, and the impoſſibility of ſupporting it, if theſe duties were neglected. 'Tis thus *juſtice* or a regard to the property of others, *fidelity* or the obſervance of promiſes, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. For as 'tis evident, that every man loves himſelf better than any other perſon, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquiſitions as much as poſſible; and nothing can reſtrain him in this propenſity, but reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that licence, and the total diſſolution of ſociety, which muſt enſue from it. His original inclination, therefore, or inſtinct, is here checked and reſtrained by a ſubſequent judgment or obſervation.

THE caſe is preciſely the ſame with the political or civil duty of *allegiance*, as with the natural duties of juſtice and fidelity. Our primary inſtincts lead us, either to indulge ourſelves in unlimited liberty, or to ſeek dominion over others: And 'tis reflection only, which engages us to ſacrifice ſuch ſtrong paſſions to the intereſts of peace and order. A very ſmall degree of experience and obſervation ſuffices to teach us, that ſociety cannot poſſibly be maintained without the authority of magiſtrates, and that this authority muſt ſoon fall into contempt, where exact obedience is not payed to it. The obſervation of theſe general and obvious intereſts is the ſource of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation, which we attribute to it.

WHAT neceſſity, therefore, is there to found the duty of *allegiance* or obedience to magiſtrates on that of *fidelity* or a regard to promiſes, and to ſuppoſe, that 'tis the conſent of each individual, which ſubjects him to government; when it appears, that both allegiance and fidelity ſtand preciſely on the ſame foundation, and are both ſubmitted to by mankind, on account of the apparent intereſts and neceſſities of human ſociety? We are bound to obey our ſovereign, 'tis ſaid; becauſe we have given a tacit promiſe to that purpoſe. But why are we bound to obſerve our promiſe? It muſt here be aſſerted, that the commerce and intercourſe of mankind, which are of ſuch mighty advantage, can have no ſecurity where men pay no regard to their engagements. In like manner, may it be ſaid, that men could not live at all in ſociety, at leaſt in a civilized ſociety, without laws and magiſtrates and judges, to prevent the encroachments of the ſtrong upon the weak, of the violent upon the juſt and equitable. The obligation to allegiance, being of like force and authority with the obligation to fidelity, we gain nothing by reſolving the one into the other. The general intereſts or neceſſities of ſociety are ſufficient to eſtabliſh both.

If the reaſon is aſked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily anſwer: *becauſe ſociety could not otherwiſe ſubſiſt:* And this anſwer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your anſwer is, *becauſe we ſhould keep our word.* But beſides, that no body, till trained in a philoſophical ſyſtem, can either comprehend or reliſh this anſwer: Beſides this, I ſay, you find yourſelf embarraſſed, when 'tis aſked, *why we are bound to keep our word?* And you can give no other anſwer, but what would, immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance.

But *to whom is allegiance due? And who are our lawful ſovereigns?* This queſtion is often the moſt difficult of any, and liable to infinite diſcuſſions. When people are ſo happy, that they can anſwer, *Our preſent ſovereign, who inherits, in a direct line, from anceſtors, that have governed us for many ages*; this anſwer admits of no reply; even tho' hiſtorians, in tracing up to the remoteſt antiquity the origin of that royal family, may find, as commonly happens, that its firſt authority was derived from uſurpation and violence. 'Tis confeſt, that private juſtice or the abſtinence from the properties of others, is a moſt cardinal virtue: Yet reaſon tells us, that there is no property in durable objects, ſuch as lands or houſes, when carefully examined in paſſing from hand to hand, but muſt, in ſome period, have been founded on fraud and injuſtice. The neceſſities of human ſociety, neither in private nor public life, will allow of ſuch an accurate enquiry: And there is no virtue or moral duty, but what may, with facility, be refined away, if we indulge a falſe philoſophy, in ſifting and ſcrutinizing it, by every captious rule of logic, in every light or poſition, in which it may be placed.

The queſtions with regard to private property have filled infinite volumes of law and philoſophy, if in both we add the commentators to the original text; and in the end, we may ſafely pronounce, that many of the rules, there eſtabliſhed, are uncertain, ambiguous, and arbitrary. The like opinion may be formed with regard to the ſucceſſions and rights of princes and forms of government. Many caſes, no doubt, occur, eſpecially in the infancy of any government, which admit of no determination from the laws of juſtice and equity: And our hiſtorian, Rapin, allows, that the controverſy between Edward the third and Philip de Valois was of this nature, and could be decided only by an appeal to heaven, that is, by war and violence.

Who ſhall tell me, whether Germanicus or Druſus ought to have ſucceeded Tiberius, had he died, while they were both alive, without naming any of them for his ſucceſſor? Ought the right of adoption to be received as equivalent to that of blood, in a nation, where it had the ſame effect in private families, and had already, in two inſtances, taken place in the public? Ought Germanicus to be eſteemed the eldeſt ſon, becauſe he was born before Druſus; or the younger, becauſe he was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldeſt brother had no advantage in the ſucceſſion of private families? Ought the Roman empire, at that time, to be eſteemed hereditary, becauſe of two examples; or ought it, even ſo early, to be regarded as belonging to the ſtronger or the preſent poſſeſſor, as being founded on ſo recent an uſurpation?

Commodus mounted the throne after a pretty long ſucceſſion of excellent emperors, who had acquired their title, not by birth, or public election, but by the

fictitious rite of adoption. That bloody debauchee being murdered by a conſpiracy ſuddenly formed betwixt his wench and her gallant, who happened at that time to be *Prætorian Præfect*, or to have the command of the guards; theſe immediately deliberated about chooſing a maſter to human kind, to ſpeak in the ſtyle of thoſe ages; and caſt their eyes on PERTINAX. Before the tyrant's death was known, the *Præfect* went ſecretly to that ſenator, who, on the appearance of the ſoldiers, imagined that his execution had been ordered by COMMODUS. He was immediately ſaluted emperor by the officer and his attendants; chearfully proclaimed by the populace; unwillingly ſubmitted to by the guards; formally recognized by the ſenate; and paſſively received by the provinces and armies of the empire.

THE diſcontent of the *Prætorian* bands ſoon broke out in a ſudden ſedition, which occaſioned the murther of that excellent prince: And the world being now without a maſter and without government, the guards thought proper to ſet the empire formally to ſale. JULIAN, the purchaſer, was proclaimed by the ſoldiers, recognized by the ſenate, and ſubmitted to by the people, and muſt alſo have been ſubmitted to by the provinces, had not the envy of the legions begot oppoſition and reſiſtance. PESCENNIUS NIGER in SYRIA elected himſelf emperor, gained the tumultuary conſent of his army, and was attended with the ſecret good-will of the ſenate and people of ROME. ALBINUS in BRITAIN found an equal right to ſet up his claim; but SEVERUS, who governed PANNONIA, prevailed in the end above both of them. That able politician and warrior, finding his own birth and dignity too much inferior to the imperial crown, profeſt at firſt, an intention only of revenging the death of PERTINAX. He marched as general into ITALY, defeated JULIAN; and without our being able to fix any preciſe commencement even of the ſoldiers conſent, he was from neceſſity acknowleged emperor by the ſenate and people; and fully eſtabliſhed in his violent authority by ſubduing NIGER and ALBINUS [b].

Inter hæc Gordianus CÆSAR (ſays CAPITOLINUS, ſpeaking of another period) *ſublatus a militibus*, Imperator *eſt appellatus, quia non erat alius in præſenti.* 'Tis to be remarked that GORDIAN was a boy of fourteen years of age.

FREQUENT inſtances of a like nature occur in the hiſtory of the emperors; in that of ALEXANDER's ſucceſſors; and of many other countries: Nor can any thing be more unhappy than a deſpotic government of that kind; where the ſucceſſion is disjointed and irregular, and muſt be determined, on every occaſion, by force or election. In a free government, the matter is often unavoidable, and is alſo much leſs dangerous. The intereſts of liberty may there frequently lead the people, in their own defence, to alter the ſucceſſion of the crown. And the conſtitution, being compounded of parts, may ſtill maintain a ſufficient ſtability, by reſting on the ariſtocratical or democratical members, tho' the monarchical be altered, from time to time, in order to accommodate it to the former.

IN an abſolute government, when there is no legal prince, who has a title to the throne, it may ſafely be determined to belong to the firſt occupier. Inſtances of this kind are but too frequent, eſpecially in the eaſtern monarchies. When any race of princes expires, the will or deſtination of the laſt ſovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus the edict of LEWIS the XIVth, who called the ba-

[b] HERODIAN, Lib. 2.

ſtard

ſtard prince to the ſucceſſion in caſe of the failure of all the legitimate princes, would, in ſuch an event, have ſome authority [c]. Thus the will of CHARLES the ſecond diſpoſed of the whole SPANISH monarchy. The ceſſion of the antient proprietor, eſpecially when joined to conqueſt, is likewiſe eſteemed a very good title. The general bond or obligation, which binds us to government, is the intereſt and neceſſities of ſociety; and this obligation is very ſtrong. The determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of government is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Preſent poſſeſſion has conſiderable authority in theſe caſes, and greater than in private property; becauſe of the diſorders, which attend all revolutions and changes of government [d].

WE ſhall only obſerve, before we conclude, that tho' an appeal to general opinion may juſtly, in the ſpeculative ſciences of metaphyſics, natural philoſophy, or aſtronomy, be eſteemed unfair and inconcluſive, yet in all queſtions with regard to morals, as well as criticiſm, there is really no other ſtandard, by which any controverſy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to paradoxes, which are repugnant to the common ſentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages. The doctrine, which founds all lawful government on an *original contract*, or conſent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the ableſt of its partizans, in proſecution of it, ſcrupled to affirm, *that abſolute monarchy is inconſiſtent with civil ſociety, and ſo can be no form of civil government at all* [e]; *and that the ſupreme power in a ſtate cannot take from any man by taxes and impoſitions, any part of his property, without his own conſent or that of his repreſentatives* [f]. What authority any moral reaſoning can have, which leads into opinions, ſo wide of the general practice of mankind, in every place but this ſingle kingdom, 'tis eaſy to determine [g].

[c] 'Tis remarkable, that in the remonſtrance of the duke of BOURBON and the legitimate princes, againſt this deſtination of LOUIS the XIVth, the doctrine of the *original contract* is inſiſted on, even in that abſolute government. The FRENCH nation, ſay they, chooſing HUGH CAPET and his poſterity to rule over them and their poſterity, where the former line fails, there is a tacit right reſerved to chooſe a new royal family; and this right is invaded by calling the baſtard princes to the throne, without the conſent of the nation. But the Comte de BOULAINVILLIERS, who wrote in defence of the baſtard princes, ridicules this notion of an original contract, eſpecially when applied to HUGH CAPET; who mounted the throne, ſays he, by the ſame arts, which have ever been employed by all conquerors and uſurpers. He got his title, indeed, recognized by the ſtates after he had put himſelf in poſſeſſion: But is this a choice or contract? The Comte de BOULAINVILLIERS, we may obſerve, was a noted republican; but being a man of learning, and very converſant in hiſtory, he knew the people were never almoſt conſulted in theſe revolutions and new eſtabliſhments, and that time alone beſtowed right and authority on what was commonly at firſt founded on force and violence. See *Etat de la* FRANCE. Vol. III.

[d] The crime of rebellion, amongſt the antients was commonly marked by the terms πατρίζειν, *novas res moliri*.

[e] See LOCKE on government, chap. 7. §. 90.

[f] Id. Chap. 11. §. 138, 139, 140.

[g] The only paſſage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to government is aſcribed to a promiſe is in PLATO *in Critone*; where SOCRATES refuſes to eſcape from priſon, becauſe he had tacitly promiſed to obey the laws. Thus he builds a *tory* conſequence of paſſive obedience, on a *whig* foundation of the original contract.

New diſcoveries are not to be expected in theſe matters. If no man, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on contract, 'tis certain it cannot, in general, have any ſuch foundation.

ESSAY

ESSAY XII.

OF PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.

IN the former eſſay, we endeavored to refute the *ſpeculative* ſyſtems of politics advanced in this nation; as well the religious ſyſtem of the one party, as the philoſophical of the other. We come now to examine the *practical* conſequences, deduced by each party, with regard to the meaſures of ſubmiſſion due to ſovereigns.

As the obligation to juſtice is founded intirely on the intereſts of ſociety, which require mutual abſtinence from property, in order to preſerve peace among mankind; 'tis evident, that, when the execution of juſtice would be attended with very pernicious conſequences, that virtue muſt be ſuſpended, and give place to public utility, in ſuch extraordinary and ſuch preſſing emergencies. The maxim, *fiat Juſtitia & ruat Cælum*, let juſtice be performed, tho' the univerſe be deſtroyed, is apparently falſe, and by ſacrificing the end to the means, ſhews a prepoſterous idea of the ſubordination of duties. What governor of a town makes any ſcruple of burning the ſuburbs, when they facilitate the advances of the enemy? Or what general abſtains from plundering a neutral country, when the neceſſities of war require it, and he cannot otherwiſe maintain his army? The caſe is the ſame with the duty of allegiance; and common ſenſe teaches us, that as government obliges to obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, that duty muſt always, in extraordinary caſes, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation. *Salus populi ſuprema Lex*, the ſafety of the people is the ſupreme law. This maxim is agreeable to the ſentiments of mankind in all ages: Nor is any one, when he reads of the inſurrections againſt a NERO, or a PHILIP, ſo infatuated with party-ſyſtems, as not to wiſh ſucceſs to the enterprize, and praiſe the undertakers. Even our high monarchical party, in ſpite of their ſublime theory, are forced, in ſuch caſes, to judge, and feel, and approve, in conformity to the reſt of mankind.

RESISTANCE, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies, the queſtion can only be, among good reaſoners, with regard to the degree of neceſſity, which can juſtify reſiſtance, and render it lawful or commendable. And here I muſt confeſs, that I ſhall always incline to *their* ſide, who draw the bond of allegiance the cloſeſt poſſible, and conſider an infringement of it, as the laſt refuge, in deſperate caſes, when the public is in the higheſt danger, from violence and tyranny. For beſides the miſchiefs of a civil war, which commonly attends inſurrection; 'tis certain, that where a diſpoſition to rebellion appears among any people, it is one chief cauſe of tyranny in the rulers, and forces them into many violent meaſures, which they never would have embraced, had every one ſeemed inclined to ſubmiſſion and obedience. 'Tis thus the *tyrannicide* or aſſaſſination, approved of by ancient maxims, inſtead of keeping tyrants and uſurpers in awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now juſtly, upon that account, aboliſhed by the laws of nations, and univerſally condemned as a baſe and treacherous method of bringing to juſtice theſe diſturbers of ſociety.

BESIDES;

BESIDES; we muſt conſider, that as obedience is our duty in the common courſe of things, it ought chiefly to be inculcated; nor can any thing be more prepoſterous than an anxious care and ſollicitude in ſtating all the caſes, in which reſiſtance may be allowed. Thus, tho' a philoſopher reaſonably acknowleges, in the courſe of an argument, that the rules of juſtice may be diſpenſed with in caſes of urgent neceſſity; what ſhould we think of a preacher or caſuiſt, who ſhould make it his chief ſtudy to find out ſuch caſes, and enforce them with all the vehemence of argument and eloquence? Would he not be better employed in inculcating the general doctrine, than in diſplaying the particular exceptions, which we are, perhaps, but too much inclined, of ourſelves, to embrace, and to extend?

THERE are, however, two reaſons, which may be pleaded in defence of that party among us, who have, with ſo much induſtry, propagated the maxims of reſiſtance; maxims, which, it muſt be confeſt, are, in general, ſo pernicious, and ſo deſtructive of civil ſociety. The *firſt* is, that their antagoniſts carrying the doctrine of obedience to ſuch an extravagant height, as not only never to mention the exceptions in extraordinary caſes (which might, perhaps, be excuſable) but even poſitively to exclude them; it became neceſſary to inſiſt on theſe exceptions, and defend the rights of injured truth and liberty. The *ſecond*, and, perhaps, better reaſon, is founded on the nature of the BRITISH conſtitution and form of government.

'TIS almoſt peculiar to our conſtitution to eſtabliſh a firſt magiſtrate with ſuch high pre-eminence and dignity, that, tho' limited by the laws, he is, in a manner, ſo far as regards his own perſon, above the laws, and can neither be queſtioned nor puniſhed for any injury or wrong, which may be committed by him. His miniſters alone, or thoſe who act by his commiſſion, are obnoxious to juſtice; and while the prince is thus allured, by the proſpect of perſonal ſafety, to give the laws their free courſe, an equal ſecurity is, in effect, obtained, by the puniſhment of leſſer offenders, and at the ſame time a civil war is avoided, which would be the infallible conſequence, were an attack, at every turn, made directly upon the ſovereign. But tho' the conſtitution pays this ſalutary compliment to the prince, it can never reaſonably be underſtood, by that maxim, to have determined its own deſtruction, or to have eſtabliſhed a tame ſubmiſſion, where he protects his miniſters, perſeveres in injuſtice, and uſurps the whole power of the commonwealth. This caſe, indeed, is never expreſsly put by the laws; becauſe it is impoſſible for them, in their ordinary courſe, to provide a remedy for it, or eſtabliſh any magiſtrate, with ſuperior authority, to chaſtiſe the exorbitancies of the prince. But as a right without a remedy would be the greateſt of all abſurdities; the remedy, in this caſe, is the extraordinary one of reſiſtance, when affairs come to that extremity, that the conſtitution can be defended by it alone. Reſiſtance, therefore, muſt, of courſe, become more frequent in the BRITISH government, than in others, which are ſimpler, and conſiſt of fewer parts and movements. Where the king is an abſolute ſovereign, he has little temptation to commit ſuch enormous tyranny as may juſtly provoke rebellion: But where he is limited, his imprudent ambition, without any great vices, may run him into that perillous ſituation. This was evidently the caſe with CHARLES the Firſt; and if we may now ſpeak truth, after animoſities are laid, this was alſo the caſe with JAMES the Second. Theſe were harmleſs, if not,

not, in their private character, good men; but miſtaking the nature of our conſtitution, and engroſſing the whole legiſlative power, it became neceſſary to oppoſe them with ſome vehemence; and even to deprive the latter formally of that authority, which he had uſed with ſuch imprudence and indiſcretion.

ESSAY XIII.

OF THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION.

I SUPPOSE, that a member of parliament, in the reign of King WILLIAM or Queen ANNE, while the eſtabliſhment of the *Proteſtant Succeſſion* was yet uncertain, were deliberating concerning the party he would chooſe in that important queſtion, and weighing, with impartiality, the advantages and diſadvantages on each ſide. I believe the following particulars would have entered into his conſideration.

HE would eaſily perceive the great advantages reſulting from the reſtoration of the STUART family; by which we ſhould preſerve the ſucceſſion clear and undiſputed, free from a pretender, with ſuch a ſpecious title as that of blood, which, with the multitude, is always the claim, the ſtrongeſt and moſt eaſily comprehended. 'Tis in vain to ſay, as many have done, that the queſtion with regard to *governors*, independent of *government*, is frivolous, and little worth diſputing, much leſs fighting about. The generality of mankind never will enter into theſe ſentiments; and 'tis much happier, I believe, for ſociety, that they do not, but rather continue in their natural prejudices and prepoſſeſſions. How could ſtability be preſerved in any monarchical government, (which, tho' perhaps, not the beſt, is, and always has been, the moſt common of any) unleſs men had ſo paſſionate a regard for the true heir of their royal family; and even tho' weak in underſtanding, or infirm in years, gave him ſo great a preference above perſons the moſt accompliſhed in ſhining talents, or celebrated for great atchievements? Would not every popular leader put in his claim at every vacancy, or even without any vacancy; and the kingdom become the theatre of perpetual wars and convulſions? The condition of the ROMAN empire, ſurely, was not, in this reſpect, much to be envied; nor is that of the *Eaſtern* nations, who pay little regard to the title of their ſovereigns, but ſacrifice them, every day, to the caprice or momentary humor of the populace or ſoldiery. 'Tis but a fooliſh wiſdom, which is ſo carefully diſplayed, in undervaluing princes, and placing them on a level with the meaneſt of mankind. To be ſure, an anatomiſt finds no more in the greateſt monarch than in the loweſt peaſant or day-laborer; and a moraliſt may, perhaps, frequently find leſs. But what do all theſe reflections tend to? We, all of us, ſtill retain theſe prejudices in favor of birth and family; and neither in our ſerious occupations, nor moſt careleſs amuſements, can we ever get entirely rid of them. A tragedy, that would repreſent the adventures of ſailors, or porters, or even of private gentlemen, would preſently diſguſt us; but one that introduces kings and princes, acquires in our eyes an air of importance and dignity. Or ſhould a man be able, by his ſuperior wiſdom,

to get entirely above ſuch prepoſſeſſions, he would ſoon, by means of the ſame wiſdom, again bring himſelf down to them, for the ſake of ſociety, whoſe welfare he would perceive to be intimately connected with them. Far from endeavoring to undeceive the people in this particular, he would cheriſh ſuch ſentiments of reverence to their princes; as requiſite to preſerve a due ſubordination in ſociety. And tho' the lives of twenty thouſand men be often ſacrificed to maintain a king in poſſeſſion of his throne, or preſerve the right of ſucceſſion undiſturbed, he entertains no indignation at the loſs, on pretence that every individual of theſe was, perhaps, in himſelf, as valuable as the prince he ſerved. He conſiders the conſequences of violating the hereditary rights of kings: Conſequences, which may be felt for many centuries; while the loſs of ſeveral thouſand men brings ſo little prejudice to a large kingdom, that it may not be perceived a few years afterwards.

THE advantages of the HANOVER ſucceſſion are of an oppoſite nature, and ariſe from this very circumſtance, that it violates hereditary right; and places on the throne a prince, to whom birth gave no title to that dignity. 'Tis evident to any one who conſiders the hiſtory of this iſland, that the privileges of the people have, during the two laſt centuries, been continually upon the increaſe, by the diviſion of the church-lands, by the alienations of the barons eſtates, by the progreſs of trade, and above all, by the happineſs of our ſituation, which, for a long time, gave us ſufficient ſecurity, without any ſtanding army or military eſtabliſhment. On the contrary, public liberty has, almoſt in every other nation of EUROPE, been, during the ſame period, extremely upon the decline; while the people were diſguſted at the hardſhips of the old GOTHIC militia, and choſe rather to intruſt their prince with mercenary armies, which he eaſily turned againſt themſelves. It was nothing extraordinary, therefore, that ſome of our BRITISH ſovereigns miſtook the nature of the conſtitution, and genius of the people; and as they embraced all the favorable precedents left them by their anceſtors, they overlooked all thoſe which were contrary, and which ſuppoſed a limitation in our government. They were encouraged in this miſtake, by the example of all the neighboring princes, who, bearing the ſame title or appellation, and being adorned with the ſame enſigns of authority, naturally led them to claim the ſame powers and prerogatives [h]. The flattery of courtiers farther blinded them; and above

[h] It appears from the ſpeeches, and proclamations, and whole train of King JAMES I.'s actions, as well as his ſon's, that they conſidered the ENGLISH government as a ſimple monarchy, and never imagined that any conſiderable part of their ſubjects entertained a contrary idea. This made them diſcover their pretenſions, without preparing any force to ſupport them; and even without reſerve or diſguiſe, which are always employed by thoſe, who enter upon any new project, or endeavor to innovate in any government. King JAMES told his parliament plainly, when they meddled in ſtate affairs, *Ne ſutor ultra crepidam.* He uſed alſo, at his table, in promiſcuous companies, to advance his notions, in a manner ſtill more undiſguiſed: As we may learn from a ſtory told in the life of Mr. WALLER, and which that poet uſed frequently to repeat. When Mr. WALLER was young, he had the curioſity to go to court; and he ſtood in the circle, and ſaw King JAMES dine, where, amongſt other company, there ſat at table two biſhops. The King, openly and aloud, propoſed this queſtion, *Whether he might not take his ſubjects money, when he had occaſion for it, without all this formality of parliament?* The one biſhop readily replied, *God forbid you ſhould not: For you are the breath of our noſtrils.* The other biſhop declined anſwering, and ſaid he was not ſkilled in parliamentary caſes: But upon the King's urging him, and ſaying he would admit of no evaſion, his Lord-

above all, that of the clergy, who from ſeveral paſſages of *ſcripture*, and theſe wreſted too, had erected a regular and avowed ſyſtem of tyranny and deſpotic power. The only method of deſtroying, at once, all theſe exorbitant claims and pretenſions, was to depart from the true hereditary line, and chuſe a prince, who, being plainly a creature of the public, and receiving the crown on conditions, expreſſed and avowed, found his authority eſtabliſhed on the ſame bottom with the privileges of the people. By electing him in the royal line, we cut off all hopes of ambitious ſubjects, who might, in future emergencies, diſturb the government by their cabals and pretenſions: By rendering the crown hereditary in his family, we avoided all the inconveniencies of elective monarchy: And by excluding the lineal heir, we ſecured all our conſtitutional limitations, and rendered our government uniform and of a piece. The people cheriſh monarchy, becauſe protected by it: The monarch favors liberty, becauſe created by it. And thus every advantage is obtained by the new eſtabliſhment, as far as human ſkill and wiſdom can extend itſelf.

THESE are the ſeparate advantages of fixing the ſucceſſion, either in the houſe of STUART, or in that of HANOVER. There are alſo diſadvantages in each eſtabliſhment, which an impartial patriot would ponder and examine, in order to form a juſt judgment upon the whole.

THE diſadvantages of the Proteſtant ſucceſſion conſiſt in the foreign dominions, which are poſſeſſed by the princes of the HANOVER line, and which, it might be ſuppoſed, would engage us in the intrigues and wars of the continent, and loſe us, in ſome meaſure, the ineſtimable advantage we poſſeſs, of being ſurrounded and guarded by the ſea, which we command. The diſadvantages of recalling the abdicated family conſiſt chiefly in their religion, which is more prejudicial to ſociety than that eſtabliſhed amongſt us, is contrary to it, and affords no toleration or peace or ſecurity to any other religion.

IT appears to me, that all theſe advantages and diſadvantages are allowed on both ſides; at leaſt, by every one, who is at all ſuſceptible of argument or reaſoning. No ſubject, however loyal, pretends to deny, that the diſputed title and foreign dominions of the preſent royal family are a loſs; nor is there any partizan of the STUART family, but will confeſs, that the claim of hereditary, indefeaſible right, and the Roman Catholic religion, are alſo diſadvantages in that family. It belongs, therefore, to a philoſopher alone, who is of neither party, to put all theſe circumſtances in the ſcale, and aſſign to each of them its proper

Lordſhip replyed very pleaſantly, *Why, then, I think your Majeſty may lawfully take my brother's money: For he offers it.* In Sir WALTER RALEIGH's preface to the Hiſtory of the world, there is this remarkable paſſage. PHILIP II. *by ſtrong hand and main force, attempted to make himſelf not only an* abſolute monarch *over the* Netherlands, *like unto the kings and ſovereigns of* England *and* France; *but* Turk-like, *to tread under his feet all their natural and fundamental laws, privileges, and antient rights.* SPENSER, ſpeaking of ſome grants of the ENGLISH kings to the IRISH corporations, ſays, "All which, tho', at the time of their firſt "grant, they were tolerable, and perhaps reaſonable, yet now are moſt unreaſonable and "inconvenient. But all theſe will eaſily be cut "off with the ſuperior power of her Majeſty's "prerogative, againſt which her own grants are "not to be pleaded or inforced." *State of* IRELAND, p. 1537. Edit. 1706.

As theſe were very common, if not, perhaps, the univerſal notions of the times, the two firſt princes of the houſe of STUART were the more excuſable for their miſtake. And RAPIN, ſuitable to his uſual maligaity and partiality, ſeems to treat them with too much ſeverity, upon account of it.

poiſe and influence. Such an one will readily, at firſt, acknowlege, that all political queſtions are infinitely complicated; and that there ſcarce ever occurs in any deliberation, a choice, which is either purely good, or purely ill. Conſequences, mixed and varied, may be foreſeen to flow from every meaſure: and many conſequences, unforeſeen, do always, in fact, reſult from it. Heſitation, and reſerve, and ſuſpenſe, are, therefore, the only ſentiments he brings to this eſſay or trial. Or if he indulges any paſſion, 'tis that of deriſion and ridicule againſt the ignorant multitude, who are always clamorous and dogmatical, even in the niceſt queſtions, of which, from want of temper, perhaps ſtill more than of underſtanding, they are altogether unfit judges.

But to ſay ſomething more determinate on this head, the following reflections will, I hope, ſhow the temper, if not the underſtanding of a philoſopher.

Were we to judge merely by firſt appearance, and by paſt experience, we muſt allow that the advantages of a parliamentary title in the houſe of Hanover are much greater than thoſe of an undiſputed hereditary title in the houſe of Stuart; and that our fathers acted wiſely in preferring the former to the latter. So long as the houſe of Stuart reigned in Britain, which, with ſome interruptions, was above 80 years, the government was kept in a continual fever, by the contentions betwixt the privileges of the people and the prerogatives of the crown. If arms were dropt, the noiſe of diſputes continued: Or if theſe were ſilenced, jealouſy ſtill corroded the heart, and threw the nation into an unnatural ferment and diſorder. And while we were thus occupied in domeſtic contentions, a foreign power, dangerous, if not fatal, to public liberty, erected itſelf in Europe, without any oppoſition from us, and even ſometimes with our aſſiſtance.

But during theſe laſt ſixty years, when a parliamentary eſtabliſhment has taken place; whatever factions may have prevailed either among the people or in public aſſemblies, the whole force of our conſtitution has always fallen to one ſide, and an uninterrupted harmony has been preſerved between our princes and our parliaments. Public liberty, with internal peace and order, has floriſhed almoſt without interruption: Trade and manufactures and agriculture have increaſed: The arts and ſciences and philoſophy have been cultivated: Even religious parties have been neceſſitated to lay aſide their mutual rancor: And the glory of the nation has ſpred itſelf all over Europe; while we ſtand the bulwark againſt oppreſſion, and the great antagoniſt of that power which threatens every people with conqueſt and ſubjection. So long and ſo glorious a period no nation almoſt can boaſt of: Nor is there another inſtance, in the whole hiſtory of mankind, that ſo many millions of people have, during ſuch a ſpace of time, been held together, in a manner ſo free, ſo rational, and ſo ſuitable to the dignity of human nature.

But tho' this recent inſtance ſeems clearly to decide in favor of the preſent eſtabliſhment, there are ſome circumſtances to be thrown into the other ſcale; and 'tis dangerous to regulate our judgment by one event or example.

We have had two rebellions during the floriſhing period above mentioned, beſides plots and conſpiracies without number. And if none of theſe have produced any very fatal event, we may aſcribe our eſcape chiefly to the narrow genius of thoſe princes who diſputed our eſtabliſhment; and may eſteem ourſelves ſo far fortu-

fortunate. But the claims of the baniſhed family, I fear, are not yet antiquated; and who can foretel, that their future attempts will produce no greater diſorder?

THE diſputes betwixt privilege and prerogative may eaſily be compoſed by laws, and votes, and conferences, and conceſſions; where there is tolerable temper or prudence on both ſides, or on either ſide. Among contending titles, the queſtion can only be determined by the ſword, and by devaſtation, and by civil war.

A PRINCE who fills the throne with a diſputed title, dares not arm his ſubjects; the only method of ſecuring a people fully, both againſt domeſtic oppreſſion and foreign conqueſt.

NOTWITHSTANDING all our riches and renown, what a critical eſcape did we lately make from dangers, which were owing not ſo much to bad conduct and ill ſucceſs in war, as to the pernicious practice of mortgaging our finances, and the ſtill more pernicious maxim of never paying off our incumbrances? Such fatal meaſures could never have been embraced, had it not been to ſecure a precarious eſtabliſhment [1].

BUT to convince us, that an hereditary title is to be embraced rather than a parliamentary one, which is not ſupported by any other views or motives; a man needs only tranſport himſelf back to the æra of the reſtoration, and ſuppoſe, that he had had a ſeat in that parliament which recalled the royal family, and put a period to the greateſt diſorders that ever aroſe from the oppoſite pretenſions of prince and people. What would have been thought of one, that had propoſed, at that time, to ſet aſide CHARLES II. and ſettle the crown on the Duke of YORK or GLOCESTER, merely in order to exclude all high claims, like thoſe of their father and grandfather? Would not ſuch an one have been regarded as a very extravagant projector, who loved dangerous remedies, and could tamper and play with a government and national conſtitution, like a quack with a ſickly patient?

THE advantages which reſult from a parliamentary title, preferably to an hereditary one, tho' they are great, are too refined ever to enter into the conception of the vulgar. The bulk of mankind would never allow them to be ſufficient for committing what would be regarded as an injuſtice to the prince. They muſt be ſupported by ſome groſs, popular, and familiar topics; and wiſe men, tho' convinced of their force, would reject them, in compliance with the weakneſs and prejudices of the people. An incroaching tyrant or deluded bigot alone, by his miſconduct, is able to enrage the nation, and render practicable what was always, perhaps, deſireable.

IN reality, the reaſon aſſigned by the nation for excluding the race of STUART, and ſo many other branches of the royal family, is not on account of their hereditary title, (which, however juſt in itſelf, would, to vulgar apprehenſions, have appeared altogether abſurd) but on account of their religion. Which leads us to compare the diſadvantages above mentioned of each eſtabliſhment.

I CONFESS, that, conſidering the matter in general, it were rather to be wiſhed, that our prince had no foreign dominions, and could confine all his attention to the government of this iſland. For, not to mention ſome real inconveniencies that

[1] Thoſe who conſider how univerſal this pernicious practice of funding has become all over EUROPE, may perhaps diſpute this laſt opinion. But we lay under leſs neceſſity than other ſtates.

may

may reſult from territories on the continent, they afford ſuch a handle for calumny and defamation, as is greedily ſeized by the people, who are always diſpoſed to think ill of their ſuperiors. It muſt, however, be acknowleged, that HANOVER is, perhaps, the ſpot of ground in EUROPE the leaſt inconvenient for a King of BRITAIN. It lies in the heart of GERMANY, at a diſtance from the great powers, which are our natural rivals: It is protected by the laws of the empire, as well as by the arms of its own ſovereign: And it ſerves only to connect us more cloſely with the houſe of AUSTRIA, which is our natural ally.

IN the laſt war, it has been of ſervice to us, by furniſhing us with a conſiderable body of auxiliary troops, the braveſt and moſt faithful in the world. The Elector of HANOVER is the only conſiderable prince in the empire, who has purſued no ſeparate end, and has raiſed up no ſtale pretenſions, during the late commotions of EUROPE; but has acted, all along, with the dignity of a king of BRITAIN. And ever ſince the acceſſion of that family, it would be difficult to ſhow any harm we have ever received from the electoral dominions, except that ſhort diſguſt in 1718, with CHARLES XII. who, regulating himſelf by maxims very different from thoſe of other princes, made a perſonal quarrel of every public injury.

THE religious perſuaſion of the houſe of STUART is an inconvenience of a much deeper dye, and would threaten us with much more diſmal conſequences. The Roman Catholic religion, with its huge train of prieſts and friers, is vaſtly more expenſive than ours: Even tho' unaccompanied with its natural attendants of inquiſitors, and ſtakes, and gibbets, it is leſs tolerating: And not contented with dividing the ſacerdotal from the regal office, (which muſt be prejudicial to any ſtate) it beſtows the former on a foreigner, who has always a ſeparate, and may often have an oppoſite intereſt to that of the public.

BUT were this religion ever ſo advantageous to ſociety, it is contrary to that which is eſtabliſhed among us, and which is likely to keep poſſeſſion, for a long time, of the minds of the people. And tho' it is much to be hoped, that the progreſs of reaſon and philoſophy will, by degrees, abate the virulent acrimony of oppoſite religions all over EUROPE; yet the ſpirit of moderation has, as yet, made too ſlow advances to be entirely truſted. The conduct of the SAXON family, where the ſame perſon can be a Catholic King and a Proteſtant Elector, is, perhaps, the firſt inſtance, in modern times, of ſo reaſonable and prudent a behavior. And the gradual progreſs of the Catholic ſuperſtition does, even there, prognoſticate a ſpeedy alteration: After which, 'tis juſtly to be apprehended, that perſecutions will put a ſpeedy period to the Proteſtant religion in the place of its nativity.

THUS, upon the whole, the advantages of the ſettlement in the family of STUART, which frees us from a diſputed title, ſeem to bear ſome proportion with thoſe of the ſettlement in the family of HANOVER, which frees us from the claims of prerogative: But at the ſame time, its diſadvantages, by placing on the throne a Roman Catholic, are much greater than thoſe of the other eſtabliſhment, in ſettling the crown on a foreign prince. What party an impartial patriot, in the reign of K. WILLIAM or Q. ANNE, would have choſen amidſt theſe oppoſite views, may, perhaps, to ſome appear hard to determine. For my part, I eſteem liberty ſo invaluable a bleſſing in ſociety, that whatever favors its progreſs and ſecurity,

ſecurity, can ſcarce be too fondly cheriſhed by every one who is a lover of human kind.

But the ſettlement in the houſe of Hanover has actually taken place. The princes of that family, without intrigue, without cabal, without ſolicitation on their part, have been called to mount our throne, by the united voice of the whole legiſlative body. They have, ſince their acceſſion, diſplayed, in all their actions, the utmoſt mildneſs, equity, and regard to the laws and conſtitution. Our own miniſters, our own parliaments, ourſelves have governed us; and if aught ill has befallen us, we can only blame fortune or ourſelves. What a reproach muſt we become among nations, if, diſguſted with a ſettlement ſo deliberately made, and whoſe conditions have been ſo religiouſly obſerved, we ſhould throw every thing again into confuſion; and by our levity and rebellious diſpoſition, prove ourſelves totally unfit for any ſtate but that of abſolute ſlavery and ſubjection?

The greateſt inconvenience attending a diſputed title, is, that it brings us in danger of civil wars and rebellions. What wiſe man, to avoid this inconvenience, would run directly upon a civil war and rebellion? Not to mention, that ſo long poſſeſſion, ſecured by ſo many laws, muſt, ere this time, in the apprehenſion of a great part of the nation, have begot a title in the houſe of Hanover, independent of their preſent poſſeſſion: So that now we ſhould not, even by a revolution, obtain the end, of avoiding a diſputed title.

No revolution made by national forces, will ever be able, without ſome other great neceſſity, to aboliſh our debts and incumbrances, in which the intereſt of ſo many perſons is concerned. And a revolution made by foreign forces, is a conqueſt: A calamity with which the precarious balance of power very nearly threatens us, and which our civil diſſenſions are likely, above all other circumſtances, to bring ſuddenly upon us.

ESSAY XIV.

IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH.

OF all mankind, there are none ſo pernicious as political projectors, if they have power; nor ſo ridiculous, if they want it: As on the other hand, a wiſe politician is the moſt beneficial character in nature, if accompanied with authority; and the moſt innocent, and not altogether uſeleſs, even if deprived of it. 'Tis not with forms of government, as with other artificial contrivances; where an old engine may be rejected, if we can diſcover another more accurate and commodious, or where trials may ſafely be made, even tho' the ſucceſs be doubtful. An eſtabliſhed government has an infinite advantage, by that very circumſtance of its being eſtabliſhed; the bulk of mankind being governed by authority, not reaſon, and never attributing authority to any thing that has not the recommendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, in this affair, or try projects merely

upon the credit of ſuppoſed argument and philoſophy, can never be the part of a wiſe magiſtrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age; and tho' he may attempt ſome improvement for the public good, yet will he adjuſt his innovations, as much as poſſible, to the antient fabric, and preſerve entire the chief pillars and ſupports of the conſtitution.

THE mathematicians in EUROPE have been much divided concerning that figure of a ſhip, which is the moſt commodious for ſailing; and HUYGENS, who at laſt determined this controverſy, is juſtly thought to have obliged the learned, as well as commercial world; tho' COLUMBUS had ſailed to AMERICA, and Sir FRANCIS DRAKE made the tour of the world, without any ſuch diſcovery. As one form of government muſt be allowed more perfect than another, independent of the manners and humors of particular men; why may we not inquire, what is the moſt perfect of all, tho' the common botched and inaccurate governments ſeem to ſerve the purpoſes of ſociety, and tho' it be not ſo eaſy to eſtabliſh a new government, as to build a veſſel upon a new plan? The ſubject is ſurely the moſt worthy curioſity of any the wit of man can poſſibly deviſe. And who knows, if this controverſy were fixed by the univerſal conſent of the learned, but in ſome future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a diſſolution of the old governments, or the combination of men to form a new one, in ſome diſtant part of the world? In all caſes, it muſt be advantageous to know what is moſt perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring any real conſtitution or form of government as near it as poſſible, by ſuch gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too great diſturbance to ſociety.

ALL I pretend to in the preſent eſſay is to revive this ſubject of ſpeculation; and therefore I ſhall deliver my ſentiments in as few words as poſſible. A long diſſertation on that head would not, I apprehend, be very acceptable to the public, who will be apt to regard ſuch diſquiſitions, both as uſeleſs and chimerical.

ALL plans of government, which ſuppoſe great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary. Of this nature, are the *Republic* of PLATO, and the *Utopia* of Sir THOMAS MORE. The OCEANA is the only valuable model of a commonwealth, that has as yet been offered to the public.

THE chief defects of the OCEANA ſeem to be theſe. *Firſt*, Its rotation is inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever ability, by intervals, out of public employments. *Secondly*, Its *Agrarian* is impracticable. Men will ſoon learn the art, which was practiſed in antient ROME, of concealing their poſſeſſions under other people's names; till at laſt, the abuſe will become ſo common, that they will throw off, even the appearance of reſtraint. *Thirdly*, The OCEANA provides not a ſufficient ſecurity for liberty, or the redreſs of grievances. The ſenate muſt propoſe, and the people conſent; by which means, the ſenate have not only a negative upon the people, but, what is of infinitely greater conſequence, their negative goes before the votes of the people. Were the King's negative of the ſame nature in the ENGLISH conſtitution, and could he prevent any bill from coming into parliament, he would be an abſolute monarch. As his negative follows the votes of the houſes, it is of little conſequence: Such a difference is there in the manner of placing the ſame thing. When a popular bill has been debated

debated in the two houſes, is brought to maturity, all its conveniencies and inconveniencies weighed and balanced; if afterwards it be preſented for the royal aſſent, few princes will venture to reject the unanimous deſire of the people. But could the King cruſh a diſagreeable bill in embryo, (as was the caſe for ſome time, in the SCOTCH parliament, by means of the lords of the articles), the BRITISH government would have no balance, nor would grievances ever be redreſſed: And 'tis certain, that exorbitant power proceeds not, in any government, from new laws, ſo much as from neglecting to remedy the abuſes which frequently riſe from the old ones. A government, ſays MACHIAVEL, muſt often be brought back to its original principles. It appears then, that in the OCEANA the whole legiſlature may be ſaid to reſt in the ſenate; which HARRINGTON would own to be an inconvenient form of government, eſpecially after the *Agrarian* is aboliſhed.

HERE is a form of government, to which I cannot, in theory, diſcover any conſiderable objection.

LET GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND, or any territory of equal extent, be divided into 100 counties, and each county into 100 pariſhes, making in all 10,000. If the country purpoſed to be erected into a commonwealth, be of more narrow extent, we may diminiſh the number of counties; but never bring them below thirty. If it be of greater extent, 'twere better to enlarge the pariſhes, or throw more pariſhes into a county, than increaſe the number of counties.

LET all the free-holders of ten pounds a-year in the country, and all the houſe-holders worth 200 pounds in the town pariſhes, meet annually in the pariſh-church, and chuſe, by ballot, ſome freeholder of the county for their member, whom we ſhall call the county *repreſentative*.

LET the 100 county repreſentatives, two days after their election, meet in the county-town, and chuſe by ballot, from their own body, ten county *magiſtrates*, and one *ſenator*. There are, therefore, in the whole commonwealth, 100 ſenators, 1100 county magiſtrates, and 10,000 county repreſentatives. For we ſhall beſtow on all ſenators the authority of county magiſtrates, and on all county magiſtrates the authority of county repreſentatives.

LET the ſenators meet in the capital, and be endowed with the whole executive power of the commonwealth; the power of peace and war, of giving orders to generals, admirals, and ambaſſadors, and, in ſhort, all the prerogatives of a BRITISH King, except his negative.

LET the county repreſentatives meet in their particular counties, and poſſeſs the whole legiſlative power of the commonwealth; the greateſt number of counties deciding the queſtion; and where theſe are equal, let the ſenate have the caſting vote.

EVERY new law muſt firſt be debated in the ſenate; and tho' rejected by it, if ten ſenators inſiſt and proteſt, it muſt be ſent down to the counties. The ſenate may join to the copy of the law, their reaſons for receiving or rejecting it.

BECAUSE it would be troubleſome to aſſemble the whole county repreſentatives for every trivial law that may be requiſite, the ſenate have their choice of ſending down the law either to the county magiſtrates or county repreſentatives.

THE magiſtrates, tho' the law be referred to them, may, if they pleaſe, call the repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination.

WHETHER the law be referred by the ſenate to the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives, a copy of it, and of the ſenate's reaſons, muſt be ſent to every repreſentative eight days before the day appointed for the aſſembling, in order to deliberate concerning it. And tho' the determination be, by the ſenate, referred to the magiſtrates, if five repreſentatives of the county order the magiſtrates to aſſemble the whole court of repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination, they muſt obey.

EITHER the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives may give, to the ſenator of the county, the copy of a law to be propoſed to the ſenate; and if five counties concur in the ſame order, the law, tho' refuſed by the ſenate, muſt come either to the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives, as is contained in the order of the five counties.

ANY twenty counties, by a vote either of their magiſtrates or repreſentatives, may throw any man out of all public offices for a year. Thirty counties for three years.

THE ſenate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members of its own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The ſenate cannot throw out twice in a year the ſenator of the ſame county.

THE power of the old ſenate continues for three weeks after the annual election of the county repreſentatives. Then all the new ſenators are ſhut up in a conclave, like the cardinals; and by an intricate ballot, ſuch as that of VENICE or MALTA, they chuſe the following magiſtrates; a protector, who repreſents the dignity of the commonwealth, and preſides in the ſenate; two ſecretaries of ſtate; theſe ſix councils, a council of ſtate, a council of religion and learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council of war, a council of the admiralty, each council conſiſting of five perſons; together with ſix commiſſioners of the treaſury and a firſt commiſſioner. All theſe muſt be ſenators. The ſenate alſo names all the ambaſſadors to foreign courts, who may either be ſenators or not.

THE ſenate may continue any or all of theſe, but muſt re-elect them every year.

THE protector and two ſecretaries have ſeſſion and ſuffrage in the council of ſtate. The buſineſs of that council is all foreign politics. The council of ſtate has ſeſſion and ſuffrage in all the other councils.

THE council of religion and learning inſpects the univerſities and clergy. That of trade inſpects every thing that may affect commerce. That of laws inſpects all the abuſes of laws by the inferior magiſtrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the municipal law. That of war inſpects the militia and its diſcipline, magazines, ſtores, &c. and when the republic is in war, examines into the proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the ſame power with regard to the navy, together with the nomination of the captains and all inferior officers.

NONE of theſe councils can give orders themſelves, except where they receive ſuch powers from the ſenate. In other caſes, they muſt communicate every thing to the ſenate.

WHEN the ſenate is under adjournment, any of the councils may aſſemble it before the day appointed for its meeting.

the magiſtrates of the county to which the regiment belongs. The magiſtrates may break any officer in the county regiment. And the ſenate may do the ſame to any officer in the ſervice. If the magiſtrates do not think proper to confirm the general's choice, they may nominate another officer in the place of him they reject.

ALL crimes are tryed within the county by the magiſtrates and a jury. But the ſenate can ſtop any trial, and bring it before themſelves.

ANY county may indict any man before the ſenate, for any crime.

THE protector, the two ſecretaries, the council of ſtate, with any five more that the ſenate appoints, on extraordinary emergencies, are poſſeſſed of *dictatorial* power for ſix months.

THE protector may pardon any perſon condemned by the inferior courts.

IN time of war, no officer of the army that is in the field, can have any civil office in the commonwealth.

THE capital, which we ſhall call LONDON, may be allowed four members in the ſenate. It may therefore be divided into four counties. The repreſentatives of each of theſe chuſe one ſenator, and ten magiſtrates. There are therefore in the city four ſenators, forty-four magiſtrates, and four hundred repreſentatives. The magiſtrates have the ſame authority as in the counties. The repreſentatives alſo have the ſame authority; but they never meet in one general court: They give their votes in their particular county, or diviſion of hundreds.

WHEN they enact any city-law, the greateſt number of counties or diviſions determines the matter. And where theſe are equal, the magiſtrates have the caſting vote.

THE magiſtrates chuſe the mayor, ſheriff, recorder, and other officers of the city.

IN the commonwealth, no repreſentative, magiſtrate, or ſenator, as ſuch, has any ſalary. The protector, ſecretaries, councils, and ambaſſadors, have ſalaries.

THE firſt year in every century is ſet apart to correct all inequalities, which time may have produced in the repreſentative. This muſt be done by the legiſlature.

THE following political aphoriſms may explain the reaſon of theſe orders.

THE lower ſort of people and ſmall proprietors are good enough judges of one not very diſtant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably chuſe the beſt, or nearly the beſt repreſentative: But they are wholly unfit for county-meetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.

TEN thouſand, even tho' they were not annually elected, are a large enough baſis for any free government. 'Tis true, the nobles in POLAND are more than 10,000, and yet theſe oppreſs the people. But as power continues there always in the ſame perſons and families, this makes them, in a manner, a different nation from the people. Beſides, the nobles are there united under a few heads of families.

ALL free governments muſt conſiſt of two councils, a leſs and a greater, or, in other words, of a ſenate and people. The people, as HARRINGTON obſerves,

would want wiſdom, without the ſenate: The ſenate, without the people, would want honeſty.

A LARGE aſſembly of 1000, for inſtance, to repreſent the people, if allowed to debate, would fall into diſorder. If not allowed to debate, the ſenate has a negative upon them, and the worſt kind of negative, that before reſolution.

HERE therefore is an inconvenience which no government has yet fully remedied, but which is the eaſieſt to be remedied in the world. If the people debate, all is confuſion: If they do not debate, they can only reſolve; and then the ſenate carves for them. Divide the people into many ſeparate bodies; and then they may debate with ſafety, and every inconvenience ſeems to be prevented.

CARDINAL de RETZ ſays, that all numerous aſſemblies, however compoſed, are mere mob, and ſwayed in their debates by the leaſt motive. This we find confirmed by daily experience. When an abſurdity ſtrikes a member, he conveys it to his neighbor, and ſo on, till the whole be infected. Separate this great body; and tho' every member be only of middling ſenſe, 'tis not probable, that any thing but reaſon can prevail over the whole. Influence and example being removed, good ſenſe will always get the better of bad among a number of people. Good ſenſe is one thing: But follies are numberleſs; and every man has a different one. The only way of making a people wiſe, is to keep them from uniting into large aſſemblies.

THERE are two things to be guarded againſt in every *ſenate:* Its combination, and its diviſion. Its combination is moſt dangerous. And againſt this inconvenience we have provided the following remedies. 1. The great dependence of the ſenators on the people by annual elections; and that not by an undiſtinguiſhing rabble, like the ENGLISH electors, but by men of fortune and education. 2. The ſmall power they are allowed. They have few offices to diſpoſe of. Almoſt all are given by the magiſtrates in the counties. 3. The court of competitors, which being compoſed of men that are their rivals, next to them in intereſt, and uneaſy in their preſent ſituation, will be ſure to take all advantages againſt them.

THE diviſion of the ſenate is prevented, 1. By the ſmallneſs of their number. 2. As faction ſuppoſes a combination to a ſeparate intereſt, it is prevented by their dependence on the people. 3. They have a power of expelling any factious member. 'Tis true, when another member of the ſame ſpirit comes from the county, they have no power of expelling him: Nor is it fit they ſhould; for that ſhows the humor to be in the people, and probably ariſes from ſome ill conduct in public affairs. 4. Almoſt any man, in a ſenate ſo regularly choſen by the people, may be ſuppoſed fit for any civil office. 'Twould be proper, therefore, for the ſenate to form ſome *general* reſolutions with regard to the diſpoſing of offices among the members: Which reſolutions would not confine them in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one hand, or extraordinary ſtupidity on the other, appears in any ſenator; but yet they would be ſufficient to prevent brigue and faction, by making the diſpoſal of the offices a thing of courſe. For inſtance, let it be a reſolution, That no man ſhall enjoy any office, till he has ſat four years in the ſenate: That, except ambaſſadors, no man ſhall be in office two years following: That no man ſhall attain the higher offices but thro' the lower: That no man ſhall be protector twice, *&c.* The ſenate of VENICE govern themſelves by ſuch reſolutions.

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In foreign politics the intereſt of the ſenate can ſcarce ever be divided from that of the people; and therefore 'tis fit to make the ſenate abſolute with regard to them; otherwiſe there could be no ſecrecy nor refined policy. Beſides, without money no alliance can be executed; and the ſenate is ſtill ſufficiently dependent. Not to mention, that the legiſlative power being always ſuperior to the executive, the magiſtrates or repreſentatives may interpoſe, whenever they think proper.

The chief ſupport of the British government is the oppoſition of intereſts; but that, tho' in the main ſerviceable, breeds endleſs factions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of the harm. The *competitors* have no power of controlling the ſenate: They have only the power of accuſing, and appealing to the people.

'Tis neceſſary, likewiſe, to prevent both combination and diviſion in the thouſand magiſtrates. This is done ſufficiently by the ſeparation of places and intereſts.

But leſt that ſhould not be enough, their dependence on the 10,000 for their elections, ſerves to the ſame purpoſe.

Nor is that all: For the 10,000 may reſume the power, whenever they pleaſe; and not only when they all pleaſe, but when any five of a hundred pleaſe, which will happen upon the very firſt ſuſpicion of a ſeparate intereſt.

The 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide, except when they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious leaders. Not to mention their annual election, by almoſt the whole body of the people.

A small commonwealth is the happieſt government in the world, within itſelf; becauſe every thing lies under the eye of the rulers: But it may be ſubdued by great force from without. This ſcheme ſeems to have all the advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth.

Every county-law may be annulled either by the ſenate or another county; becauſe that ſhows an oppoſition of intereſts: In which caſe, no part ought to decide for itſelf. The matter muſt be referred to the whole, which will beſt determine what agrees with general intereſt.

As to the clergy and militia, the reaſons of theſe orders are obvious. Without the dependence of the clergy on the civil magiſtrate, and without a militia, 'tis folly to think any free government will ever have ſecurity or ſtability.

In many governments, the inferior magiſtrates have no rewards but what ariſe from their ambition, vanity, or public ſpirit. The ſalaries of the French judges amount not to the intereſt of the ſums they pay for their offices. The Dutch burgo-maſters have little more immediate profit than the English juſtices of peace, or the members of the houſe of commons formerly. But leſt any ſhould ſuſpect, that this would beget negligence in the adminiſtration, (which is little to be feared, conſidering the natural ambition of mankind) let the magiſtrates have competent ſalaries. The ſenators have acceſs to ſo many honorable and lucrative offices, that their attendance needs not be bought. There is little attendance required of the repreſentatives.

That the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who conſiders the reſemblance it bears to the commonwealth of the United Provinces, formerly one of the wiſeſt and moſt renowned governments that ever was in the world. The alterations in the preſent ſcheme are all evidently to the better. 1. The

combine in any plan of free government; but they eaſily conſpire in the eſteem and reverence for a ſingle perſon, who, by means of this popular favor, may ſeize the power, and forcing the more obſtinate to ſubmit, they eſtabliſh a monarchical government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the ſame notions of government, the natural equality of property favors liberty, and the nearneſs of habitation enables the citizens mutually to aſſiſt each other. Even under abſolute princes, the ſubordinate government of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties and provinces is monarchical. But theſe ſame circumſtances, which facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their conſtitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies are turbulent. For however the people may be ſeparated or divided into ſmall parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very ſenſible. Ariſtocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were moſt admired by antient writers; but they are jealous and oppreſſive. In a large government, which is modelled with maſterly ſkill, there is compaſs and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the firſt elections or firſt concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magiſtrates, who direct all the movements. At the ſame time, the parts are ſo diſtant and remote, that 'tis very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or paſſion, to hurry them into any meaſures againſt the public intereſt.

'Tis needleſs to inquire, whether ſuch a government would be immortal. I allow the juſtneſs of the poet's exclamation on the endleſs projects of human race, *Man and for ever!* The world itſelf probably is not immortal. Such conſuming plagues may ariſe as would leave even a perfect government a weak prey to its neighbors. We know not to what lengths enthuſiaſm, or other extraordinary motions of the human mind, may tranſport men, to the neglect of all order and public good. Where difference of intereſt is removed, whimſical and unaccountable factions often ariſe, from perſonal favor or enmity. Perhaps ruſt may grow to the ſprings of the moſt accurate political machine, and diſorder its motions. Laſtly, extenſive conqueſts, when purſued, muſt be the ruin of every free government; and of the more perfect governments ſooner than of the imperfect; becauſe of the very advantages which the former poſſeſs above the latter. And tho' ſuch a ſtate ought to eſtabliſh a fundamental law againſt conqueſts; yet republics have ambition as well as individuals, and preſent intereſt makes men forgetful of their poſterity. 'Tis a ſufficient incitement to human endeavors, that ſuch a government would floriſh for many ages; without pretending to beſtow on any work of man, that immortality, which the Almighty ſeems to have refuſed to his own productions.

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ENQUIRY

CONCERNING

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

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SECTION I.

OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY.

MORAL philoſophy, or the ſcience of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, inſtruction, and reformation of mankind. The one conſiders man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his actions by taſte and ſentiment; purſuing one object and avoiding another, according to the value, which theſe objects ſeem to poſſeſs, and according to the light, in which they preſent themſelves. Virtue, of all objects, is the moſt valuable and lovely; and accordingly this ſpecies of philoſophers paint her in the moſt amiable colors; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their ſubject in an eaſy and obvious manner, ſuch as is beſt fitted to pleaſe the imagination, and engage the affections. They ſelect the moſt ſtriking obſervations and inſtances from common life; place oppoſite characters in a proper contraſt; and alluring us into the paths of virtue, by the views of glory and happineſs, direct our ſteps in theſe paths, by the ſoundeſt precepts and moſt illuſtrious examples. They make us *feel* the difference betwixt vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our ſentiments; and ſo they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honor, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labors.

THE other ſpecies of philoſophers treat man rather as a reaſonable than an active being, and endeavor to form his underſtanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard mankind as a ſubject of ſpeculation; and with a narrow ſcrutiny examine human nature, in order to find thoſe principles, which regulate our underſtanding, excite our ſentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behavior. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philoſophy ſhould not yet have fixed, beyond controverſy, the foundation of morals, reaſoning, and criticiſm; and ſhould for ever talk of truth and falſehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the ſource of theſe diſtinctions. While they attempt this arduous taſk, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular inſtances to general principles, they ſtill puſh on their enquiries to principles more general, and reſt not ſatisfied till they arrive at thoſe original principles, by which, in every ſcience, all human curioſity muſt be bounded. Tho' their ſpeculations ſeem abſtract and even unintelligible to common readers, they pleaſe themſelves with the approbation of the learned and the wiſe; and think themſelves ſufficiently compenſated for the labors of their whole lives, if they can diſcover ſome hidden truths, which may contribute to the inſtruction of poſterity.

'Tis certain, that the eaſy and obvious philoſophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference to the accurate and abſtruſe; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more uſeful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and by touching thoſe principles, which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer that model of perfection, which it deſcribes. On the contrary, the abſtruſe philoſophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into buſineſs and action, vaniſhes when the philoſopher leaves the ſhade and comes into open day; nor can its principles eaſily retain any influence over our conduct and behavior. The feelings of our ſentiments, the agitations of our paſſions, the vehemence of our affections, diſſipate all its concluſions, and reduce the profound philoſopher to a mere plebeian.

This alſo muſt be confeſſed, that the moſt durable, as well as juſteſt fame has been acquired by the eaſy philoſophy, and that abſtract reaſoners ſeem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to ſupport their renown with more equitable poſterity. 'Tis eaſy for a profound philoſopher to commit a miſtake in his ſubtile reaſonings; and one miſtake is the neceſſary parent of another, while he puſhes on his conſequences, and is not deterred from embracing any concluſion, by its unuſual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philoſopher, who propoſes only to repreſent the common ſenſe of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colors, if by accident he commits a miſtake, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common ſenſe, and the natural ſentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and ſecures himſelf from any dangerous illuſions. The fame of Cicero floriſhes at preſent; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere paſſes the ſeas, and ſtill maintains his reputation: But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation and to his own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be red with pleaſure, when Locke ſhall be entirely forgotten.

The mere philoſopher is a character which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being ſuppoſed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleaſure of ſociety; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehenſion. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is ſtill more deſpiſed; nor is any thing deemed a ſurer ſign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the ſciences floriſh, than to be entirely void of all reliſh for thoſe noble entertainments. The moſt perfect character is ſuppoſed to lie between thoſe extremes; retaining an equal ability and taſte for books, company, and buſineſs; preſerving in converſation that diſcernment and delicacy which ariſe from polite letters; and in buſineſs, that probity and accuracy which are the natural reſult of a juſt philoſophy. In order to diffuſe and cultivate ſo accompliſhed a character, nothing can be more uſeful than compoſitions of the eaſy ſtyle and manner, which draw not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and ſend back the ſtudent among mankind full of noble ſentiments and wiſe precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of ſuch compoſitions, virtue becomes amiable, ſcience agreeable, company inſtructive, and retirement entertaining.

MAN is a reaſonable being; and as ſuch, receives from ſcience his proper food and nouriſhment: But ſo narrow are the bounds of human underſtanding, that little ſatisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent or ſecurity of his acquiſitions. Man is a ſociable, no leſs than a reaſonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amuſing, or preſerve the proper reliſh of them. Man is alſo an active being; and from that diſpoſition, as well as from the various neceſſities of human life, muſt ſubmit to buſineſs and occupation: But the mind requires ſome relaxation, and cannot always ſupport its bent to care and induſtry. It ſeems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as moſt ſuitable to human race, and ſecretly admoniſhed them to allow none of theſe biaſſes to *draw* too much, ſo as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your paſſion for ſcience, ſays ſhe, but let your ſcience be human, and ſuch as may have a direct reference to action and ſociety. Abſtruſe thought and profound reſearches I prohibit, and will ſeverely puniſh, by the penſive melancholy which they introduce, by the endleſs uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended diſcoveries will meet with, when communicated. Be a philoſopher; but, amidſt all your philoſophy, be ſtill a man.

WERE the generality of mankind contented to prefer the eaſy philoſophy to the abſtract and profound, without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without oppoſition, his own taſte and ſentiment. But as the matter is often carried farther, even to the abſolute rejecting all profound reaſonings or what is commonly called *metaphyſics*, we ſhall now proceed to conſider what can reaſonably be pleaded in their behalf.

WE may begin with obſerving, that one conſiderable advantage which reſults from the accurate and abſtract philoſophy, is, its ſubſerviency to the eaſy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a ſufficient degree of exactneſs in its ſentiments, precepts, or reaſonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and ſituations; and inſpire us with different ſentiments, of praiſe or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the object which they ſet before us. An artiſt muſt be better qualified to ſucceed in this undertaking, who, beſides a delicate taſte and a quick apprehenſion, poſſeſſes an accurate knowlege of the internal fabric, the operations of the underſtanding, the workings of the paſſions, and the various ſpecies of ſentiment, which diſcriminate vice and virtue. However painful this inward ſearch or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in ſome meaſure, requiſite to thoſe, who would deſcribe with ſucceſs the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomiſt preſents to the eye the moſt hideous and diſagreeable objects; but his ſcience is highly uſeful to the painter in delineating even a VENUS or an HELEN. While the latter employs all the richeſt colours of his art, and gives his figures the moſt graceful and engaging airs; he muſt ſtill carry his attention to the inward ſtructure of the human body, the poſition of the muſcles, the fabric of the bones, and the uſe and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every caſe, advantageous to beauty, and juſt reaſoning to delicate ſentiments. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.

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BESIDES, we may obſerve, in every art or profeſſion, even thoſe which moſt concern life or action, that a ſpirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more ſubſervient to the intereſts of ſociety. And tho' a philoſopher may live remote from buſineſs, the genius of philoſophy, if carefully cultivated by ſeveral, muſt gradually diffuſe itſelf thro' the whole ſociety, and beſtow a ſimilar correctneſs on every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater foreſight and ſubtilty, in the ſubdividing and ballancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reaſonings; and the general more regularity in his diſcipline, and more caution in his plans and operation. The ſtability of modern governments above the antient, and the accuracy of modern philoſophy, have improved, and probably will ſtill improve, by ſimilar gradations.

WERE there no advantage to be reaped from theſe ſtudies, beyond the gratification of an innocent curioſity, yet ought not even this to be deſpiſed; as being one acceſſion to thoſe few ſafe and harmleſs pleaſures which are beſtowed on human race. The ſweeteſt and moſt inoffenſive path of life leads thro' the avenues of ſcience and learning; and whoever can either remove any obſtructions in this way, or open up any new proſpect, ought ſo far to be eſteemed a benefactor to mankind. And tho' theſe reſearches may appear painful and fatiguing, 'tis with ſome minds as with ſome bodies, which being endowed with vigorous and florid health, require ſevere exerciſe, and reap a pleaſure from what, to the generality of mankind, may ſeem burthenſome and laborious. Obſcurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye; but to bring light from obſcurity, by whatever labor, muſt needs be delightful and rejoicing.

BUT this obſcurity, in the profound and abſtract philoſophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable ſource of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the juſteſt and moſt plauſible objection againſt a conſiderable part of metaphyſics, that they are not properly a ſcience, but ariſe either from the fruitleſs efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into ſubjects utterly inacceſſible to the underſtanding, or from the craft of popular ſuperſtition, which, being unable to defend themſelves on fair ground, raiſe theſe intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakneſs. Chaced from the open country, theſe robbers fly into the foreſt, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The ſtouteſt antagoniſt, if he remits his watch a moment, is oppreſſed: And many, thro' cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and ſubmiſſion, as their legal ſovereigns.

BUT is this a juſt cauſe why philoſophers ſhould deſiſt from ſuch reſearches, and leave ſuperſtition ſtill in poſſeſſion of her retreat? Is it not reaſonable to draw a direct contrary concluſion, and perceive the neceſſity of carrying the war into the moſt ſecret receſſes of the enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent diſappointments, will at laſt abandon ſuch airy ſciences, and diſcover the proper province of human reaſon. For beſides, that many perſons find too ſenſible an intereſt in perpetually recalling ſuch topics; beſides this, I ſay, the motive of blind deſpair can never reaſonably have place in the ſciences; ſince, however unſucceſsful former attempts may have proved, there is ſtill room to hope, that the induſtry, good fortune, or improved ſagacity of ſucceeding generations

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may reach diſcoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will ſtill leap at the arduous prize, and find himſelf ſtimulated, rather than diſcouraged, by the failures of his predeceſſors; while he hopes, that the glory of atchieving ſo hard an adventure is reſerved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at once, from theſe abſtruſe queſtions, is to enquire ſeriouſly into the nature of human underſtanding, and ſhew, from an exact analyſis of its powers and capacity, that it is, by no means, fitted for ſuch remote and abſtruſe ſubjects. We muſt ſubmit to this fatigue, in order to live at eaſe for ever after: And muſt cultivate true metaphyſics with ſome care, in order to deſtroy the falſe and adulterate. Indolence, which, to ſome perſons, affords a ſafeguard againſt this deceitful philoſophy, is, with others, over-ballanced by curioſity; and deſpair, which, at ſome moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to ſanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and juſt reaſoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all perſons and all diſpoſitions, and is alone able to ſubvert that abſtruſe philoſophy and metaphyſical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular ſuperſtition, renders it, in a manner, impenetrable to careleſs reaſoners, and gives it the air of ſcience and wiſdom.

Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the moſt uncertain and diſagreeable part of learning, there are many poſitive advantages, which reſult from an accurate ſcrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature. 'Tis remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that tho' moſt intimately preſent to us, yet whenever they become the object of reflection, they ſeem involved in obſcurity, nor can the eye readily find thoſe lines and boundaries, which diſcriminate and diſtinguiſh them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the ſame aſpect or ſituation; and muſt be apprehended, in an inſtant, by a ſuperior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflection. It becomes, therefore, no inconſiderable part of ſcience barely to know the different operations of the mind, to ſeparate them from each other, to claſs them under their proper diviſions, and to correct all that ſeeming diſorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflection and enquiry. This taſk of ordering and diſtinguiſhing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our ſenſes, riſes in its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labor, which we meet with in performing it. And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the diſtinct parts and powers of the mind, 'tis at leaſt a ſatisfaction to go ſo far; and the more obvious this ſcience may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible ſtill muſt the ignorance of it be eſteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philoſophy.

Nor can there remain any ſuſpicion, that this ſcience is uncertain and chimerical; unleſs we ſhould entertain ſuch a ſcepticiſm as is entirely ſubverſive of all ſpeculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with ſeveral powers and faculties, that theſe powers are totally diſtinct from each other, that what is really diſtinct to the immediate perception may be diſtinguiſhed by reflection; and conſequently, that there is a truth and falſhood in all propoſitions on this ſubject, and a truth and falſhood, which lie not beyond the compaſs of human underſtanding. There are many obvious diſtinctions of this kind, ſuch as thoſe betwixt the will and underſtanding, the imagination and paſſions, which

fall within the comprehenſion of every human creature; and the finer and more philoſophical diſtinctions are no leſs real and certain, tho' more difficult to be comprehended. Some inſtances, eſpecially late ones, of ſucceſs in theſe enquiries, may give us a juſter notion of the certainty and ſolidity of this branch of learning. And ſhall we eſteem it worthy the labor of a philoſopher to give us a true ſyſtem of the planets, and adjuſt the poſition and order of thoſe remote bodies; while we affect to overlook thoſe, who, with ſo much ſucceſs, delineate the parts of the mind in which we are ſo intimately concerned?

But may we not hope, that philoſophy, if cultivated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its reſearches ſtill farther, and diſcover, at leaſt in ſome degree, the ſecret ſprings and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations? Aſtronomers had long contented themſelves with proving, from the phænomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philoſopher, at laſt, aroſe, who ſeems from the happieſt reaſoning, to have alſo determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reaſon to deſpair of equal ſucceſs in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and oeconomy, if proſecuted with equal capacity and caution. 'Tis probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be reſolved into one more general and univerſal: And how far theſe reſearches may poſſibly be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by thoſe who philoſophize the moſt negligently; and nothing can be more requiſite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorow care and attention; that, if it lie within the compaſs of human underſtanding, it may at laſt be happily atchieved; if not, it may, however, be rejected with ſome confidence and ſecurity. This laſt concluſion, ſurely, is not deſireable, nor ought it to be embraced too raſhly. For how much muſt we diminiſh from the beauty and value of this ſpecies of philoſophy, upon ſuch a ſuppoſition? Moraliſts have hitherto been accuſtomed, when they conſidered the vaſt multitude and diverſity of actions that excite our approbation or diſlike, to ſearch for ſome common principle, on which this variety of ſentiments might depend. And tho' they have ſometimes carried the matter too far, by their paſſion for ſome one general principle; it muſt, however, be confeſſed, that they are excuſable, in expecting to find ſome general principles, into which all the vices and virtues were juſtly to be reſolved. The like has been the endeavor of critics, logicians, and even politicians: Nor have their attempts been wholly unſucceſsful; tho' perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring theſe ſciences ſtill nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretenſions of this kind may juſtly be deemed more raſh, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldeſt and moſt affirmative philoſophy, which has ever attempted to impoſe its crude dictates and principles on mankind.

What tho' theſe reaſonings concerning human nature ſeem abſtract, and of difficult comprehenſion? This affords no preſumption of their falſhood. On the contrary, it ſeems impoſſible, that what has hitherto eſcaped ſo many wiſe and profound philoſophers can be very obvious and eaſy. And whatever pains theſe reſearches may coſt us, we may think ourſelves ſufficiently rewarded, not only i

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point of profit but of pleaſure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our ſtock of knowlege, in ſubjects of ſuch unſpeakable importance.

But as, after all, the abſtractedneſs of theſe ſpeculations is no recommendation, but rather a diſadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be ſurmounted by care and art, and the avoiding all unneceſſary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted to throw ſome light upon ſubjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wiſe, and obſcurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different ſpecies of philoſophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearneſs, and truth with novelty! And ſtill more happy, if, reaſoning in this eaſy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abſtruſe philoſophy, which ſeems to have ſerved hitherto only as a ſhelter to ſuperſtition, and a cover to abſurdity and error!

SECTION II.

OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS.

EVERY one will readily allow, that there is a conſiderable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of exceſſive heat, or the pleaſure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this ſenſation, or anticipates it by his imagination. Theſe faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the ſenſes; but they never can reach entirely the force and vivacity of the original ſentiment. The utmoſt we ſay of them, even when they operate with greateſt vigor, is, that they repreſent their object in ſo lively a manner, that we could *almoſt* ſay we feel or ſee it: But except the mind be diſordered by diſeaſe or madneſs, they never can arrive at ſuch a pitch of vivacity, as to render theſe perceptions altogether undiſtinguiſhable. All the colors of poetry, however ſplendid, can never paint natural objects in ſuch a manner as to make the deſcription be taken for a real landſkip. The moſt lively thought is ſtill inferior to the dulleſt ſenſation.

We may obſerve a like diſtinction to run thro' all the other perceptions of the mind. A man, in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any perſon is in love, I eaſily underſtand your meaning, and form a juſt conception of his ſituation; but never can miſtake that conception for the real diſorders and agitations of the paſſion. When we reflect on our paſt ſentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colors which it employs are faint and dull, in compariſon of thoſe in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice diſcernment nor metaphyſical head to mark the diſtinction between them.

Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two claſſes or ſpecies, which are diſtinguiſhed by their different degrees of force and vivacity.

The leſs forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The other ſpecies want a name in our language, and in moſt others; I ſuppoſe,

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becauſe it was not requiſite for any, but philoſophical purpoſes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, uſe a little freedom, and call them IMPRESSIONS; employing that word in a ſenſe ſomewhat different from the uſual. By the term *impreſſion*, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or ſee, or feel, or love, or hate, or deſire, or will. And impreſſions are diſtinguiſhed from ideas, which are the leſs lively perceptions of which we are conſcious, when we reflect on any of thoſe ſenſations or movements above mentioned.

NOTHING, at firſt view, may ſeem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only eſcapes all human power and authority, but is not even reſtrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monſters, and join incongruous ſhapes and appearances, coſts no more trouble than to conceive the moſt natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an inſtant tranſport us into the moſt diſtant regions of the univerſe; or even beyond the univerſe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is ſuppoſed to lie in total confuſion. What never was ſeen, nor heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what implies an abſolute contradiction.

BUT tho' thought ſeems to poſſeſs this unbounded liberty, we ſhall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the compounding, tranſpoſing, augmenting, or diminiſhing the materials afforded us by the ſenſes and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two conſiſtent ideas, *gold*, and *mountain*, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horſe we can conceive; becauſe, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue, and this we may unite to the figure and ſhape of a horſe, which is an animal familiar to us. In ſhort, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward ſentiment: The mixture and compoſition of theſe belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to expreſs myſelf in philoſophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impreſſions or more lively ones.

To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be ſufficient. Firſt, When we analyſe our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or ſublime, we always find, that they reſolve themſelves into ſuch ſimple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or ſentiment. Even thoſe ideas, which, at firſt view, ſeem the moſt wide of this origin, are found, upon a narrower ſcrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wiſe, and good Being, ariſes from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, thoſe qualities of goodneſs and wiſdom. We may proſecute this enquiry to what length we pleaſe; where we ſhall always find, that every idea we examine is copied from a ſimilar impreſſion. Thoſe who would aſſert, that this poſition is not abſolutely univerſal and without exception, have only one, and that an eaſy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this ſource. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impreſſion or lively perception, which correſponds to it.

SECONDLY,

SECONDLY. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not ſuſceptible of any ſpecies of ſenſation, we always find, that he is as little ſuſceptible of the correſpondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colors; a deaf man of ſounds. Reſtore either of them that ſenſe, in which he is defective; by opening this new inlet for his ſenſations, you alſo open an inlet for the ideas, and he finds no difficulty of conceiving theſe objects. The caſe is the ſame, if the object, proper for exciting any ſenſation, has never been applied to the organ. A LAPLANDER or NEGROE has no notion of the reliſh of wine. And tho' there are few or no inſtances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a perſon has never felt or is wholly incapable of a ſentiment or paſſion, that belongs to his ſpecies; yet we find the ſame obſervation to take place in a leſs degree. A man of mild manners can form no notion of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a ſelfiſh heart eaſily conceive the heights of friendſhip and generoſity. 'Tis readily allowed, that other beings may poſſeſs many ſenſes, of which we can have no conception; becauſe the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have acceſs to the mind, *viz.* by the actual feeling and ſenſation.

THERE is, however, one contradictory phænomenon, which may prove, that 'tis not abſolutely impoſſible for ideas to go before their correſpondent impreſſions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the ſeveral diſtinct ideas of colors, which enter by the eyes, or thoſe of ſounds, which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from each other; tho', at the ſame time, reſembling. Now if this be true of different colors, it muſt be no leſs ſo, of the different ſhades of the ſame color; and each ſhade produces a diſtinct idea, independent of the reſt. For if this ſhould be denied, 'tis poſſible, by the continual gradation of ſhades, to run a color inſenſibly into what is moſt remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without abſurdity, deny the extremes to be the ſame. Suppoſe, therefore, a perſon to have enjoyed his ſight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colors of all kinds, except one particular ſhade of blue, for inſtance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different ſhades of that color, except that ſingle one, be placed before him, deſcending gradually from the deepeſt to the lighteſt; 'tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that ſhade is wanting, and will be ſenſible, that there is a greater diſtance in that place betwixt the contiguous colors than in any other. Now I aſk, whether 'tis poſſible for him, from his own imagination, to ſupply this deficiency, and raiſe up to himſelf the idea of that particular ſhade, tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his ſenſes? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can; and this may ſerve as a proof, that the ſimple ideas are not always, in every inſtance, derived from the correſpondent impreſſions; tho' this inſtance is ſo ſingular, that 'tis ſcarce worth our obſerving, and does not merit, that for it alone we ſhould alter our general maxim.

HERE, therefore, is a propoſition, which not only ſeems, in itſelf, ſimple and intelligible; but, if a proper uſe were made of it, might render every diſpute equally intelligible, and baniſh all that jargon, which has ſo long taken poſſeſſion of metaphyſical reaſonings, and drawn ſuch diſgrace upon them. All ideas, eſpecially abſtract ones, are naturally faint and obſcure; the mind has but a ſlender hold of them: They are apt to be confounded with other reſembling ideas: and when

we have often employed any term, tho' without a diſtinct meaning, we are apt to imagine that it has a determinate idea, annexed to it. On the contrary, all impreſſions, that is, all ſenſations, either outward or inward, are ſtrong and ſenſible: The limits between them are more exactly determined: Nor is it eaſy to fall into any error or miſtake with regard to them. When we entertain therefore any ſuſpicion, that a philoſophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent) we need but enquire, *from what impreſſion is that ſuppoſed idea derived?* And if it be impoſſible to aſſign any, this will ſerve to confirm our ſuſpicion. By bringing ideas into ſo clear a light, we may reaſonably hope to remove all diſpute, which may ariſe, concerning their nature and reality [a].

SECTION III.

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

'TIS evident, that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more ſerious thinking or diſcourſe, this is ſo obſervable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon this regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildeſt and moſt wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we ſhall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was ſtill a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which ſucceeded each other. Were the looſeſt and freeſt converſation to be tranſcribed, there would immediately be obſerved ſomething, which connected it in all its tranſitions. Or where this is wanting, the perſon, who broke the thread of diſcourſe, might ſtill inform you, that there had

[a] 'Tis probable, that no more was meant by thoſe, who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impreſſions; tho' it muſt be confeſſed, that the terms which they employed were not choſen with ſuch caution, nor ſo exactly defined as to prevent all miſtakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by *innate?* If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind muſt be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever ſenſe we take the latter word, whether in oppoſition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, cotemporary to our birth, the diſpute ſeems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word, *idea*, ſeems to be commonly taken in a very looſe ſenſe, even by Mr. Locke himſelf, as ſtanding for any of our perceptions, our ſenſations and paſſions, as well as thoughts. Now in this ſenſe, I ſhould deſire to know, what can be meant by aſſerting, that ſelf-love, or reſentment of injuries, or the paſſion betwixt the ſexes is not innate?

But admitting theſe terms, *impreſſions* and *ideas*, in the ſenſe above explained, and underſtanding by *innate* what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we aſſert, that all our impreſſions are innate, and our ideas not innate.

To be ingenuous, I muſt own it to be my opinion, that Mr. Locke was betrayed into this queſtion by the ſchoolmen, who making uſe of undefined terms, draw out their diſputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in queſtion. A like ambiguity and circumlocution ſeem to run thro' all that great philoſopher's reaſonings on this ſubject.

ſecretly

ſecretly revolved in his mind a ſucceſſion of thought, which had gradually led him away from the ſubject of converſation. Among the languages of different nations, even where we cannot ſuſpect the leaſt connexion or communication, 'tis found, that the words, expreſſive of ideas, the moſt compounded, do yet nearly correſpond to each other: A certain proof, that the ſimple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by ſome univerſal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.

THO' it be too obvious to eſcape obſervation, that different ideas are connected together; I do not find, that any philoſopher has attempted to enumerate or claſs all the principles of aſſociation; a ſubject, however, that ſeems very worthy of curioſity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, *viz.* *Reſemblance*, *Contiguity* in time or place, and *Cauſe* or *Effect*.

THAT theſe principles ſerve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original [b]: The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or diſcourſe concerning the others [c]: And if we think of a wound, we can ſcarce forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it [d]. But that this enumeration is compleat, and that there are no other principles of aſſociation, except theſe, may be difficult to prove to the ſatisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own ſatisfaction. All we can do, in ſuch caſes, is to run over ſeveral inſtances, and examine carefully the principle, which binds the different thoughts to each other, never ſtopping till we render the principle as general as poſſible. The more inſtances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more aſſurance ſhall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is compleat and entire. Inſtead of entering into a detail of this kind, which would lead into many uſeleſs ſubtilties, we ſhall conſider ſome of the effects of this connexion upon the paſſions and imagination; where we may open a field of ſpeculation more entertaining, and perhaps more inſtructive, than the other.

As man is a reaſonable being, and is continually in purſuit of happineſs, which he hopes to attain by the gratification of ſome paſſion or affection, he ſeldom acts or ſpeaks or thinks without a purpoſe and intention. He has ſtill ſome object in view; and however improper the means may ſometimes be, which he chuſes for the attainment of his end, he never loſes view of an end, nor will he ſo much as throw away his thoughts or reflections, where he hopes not to reap any ſatisfaction from them.

IN all compoſitions of genius, therefore, 'tis requiſite that the writer have ſome plan or object; and tho' he may be hurried from this plan by the vehemence of thought, as in an ode, or drop it careleſly, as in an epiſtle or eſſay, there muſt appear ſome aim or intention, in his firſt ſetting out, if not in the compoſition of the whole work. A production without a deſign would reſemble more the ravings of a madman, than the ſober efforts of genius and learning.

AS this rule admits of no exception, it follows, that in narrative compoſitions, the events or actions, which the writer relates, muſt be connected together, by ſome bond or tye: They muſt be related to each other in the imagination, and

[b] Reſemblance. [c] Contiguity. [d] Cauſe and Effect.

form

form a kind of *Unity*, which may bring them under one plan or view, and which may be the object or end of the writer in his first undertaking.

THIS connecting principle among the several events, which form the subject of a poem or history, may be very different, according to the different designs of the poet or historian. OVID has formed his plan upon the connecting principle of resemblance. Every fabulous transformation, produced by the miraculous power of the gods, falls within the compass of his work. There needs but this one circumstance in any event to bring it under his original plan or intention.

AN annalist or historian, who should undertake to write the history of EUROPE during any century, would be influenced by the connexion of contiguity in time and place. All events, which happen in that portion of space, and period of time, are comprehended in his design, tho' in other respects different and unconnected. They have still a species of unity, amidst all their diversity.

BUT the most usual species of connexion among the different events, which enter into any narrative composition, is that of cause and effect; while the historian traces the series of actions according to their natural order, remounts to their secret springs and principles, and delineates their most remote consequences. He chuses for his subject a certain portion of that great chain of events, which compose the history of mankind: Each link in this chain he endeavors to touch in his narration: Sometimes, unavoidable ignorance renders all his attempts fruitless: Sometimes, he supplies by conjecture what is wanting in knowlege: And always, he is sensible, that the more unbroken the chain is, which he presents to his readers, the more perfect is his production. He sees, that the knowlege of causes is not only the most satisfactory; this relation or connexion being the strongest of all others; but also the most instructive; since it is by this knowlege alone, we are enabled to control events, and govern futurity.

HERE therefore we may attain some notion of that *Unity* of *Action*, about which all critics, after ARISTOTLE, have talked so much: Perhaps, to little purpose, while they directed not their taste or sentiment by the accuracy of philosophy. It appears, that in all productions, as well as in the epic and tragic, there is a certain unity required, and that, on no occasion, can our thoughts be allowed to run at adventures, if we would produce a work, which will give any lasting entertainment to mankind. It appears also, that even a biographer, who should write the life of ACHILLES, would connect the events, by shewing their mutual dependence and relation, as much as a poet, who should make the anger of that hero, the subject of his narration [e]. Not only in any limited portion of life, a man's actions have a dependance on each other, but also during the whole period of his duration, from the cradle to the grave; nor is it possible to strike off one link, however minute, in this regular chain, without affecting the whole series of events, which follow. The unity of action, therefore, which is to be found in biography or history, differs from that of epic poetry, not in kind, but in degree. In epic poetry, the connexion among the events is more close and sensible: The narration is not carried on thro' such a length of time: And the actors hasten to some remarkable period, which satisfies the curiosity of the reader. This conduct of the

[e] Contrary to ARISTOTLE, Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἷς, οὐχ, ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται, ἐὰν περὶ θ' ἕνος ᾖ. Πολλὰ γὰρ, καὶ ἀπείρα τῷ γένει συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων ἐστιν ἕν. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ πράξεις, ἑνός πολλαί ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις, &c. Κεφ. η.

epic poet depends on that particular ſituation of the *Imagination* and of the *Paſſions*, which is ſuppoſed in that production. The imagination, both of writer and reader, is more enlivened, and the paſſions more enflamed than in hiſtory, biography, or any ſpecies of narration, which confine themſelves to ſtrict truth and reality. Let us conſider the effect of theſe two circumſtances, an enlivened imagination and enflamed paſſions, circumſtances, which belong to poetry, eſpecially the epic kind, above any other ſpecies of compoſition; and let us examine the reaſon why they require a ſtricter and cloſer unity in the fable.

FIRST. All poetry, being a ſpecies of painting, approaches us nearer to the objects than any other ſpecies of narration, throws a ſtronger light upon them, and delineates more diſtinctly thoſe minute circumſtances, which, tho' to the hiſtorian they ſeem ſuperfluous, ſerve mightily to enliven the imagery, and gratify the fancy. If it be not neceſſary, as in the *Iliad*, to inform us each time the hero buckles his ſhoes, and ties his garters, it will be requiſite, perhaps, to enter into a greater detail than in the HENRIADE; where the events are run over with ſuch rapidity, that we ſcarce have leiſure to become acquainted with the ſcene of action. Were a poet, therefore, to comprehend in his ſubject any great compaſs of time or ſeries of events, and trace up the death of HECTOR to its remote cauſes, in the rape of HELEN, or the judgment of PARIS, he muſt draw out his poem to an immeaſurable length, in order to fill this large canvas with juſt painting and imagery. The reader's imagination, enflamed with ſuch a ſeries of poetical deſcriptions, and his paſſions, agitated by a continual ſympathy with the actors, muſt flag long before the period of the narration, and muſt ſink into laſſitude and diſguſt, from the repeated violence of the ſame movements.

SECONDLY. That an epic poet muſt not trace the cauſes to any great diſtance, will farther appear, if we conſider another reaſon, which is drawn from a property of the paſſions ſtill more remarkable and ſingular. 'Tis evident, that in a juſt compoſition, all the affections, excited by the different events, deſcribed and repreſented, add mutual force to each other; and that while the heroes are all engaged in one common ſcene, and each action is ſtrongly connected with the whole, the concern is continually awake, and the paſſions make an eaſy tranſition from one object to another. The ſtrong connection of the events, as it facilitates the paſſage of the thought or imagination from one to another, facilitates alſo the tranſfuſion of the paſſions, and preſerves the affections ſtill in the ſame channel and direction. Our ſympathy and concern for EVE prepares the way for a like ſympathy with ADAM: The affection is preſerved almoſt entire in the tranſition; and the mind ſeizes immediately the new object as ſtrongly related to that which formerly engaged its attention. But were the poet to make a total digreſſion from his ſubject, and introduce a new actor, no way connected with the perſonages, the imagination, feeling a breach in the tranſition, would enter coldly into the new ſcene; would kindle by ſlow degrees; and in returning to the main ſubject of the poem, would paſs, as it were, upon foreign ground, and have its concern to excite anew, in order to take party with the principal actors. The ſame inconvenience follows in a leſs degree, where the poet traces his events to too great a diſtance, and binds together actions, which tho' not entirely disjoined, have not ſo ſtrong a connexion as is requiſite to forward the tranſition of the paſſions. Hence ariſes the artifice of the oblique narration, employed in the *Odyſſey* and *Æneid*; where

where the hero is introduced, at firſt, near the period of his deſigns, and afterwards ſhows us, as it were in perſpective, the more diſtant events and cauſes. By this means, the reader's curioſity is immediately excited: The events follow with rapidity, and in a very cloſe connexion: And the concern is preſerved alive, and, by means of the near relation of the objects, continually increaſes, from the beginning to the end of the narration.

The ſame rule takes place in dramatic poetry; nor is it ever permitted, in a regular compoſition, to introduce an actor, who has no connexion, or but a ſmall one, with the principal perſonages of the fable. The ſpectator's concern muſt not be diverted by any ſcenes, disjoined and ſeparated from the reſt. This breaks the courſe of the paſſions, and prevents that communication of the ſeveral emotions, by which one ſcene adds force to another, and transfuſes the pity and terror, which it excites, upon each ſucceeding ſcene, 'till the whole produces that rapidity of movement, which is peculiar to the theatre. How muſt it extinguiſh this warmth of affection to be entertained, on a ſudden, with a new action and new perſonages, no way related to the former; to find ſo ſenſible a breach or vacuity in the courſe of the paſſions, by means of this breach in the connexion of ideas; and inſtead of carrying the ſympathy of one ſcene into the following, to be obliged, every moment, to excite a new concern, and take party in a new ſcene of action?

But tho' this rule of unity of action be common to dramatic and epic poetry; we may ſtill obſerve a difference betwixt them, which may, perhaps, deſerve our attention. In both theſe ſpecies of compoſition, 'tis requiſite that the action be one and ſimple, in order to preſerve the concern or ſympathy entire and undiverted: But in epic or narrative poetry, this rule is alſo eſtabliſhed upon another foundation, *viz.* the neceſſity, that is incumbent on every writer, to form ſome plan or deſign, before he enter on any diſcourſe or narration, and to comprehend his ſubject in ſome general aſpect or united view, which may be the conſtant object of his attention. As the author is entirely loſt in dramatic compoſitions, and the ſpectator ſuppoſes himſelf to be really preſent at the actions repreſented; this reaſon has no place with regard to the ſtage; but any dialogue or converſation may be introduced, which, without improbability, might have paſſed in that determinate portion of ſpace, repreſented by the theatre. Hence in all our English comedies, even thoſe of Congreve, the unity of action is never ſtrictly obſerved; but the poet thinks it ſufficient, if his perſonages be any way related to each other, by blood, or by living in the ſame family; and he afterwards introduces them in particular ſcenes, where they diſplay their humors and characters, without much forwarding the main action. The double plots of Terence are licences of the ſame kind; but in a leſs degree. And tho' this conduct be not perfectly regular, it is not wholly unſuitable to the nature of comedy, where the movements and paſſions are not raiſed to ſuch a height as in tragedy; at the ſame time, that the fiction or repreſentation palliates, in ſome meaſure, ſuch licences. In a narrative poem, the firſt propoſition or deſign confines the author to one ſubject; and any digreſſions of this nature would, at firſt view, be rejected, as abſurd and monſtrous. Neither Boccace, La Fontaine, nor any author of that kind, tho' pleaſantry be their chief object, have ever indulged them.

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These loose hints I have thrown together, in order to excite the curiosity of philosophers, and beget a suspicion at least, if not a full persuasion, that this subject is very copious, and that many operations of the human mind depend on the connexion or association of ideas, which is here explained. Particularly, the sympathy between the passions and imagination will, perhaps, appear remarkable; while we observe that the affections, excited by one object, pass easily to another connected with it; but transfuse themselves with difficulty, or not at all, along different objects, which have no manner of connexion together. By introducing, into any composition, personages and actions, foreign to each other, an injudicious author loses that communication of emotions, by which alone he can interest the heart, and raise the passions to their proper height and period. The full explication of this principle and all its consequences would lead us into reasonings too profound and too copious for this enquiry. 'Tis sufficient, at present, to have established this conclusion, that the three connecting principles of all ideas are the relations of *Resemblance*, *Contiguity*, and *Causation*.

SECTION IV.

SCEPTICAL DOUBTS CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

PART I.

All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, *viz. Relations of Ideas* and *Matters of Fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. *That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the two sides*, is a proposition, which expresses a relation between these figures. *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty*, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependance on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Tho' there never were a true circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid, would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, *that it will rise*. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falshood. Were it demonstratively false, it would

would imply a contradiction, and could never be diſtinctly conceived by the mind.

It may, therefore, be a ſubject, worthy curioſity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence, which aſſures us of any real exiſtence and matter of fact, beyond the preſent teſtimony of our ſenſes, or the records of our memory. This part of philoſophy, 'tis obſervable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore our doubts and errors, in the proſecution of ſo important an enquiry, may be the more excuſable, while we march thro' ſuch difficult paths, without any guide or direction. They may even prove uſeful, by exciting curioſity, and deſtroying that implicit faith and ſecurity, which is the bane of all reaſoning and free enquiry. The diſcovery of defects in the common philoſophy, if any ſuch there be, will not, I preſume, be a diſcouragement, but rather an incitement, as is uſual, to attempt ſomething more full and ſatisfactory, than has yet been propoſed to the public.

All reaſonings concerning matter of fact ſeem to be founded in the relation of *Cauſe* and *Effect*. By means of that relation alone can we go beyond the evidence of our memory and ſenſes. If you were to aſk a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is abſent; for inſtance, that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a reaſon; and this reaſon would be ſome other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowlege of his former reſolutions and promiſes. A man, finding a watch or any other machine in a deſert iſland, would conclude, that there had once been men in that iſland. All our reaſonings concerning fact are of the ſame nature. And here 'tis conſtantly ſuppoſed, that there is a connexion between the preſent fact and that inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice and rational diſcourſe in the dark aſſures us of the preſence of ſome perſon: Why? becauſe theſe are the effects of the human make and fabric, and cloſely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reaſonings of this nature, we ſhall find, that they are founded in the relation of cauſe and effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the one effect may juſtly be inferred from the other.

If we would ſatisfy ourſelves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence, which aſſures us of all matters of fact, we muſt enquire how we arrive at the knowlege of cauſe and effect.

I shall venture to affirm, as a general propoſition, which admits of no exception, that the knowlege of this relation is not, in any inſtance, attained by reaſonings *à priori*; but ariſes entirely from experience, when we find, that any particular objects are conſtantly conjoined with each other. Let an object be preſented to a man of ever ſo ſtrong natural reaſon and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the moſt accurate examination of its ſenſible qualities, to diſcover any of its cauſes or effects. Adam, tho' his rational faculties be ſuppoſed, at the very firſt, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and tranſparency of water, that it would ſuffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire, that it would conſume him. No object ever diſcovers, by the qualities which appear to the ſenſes, either the cauſes, which produced it, or

the effects, which will ariſe from it; nor can our reaſon, unaſſiſted by experience, ever draw any inferences concerning real exiſtence and matter of fact.

THIS propoſition, *that cauſes and effects are diſcoverable, not by reaſon but by experience*, will readily be admitted with regard to ſuch objects, as we remember to have been once altogether unknown to us; ſince we muſt be conſcious of the utter inability which we then lay under of foretelling what would ariſe from them. Preſent two ſmooth pieces of marble to a man, who has no tincture of natural philoſophy; he will never diſcover, that they will adhere together, in ſuch a manner as to require great force to ſeparate them in a direct line, while they make ſo ſmall reſiſtance to a lateral preſſure. Such events, as bear little analogy to the common courſe of nature, are alſo readily confeſſed to be known only by experience; nor does any man imagine that the exploſion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadſtone could ever be diſcovered by arguments *à priori*. In like manner, when an effect is ſuppoſed to depend upon an intricate machinery or ſecret ſtructure of parts, we make no difficulty to attribute all our knowlege of it to experience. Who will aſſert, that he can give the ultimate reaſon, why milk or bread is proper nouriſhment for a man, not for a lion or a tyger?

BUT the ſame truth may not appear, at firſt ſight, to have the ſame evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from our firſt appearance in the world, which bear a cloſe analogy to the whole courſe of nature, and which are ſuppoſed to depend on the ſimple qualities of objects, without any ſecret ſtructure of parts. We are apt to imagine, that we could diſcover theſe effects, by the mere operations of our reaſon, without experience. We fancy, that, were we brought, on a ſudden, into this world, we could at firſt have inferred, that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulſe; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of cuſtom, that, where it is ſtrongeſt, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itſelf, and ſeems not to take place, merely becauſe it is found in the higheſt degree.

BUT to convince us, that all the laws of nature and all the operations of bodies, without exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, ſuffice. Were any object preſented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect, which will reſult from it, without conſulting paſt obſervation; after what manner, I beſeech you, muſt the mind proceed in this operation? It muſt invent or imagine ſome event, which it aſcribes to the object as its effect; and 'tis plain that this invention muſt be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never poſſibly find the effect in the ſuppoſed cauſe, by the moſt accurate ſcrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cauſe, and conſequently can never be diſcovered in it. Motion in the ſecond Billiard-ball is a quite diſtinct event from motion in the firſt; nor is there any thing in the one to ſuggeſt the ſmalleſt hint of the other. A ſtone or piece of metal raiſed into the air, and left without any ſupport, immediately falls: But to conſider the matter *à priori*; is there any thing we diſcover in this ſituation, which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the ſtone or metal?

AND as the firſt imagination or invention of a particular effect, in all natural operations, is arbitrary, where we conſult not experience; ſo muſt we alſo eſteem the

ſtacle or raiſe the greateſt weight, if by any contrivance or machinery we can encreaſe the velocity of that force, ſo as to make it an overmatch for its antagoniſt. Geometry aſſiſts us in the application of this law, by giving us the juſt dimenſions of all the parts and figures, which can enter into any ſpecies of machine; but ſtill the diſcovery of the law itſelf is owing merely to experience, and all the abſtract reaſonings in the world could never lead us one ſtep towards the knowlege of it. When we reaſon *à priori*, and conſider merely any object or cauſe, as it appears to the mind, independent of all obſervation, it never could ſuggeſt to us the notion of any diſtinct object, ſuch as its effect; much leſs, ſhew us the inſeparable and inviolable connection between them. A man muſt be very ſagacious, who could diſcover by reaſoning, that cryſtal is the effect of heat and ice of cold, without being previouſly acquainted with the operations of theſe qualities.

PART II.

But we have not, as yet, attained any tolerable ſatisfaction with regard to the queſtion firſt propoſed. Each ſolution ſtill gives riſe to a new queſtion as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther enquiries. When it is aſked, *What is the nature of all our reaſonings concerning matter of fact?* The proper anſwer ſeems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cauſe and effect. When again it is aſked, *What is the foundation of all our reaſonings and concluſions concerning that relation?* it may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we ſtill carry on our ſifting humor, and aſk, *What is the foundation of all our concluſions from experience?* this implies a new queſtion, which may be of more difficult ſolution and explication. Philoſophers, that give themſelves airs of ſuperior wiſdom and ſufficiency, have a hard taſk, when they encounter perſons of inquiſitive diſpoſitions, who puſh them from every corner, to which they retreat, and who are ſure at laſt to bring them to ſome dangerous dilemma. The beſt expedient to prevent this confuſion, is to be modeſt in our pretenſions; and even to diſcover the difficulty ourſelves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.

I shall content myſelf, in this ſection, with an eaſy taſk, and ſhall pretend only to give a negative anſwer to the queſtion here propoſed. I ſay then, that even after we have experience of the operations of cauſe and effect, our concluſions from that experience are *not* founded on reaſoning, or any proceſs of the underſtanding. This anſwer we muſt endeavor, both to explain and to defend.

It muſt certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great diſtance from all her ſecrets, and has afforded us only the knowlege of a few ſuperficial qualities of objects, while ſhe conceals from us thoſe powers and principles, on which the influence of theſe objects entirely depends. Our ſenſes inform us of the color, weight, and conſiſtence of bread; but neither ſenſes nor reaſon ever can inform us of thoſe qualities, which fit it for the nouriſhment and ſupport of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never loſe but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the moſt diſtant conception. But notwith-

notwithſtanding this ignorance of natural powers [8] and principles, we always preſume, where we ſee like ſenſible qualities, that they have like ſecret powers, and lay our account, that effects, ſimilar to thoſe, which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like color and conſiſtence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be preſented to us, we make no ſcruple of repeating the experiment, and expect, with certainty, like nouriſhment and ſupport. Now this is a proceſs of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. 'Tis allowed on all hands, that there is no known connection between the ſenſible qualities and the ſecret powers; and conſequently, that the mind is not led to form ſuch a concluſion concerning their conſtant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature. As to paſt *Experience*, it can be allowed to give *direct* and *certain* information only of thoſe preciſe objects, and that preciſe period of time, which fell under its cognizance: But why this experience ſhould be extended to future times, and to other objects, which, for aught we know, may be only in appearance ſimilar; this is the main queſtion on which I would inſiſt. The bread, which I formerly eat, nouriſhed me; that is, a body, of ſuch ſenſible qualities, was, at that time, endued with ſuch ſecret powers: But does it follow, that other bread muſt alſo nouriſh me at another time, and that like ſenſible qualities muſt always be attended with like ſecret powers? The conſequence ſeems no way neceſſary. At leaſt, it muſt be acknowleged, that there is here a conſequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain ſtep taken; a proceſs of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. Theſe two propoſitions are far from being the ſame, *I have found that ſuch an object has always been attended with ſuch an effect*, and, *I foreſee, that other objects, which are, to appearance, ſimilar, will be attended with ſimilar effects*. I ſhall allow, if you pleaſe, that the one propoſition may juſtly be inferred from the other: I know in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you inſiſt, that the inference is made by a chain of reaſoning, I deſire you to produce that reaſoning. The connection between theſe propoſitions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw ſuch an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reaſoning and argument. What that medium is, I muſt confeſs, paſſes my comprehenſion; and 'tis incumbent on thoſe to produce it, who aſſert, that it really exiſts, and is the origin of all our concluſions concerning matter of fact.

This negative argument muſt certainly, in proceſs of time, become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philoſophers ſhall turn their inquiries this way; and no one be ever able to diſcover any connecting propoſition or intermediate ſtep, which ſupports the underſtanding in this concluſion. But as the queſtion is yet new, every reader may not truſt ſo far to his own penetration, as to conclude, becauſe an argument eſcapes his reſearch and enquiry, that therefore it does not really exiſt. For this reaſon it may be requiſite to venture upon a more difficult taſk; and enumerating all the branches of human knowlege, endeavor to ſhew, that none of them can afford ſuch an argument.

All reaſonings may be divided into two kinds, *viz.* demonſtrative reaſonings, or thoſe concerning relations of ideas, and moral reaſonings or thoſe concerning matter of fact and exiſtence. That there are no demonſtrative arguments in the caſe, ſeems evident; ſince it implies no contradiction, that the courſe of nature

[8] The word, Power, is here uſed in a looſe and popular ſenſe. The more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7.

may

may change, and that an object ſeemingly like thoſe which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and diſtinctly conceive, that a body falling from the clouds, and which, in all other reſpects, reſembles ſnow, has yet the taſte of ſalt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible propoſition than to affirm, that all the trees will floriſh in DECEMBER and JANUARY, and decay in MAY and JUNE? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be diſtinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved falſe by any demonſtrative arguments or abſtract reaſonings *à priori*.

IF we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put truſt in paſt experience, and make it the ſtandard of our future judgment, theſe arguments muſt be probable only, or ſuch as regard matter of fact and real exiſtence, according to the diviſion above-mentioned. But that there are no arguments of this kind, muſt appear, if our explication of that ſpecies of reaſoning be admitted as ſolid and ſatisfactory. We have ſaid, that all arguments concerning exiſtence are founded on the relation of cauſe and effect; that our knowlege of that relation is derived entirely from experience, and that all our experimental concluſions proceed upon the ſuppoſition, that the future will be conformable to the paſt. To endeavor, therefore, the proof of this laſt ſuppoſition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding exiſtence, muſt be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in queſtion.

IN reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the ſimilarity, which we diſcover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects ſimilar to thoſe, which we have found to follow from ſuch objects. And tho' none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to diſpute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life; it may ſurely be allowed a philoſopher to have ſo much curioſity at leaſt, as to examine the principle of human nature which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that ſimilarity, which nature has placed among different objects. From cauſes, which appear *ſimilar*, we expect ſimilar effects. This is the ſum of all our experimental concluſions. Now it ſeems evident, that if this concluſion were formed by reaſon, it would be as perfect at firſt, and upon one inſtance, as after ever ſo long a courſe of experience. But the caſe is far otherwiſe. Nothing ſo like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this apparent ſimilarity, expects the ſame taſte and reliſh in all of them. 'Tis only after a long courſe of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and ſecurity with regard to a particular event. Now where is that proceſs of reaſoning, which from one inſtance draws a concluſion, ſo different from that which it infers from a hundred inſtances, that are no way different from that ſingle inſtance? This queſtion I propoſe as much for the ſake of information, as with an intention of raiſing difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any ſuch reaſoning. But I keep my mind ſtill open to inſtruction, if any one will vouchſafe to beſtow it on me.

SHOULD it be ſaid, that from a number of uniform experiments, we *infer* a connection between the ſenſible qualities and the ſecret powers; this, I muſt confeſs, ſeems the ſame difficulty, couched in different terms. The queſtion ſtill recurs, On what proceſs of argument this *inference* is founded? Where is the medium, the interpoſing ideas, which join propoſitions ſo very wide of each other? 'Tis confeſſed, that the color, conſiſtence, and other ſenſible qualities of bread

appear

appear not, of themſelves, to have any connexion with the ſecret powers of nouriſhment and ſupport. For otherwiſe we could infer theſe ſecret powers from the firſt appearance of theſe ſenſible qualities, without the aid of experience; contrary to the ſentiment of all philoſophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here then is our natural ſtate of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience? It only ſhews us a number of uniform effects, reſulting from certain objects, and teaches us, that thoſe particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with ſuch powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with ſimilar ſenſible qualities is produced, we expect ſimilar powers and forces, and lay our account with a like effect. From a body of like color and conſiſtence with bread, we look for like nouriſhment and ſupport. But this ſurely is a ſtep or progreſs of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man ſays, *I have found, in all paſt inſtances, ſuch ſenſible qualities, conjoined with ſuch ſecret powers:* And when he ſays, *ſimilar ſenſible qualities will always be conjoined with ſimilar ſecret powers*; he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are theſe propoſitions in any reſpect the ſame. You ſay that the one propoſition is an inference from another. But you muſt confeſs, that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonſtrative: Of what nature is it then? To ſay it is experimental is begging the queſtion. For all inferences from experience ſuppoſe, as their foundation; that the future will reſemble the paſt, and that ſimilar powers will be conjoined with ſimilar ſenſible qualities. If there be any ſuſpicion, that the courſe of nature may change, and that the paſt may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes uſeleſs, and can give riſe to no inference or concluſion. 'Tis impoſſible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this reſemblance of the paſt to the future; ſince all theſe arguments are founded on the ſuppoſition of that reſemblance. Let the courſe of things be allowed hitherto ever ſo regular; that alone, without ſome new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue ſo. In vain do you pretend to have learnt the nature of bodies from your paſt experience. Their ſecret nature, and conſequently, all their effects and influence may change, without any change in their ſenſible qualities. This happens ſometimes, and with regard to ſome objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what proceſs of argument ſecures you againſt this ſuppoſition? My practice, you ſay, refutes my doubts. But you miſtake the purport of my queſtion. As an agent, I am quite ſatisfied in the point; but as a philoſopher, who has ſome ſhare of curioſity, I will not ſay ſcepticiſm, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me ſatisfaction in a matter of ſuch vaſt importance. Can I do better than propoſe the difficulty to the public, even tho', perhaps, I have ſmall hopes of obtaining a ſolution? We ſhall at leaſt, by this means, be ſenſible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowlege.

I MUST confeſs, that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance, who concludes, becauſe an argument has eſcaped his own inveſtigation, that therefore it does not really exiſt. I muſt alſo confeſs, that tho' all the learned, for ſeveral ages, ſhould have employed their time in fruitleſs ſearch upon any ſubject, it may ſtill, perhaps, be raſh to conclude poſitively, that the ſubject muſt, therefore, paſs all human comprehenſion. Even tho' we examine all the ſources of our knowlege, and

conclude them unfit for ſuch a ſubject, there may ſtill remain a ſuſpicion, that the enumeration is not compleat, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the preſent ſubject, there are ſome conſiderations, which ſeem to remove all this accuſation of arrogance or ſuſpicion of miſtake.

'Tis certain, that the moſt ignorant and ſtupid peaſants, nay infants, nay even brute beaſts improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by obſerving the effects, which reſult from them. When a child has felt the ſenſation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a ſimilar effect from a cauſe, which is ſimilar in its ſenſible qualities and appearance. If you aſſert, therefore, that the underſtanding of the child is led into this concluſion by any proceſs of argument or ratiocination, I may juſtly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretext to refuſe ſo equitable a demand. You cannot ſay, that the argument is abſtruſe, and may poſſibly eſcape your enquiry; ſince you confeſs, that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you heſitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the queſtion, and confeſs, that it is not reaſoning, which engages us to ſuppoſe the paſt reſembling the future, and to expect ſimilar effects from cauſes, which are, to appearance, ſimilar. This is the propoſition, which I intended to enforce in the preſent ſection. If I be right, I pretend to have made no mighty diſcovery. And if I be wrong, I muſt acknowlege myſelf to be indeed a very backward ſcholar; ſince I cannot now diſcover an argument, which, it ſeems, was perfectly familiar to me, long before I was out of my cradle.

SECTION V.

SCEPTICAL SOLUTION OF THESE DOUBTS.

PART I.

THE paſſion for philoſophy, like that for religion, ſeems liable to this inconvenience, that, tho' it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only ſerve, by imprudent management, to foſter a predominant inclination, and puſh the mind, with more determined reſolution, towards that ſide, which already *draws* too much, by the byaſs and propenſity of the natural temper. 'Tis certain, that, while we aſpire to the magnanimous firmneſs of the philoſophic ſage, and endeavor to confine our pleaſures altogether within our own minds, we may, at laſt, render our philoſophy, like that of EPICTETUS, and other *Stoics*, only a more refined ſyſtem of ſelfiſhneſs, and reaſon ourſelves out of all virtue, as well as ſocial enjoyment. While we ſtudy with attention the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts on the empty and tranſitory nature of riches and honors, we are, perhaps, all the while flattering our natural indolence, which, hating the buſtle of the world and drudgery of buſineſs, ſeeks a pretext of reaſon, to give itſelf a full and uncontroled indulgence. There is, however, one ſpecies of philoſophy, which ſeems little liable to this inconvenience,

venience, and that becauſe it ſtrikes in with no diſorderly paſſion of the human mind, nor can mingle itſelf with any natural affection or propenſity; and that is the ACADEMIC or SCEPTICAL philoſophy. The academics talk always of doubts, and ſuſpenſe of judgment, of danger in haſty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the underſtanding, and of renouncing all ſpeculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than ſuch a philoſophy to the ſupine indolence of the mind, its raſh arrogance, its lofty pretenſions, and its ſuperſtitious credulity. Every paſſion is mortified by it, except the love of truth; and that paſſion never is, nor can be carried to too high a degree. 'Tis ſurprizing, therefore, that this philoſophy, which, in almoſt every inſtance, muſt be harmleſs and innocent, ſhould be the ſubject of ſo much groundleſs reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very circumſtance which renders it ſo innocent, is what chiefly expoſes it to the public hatred, and reſentment. By flattering no irregular paſſion, it gains few partizans: By oppoſing ſo many vices and follies, it raiſes to itſelf abundance of enemies, who ſtigmatize it as libertine, profane, and irreligious.

NOR need we fear, that this philoſophy, while it endeavors to limit our enquiries to common life, ſhould ever undermine the reaſonings of common life, and carry its doubts ſo far as to deſtroy all action, as well as ſpeculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abſtract reaſoning whatſoever. Tho' we ſhould conclude, for inſtance, as in the foregoing ſection, that, in all reaſonings from experience, there is a ſtep taken by the mind, which is not ſupported by any argument or proceſs of the underſtanding; there is no danger, that theſe reaſonings, on which almoſt all knowlege depends, will ever be affected by ſuch a diſcovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this ſtep, it muſt be induced by ſome other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preſerve its influence as long as human nature remains the ſame. What that principle is, may well be worth the pains of enquiry.

SUPPOSE a perſon, tho' endowed with the ſtrongeſt faculties of reaſon and reflection, to be brought on a ſudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately obſerve a continual ſucceſſion of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to diſcover any thing farther. He would not, at firſt, by any reaſoning, be able to reach the idea of cauſe and effect; ſince the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the ſenſes; nor is it reaſonable to conclude, merely becauſe one event, in one inſtance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cauſe, and the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and caſual. There may be no reaſon to infer the exiſtence of the one from the appearance of the other. And in a word, ſuch a perſon without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reaſoning concerning any matter or fact, or be aſſured of any thing beyond what was immediately preſent to his memory and ſenſes.

SUPPOSE again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived ſo long in the world as to have obſerved ſimilar objects or events to be conſtantly conjoined together; what is the conſequence of this experience? He immediately infers the exiſtence of the one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowlege of the ſecret power, by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any proceſs of reaſoning,

he is engaged to draw this inference. But ſtill he finds himſelf determined to draw it: And tho' he ſhould be convinced, that his underſtanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheleſs continue in the ſame courſe of thinking. There is ſome other principle, which determines him to form ſuch a concluſion.

THIS principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propenſity to renew the ſame act or operation, without being impelled by any reaſoning or proceſs of the underſtanding; we always ſay, that this propenſity is the effect of *Cuſtom*. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reaſon of ſuch a propenſity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is univerſally acknowleged, and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps, we can puſh our enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the cauſe of this cauſe; but muſt reſt contented with it as the ultimate principle, which we can aſſign of all our concluſions from experience. 'Tis ſufficient ſatisfaction, that we can go ſo far; without repining at the narrowneſs of our faculties, becauſe they will carry us no farther. And 'tis certain we here advance a very intelligible propoſition at leaſt, if not a true one, when we aſſert, that, after the conſtant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for inſtance, weight and ſolidity, we are determined by cuſtom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypotheſis ſeems even the only one, which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thouſand inſtances, an inference, which we are not able to draw from one inſtance, that is, in no reſpect, different from them. Reaſon is incapable of any ſuch variation. The concluſions, which it draws from conſidering one circle, are the ſame which it would form upon ſurveying all the circles in the univerſe. But no man, having ſeen only one body move after being impelled by another, could infer, that every other body will move after a like impulſe. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of cuſtom, not of reaſoning [a].

CUSTOM,

[a] Nothing is more uſual than for writers even on *moral*, *political*, or *phyſical* ſubjects, to diſtinguiſh betwixt *reaſon* and *experience*, and to ſuppoſe, that theſe ſpecies of argumentation are entirely different from each other. The former are taken for the mere reſult of our intellectual faculties, which, by conſidering *à priori* the nature of things, and examining the effects, that muſt follow from their operation, eſtabliſh particular principles of ſcience and philoſophy. The latter are ſuppoſed to be derived entirely from ſenſe and obſervation, by which we learn what has actually reſulted from the operation of particular objects, and are thence able to infer, what will, for the future, reſult from them. Thus, for inſtance, the limitations and reſtraints of civil government, and a legal conſtitution may be defended, either from *reaſon*, which, reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human nature, teaches, that no man can ſafely be truſted with unlimited authority; or from *experience* and hiſtory, which inform us of the enormous abuſes, that ambition, in every age and country, has been found to make of ſo imprudent a confidence.

The ſame diſtinction betwixt reaſon and experience is maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of life; while the experienced ſtateſman, general, phyſician or merchant is truſted and followed; and the unpractiſed novice, with whatever natural talents endowed, neglected and deſpiſed. Tho' it be allowed, that reaſon may form very plauſible conjectures with regard to the conſequences of ſuch a particular conduct in ſuch particular circumſtances; 'tis ſtill ſuppoſed imperfect, without the aſſiſtance of experience, which is alone able to give ſtability and certainty to the maxims, derived from ſtudy and reflection.

But notwithſtanding that this diſtinction be thus univerſally received, both in the active and ſpeculative ſcenes of life, I ſhall not ſcruple to pronounce, that it is, at bottom, erroneous, or at leaſt, ſuperficial.

If we examine thoſe arguments, which, in any of the ſciences above-mentioned, are ſuppoſed to be

CUSTOM, then, is the great guide of human life. 'Tis that principle alone, which renders our experience uſeful to us, and makes us expect for the future, a ſimilar train of events with thoſe which have appeared in the paſt. Without the influence of cuſtom, we ſhould be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is immediately preſent to the memory and ſenſes. We ſhould never know how to adjuſt means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of ſpeculation.

BUT here it may be proper to remark, that tho' our concluſions from experience carry us beyond our memory and ſenſes, and aſſure us of matters of fact, which happened in the moſt diſtant places and moſt remote ages; yet ſome fact muſt always be preſent to the ſenſes or memory, from which we may firſt proceed in drawing theſe concluſions. A man, who ſhould find in a deſert country the remains of pompous buildings, would conclude, that the country had, in antient times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature occur to him, he could never form ſuch an inference. We learn the events of former ages from hiſtory; but then we muſt peruſe the volumes, in which this inſtruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences from one teſtimony to another, till we arrive at the eye-witneſſes and ſpectators of theſe diſtant events. In a word, if we proceed not upon ſome fact, preſent to the memory or ſenſes, our reaſonings would be merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to ſupport it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowlege of any real exiſtence. If I aſk, why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you muſt tell me ſome reaſon; and this reaſon will be ſome other fact, connected with it: But as you cannot proceed after this manner, *in in-*

be the mere effects of reaſoning and reflection, they will all be found to terminate, at laſt, in ſome general principle or concluſion, for which we can aſſign no reaſon but obſervation and experience. The only difference betwixt them and thoſe maxims, which are vulgarly eſteemed the reſult of pure experience, is, that the former cannot be eſtabliſhed without ſome proceſs of thought, and ſome reflection on what we have obſerved, in order to diſtinguiſh its circumſtances, and trace its conſequences: Whereas in the latter, the experienced event is exactly and fully ſimilar to that which we infer as the reſult of any particular ſituation. The hiſtory of a TIBERIUS or a NERO makes us dread a like tyranny were our monarchs freed from the reſtraints of laws and ſenates: But the obſervation of any fraud or cruelty in private life is ſufficient, with the aid of a little thought, to give us the ſame apprehenſion; while it ſerves as an inſtance of the general corruption of human nature, and ſhews us the danger which we muſt incur by repoſing an entire confidence in mankind. In both caſes, 'tis experience which is ultimately the foundation of our inference and concluſion.

There is no man ſo young and unexperienced, as not to have formed from obſervation, many general and juſt maxims concerning human affairs and the conduct of life; but it muſt be confeſſed, that, when a man comes to put theſe in practice, he will be extremely liable to error, till time and farther experience, both enlarge theſe maxims, and teach him their proper uſe and application. In every ſituation or incident, there are many particular and ſeemingly minute circumſtances, which the man of greateſt talents is, at firſt, apt to overlook, tho' on them the juſtneſs of his concluſions, and conſequently the prudence of his conduct, entirely depend. Not to mention, that, to a young beginner, the general obſervations and maxims occur not always on the proper occaſions, nor can be immediately applied with due calmneſs and diſtinction. The truth is, an unexperienced reaſoner could be no reaſoner at all, were he abſolutely unexperienced; and when we aſſign that character to any one, we mean it only in a comparative ſenſe, and ſuppoſe him poſſeſſed of experience in a ſmaller and more imperfect degree.

finitum,

finitum, you muſt at laſt terminate in ſome fact, which is preſent to your memory or ſenſes; or muſt allow, that your belief is entirely without foundation.

WHAT then is the concluſion of the whole matter? A ſimple one; tho' it muſt be confeſſed, pretty remote from the common theories of philoſophy. All belief of matter of fact or real exiſtence is derived merely from ſome object, preſent to the memory or ſenſes, and a cuſtomary conjunction betwixt that and any other object. Or in other words; having found, in many inſtances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, ſnow and cold, have always been conjoined together; if flame or ſnow be preſented anew to our ſenſes; the mind is carried by cuſtom to expect heat or cold, and to *believe*, that ſuch a quality does exiſt, and will diſcover itſelf upon a nearer approach. This belief is the neceſſary reſult of placing the mind in ſuch circumſtances. 'Tis an operation of the ſoul, when we are ſo ſituated, as unavoidable as to feel the paſſion of love, when we receive benefits, or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All theſe operations are a ſpecies of natural inſtincts, whioh no reaſoning or proceſs of the thought and underſtanding is able, either to produce, or to prevent.

At this point, it would be very allowable for us to ſtop our philoſophical reſearches. In moſt queſtions, we can never make a ſingle ſtep farther; and in all queſtions, we muſt terminate here at laſt, after our moſt reſtleſs and curious enquiries. But ſtill our curioſity will be pardonable, perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to ſtill farther reſearches, and make us examine more accurately the nature of this *belief*, and of the *cuſtomary conjunction*, whence it is derived. By this means we may meet ſome explications and analogies, that will give ſatisfaction; at leaſt to ſuch as love the abſtract ſciences, and can be entertained with ſpeculations, which, however accurate, may ſtill retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As to readers of a different taſte; the remaining part of this ſection is not calculated for them, and the following enquiries may well be underſtood, tho' it be neglected.

PART II.

THERE is nothing more free than the imagination of man; and tho' it cannot exceed that original ſtock of ideas, which is furniſhed by the internal and external ſenſes, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, ſeparating, and dividing theſe ideas, to all the varieties of fiction and viſion. It can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of reality, aſcribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as exiſtent, and paint them out to itſelf with every circumſtance, that belongs to any hiſtorical fact, which it believes with the greateſt certainty. Wherein, therefore, conſiſts the difference betwixt ſuch a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to ſuch a conception, as commands our aſſent, and which is wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction, and conſequently be able to believe whatever it pleaſes; contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horſe; but it is not in our power to believe, that ſuch an animal has ever really exiſted.

IT follows, therefore, that the difference betwixt *fiction* and *belief* lies in ſome ſentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which

depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleaſure. It muſt be excited by nature, like all other ſentiments; and muſt ariſe from the particular ſituation, in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is preſented to the memory or ſenſes, it immediately, by the force of cuſtom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is uſually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or ſentiment, different from the looſe reveries of the fancy. In this conſiſts the whole nature of belief. For as there is no matter of fact which we believe ſo firmly, that we cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no difference betwixt the conception aſſented to, and that which is rejected, were it not for ſome ſentiment, which diſtinguiſhes the one from the other. If I ſee a billiard-ball moving towards another, on a ſmooth table, I can eaſily conceive it to ſtop upon contact. This conception implies no contradiction; but ſtill it feels very differently from that conception, by which I repreſent to myſelf the impulſe, and the communication of motion from one ball to another.

WERE we to attempt a *definition* of this ſentiment, we ſhould, perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not an impoſſible taſk; in the ſame manner as if we ſhould endeavor to define the feeling of cold or paſſion of anger, to a creature who never had an experience of theſe ſentiments. BELIEF is the true and proper name of this feeling; and no one is ever at a loſs to know the meaning of that term; becauſe every man is every moment conſcious of the ſentiment, repreſented by it. It may not, however, be improper to attempt a *deſcription* of this ſentiment; in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at ſome analogies, which may afford a more perfect explication of it. I ſay then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, ſteady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may ſeem ſo unphiloſophical, is intended only to expreſs that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for ſuch, more preſent to us than fictions, cauſes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a ſuperior influence on the paſſions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, 'tis needleſs to diſpute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways poſſible. It may conceive fictitious objects with all the circumſtances of place and time. It may ſet them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true colors, juſt as they might have exiſted. But as it is impoſſible, that that faculty of imagination can ever, of itſelf, reach belief, 'tis evident, that belief conſiſts not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the *manner* of their conception, and in their *feeling* to the mind. I confeſs, that 'tis impoſſible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. We may make uſe of words, which expreſs ſomething near it. But its true and proper name, as we obſerved before, is *belief*; which is a term, that every one ſufficiently underſtands in common life. And in philoſophy, we can go no farther than aſſert, that *belief* is ſomething felt by the mind, which diſtinguiſhes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; inforces them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of all our actions. I hear at preſent, for inſtance, a perſon's voice, with whom I am acquainted; and the ſound comes as from the next room. This impreſſion of my ſenſes immediately conveys my thought

thought to the perſon, together with all the ſurrounding objects. I paint them out to myſelf as exiſting at preſent, with the ſame qualities and relations, of which I formerly knew them poſſeſt. Theſe ideas take faſter hold of my mind, than ideas of an inchanted caſtle. They are very different to the feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind, either to give pleaſure or pain, joy or ſorrow.

Let us, then, take in the whole compaſs of this doctrine, and allow, that the ſentiment of belief is nothing but a conception of an object more intenſe and ſteady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and that this *manner* of conception ariſes from a cuſtomary conjunction of the object with ſomething preſent to the memory or ſenſes: I believe that it will not be difficult, upon theſe ſuppoſitions, to find other operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up theſe phænomena to principles ſtill more general.

We have already obſerved, that nature has eſtabliſhed connexions among particular ideas, and that no ſooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and inſenſible movement. Theſe principles of connexion or aſſociation we have reduced to three, *viz.* *Reſemblance*, *Contiguity*, and *Cauſation*; which are the only bonds, that unite our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of reflection or diſcourſe, which, in a greater or leſs degree, takes place among all mankind. Now here ariſes a queſtion, on which the ſolution of the preſent difficulty will depend. Does it happen, in all theſe relations, that, when one of the objects is preſented to the ſenſes or memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a ſteadier and ſtronger conception of it than what otherwiſe it would have been able to attain? This ſeems to be the caſe with that belief, which ariſes from the relation of cauſe and effect. And if the caſe be the ſame with the other relations or principles of aſſociation, we may eſtabliſh this as a general law, which takes place in all the operations of the mind.

We may, therefore, obſerve, as the firſt experiment to our preſent purpoſe, that, upon the appearance of the picture of an abſent friend, our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the *reſemblance*, and that every paſſion, which that idea occaſions, whether of joy or ſorrow, acquires new force and vigor. In producing this effect, there concur both a relation and a preſent impreſſion. Where the picture bears him no reſemblance, or at leaſt was not intended for him, it never ſo much as conveys our thought to him: And where it is abſent, as well as the perſon; tho' the mind may paſs from the thought of the one to that of the other; it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that tranſition. We take a pleaſure in viewing the picture of a friend, when 'tis ſet before us; but when 'tis removed, rather chuſe to conſider him directly, than by reflection in an image, which is equally diſtant and obſcure.

The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be conſidered as experiments of the ſame nature. The devotees of that ſuperſtition uſually plead in excuſe of the mummeries, with which they are upbraided, that they feel the good effect of thoſe external motions, and poſtures, and actions, in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervor, which otherwiſe would decay, if directed entirely to diſtant and immaterial objects. We ſhadow out the objects of our faith, ſay they, in ſenſible types and images, and render them more preſent to us by the immediate

immediate preſence of theſe types, than 'tis poſſible for us to do, merely by an intellectual view and contemplation. Senſible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other; and this influence they readily convey to thoſe ideas, to which they are related, and which they reſemble. I ſhall only infer from theſe practices, and this reaſoning, that the effect of reſemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common; and as in every caſe a reſemblance and a preſent impreſſion muſt concur, we are abundantly ſupplied with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle.

We may add force to theſe experiments by others of a different kind, in conſidering the effects of *contiguity* as well as of *reſemblance*. 'Tis certain that diſtance diminiſhes the force of every idea, and that upon our approach to any object; tho' it does not diſcover itſelf to our ſenſes; it operates upon the mind with an influence, which imitates an immediate impreſſion. The thinking on any object readily tranſports the mind to what is contiguous; but 'tis only the actual preſence of an object, that tranſports it with a ſuperior vivacity. When I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues diſtant; tho' even at that diſtance the reflecting on any thing in the neighborhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter caſe, both the objects of the mind are ideas; notwithſtanding there is an eaſy tranſition betwixt them; that tranſition alone is not able to give a ſuperior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of ſome immediate impreſſion [1].

No one can doubt but cauſation has the ſame influence as the other two relations of reſemblance and contiguity. Superſtitious people are fond of the relicts of ſaints and holy men, for the ſame reaſon, that they ſeek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and ſtrong conception of thoſe exemplary lives, which they deſire to imitate. Now 'tis evident, that one of the beſt relicts, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a ſaint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be conſidered in this light, 'tis becauſe they were once at his diſpoſal, and were moved and affected by him; in which reſpect they are to be conſidered as imperfect effects, and as connected with him by a ſhorter chain of conſequences than any of thoſe, by which we learn the reality of his exiſtence.

Suppose, that the ſon of a friend, who had been long dead or abſent were preſented to us; 'tis evident, that this object would inſtantly revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all paſt intimacies and familiarities in more lively

[1] "Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an "errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in qui- "bus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum "eſſe verſatos, magis moveamur, quam ſiquando "eorum ipſorum aut facta audiamus aut ſcriptum "aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. "Venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem "accepimus primum hîc diſputare ſolitum: Cu- "jus etiam illi horti propinqui non memoriam "ſolum mihi afferunt, ſed ipſum videntur in con- "ſpectu meo hîc ponere. Hic Speusippus, hîc "Xenocrates, hîc ejus auditor Polemo; cu- "jus ipſa illa ſeſſio fuit, quam videamus. Equidem "etiam curiam noſtram, Hostiliam dico, non "hanc novam, quæ mihi minor eſſe videtur poſt- "quam eſt major, ſolebam intuens, Scipionem, "Catonem, Lælium, noſtrum vero in pri- "mis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis "eſt in locis; ut non ſine cauſa ex his memoriæ "deducta ſit diſciplina. Cicero *de Finibus*. Lib. 5.

colors than they would otherwiſe have appeared to us. This is another phænomenon, which ſeems to prove the principle above-mentioned.

We may obſerve, that in theſe phænomena the belief of the correlative object is always pre-ſuppoſed; without which the relation could have no effect in enlivening the idea. The influence of the picture ſuppoſes, that we *believe* our friend to have once exiſted. Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unleſs we *believe* that it really exiſts. Now I aſſert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or ſenſes, is of a ſimilar nature, and ariſes from ſimilar cauſes, with the tranſition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguiſhes the flame. This tranſition of thought from the cauſe to the effect proceeds not from reaſon. It derives its origin altogether from cuſtom and experience. And as it firſt begins from an object, preſent to the ſenſes, it renders the idea or conception of flame more ſtrong and lively than any looſe, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea ariſes immediately. The thought moves inſtantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impreſſion preſent to the ſenſes. When a ſword is levelled at my breaſt, does not the idea of wound and pain ſtrike me more ſtrongly, than when a glaſs of wine is preſented to me, even tho' by accident this idea ſhould occur after the appearance of the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to cauſe ſuch a ſtrong conception, except only a preſent object and cuſtomary tranſition to the idea of another object, which we have been accuſtomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind in all our concluſions concerning matter of fact and exiſtence; and 'tis a ſatisfaction to find ſome analogies, by which it may be explained. The tranſition from a preſent object does in all caſes give ſtrength and ſolidity to the related idea.

Here is a kind of pre-eſtabliſhed harmony betwixt the courſe of nature and the ſucceſſion of our ideas; and tho' the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have ſtill, we find, gone on in the ſame train with the other works of nature. Cuſtom is that admirable principle, by which this correſpondence has been effected; ſo neceſſary to the ſubſiſtence of our ſpecies, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumſtance and occurrence of human life. Had not the preſence of an object inſtantly excited the idea of thoſe objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our knowlege muſt have been limited to the narrow ſphere of our memory and ſenſes; and we ſhould never have been able to adjuſt means to ends, nor employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Thoſe, who delight in the diſcovery and contemplation of *final cauſes*, have here ample ſubject to employ their wonder and admiration.

I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like cauſes, and *vice verſa*, is ſo eſſential to the ſubſiſtence of all human creatures, it is not probable that it could be truſted to the fallacious deductions of our reaſon, which is ſlow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the firſt years of infancy; and at beſt is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and miſtake. 'Tis more conformable to the ordinary wiſdom of nature to ſecure ſo neceſſary an act of the mind, by ſome inſtinct or mechanical tendency, which may

be infallible in its operations, may diſcover itſelf at the firſt appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the labored deductions of the underſtanding. As nature has taught us the uſe of our limbs, without giving us the knowlege of the muſcles and nerves, by which they are actuated; ſo has ſhe implanted in us an inſtinct, which carries forward the thought in a correſpondent courſe to that which ſhe has eſtabliſhed among external objects; tho' we are ignorant of thoſe powers and forces, on which this regular courſe and ſucceſſion of objects totally depends.

SECTION VI.

OF PROBABILITY*.

THO' there be no ſuch thing as *Chance* in the world; our ignorance of the real cauſe of any event has the ſame influence on the underſtanding, and begets a like ſpecies of belief or opinion.

THERE is certainly a probability, which ariſes from a ſuperiority of chances on any ſide; and according as this ſuperiority encreaſes, and ſurpaſſes the oppoſite chances, the probability receives a proportionable encreaſe, and begets ſtill a higher degree of belief or aſſent to that ſide, in which we diſcover the ſuperiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number of ſpots on four ſides, and with another figure or number of ſpots on the two remaining ſides, it would be more probable, that the former ſhould turn up than the latter; tho' if it had a thouſand ſides marked in the ſame manner, and only one ſide different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the event more ſteady and ſecure. This proceſs of the thought or reaſoning may ſeem trivial and obvious; but to thoſe, who conſider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for very curious ſpeculations.

IT ſeems evident, that when the mind looks forward to diſcover the event, which may reſult from the throw of ſuch a dye, it conſiders the turning up of each particular ſide as alike probable; and this is the very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended in it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of ſides concur in the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to that event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various poſſibilities or chances, on which the ultimate reſult depends. This concurrence of ſeveral views in one particular event begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the ſentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagoniſt, which is ſupported by a ſmaller number of views, and recurs leſs frequently to the mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a

* Mr. LOCKE divides all arguments into demonſtrative and probable. In this view, we muſt ſay, that 'tis only probable all men muſt die, or that the ſun will riſe to morrow. But to conform our language more to common uſe, we ſhould divide arguments into *demonſtrations*, *proofs*, and *probabilities*. By proofs meaning ſuch arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or oppoſition.

firmer and ſtronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps, in ſome meaſure, be accounted for. The concurrence of theſe ſeveral views or glimpſes imprints its idea more ſtrongly on the imagination; gives it ſuperior force and vigor; renders its influence on the paſſions and affections more ſenſible; and in a word, begets that reliance or ſecurity, which conſtitutes the nature of belief and opinion.

THE caſe is the ſame with the probability of cauſes, as with that of chance. There are ſome cauſes, which are entirely uniform and conſtant in producing a particular effect; and no inſtance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always burnt, and water ſuffocated every human creature: The production of motion by impulſe and gravity is an univerſal law, which has hitherto admitted of no exception. But there are other cauſes which have been found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb proved always a purge, or opium a ſoporific to every one, who has taken theſe medicines. 'Tis true, when any cauſe fails of producing its uſual effect, philoſophers aſcribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but ſuppoſe, that ſome ſecret cauſes, in the particular ſtructure of parts, have prevented the operation. Our reaſonings, however, and concluſions concerning the event are the ſame as if this principle had no place. Being determined by cuſtom to transfer the paſt to the future, in all our inferences; where the paſt has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the event with the greateſt aſſurance, and leave no room for any contrary ſuppoſition. But where different effects have been found to follow from cauſes, which are *to appearance* exactly ſimilar, all theſe various effects muſt occur to the mind in transfering the paſt to the future, and enter into our conſideration, when we determine the probability of the event. Tho' we give the preference to that which has been found moſt uſual, and believe that this effect will exiſt, we muſt not overlook the other effects, but muſt give each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be more or leſs frequent. 'Tis more probable, in every place of EUROPE, that there will be froſt ſometime in JANUARY, than that the weather will continue open thro'out that whole month; tho' this probability varies according to the different climates, and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it ſeems evident, that when we transfer the paſt to the future, in order to determine the effect, which will reſult from any cauſe, we tranſfer all the different events, in the ſame proportion as they have appeared in the paſt, and conceive one to have exiſted a hundred times, for inſtance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget that ſentiment which we call *belief*, and give it the preference above its antagoniſt, which is not ſupported by an equal number of experiments, and occurs not ſo frequently to the thought in transferring the paſt to the future. Let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received ſyſtems of philoſophy, and he will be ſenſible of the difficulty. For my part, I ſhall think it ſufficient, if the preſent hints excite the curioſity of philoſophers, and make them ſenſible how extremely defective all common theories are, in treating of ſuch curious and ſuch ſublime ſubjects.

SECTION

SECTION VII.

OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.

PART I.

THE great advantage of the mathematical ſciences above the moral conſiſts in this, that the ideas of the former, being ſenſible, are always clear and determinate, the ſmalleſt diſtinction between them is immediately perceptible, and the ſame terms are ſtill expreſſive of the ſame ideas, without ambiguity or variation. An oval is never miſtaken for a circle, nor an hyperbola for an ellipſis. The iſoſceles and ſcalenum are diſtinguiſhed by boundaries more exact than vice and virtue, right and wrong. If any term be defined in geometry, the mind readily, of itſelf, ſubſtitutes, on all occaſions, the definition for the term defined: Or even when no definition is employed, the object itſelf may be preſented to the ſenſes, and by that means be ſteadily and clearly apprehended. But the finer ſentiments of the mind, the operations of the underſtanding, the various agitations of the paſſions, tho' really in themſelves diſtinct, eaſily eſcape us, when ſurveyed by reflection; nor is it in our power to recall the original object, as often as we have occaſion to contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means, is gradually introduced into our reaſonings: Similar objects are readily taken to be the ſame: And the concluſion becomes, at laſt, very wide of the premiſes.

ONE may ſafely, however, affirm, that, if we conſider theſe ſciences in a proper light, their advantages and diſadvantages very nearly compenſate each other, and reduce both of them to a ſtate of equality. If the mind with greater facility retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it muſt carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of reaſoning, and compare ideas much wider of each other, in order to reach the abſtruſer truths of that ſcience. And if moral ideas are apt, without extreme care, to fall into obſcurity and confuſion, the inferences are always much ſhorter in theſe diſquiſitions, and the intermediate ſteps, which lead to the concluſion, much fewer than in the ſciences, which treat of quantity and number. In reality, there is ſcarce a propoſition of EUCLID ſo ſimple as not to conſiſt of more parts, than are to be found in any moral reaſoning, which runs not into chimera and conceit. Where we trace the principles of the human mind thro' a few ſteps, we may be very well ſatisfied with our progreſs; conſidering how ſoon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning cauſes, and reduces us to an acknowlegement of our ignorance. The chief obſtacle, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or metaphyſical ſciences is the obſcurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compaſs of thought, requiſite to the forming any concluſion. And perhaps, our progreſs in natural philoſophy is chiefly retarded by the want of proper experiments and phænomena, which often are diſcovered by chance, and cannot always be found, when requiſite, even by the moſt diligent and prudent enquiry. As moral philoſophy ſeems hitherto to have received leſs improve-

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ments than either geometry or phyſics, we may conclude, that, if there be any difference in this reſpect among theſe ſciences, the difficulties, which obſtruct the progreſs of the former, require ſuperior care and capacity to be ſurmounted.

THERE are no ideas, which occur in metaphyſics, more obſcure and uncertain, than thoſe of *power*, *force*, *energy*, or *neceſſary connexion*, of which it is every moment neceſſary for us to treat in all our diſquiſitions. We ſhall, therefore, endeavor, in this ſection, to fix, if poſſible, the preciſe meaning of theſe terms, and thereby remove ſome part of that obſcurity, which is ſo much complained of in this ſpecies of philoſophy.

IT ſeems a propoſition, which will not admit of much diſpute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impreſſions, or in other words, that 'tis impoſſible for us to *think* of any thing, which we have not antecedently *felt*, either by our external or internal ſenſes. I have endeavored [1] to explain and prove this propoſition, and have expreſſed my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater clearneſs and preciſion in philoſophical reaſonings, than what they have hitherto been ever able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of thoſe parts or ſimple ideas, that compoſe them. But when we have puſhed up definitions to the moſt ſimple ideas, and find ſtill ſome ambiguity and obſcurity; what reſource are we then poſſeſſed of? By what invention can we throw light upon theſe ideas, and render them altogether preciſe and determinate to our intellectual view? Produce the impreſſions or original ſentiments, from which the ideas are copied. Theſe impreſſions are all ſtrong and ſenſible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themſelves, but may throw light on their correſpondent ideas, which lie in obſcurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microſcope or ſpecies of optics, by which, in the moral ſciences, the moſt minute, and moſt ſimple ideas may be ſo enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehenſion, and be equally known with the groſſeſt and moſt ſenſible ideas, which can be the object of our enquiry.

To be fully acquainted therefore, with the idea of power or neceſſary connexion, let us examine its impreſſion; and in order to find the impreſſion with greater certainty, let us ſearch for it in all the ſources, from which it may poſſibly be derived.

WHEN we look about us towards external objects, and conſider the operation of cauſes, we are never able, in a ſingle inſtance, to diſcover any power or neceſſary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cauſe, and renders the one an infallible conſequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulſe of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the ſecond. This is the whole, that appears to the *outward* ſenſes. The mind feels no ſentiment or *inward* impreſſion from this ſucceſſion of objects: Conſequently, there is not, in any ſingle, particular inſtance of cauſe and effect, any thing which can ſuggeſt the idea of power or neceſſary connexion.

FROM the firſt appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will reſult from it. But were the power or energy of any cauſe diſcoverable by the mind, we could foreſee the effect, even without experience, and might, at firſt,

[1] Section II.

pronounce

pronounce with certainty concerning it, by the mere dint of thought and reaſoning.

In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its ſenſible qualities, diſcover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other object, which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extenſion, motion; theſe qualities are all compleat in themſelves; and never point out any other event, which may reſult from them. The ſcenes of the univerſe are continually ſhifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted ſucceſſion; but the power or force, which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never diſcovers itſelf in any of the ſenſible qualities of body. We know, that, in fact, heat is a conſtant attendant of flame? but what is the connexion between them, we have no room ſo much as to conjecture or imagine. 'Tis impoſſible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, in ſingle inſtances of their operation; becauſe no bodies ever diſcover any power, which can be the original of this idea [m].

Since, therefore, external objects, as they appear to the ſenſes, give us no idea of power or neceſſary connexion, by their operations in particular inſtances, let us ſee, whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any internal impreſſion. It may be ſaid, that we are every moment conſcious of power in our own minds; while we feel, that, by the ſimple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our minds, in their operation. An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raiſes a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by conſciouſneſs. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain, that we ourſelves and all other intelligent beings are poſſeſſed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, ſince it ariſes from reflecting on the operations of our own minds, and on the command, which is exerciſed by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the mind.

We ſhall proceed to examine this pretenſion; and firſt with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This influence, we may obſerve, is a fact, which, like all other natural operations, can be known only by experience, and can never be foreſeen from any apparent energy or power in the cauſe, which connects it with the effect, and renders the one an infallible conſequence of the other. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conſcious: But the means, by which this is effected; the energy, by which the will performs ſo extraordinary an operation; of this we are ſo far from being immediately conſcious, that it muſt for ever eſcape our moſt diligent enquiry.

For *firſt*; is there any principle in all nature more myſterious than the union of ſoul with body; by which a ſuppoſed ſpiritual ſubſtance acquires ſuch an influence over a material one, that the moſt refined thought is able to actuate the

[m] Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, ſays, that finding from experience, that there are ſeveral new productions in matter, and concluding that there muſt ſomewhere be a power, capable of producing them, we arrive at laſt by this reaſoning at the idea of power. But no reaſoning can ever give us a new, original, ſimple idea; as this philoſopher himſelf confeſſes. This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea.

groſſeſt

groſſeſt matter? Were we empowered, by a ſecret wiſh, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; this extenſive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehenſion. But if by conſciouſneſs we perceived any power or energy in the will, we muſt know this power; we muſt know its connexion with the effect; we muſt know the ſecret union of ſoul and body, and the nature of both theſe ſubſtances; by which the one is able to operate, in ſo many inſtances, upon the other.

Secondly, We are not able to move all the organs of the body with a like authority; tho' we cannot aſſign any other reaſon, beſides experience, for ſo remarkable a difference betwixt one and the other. Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, and not over the heart or liver? This queſtion would never embarraſs us, were we conſcious of a power in the former caſe, and not in the latter. We ſhould, then, perceive, independent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumſcribed within ſuch particular limits. Being in that caſe fully acquainted with the power or force, by which it operates, we ſhould alſo know, why its influence reaches preciſely to ſuch boundaries, and no farther.

A MAN, ſtruck ſuddenly with a palſy in the leg or arm, or who had newly loſt thoſe members, frequently endeavors, at firſt, to move them, and employ them in their uſual offices. Here he is as much conſcious of power to command ſuch limbs, as a man in perfect health is conſcious of power to actuate any member, which remains in its natural ſtate and condition. But conſciouſneſs never deceives. Conſequently, neither in the one caſe nor in the other, are we ever conſcious of any power. We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us, how one event conſtantly follows another, without inſtructing us in the ſecret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inſeparable.

Third'ly, WE learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in voluntary motion, is not the member itſelf, which is moved, but certain muſcles, and nerves, and animal ſpirits, and perhaps, ſomething ſtill more minute and more unknown, thro' which the motion is ſucceſſively propagated, 'ere it reach the member itſelf, whoſe motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, by which this whole operation is performed, ſo far from being directly and fully known by an inward ſentiment or conſciouſneſs, is, to the laſt degree, myſterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event: Immediately, another event, unknown to ourſelves, and totally different from that intended, is produced: This event produces another, equally unknown: Till at laſt, thro' a long ſucceſſion, the deſired event is produced. But if the original power were felt it muſt be known: Were it known, its effect muſt alſo be known; ſince all power is relative to its effect. And *vice verſa*, if the effect be not known, the power cannot be known or felt. How, indeed, can we be conſcious of a power to move our limbs, when we have no ſuch power; but only that to move certain animal ſpirits, which, tho' they produce at laſt the motion of our limbs, yet operate in ſuch a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehenſion?

WE may, therefore, conclude from the whole; I hope, without any temerity, tho' with aſſurance; that our idea of power is not copied from any ſentiment or con-

conſciouſneſs of power within ourſelves, when we give riſe to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper uſe and office. That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience, like other natural events: But the power or energy, by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable[n].

SHALL we then aſſert, that we are conſcious of a power or energy in our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raiſe up a new idea, fix the mind to a contemplation of it, turn it on all ſides, and at laſt diſmiſs it for ſome other idea, when we think, that we have ſurveyed it with ſufficient accuracy? I believe the ſame arguments will prove, that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy.

Firſt, IT muſt be allowed, that when we know a power, we know that very circumſtance in the cauſe, by which it is enabled to produce the effect: For theſe are ſuppoſed to be ſynonimous. We muſt, therefore, know both the cauſe and effect, and the relation betwixt them. But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human ſoul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? This is a real creation; a production of ſomething out of nothing: Which implies a power ſo great, that it may ſeem, at firſt ſight, beyond the reach of any being, leſs than infinite. At leaſt, it muſt be owned, that ſuch a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by the mind. We only feel the event, *viz.* the exiſtence of an idea, conſequent to a command of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is performed; the power, by which it is produced; is entirely beyond our comprehenſion.

Secondly, THE command of the mind over itſelf is limited, as well as its command over the body; and theſe limits are not known by reaſon, or any acquaintance with the nature of the cauſe and effect; but only by experience and obſervation, as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects. Our authority over our ſentiments and paſſions is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter authority is circumſcribed within very narrow boundaries. Will any one pretend to aſſign the ultimate reaſon of theſe boundaries, or ſhow why the power is deficient in one caſe and not in another?

Thirdly, THIS ſelf-command is very different at different times. A man in health poſſeſſes more of it, than one languiſhing with ſickneſs. We are more maſter of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening: Faſting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reaſon for theſe variations, except experience? Where then is the power, of which we pretend to be conſcious? Is there not here,

[n] It may be pretended, that the reſiſtance which we meet with in bodies, obliging us frequently to exert our force, and call up all our power; this gives us the idea of force, and power. 'Tis this *Niſus* or ſtrong endeavor, of which we are conſcious, that is the original impreſſion, from which this idea is copied. But, *firſt*, we attribute power to a vaſt number of objects, where we never can ſuppoſe this reſiſtance or exertion of force to take place: To the ſupreme Being, who never meets with any reſiſtance; to the mind in its command over its ideas and limbs, in common thinking and motion, where the effect follows immediately upon the will, without any exertion or ſummoning up of force; to inanimate matter, which is not capable of this ſentiment. *Secondly*, This ſentiment of an endeavor to overcome reſiſtance has no known connexion with any event: What follows it, we know by experience; but could not know it *à priori*. It muſt, however, be confeſſed, that the animal *Niſus*, which we experience, tho' it can afford no accurate preciſe idea of power, enters very much into that vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed of it. See p. 326.

either in a ſpiritual or material ſubſtance, or both, ſome ſecret mechaniſm or ſtructure of parts, upon which the effect depends, and which being entirely unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehenſible?

VOLITION is ſurely an act of the mind, with which we are ſufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it. Conſider it on all ſides. Do you find any thing in it like this creative power, by which it raiſes from nothing a new idea, and with a kind of FIAT, imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed ſo to ſpeak, who called forth into exiſtence all the various ſcenes of nature? So far from being conſcious of this energy in the will, it requires as certain experience, as that of which we are poſſeſſed, to convince us, that ſuch extraordinary effects do ever reſult from a ſimple act of volition.

THE generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature; ſuch as the deſcent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nouriſhment of bodies by food; but ſuppoſe, that, in all theſe caſes, they perceive the very force and energy of the cauſe, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, ſuch a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the cauſe, they immediately expect with aſſurance its uſual attendant, and hardly conceive it poſſible, that any other event could reſult from it. 'Tis only on the diſcovery of extraordinary phænomena, ſuch as earthquakes, peſtilence, and prodigies of any kind, that they find themſelves at a loſs to aſſign a proper cauſe, and to explain the manner, in which the effect is produced by it. 'Tis uſual for men, in ſuch difficulties, to have recourſe to ſome inviſible, intelligent principle [o], as the immediate cauſe of that event, which ſurpriſes them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature. But philoſophers, who carry their ſcrutiny a little farther, immediately perceive, that, even in the moſt familiar events, the energy of the cauſe is as unintelligible as in the moſt unuſual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent CONJUNCTION of objects, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like CONNEXION between them. Here then, many philoſophers think themſelves obliged by reaſon to have recourſe, on all occaſions, to the ſame principle, which the vulgar never appeal to but in caſes, that appear miraculous and ſupernatural. They acknowlege mind and intelligence to be, not only the ultimate and original cauſe of all things, but the immediate and ſole cauſe of every event, which appears in nature. They pretend, that thoſe objects, which are commonly denominated *cauſes*, are in reality nothing but *occaſions*; and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the ſupreme Being, who wills, that ſuch particular objects ſhould, for ever, be conjoined with each other. Inſtead of ſaying, that one billiard-ball moves another, by a force, which it has derived from the author of nature; 'tis the Deity himſelf, they ſay, who, by a particular volition, moves the ſecond ball, being determined to this operation by the impulſe of the firſt ball; in conſequence of thoſe general laws, which he has laid down to himſelf in the government of the univerſe. But philoſophers, advancing ſtill in their enquiries, diſcover, that, as

[o] Θεος απο μηχανης.

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we are totally ignorant of the power, on which depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no leſs ignorant of that power, on which depends the operation of mind on body, or of body on mind; nor are we able, either from our ſenſes or conſciouſneſs, to aſſign the ultimate principle, in one caſe more than in the other. The ſame ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the ſame concluſion. They aſſert, that the Deity is the immediate cauſe of the union betwixt ſoul and body, and that they are not the organs of ſenſe, which, being agitated by external objects, produce ſenſations in the mind; but that 'tis a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites ſuch a ſenſation, in conſequence of ſuch a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will, that produces local motion in our members: 'Tis God himſelf, who is pleaſed to ſecond our will, in itſelf impotent, and to command that motion, which we erroneouſly attribute to our own power and efficacy. Nor do philoſophers ſtop at this concluſion. They ſometimes extend the ſame inference to the mind itſelf, in its internal operations. Our mental viſion or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raiſe up its image in the fancy; it is not the will, which creates that idea: 'Tis the univerſal Creator of all things, who diſcovers it to the mind, and renders it preſent to us.

THUS, according to theſe philoſophers, every thing is full of God. Not contented with the principle, that nothing exiſts but by his will, that nothing poſſeſſes any power but by his conceſſion: They rob nature, and all created beings of every power, in order to render their dependance on the Deity ſtill more ſenſible and immediate. They conſider not, that by this theory they diminiſh, inſtead of magnifying, the grandeur of thoſe attributes, which they affect ſo much to celebrate. It argues ſurely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures, than to operate every thing by his own immediate volition. It argues more wiſdom to contrive at firſt the fabric of the world with ſuch perfect foreſight, that, of itſelf, and by its proper operation, it may ſerve all the purpoſes of providence, than if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjuſt its parts, and animate by his breath all the wheels of that ſtupendous machine.

BUT if we would have a more philoſophical confutation of this theory, perhaps the two following reflections may ſuffice.

Firſt, IT ſeems to me, that this theory, of the univerſal energy and operation of the ſupreme Being, is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, who is ſufficiently apprized of the weakneſs of human reaſon, and the narrow limits, to which it is confined in all its operations. Tho' the chain of arguments, which conduct to it, were ever ſo logical, there muſt ariſe a ſtrong ſuſpicion, if not an abſolute aſſurance, that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to concluſions ſo extraordinary, and ſo remote from common life and experience. We are got into fairy-land, long ere we have reached the laſt ſteps of our theory; and *there* we have no reaſon to truſt our common methods of argument, or think that our uſual analogies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too ſhort to fathom ſuch immenſe abyſſes. And however we may flatter ourſelves, that we are guided in every ſtep, which we take, by a kind of verifimilitude and experience; we may be aſſured, that this fancied

experience has no authority when we thus apply it to ſubjects, that lie entirely out of the ſphere of experience. But on this we ſhall have occaſion to touch afterwards [p].

Secondly, I cannot perceive any force in the arguments, on which this theory is founded. We are ignorant, 'tis true, of the manner, in which bodies operate on each other: Their force or energy is entirely incomprehenſible. But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force, by which a mind, even the ſupreme mind, operates either on itſelf or on body? Whence, I beſeech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no ſentiment or conſciouſneſs of this power in ourſelves: We have no idea of the ſupreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reaſon for rejecting any thing, we ſhould be led into that principle of denying all energy in the ſupreme Being as much as in the groſſeſt matter. We ſurely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. Is it more difficult to conceive, that motion may ariſe from impulſe, than that it may ariſe from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in both caſes [q].

PART II.

BUT to haſten to a concluſion of this argument, which is already drawn out to too great a length: We have ſought in vain, for an idea of power or neceſſary connexion in all the ſources, from which we could ſuppoſe it to be derived. It appears, that, in ſingle inſtances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmoſt ſcrutiny, diſcover any thing but one event following another; without being able to comprehend any force or power, by which the cauſe operates, or any connexion between it and its ſuppoſed effect. The ſame difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body; where we obſerve the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former; but are not able to obſerve nor conceive the tye, which binds together the motion and volition, or the energy, by which the mind produces this effect. The authority of the will over our own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehenſible: So that upon the whole, there appears not, thro' all nature, any one inſtance of connexion, which

[p] Section XII.

[q] I need not examine at length the *vis inertiæ* which is ſo much talked of in the new philoſophy, and which is aſcribed to matter. We find by experience, that a body at reſt or in motion continues for ever in its preſent ſtate, till put from it by ſome new cauſe: And that a body impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires itſelf. Theſe are facts. When we call this a *vis inertiæ*, we only mark theſe facts, without pretending to have any idea of the inert power; in the ſame manner as when we talk of gravity, we mean certain effects, without comprehending that active power. It was never the meaning of ſir ISAAC NEWTON to rob ſecond cauſes of all force or energy; tho' ſome of his followers have endeavored to eſtabliſh that theory upon his authority. On the contrary, that great philoſopher had recourſe to an etherial active fluid to explain his univerſal attraction; tho' he was ſo cautious and modeſt as to allow, that it was a mere hypotheſis, not to be inſiſted on, without more experiments. I muſt confeſs, that there is ſomething in the fate of opinions a little extraordinary. DES-CARTES inſinuated that doctrine of the univerſal and ſole efficacy of the Deity, without inſiſting on it. MALEBRANCHE and other CARTESIANS made it the foundation of all their philoſophy. It had, however, no authority in ENGLAND. LOCKE, CLARKE, and CUDWORTH, never ſo much as take notice of it, but ſuppoſed all along, that matter has a real, tho' ſubordinate and derived power. By what means has it become ſo prevalent among our modern metaphyſicians?

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which ſeems founded on ſufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakned by any general diffidence of the underſtanding, or ſceptical ſuſpicion concerning every concluſion, which is new and extraordinary. No concluſions can be more agreeable to ſcepticiſm than ſuch as make diſcoveries concerning the weakneſs and narrow limits of human reaſon and capacity.

And what ſtronger inſtance can be produced of the ſurprizing ignorance and weakneſs of the underſtanding, than the preſent? For ſurely, if there be any relation among objects, which it imports us to know perfectly, 'tis that of cauſe and effect. On this are founded all our reaſonings concerning matter of fact or exiſtence. By means of it alone we attain any aſſurance concerning objects, which are removed from the preſent teſtimony of our memory and ſenſes. The only immediate utility of all ſciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their cauſes. Our thoughts and enquiries, are, therefore, every moment, employed about this relation. And yet ſo imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that 'tis impoſſible to give any juſt definition of cauſe, except what is drawn from ſomething extraneous and foreign to it. Similar objects are always conjoined with ſimilar. Of this we have experience. Suitable to this experience, therefore, we may define a cauſe to be *an object, followed by another, and where all the objects, ſimilar to the firſt, are followed by objects, ſimilar to the ſecond.* Or in other words, *where, if the firſt object had not been, the ſecond never had exiſted.* The appearance of a cauſe always conveys the mind, by a cuſtomary tranſition, to the idea of the effect. Of this alſo we have experience. We may, therefore, ſuitable to this experience, form another definition of cauſe, and call it, *an object followed by another, and whoſe appearance always conveys the thought to that other.* But tho' both theſe definitions be drawn from circumſtances foreign to the cauſe, we cannot remedy this inconvenience, or attain any more perfect definition, which may point out that circumſtance in the cauſe, which gives it a connexion with its effect. We have no idea of this connexion; nor even any diſtinct notion what it is we deſire to know, when we endeavor at a conception of it. We ſay, for inſtance, that the vibration of this ſtring is the cauſe of this particular ſound. But what do we mean by that affirmation? We either mean, *that this vibration is followed by this ſound, and that all ſimilar vibrations have been followed by ſimilar ſounds:* Or, *that this vibration is followed by this ſound, and that upon the appearance of one, the mind anticipates the ſenſes, and forms immediately an idea of the other.* We may conſider the relation of cauſe and effect in either of theſe two lights; but beyond theſe, we have no idea of it [r].

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[r] According to theſe explications and definitions, the idea of *power* is relative as much as that of *cauſe*; and both have a reference to an effect, or ſome other event conſtantly conjoined with the former. When we conſider the *unknown* circumſtance of an object, by which the degree or quantity of its effect is fixt and determined, we call that its power: And accordingly, 'tis allowed by all philoſophers, that the effect is the meaſure of the power. But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itſelf, why could not they meaſure it in itſelf? The diſpute, whether the force of a body in motion be as its velocity, or the ſquare of its velocity; this diſpute, I ſay, needed not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or unequal times; but by a direct menſuration and compariſon.

As to the frequent uſe of the words, Force, Power, Energy, &c. which every where occur in common converſation, as well as in philoſophy; that is no proof, that we are acquainted, in any inſtance, with the connecting principle betwixt cauſe and effect, or can account ultimately for

SECTION VIII.

OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

PART I.

IT might reaſonably be expected, in queſtions, which have been canvaſſed and diſputed with great eagerneſs ſince the firſt origin of ſcience and philoſophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at leaſt, ſhould have been agreed upon among the diſputants; and our enquiries, in the courſe of two thouſand years, been able to paſs from words to the true and real ſubject of the controverſy. For how eaſy may it ſeem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reaſoning, and make theſe definitions, not the mere ſound of words, the object of future ſcrutiny and examination? But if we conſider the matter more narrowly, we ſhall be apt to draw a quite oppoſite concluſion. From that circumſtance alone, that a controverſy has been long kept on foot, and remains ſtill undecided, we may preſume, that there is ſome ambiguity in the expreſſion, and that the diſputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controverſy. For as the faculties of the ſoul are ſuppoſed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwiſe nothing could be more fruitleſs than to reaſon or diſpute together; it were impoſſible, if men affix the ſame ideas to their terms, that they could ſo long form different opinions of the ſame ſubject; eſpecially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themſelves on all ſides, in ſearch of arguments, which may give them the victory over their antagoniſts. 'Tis true; if men attempt the diſcuſſion of queſtions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, ſuch as thoſe concerning the origin of worlds, or the œconomy of the intellectual ſyſtem or region of ſpirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitleſs conteſts, and never arrive at any determinate concluſion. But if the queſtion regard any ſubject of common life and experience; nothing, one would think, could preſerve the diſpute ſo long undecided, but ſome ambiguous expreſſions, which keep the antagoniſts ſtill at a diſtance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.

THIS has been the caſe in the long diſputed queſtion concerning liberty and neceſſity; and to ſo remarkable a degree, that, if I be not much miſtaken, we ſhall find all mankind, both learned and ignorant, to have been always of the ſame opinion with regard to that ſubject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controverſy. I own, that this diſpute has been ſo much canvaſſed on all hands, and has led philoſophers into ſuch a labyrinth of obſcure ſophiſtry, that 'tis no wonder, if a ſenſible and polite reader indulge his eaſe ſo far as to turn a deaf ear to the propoſal of ſuch a queſtion, from which he can expect neither inſtruction nor entertainment. But the ſtate of the argument here propoſed may, perhaps, ſerve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promiſes at leaſt ſome deciſion of the controverſy, and will not much diſturb his eaſe, by any intricate or obſcure reaſoning.

I HOPE

I HOPE, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrines both of neceſſity and of liberty, according to any reaſonable ſenſe, which can be put on theſe terms; and that the whole controverſy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We ſhall begin with examining the doctrine of neceſſity.

'TIS univerſally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceſſary force, and that every natural effect is ſo preciſely determined by the energy of its cauſe, that no other effect, in ſuch particular circumſtances, could poſſibly have reſulted from the operation of that cauſe. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, preſcribed with ſuch exactneſs, that a living creature may as ſoon ariſe from the ſhock of two bodies, as motion in any other degree or direction, than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a juſt and preciſe idea of *neceſſity*, we muſt conſider, whence that idea ariſes, when we apply it to the operation of bodies.

IT ſeems evident, that, if all the ſcenes of nature were ſhifted continually in ſuch a manner, that no two events bore any reſemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any ſimilitude to whatever had been ſeen before, we ſhould never, in that caſe, have attained the leaſt idea of neceſſity, or of a connexion among theſe objects. We might ſay, upon ſuch a ſuppoſition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cauſe and effect muſt be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reaſoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and ſenſes remain the only canals, by which the knowlege of any real exiſtence could poſſibly have acceſs to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of neceſſity and cauſation ariſes entirely from that uniformity, obſervable in the operations of nature; where ſimilar objects are conſtantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by cuſtom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. Theſe two circumſtances form the whole of that neceſſity, which we aſcribe to matter. Beyond the conſtant *conjunction* of ſimilar objects, and the conſequent *inference* from one to the other, we have no notion of any neceſſity, or connexion.

IF it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt or heſitation, that theſe two circumſtances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of the mind; it muſt follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of neceſſity, and that they have hitherto diſputed, merely for not underſtanding each other.

AS to the firſt circumſtance, the conſtant and regular conjunction of ſimilar events; we may poſſibly ſatisfy ourſelves by the following conſiderations. It is univerſally acknowleged, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains ſtill the ſame, in its principles and operations. The ſame motives produce always the ſame actions: The ſame events follow from the ſame cauſes. Ambition, avarice, ſelf-love, vanity, friendſhip, generoſity, public ſpirit; theſe paſſions, mixed in various degrees, and diſtributed thro' ſociety, have been, from the beginning of the world, and ſtill are, the ſources of all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been obſerved among mankind. Would you know the ſentiments, inclinations, and courſe of life of the GREEKS and ROMANS? Study well the temper and actions of

the FRENCH and ENGLISH. You cannot be much miſtaken in transferring to the former *moſt* of the obſervations, which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are ſo much the ſame, in all times and places, that hiſtory informs us of nothing new or ſtrange in this particular. Its chief uſe is only to diſcover the conſtant and univerſal principles of human nature, by ſhewing men in all varieties of circumſtances and ſituations, and furniſhing us with materials, from which we may form our obſervations, and become acquainted with the regular ſprings of human action and behavior. Theſe records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are ſo many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philoſopher fixes the principles of his ſcience; in the ſame manner as the phyſician or natural philoſopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments, which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by ARISTOTLE, and HIPPOCRATES, more like to thoſe, which at preſent lie under our obſervation, than the men, deſcribed by POLYBIUS and TACITUS, are to thoſe who now govern the world.

SHOULD a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, entirely different from any, with whom we were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely diveſted of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleaſure but friendſhip, generoſity, and public ſpirit; we ſhould immediately, from theſe circumſtances, detect the falſhood, and prove him a liar, with the ſame certainty as if he had ſtuffed his narration with ſtories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we would explode any forgery in hiſtory, we cannot make uſe of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions, aſcribed to any perſon, are directly contrary to the courſe of nature, and that no human motives, in ſuch circumſtances, could ever induce him to ſuch a conduct. The veracity of QUINTUS CURTIUS is as ſuſpicious, when he deſcribes the ſupernatural courage of ALEXANDER, by which he was hurried on ſingly to attack multitudes, as when he deſcribes his ſupernatural force and activity, by which he was able to reſiſt them. So readily and univerſally do we acknowlege a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body.

HENCE likewiſe the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of buſineſs and company, in order to inſtruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as ſpeculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowlege of mens inclinations and motives, from their actions, expreſſions, and even geſtures; and again, deſcend to the interpretation of their actions from the knowlege of their motives and inclinations. The general obſervations, treaſured up by a courſe of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and teaches us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations paſs for the ſpecious coloring of a cauſe. And tho' virtue and honor be allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfect diſintereſtedneſs, ſo often pretended, is never expected in multitudes and parties; ſeldom in their leaders; and ſcarcely even in individuals of any rank or ſtation. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomolous, it were impoſſible to collect any general obſervations concerning mankind; and no experience, however accurately digeſted by reflection, would ever ſerve to any purpoſe. Why

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ceives, that the ſame force in the ſpring or pendulum has always the ſame influence on the wheels; but fails of its uſual effect, perhaps by reaſon of a grain of duſt, which puts a ſtop to the whole movement. From the obſervation of ſeveral parallel inſtances, philoſophers form a maxim, that the connexion between all cauſes and effects is equally neceſſary, and that its ſeeming uncertainty in ſome inſtances proceeds from the ſecret oppoſition of contrary cauſes.

THUS for inſtance, in the human body, when the uſual ſymptoms of health or ſickneſs diſappoint our expectation; when medicines operate not with their wonted powers; when irregular events follow from any particular cauſes; the philoſopher and phyſician are not ſurprized at the matter, nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the neceſſity and uniformity of thoſe principles, by which the animal œconomy is conducted. They know, that a human body is a mighty complicated machine: That many ſecret powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehenſion: That to us it muſt often appear very uncertain in its operations: And that therefore the irregular events, which outwardly diſcover themſelves, can be no proof, that the laws of nature are not obſerved with the greateſt regularity in its internal operations and government.

THE philoſopher, if he be conſiſtent, muſt apply the ſame reaſonings to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The moſt irregular and unexpected reſolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by thoſe who know every particular circumſtance of their character and ſituation. A perſon of an obliging diſpoſition gives a peeviſh anſwer: But he has the tooth-ake, or has not dined. A ſtupid fellow diſcovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage: But he has met with a ſudden piece of good-fortune. Or even when an action, as ſometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the perſon himſelf or by others; we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconſtant and irregular. This is, in a manner, the conſtant character of human nature; tho' it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to ſome perſons, who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a continued courſe of caprice and inconſtancy. The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithſtanding theſe ſeeming irregularities; in the ſame manner as the winds, rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather are ſuppoſed to be governed by ſteady principles; tho' not eaſily diſcoverable by human ſagacity and enquiry.

THUS it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform, as that between the cauſe and effect in any part of nature; but alſo that this regular conjunction has been univerſally acknowleged among mankind, and has never been the ſubject of diſpute, either in philoſophy or common life. Now as it is from paſt experience, that we draw all inferences concerning the future, and as we conclude, that objects will always be conjoined together, which we find always to have been conjoined; it may ſeem ſuperfluous to prove, that this experienced uniformity in human actions is the ſource of all the *inferences*, which we form concerning them. But in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights, we ſhall alſo inſiſt, tho' briefly, on this latter topic.

THE mutual dependance of men is ſo great, in all ſocieties, that ſcarce any human action is intirely compleat in itſelf, or is performed without ſome reference to the actions of others, which are requiſite to make it anſwer fully the intention of

of the agent. The pooreſt artificer, who labours alone, expects at leaſt the protection of the magiſtrate, to enſure the enjoyment of the fruits of his labor. He alſo expects, that, when he carries his goods to market, and offers them at a reaſonable price, he ſhall find buyers; and ſhall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others to ſupply him with thoſe commodities, which are requiſite for his ſubſiſtence. In proportion as mens dealings are more extenſive, and their intercourſe with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their ſchemes of life, a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from their proper motives, to co-operate with their own. In all theſe concluſions, they take their meaſures from paſt experience, in the ſame manner as in their reaſonings concerning external objects; and firmly believe, that men, as well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the ſame, which they have ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labor of his ſervants, for the execution of any work, as much as upon the tools, which he employs, and would be equally ſurprized, were his expectations diſappointed. In ſhort, this experimental inference and reaſoning concerning the actions of others enters ſo much into human life, that no man, while awake, is ever a moment without employing it. Have we not reaſon, therefore, to affirm, that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of neceſſity, according to the foregoing definition and explication of it?

Nor have philoſophers ever entertained a different opinion from the people in this particular. For not to mention, that almoſt every action of their life ſuppoſes that opinion; there are even few of the ſpeculative parts of learning, to which it is not eſſential. What would become of *hiſtory*, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the hiſtorian, according to the experience, which we have had of mankind? How could *politics* be a ſcience, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon ſociety? Where would be the foundation of *morals*, if particular characters had no certain nor determinate power to produce particular ſentiments, and if theſe ſentiments had no conſtant operation on actions? And with what pretext could we employ our *criticiſm* upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and ſentiments of his actors, either natural or unnatural, to ſuch characters, and in ſuch circumſtances? It ſeems almoſt impoſſible, therefore, to engage, either in ſcience or action of any kind, without acknowleging the doctrine of neceſſity, and this *inference* from motives to voluntary actions; from characters to conduct.

And indeed, when we conſider how aptly *natural* and *moral* evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument, we ſhall make no ſcruple to allow, that they are of the ſame nature, and derived from the ſame principles. A priſoner, who has neither money nor intereſt, diſcovers the impoſſibility of his eſcape, as well from the obſtinacy of the goaler, as from the walls and bars, with which he is ſurrounded; and in all attempts for his freedom, chuſes rather to work upon the ſtone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The ſame priſoner, when conducted to the ſcaffold, foreſees his death as certainly from the conſtancy and fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the ax or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refuſal of the ſoldiers to conſent to his eſcape; the action of the executioner; the ſeparation of the head and body; bleeding, convulſive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural

cauſes,

cauſes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them, in paſſing from one link to another: Nor is leſs certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects preſent to the memory or ſenſes, by a train of cauſes, cemented together by what we are pleaſed to call a *phyſical* neceſſity. The ſame experienced union has the ſame effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volitions, and actions; or figure and motion. We may change the names of things; but their nature and their operation on the underſtanding never change.

I HAVE frequently conſidered, what could poſſibly be the reaſon, why all mankind, tho' they have ever, without heſitation, acknowleged the doctrine of neceſſity, in their whole practice and reaſoning, have yet diſcovered ſuch a reluctance to acknowlege it in words, and have rather ſhewn a propenſity, in all ages, to profeſs the contrary opinion. The matter, I think, may be accounted for, after the following manner. If we examine the operations of bodies and the production of effects from their cauſes, we ſhall find, that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowlege of this relation, than barely to obſerve, that particular objects are *conſtantly conjoined* together, and that the mind is carried, by a *cuſtomary tranſition*, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But tho' this concluſion concerning human ignorance be the reſult of the ſtricteſt ſcrutiny of this ſubject, men ſtill entertain a ſtrong propenſity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive ſomething like a neceſſary connexion between the cauſe and the effect. When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and *feel* no ſuch connexion of the motive and the action; they are apt, from thence, to ſuppoſe, that there is a difference betwixt the effects, reſulting from material force, and thoſe which ariſe from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced, that we know nothing farther of cauſation of any kind, than merely the *conſtant conjunction* of objects, and the conſequent *inference* of the mind from one to another, and finding, that theſe two circumſtances are univerſally acknowleged to have place in voluntary actions; we may thence be more eaſily led to own the ſame neceſſity common to all cauſes. And tho' this reaſoning may contradict the ſyſtems of many philoſophers, in aſcribing neceſſity to the determinations of the will, we ſhall find, upon reflection, that they diſſent from it in words only, not in their real ſentiments. Neceſſity, according to the ſenſe, in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philoſopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended, that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, ſome farther connexion between the cauſe and effect; and a connexion which has not place in the voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it be ſo or not, can only appear upon examination; and it is incumbent on theſe philoſophers to make good their aſſertion, by defining or deſcribing that neceſſity, and pointing it out to us, in the operations of material cauſes.

IT would ſeem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this queſtion concerning liberty and neceſſity, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the ſoul, the influence of the underſtanding, and the operations of the will. Let them firſt diſcuſs a more ſimple queſtion, *viz.* the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of cauſation and neceſſity, except that of a conſtant conjunction of objects, and ſubſequent inference of the mind from one to another. If theſe circumſtances form, in reality, the

and that the one affords no inference, from which we can conclude the exiſtence of the other. For theſe are plain and acknowleged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean, *a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will*; that is, if we chuſe to remain at reſt, we may; if we chuſe to to move, we alſo may. Now this hypothetical liberty is univerſally allowed to belong to every body, who is not a priſoner and in chains. Here then is no ſubject of diſpute.

WHATEVER definition we may give of liberty, we ſhould be careful to obſerve two requiſite circumſtances; *firſt*, that it be conſiſtent with plain matter of fact; *ſecondly*, that it be conſiſtent with itſelf. If we obſerve theſe circumſtances, and render our definition intelligible, I am perſuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it.

'Tis univerſally allowed, that nothing exiſts without a cauſe of its exiſtence, and that chance, when ſtrictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power, which has, any where, a being in nature. But 'tis pretended that ſome cauſes are neceſſary, and ſome are not neceſſary. Here then is the admirable advantage of definitions. Let any one *define* a cauſe, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a *neceſſary connexion* with its effect; and let him ſhew diſtinctly the origin of the idea, expreſſed by the definition; and I ſhall frankly give up the whole controverſy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received, this muſt be abſolutely impracticable. Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other, we ſhould never have entertained any notion of cauſe and effect; and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the underſtanding, which is the only connexion, that we can have any comprehenſion of. Whoever attempts a definition of cauſe, excluſive of theſe circumſtances, will be obliged, either to employ unintelligible terms, or ſuch as are ſynonimous to the term, which he endeavors to define [b]. And if the definition above-mentioned, be admitted; liberty, when oppoſed to neceſſity, not to conſtraint, is the ſame thing with chance; which is univerſally allowed to have no exiſtence.

PART II.

THERE is no method of reaſoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than in philoſophical debates, to endeavor the refutation of any hypotheſis, by a pretext of its dangerous conſequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads into abſurdities, 'tis certainly falſe; but 'tis not certain that an opinion is falſe, becauſe 'tis of dangerous conſequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as ſerving nothing to the diſcovery of truth, but only to make the perſon of an antagoniſt odious. This I obſerve in general, without pretending to draw any advantage from it. I ſubmit frankly to an examination of this kind, and ſhall venture to affirm, that the doctrines, both of neceſſity and of

[b] Thus if a cauſe be defined, *that which produces any thing*; 'tis eaſy to obſerve, that *producing* is ſynonimous to *cauſing*. In like manner, if a cauſe be defined, *that by which any thing exiſts*; this is liable to the ſame objection. For what is meant by theſe words, *by which?* Had it been ſaid, that a cauſe is *that* after which *any thing conſtantly exiſts*; we ſhould have underſtood the terms. For this is, indeed, all we know of the matter. And this conſtancy forms the very eſſence of neceſſity, nor have we any other idea of it.

liberty,

liberty, as above explained, are not only conſiſtent with morality and religion, but are abſolutely eſſential to the ſupport of them.

NECESSITY may be defined two ways, conformable to the two definitions of *cauſe*, of which it makes an eſſential part. It conſiſts either in the conſtant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the underſtanding from one object to another. Now neceſſity, in both theſe ſenſes, (which, indeed, are, at bottom, the ſame) has univerſally, tho' tacitly, in the ſchools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed to belong to the will of man; and no man has ever pretended to deny, that we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that thoſe inferences are founded in the experienced union of like actions, with like motives, inclinations, and circumſtances. The only particular, in which any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refuſe to give the name of neceſſity to this property of human actions: But as long as the meaning is underſtood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or that he will maintain it poſſible to diſcover ſomething farther in the operations of matter. But this, it muſt be acknowleged, can be of no conſequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural philoſophy or metaphyſics. We may here be miſtaken in aſſerting, that there is no idea of any other neceſſity or connexion in the actions of body: But ſurely we aſcribe nothing to the actions of the mind, but what every one does, and muſt readily allow of. We change no circumſtance in the received orthodox ſyſtem with regard to the will, but only in that with regard to material objects and cauſes. Nothing therefore can be more innocent, at leaſt, than this doctrine.

ALL laws being founded on rewards and puniſhments, 'tis ſuppoſed as a fundamental principle, that theſe motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. We may give to this influence, what name we pleaſe; but as 'tis uſually conjoined with the action, it muſt be eſteemed a *cauſe*, and be looked upon as an inſtance of that neceſſity, which we would eſtabliſh.

THE only proper object of hatred or vengeance, is a perſon or creature, endowed with thought and conſciouſneſs; and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that paſſion, 'tis only by their relation to the perſon, or connexion with him. Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and periſhing; and where they proceed not from ſome *cauſe* in the characters and diſpoſition of the perſon who performed them, they can neither redound to his honor, if good, nor infamy, if evil. The actions themſelves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the perſon is not anſwerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and conſtant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, 'tis impoſſible he can, upon their account, become the object of puniſhment or vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies neceſſity, and conſequently cauſes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the moſt horrid crime, as at the firſt moment of his birth, nor is his character any way concerned in his actions; ſince they are not derived from it, and the wickedneſs of the one can never be uſed as a proof of the depravity of the other.

MEN are not blamed for ſuch actions as they perform ignorantly and caſually, whatever may be the conſequences. Why? but becauſe the principles of theſe actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone. Men are leſs blamed

ſor ſuch actions as they perform haſtily and unpremeditately, than for ſuch as proceed from deliberation. For what reaſon? but becauſe a haſty temper, tho' a conſtant cauſe or principle in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character. Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for? but by aſſerting, that actions render a perſon criminal, merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by any alteration of theſe principles, they ceaſe to be juſt proofs, they likewiſe ceaſe to be criminal. But except upon the doctrine of neceſſity, they never were juſt proofs, and conſequently never were criminal.

It will be equally eaſy to prove, and from the ſame arguments, that *liberty*, according to that definition above-mentioned, in which all men agree, is alſo eſſential to morality, and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are ſuſceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the objects either of approbation or diſlike. For as actions are objects of our moral ſentiments, ſo far only as they are indications of the internal character, paſſions, and affections; 'tis impoſſible that they can give riſe either to praiſe or blame, where they proceed not from theſe principles, but are derived altogether from external violence.

I PRETEND not to have obviated or removed all objections to this theory, with regard to neceſſity and liberty. I can foreſee other objections, derived from topics, which have not here been treated of. It may be ſaid, for inſtance, that if voluntary actions be ſubjected to the ſame laws of neceſſity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of neceſſary cauſes, pre-ordained and predetermined, reaching from the original cauſe of all, to every ſingle volition of every human creature. No contingency any where in the univerſe; no indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at the ſame time, acted upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who firſt beſtowed motion on this immenſe machine, and placed all beings in that particular poſition, whence every ſubſequent event, by an inevitable neceſſity, muſt reſult. Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from ſo good a cauſe; or if they have any turpitude, they muſt involve our Creator in the ſame guilt, while he is acknowleged to be their ultimate cauſe and author. For as a man, who fired a mine, is anſwerable for all the conſequences, whether the train he employed be long or ſhort: ſo wherever a continued chain of neceſſary cauſes are fixed, that Being, either finite or infinite, who produces the firſt, is likewiſe the author of all the reſt, and muſt both bear the blame, and acquire the praiſe, which belong to them. Our cleareſt and moſt unalterable ideas of morality eſtabliſh this rule, upon unqueſtionable reaſons, when we examine the conſequences of any human action; and theſe reaſons muſt ſtill have greater force, when applied to the volitions and intentions of a Being, infinitely wiſe and powerful. Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for ſo limited a creature as man; but thoſe imperfections have no place in our Creator. He foreſaw, he ordained, he intended all thoſe actions of men, which we ſo raſhly pronounce criminal. And we muſt conclude, therefore, either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accountable for them. But as either of theſe poſitions is abſurd and impious, it follows, that the doctrine from which they are deduced, cannot poſſibly be true, as being liable to all the ſame objections. An abſurd conſequence,

if neceſſary, proves the original doctrine to be abſurd; in the ſame manner that criminal actions render criminal the original cauſe, if the connexion between them be neceſſary and inevitable.

THIS objection conſiſts of two parts, which we ſhall examine ſeparately; *Firſt*, that if human actions can be traced up, by a neceſſary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite perfection of that Being, from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or *Secondly*, if they be criminal, we muſt retract the attribute of perfection, which we aſcribe to the Deity, and muſt acknowlege him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.

THE anſwer to the firſt objection ſeems obvious and convincing. There are many philoſophers, who, after an exact ſcrutiny of all the phænomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, conſidered as one ſyſtem, is, in every period of its exiſtence, ordered with perfect benevolence; and that the utmoſt poſſible happineſs will, in the end, reſult to every created being, without any mixture of poſitive or abſolute ill and miſery. Every phyſical ill, ſay they, makes an eſſential part of this benevolent ſyſtem, and could not poſſibly be removed, even by the Deity himſelf, conſidered as a wiſe agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or excluding greater good, which will reſult from it. From this theory, ſome philoſophers, and the antient *Stoics* among the reſt, derived a topic of conſolation, under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils, that thoſe ills, under which they labored, were, in reality, goods to the univerſe; and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the whole ſyſtem of nature, every event became an object of joy and exultation. But tho' this topic be ſpecious and ſublime, it was ſoon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You would ſurely more irritate, than appeaſe a man, lying under the racking pains of the gout, by preaching up to him the rectitude of thoſe general laws, which produced the malignant humors in his body, and led them, thro' the proper canals, to the nerves and ſinews, where they now excite ſuch acute torments. Theſe enlarged views may, for a moment, pleaſe the imagination of a ſpeculative man, who is placed in eaſe and ſecurity; but neither can they dwell with conſtancy on his mind, even tho' undiſturbed by the emotions of pain or paſſion; much leſs can they maintain their ground, when attacked by ſuch powerful antagoniſts. The affections take a narrower and more natural ſurvey of their objects, and by an oeconomy, more ſuitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings around us, and are actuated by ſuch events as appear good or ill to the private ſyſtem. The caſe is the ſame with *moral* as with *phyſical* ill. It cannot reaſonably be ſuppoſed, that thoſe remote conſiderations, which are found of ſo little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is ſo formed by nature, that, upon the appearance of certain characters, diſpoſitions, and actions, it immediately feels the ſentiment of approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more eſſential to its frame and conſtitution.

THE characters, which engage its approbation, are chiefly ſuch as contribute to the peace and ſecurity of human ſociety; as the characters, which excite blame, are chiefly ſuch as tend to public detriment and diſturbance: Whence we may reaſonably preſume, that the moral ſentiments ariſe, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection on theſe oppoſite intereſts. What tho' philoſophical

meditations eſtabliſh a different opinion or conjecture; that every thing is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities, which diſturb ſociety, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as ſuitable to the primary intention of nature, as thoſe which more directly promote its happineſs and welfare? Are ſuch remote and uncertain ſpeculations able to counter-balance the ſentiments, which ariſe from the natural and immediate view of the objects? A man, who is robbed of a conſiderable ſum; does he find his vexation for the loſs any way diminiſhed by theſe ſublime reflections? Why then ſhould his moral reſentment againſt the crime be ſuppoſed incompatible with them? Or why ſhould not the acknowlegement of a real diſtinction between vice and virtue be reconcileable to all ſpeculative ſyſtems of philoſophy, as well as that of a real diſtinction between perſonal beauty and deformity? Both theſe diſtinctions are founded in the natural ſentiments of the human mind: And theſe ſentiments are not to be controled nor altered by any philoſophical theory or ſpeculation whatſoever.

THE *ſecond* objection admits not of ſo eaſy and ſatisfactory an anſwer; nor is it poſſible to explain diſtinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cauſe of all the actions of men, without being the author of ſin and moral turpitude. Theſe are myſteries, which mere natural and unaſſiſted reaſon is very unfit to handle; and whatever ſyſtem it embraces, it muſt find itſelf involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every ſtep which it takes with regard to ſuch ſubjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with preſcience; or to defend abſolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of ſin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the ſkill of philoſophy. Happy, if ſhe be thence ſenſible of her temerity, when ſhe pries into theſe ſublime myſteries; and leaving a ſcene ſo full of obſcurities and perplexities, return, with ſuitable modeſty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life; where ſhe will find difficulties enow to employ her enquiries, without launching into ſo boundleſs an ocean of doubts, uncertainties and contradictions!

SECTION IX.

OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS.

ALL our reaſonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a ſpecies of ANALOGY, which leads us to expect from any cauſe the ſame events, which we have obſerved to reſult from ſimilar cauſes. Where the cauſes are entirely ſimilar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and concluſive: Nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he ſees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and coheſion of parts; as in all other inſtances, which have ever fallen under his obſervation. But where the objects have not ſo exact a ſimilarity, the analogy is leſs perfect, and the inference is leſs concluſive; tho' ſtill it has ſome force, in proportion to the degrees of ſimilarity and reſemblance. The anatomical obſervations, formed upon one animal, are, by this ſpecies of reaſoning, extended to all animals; and 'tis certain, that when the

the circulation of the blood, for inſtance, is proved clearly to have place in one creature, as a frog or fiſh, it forms a ſtrong preſumption, that the ſame principle has place in all. Theſe analogical obſervations may be carried farther, even to this ſcience, of which we are now treating; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of the underſtanding, or the origin and connexion of the paſſions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the ſame theory is requiſite to explain the ſame phænomena, in all other animals. We ſhall make trial of this, with regard to the hypotheſis, by which, in the foregoing diſcourſe, we have endeavored to account for all experimental reaſonings; and 'tis hoped, that this new point of view will ſerve to confirm all our former obſervations.

Firſt, It ſeems evident, that animals, as well as men, learn many things from experience, and infer, that the ſame events will always follow from the ſame cauſes. By this principle, they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treaſure up a knowlege of the nature of fire, water, earth, ſtones, heights, depths, *&c.* and of the effects, which reſult from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly diſtinguiſhable from the cunning and ſagacity of the old, who have learned, by long obſervation, to avoid what hurt them, and to purſue what gave eaſe or pleaſure. A horſe, that has been accuſtomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height, which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will truſt the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and will place himſelf ſo as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occaſion, founded in any thing but his obſervation and experience.

This is ſtill more evident from the effects of diſcipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and puniſhments, may be taught any courſe of action, the moſt contrary to their natural inſtincts and propenſities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehenſive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience, which makes him anſwer to his name, and infer, from ſuch an arbitrary ſound, that you mean him, rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?

In all theſe caſes, we may obſerve, that the animal infers ſome fact beyond what immediately ſtrikes his ſenſes; and that this inference is altogether founded on paſt experience, while the creature expects from the preſent object the ſame events, which it has always found in its obſervation to reſult from ſimilar objects.

Secondly, 'Tis impoſſible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any proceſs of argument or reaſoning, by which he concludes, that like events muſt follow like objects, and that the courſe of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature, they ſurely lie too abſtruſe for the obſervation of ſuch imperfect underſtandings; ſince it may well employ the utmoſt care and attention of a philoſophic genius to diſcover and obſerve them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in theſe inferences by reaſoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and concluſions: Neither are philoſophers themſelves, who, in all the active parts of life are, in the main, the ſame with the vulgar, and are go-

verned by the ſame maxims. Nature muſt have provided ſome other principle, of more ready, and more general uſe and application; nor can an operation of ſuch immenſe conſequence in life, as that of inferring effects from cauſes, be truſted to the uncertain proceſs of reaſoning and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to men, it ſeems to admit of no queſtion with regard to the brute-creation; and the concluſion being once firmly eſtabliſhed in the one, we have a ſtrong preſumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be univerſally admitted, without any exception or reſerve. 'Tis cuſtom alone, which engages animals, from every object, that ſtrikes their ſenſes, to infer its uſual attendant, and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one, to conceive the other, in that ſtrong and lively manner, which we denominate *belief*. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all the higher, as well as lower claſſes of ſenſitive beings, which fall under our notice and obſervation [a].

But tho' animals learn many parts of their knowlege from obſervation, there are alſo many parts of it, which they derive from the original hand of nature, which much exceed the ſhare of capacity they poſſeſs on ordinary occaſions; and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longeſt practice and experience. Theſe we denominate Instincts, and are ſo apt to admire, as ſomething very extraordinary, and inexplicable by all the diſquiſitions of human underſtanding. But our wonder will, perhaps, ceaſe or diminiſh; when we conſider, that the experimental reaſoning itſelf, which we poſſeſs in common with beaſts, and on which

[a] Since all reaſonings concerning facts or cauſes is derived merely from cuſtom, it may be aſked how it happens, that men ſo much ſurpaſs animals in reaſoning, and one man ſo much ſurpaſſes another? Has not the ſame cuſtom the ſame influence on all?

We ſhall here endeavor briefly to explain the great difference in human underſtandings: After which, the reaſon of the difference betwixt men and animals will eaſily be comprehended.

1. When we have lived any time, and have been accuſtomed to the uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the latter to reſemble the former. By means of this general habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reaſoning, and expect a ſimilar event with ſome degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made accurately, and free from all foreign circumſtances. 'Tis therefore conſidered as a matter of great importance to obſerve the conſequences of things; and as one man may very much ſurpaſs another in attention and memory and obſervation, this will make a very great difference in their reaſoning.

2. Where there is a complication of cauſes to produce any effect, one mind may be much larger than another, and better able to comprehend the whole ſyſtem of objects, and to infer juſtly their conſequences.

3. One man is able to carry on a chain of conſequences to a greater length than another.

4. Few men can think long without running into a confuſion of ideas, and miſtaking one for another; and there are various degrees of this infirmity.

5. The circumſtance, on which the effect depends, is frequently involved in other circumſtances, which are foreign and extrinſic. The ſeparation of it often requires great attention, accuracy, and ſubtilty.

6. The forming general maxims from particular obſervation is a very nice operation; and nothing is more uſual, from haſte or a narrowneſs of mind, which ſees not on all ſides, than to commit miſtakes in this particular.

7. When we reaſon from analogies, the man, who has the greater experience or the greater promptitude of ſuggeſting analogies, will be the better reaſoner.

8. Byaſſes from prejudice, education, paſſion, party, &c. hang more upon one mind than another.

9. After we have acquired a confidence in human teſtimony, books and converſation enlarge much more the ſphere of one man's experience and thought than thoſe of another.

'Twould be eaſy to diſcover many other circumſtances that make a difference in the underſtandings of men.

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the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a ſpecies of inſtinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourſelves; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any ſuch relations or compariſons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Tho' the inſtinct be different, yet ſtill it is an inſtinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with ſuch exactneſs, the art of incubation, and the whole oeconomy and order of its nurſery.

SECTION X.

OF MIRACLES.

PART I.

THERE is in Dr. TILLOTSON's writings an argument againſt the *real preſence*, which is as conciſe, and elegant, and ſtrong as any argument can poſſibly be ſuppoſed againſt a doctrine, that is ſo little worthy of a ſerious refutation. 'Tis acknowleged on all hands, ſays that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the ſcripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the teſtimony of the apoſtles, who were eye-witneſſes to thoſe miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine miſſion. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the *Chriſtian* religion is leſs than the evidence for the truth of our ſenſes; becauſe, even in the firſt authors of our religion, it was no greater; and 'tis evident it muſt diminiſh in paſſing from them to their diſciples; nor can any one be ſo certain of the truth of their teſtimony, as of the immediate object of his ſenſes. But a weaker evidence can never deſtroy a ſtronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real preſence ever ſo clearly revealed in ſcripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of juſt reaſoning to give our aſſent to it. It contradicts ſenſe, tho' both the ſcripture and tradition, on which it is ſuppoſed to be built, carry not ſuch evidence with them as ſenſe; when they are conſidered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breaſt, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.

NOTHING is ſo convenient as a deciſive argument of this kind, which muſt at leaſt *ſilence* the moſt arrogant bigotry and ſuperſtition, and free us from their impertinent ſollicitations. I flatter myſelf, that I have diſcovered an argument of a like nature, which, if juſt, will, with the wiſe and learned, be an everlaſting check to all kinds of ſuperſtitious deluſion, and conſequently, will be uſeful as long as the world endures. For ſo long, I preſume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all hiſtory, ſacred and prophane.

THO' experience be our only guide in reaſoning concerning matters of fact; it muſt be acknowleged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in ſome caſes is apt to lead us into errors and miſtakes. One, who, in our climate, ſhould expect better weather in any week of JUNE than in one of DECEMBER, would reaſon juſtly and conformable to experience; but 'tis certain, that he may happen,

happen, in the event, to find himſelf miſtaken. However, we may obſerve, that, in ſuch a caſe, he would have no cauſe to complain of experience; becauſe it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent obſervation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their ſuppoſed cauſes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been conſtantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and ſometimes to diſappoint our expectations; ſo that in our reaſonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of aſſurance, from the higheſt certainty to the loweſt ſpecies of moral evidence.

A WISE man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In ſuch concluſions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the laſt degree of aſſurance, and regards his paſt experience as a full *proof* of the future exiſtence of that event. In other caſes, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the oppoſite experiments: He conſiders which ſide is ſupported by the greateſt number of experiments: To that ſide he inclines, with doubt and heſitation; and when at laſt he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call *probability*. All probability, then, ſuppoſes an oppoſition of experiments and obſervations; where the one ſide is found to over-balance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the ſuperiority. A hundred inſtances or experiments on one ſide, and fifty on another, afford a very doubtful expectation of any event; tho' a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reaſonably beget a pretty ſtrong degree of aſſurance. In all caſes, we muſt balance the oppoſite experiments, where they are oppoſite, and deduct the ſmaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the ſuperior evidence.

To apply theſe principles to a particular inſtance; we may obſerve, that there is no ſpecies of reaſoning more common, more uſeful, and even neceſſary to human life, than that derived from the teſtimony of men, and the reports of eye-witneſſes and ſpectators. This ſpecies of reaſoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cauſe and effect. I ſhall not diſpute about a word. It will be ſufficient to obſerve, that our aſſurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our obſervation of the veracity of human teſtimony, and of the uſual conformity of facts to the reports of witneſſes. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any diſcoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their conſtant and regular conjunction; 'tis evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favor of human teſtimony, whoſe connexion with any events ſeems, in itſelf, as little neceſſary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not ſenſible to ſhame, when detected in a falſhood: were not theſe, I ſay, diſcovered by *experience* to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we ſhould never repoſe the leaſt confidence in human teſtimony. A man delirious, or noted for falſhood and villany, has no manner of authority with us.

AND as the evidence, derived from witneſſes and human teſtimony, is founded on paſt experience, ſo it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as a *proof* or *a probability*, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report,

report and any kind of objects, has been found to be conſtant or variable. There are a number of circumſtances to be taken into conſideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate ſtandard, by which we determine all diſputes, that may ariſe concerning them, is always derived from experience and obſervation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any ſide, 'tis attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the ſame oppoſition and mutual deſtruction of arguments as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently heſitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the oppoſite circumſtances, which cauſe any doubt or uncertainty; and when we diſcover a ſuperiority on any ſide, we incline to it; but ſtill with a diminution of aſſurance, in proportion to the force of its antagoniſt.

THIS contrariety of evidence, in the preſent caſe, may be derived from ſeveral different cauſes; from the oppoſition of contrary teſtimony; from the character or number of the witneſſes; from the manner of their delivering their teſtimony; or from the union of all theſe circumſtances. We entertain a ſuſpicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witneſſes contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a ſuſpicious character; when they have an intereſt in what they affirm; when they deliver their teſtimony with doubt and heſitation, or on the contrary, with too violent aſſeverations. There are many other particulars of the ſame kind, which may diminiſh or deſtroy the force of any argument, derived from human teſtimony.

SUPPOSE, for inſtance, that the fact, which the teſtimony endeavors to eſtabliſh, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that caſe, the evidence, reſulting from the teſtimony, admits a diminution, greater or leſs, in proportion as the fact is more or leſs unuſual. The reaſon, why we place any credit in witneſſes and hiſtorians is not from any *connexion*, which we perceive *à priori* between teſtimony and reality, but becauſe we are accuſtomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact atteſted is ſuch a one as has ſeldom fallen under our obſervation, here is a conteſt of two oppoſite experiences; of which the one deſtroys the other as far as its force goes, and the ſuperior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very ſame principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of aſſurance in the teſtimony of witneſſes, gives us alſo, in this caſe, another degree of aſſurance againſt the fact, which they endeavor to eſtabliſh; from which contradiction there neceſſarily ariſe a counterpoize, and mutual deſtruction of belief and authority.

I ſhould not believe ſuch a ſtory were it told me by CATO; was a proverbial ſaying in ROME, even during the life-time of that philoſophical patriot [b]. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate ſo great an authority.

THE INDIAN prince, who refuſed to believe the firſt relations concerning the effects of froſt, reaſoned juſtly; and it naturally required very ſtrong teſtimony to engage his aſſent to facts, which aroſe from a ſtate of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and bore ſo little analogy to thoſe events, of which he had had conſtant and uniform experience. Tho' they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it [c]. BUT

[b] PLUTARCH. in vita CATONIS.

[c] No INDIAN, 'tis evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a ſituation quite unknown to him; and 'tis impoſſible for him to tell *à priori* what will reſult from it. 'Tis making a new experi-

But in order to increaſe the probability againſt the teſtimony of witneſſes, let us ſuppoſe that the fact, which they affirm, inſtead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and ſuppoſe alſo, that the teſtimony, conſidered apart, and in itſelf, amounts to an entire proof; in that caſe there is proof againſt proof, of which the ſtrongeſt muſt prevail, but ſtill with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagoniſt.

A Miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has eſtabliſhed theſe laws, the proof againſt a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can poſſibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men muſt die; that lead cannot, of itſelf, remain ſuſpended in the air; that fire conſumes wood, and is extinguiſhed by water; unleſs it be, that theſe events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of theſe laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is eſteemed a miracle if it ever happen in the common courſe of nature. 'Tis no miracle that a man in ſeeming good health ſhould die on a ſudden; becauſe ſuch a kind of death, tho' more unuſual than any other, has yet been frequently obſerved to happen. But 'tis a miracle, that a dead man ſhould come to life; becauſe that has never been obſerved, in any age or country. There muſt, therefore, be an uniform experience againſt every miraculous event, otherwiſe the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full *proof*, from the nature of the fact, againſt the exiſtence of any miracle; nor can ſuch a proof be deſtroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an oppoſite proof, which is ſuperior[4].

periment, the conſequence of which is always uncertain. One may ſometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but ſtill this is but conjecture. And it muſt be confeſt, that, in the preſent caſe of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is ſuch as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water paſſes in a moment, from the utmoſt liquidity to perfect hardneſs. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated *extraordinary*, and requires a pretty ſtrong teſtimony, to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But ſtill it is not *miraculous*, nor contrary to uniform experience of the courſe of nature in caſes where all the circumſtances are the ſame. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always ſeen water liquid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never ſaw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reaſonably be poſitive what would there be the conſequence.

[4] Sometimes an event may not, *in itſelf*, ſeem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reaſon of ſome circumſtances, be denominated a miracle; becauſe, in *fact*, it is contrary to theſe laws. Thus if a perſon, claiming a divine authority, ſhould command a ſick perſon to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in ſhort, ſhould order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; theſe might juſtly be eſteemed miracles, becauſe they are really, in this caſe, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any ſuſpicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no tranſgreſſion of the laws of nature. If this ſuſpicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a tranſgreſſion of theſe laws; becauſe nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man ſhould have ſuch an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, *a tranſgreſſion of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interpoſal of ſome inviſible agent.* A miracle may either be diſcoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and eſſence. The raiſing of a houſe or ſhip into the air is a viſible miracle. The raiſing of a feather, when the wind wants ever ſo little of a force requiſite for that purpoſe, is as real a miracle, tho' not ſo ſenſible with regard to us.

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The plain conſequence is (and 'tis a general maxim worthy of our attention) "That no teſtimony is ſufficient to eſtabliſh a miracle, unleſs the teſtimony be "of ſuch a kind, that its falſhood would be more miraculous, than the fact, "which it endeavors to eſtabliſh: And even in that caſe, there is a mutual de-"ſtruction of arguments, and the ſuperior only gives us an aſſurance ſuitable to "that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior." When any one tells me, that he ſaw a dead man reſtored to life, I immediately conſider with myſelf, whether it be more probable, that this perſon ſhould either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates, ſhould really have happened. I weigh the one miracle againſt the other, and according to the ſuperiority, which I diſcover, I pronounce my deciſion, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falſhood of his teſtimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

PART II.

In the foregoing reaſoning we have ſuppoſed, that the teſtimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may poſſibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falſhood of that teſtimony would be a kind of prodigy. But 'tis eaſy to ſhew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our conceſſions, and that there never was a miraculous event, eſtabliſhed on ſo full an evidence.

For *firſt*, there is not to be found, in all hiſtory, any miracle atteſted by a ſufficient number of men, of ſuch unqueſtioned good-ſenſe, education, and learning as to ſecure us againſt all deluſion in themſelves; of ſuch undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all ſuſpicion of any deſign to deceive others; of ſuch credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have a great deal to loſe in caſe of being detected in any falſhood: and at the ſame time atteſting facts, performed in ſuch a public manner, and in ſo celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumſtances are requiſite to give us a full aſſurance in the teſtimony of men.

Secondly. We may obſerve in human nature a principle, which, if ſtrictly examined, will be found to diminiſh extremely the aſſurance, which we might have, from human teſtimony, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourſelves in our reaſonings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, reſemble thoſe, of which we have; that what we have found to be moſt uſual is always moſt probable; and that where there is an oppoſition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to ſuch of them as are founded on the greateſt number of paſt obſervations. But tho' in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact, which is unuſual and incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind obſerves not always the ſame rule; but when any thing is affirmed utterly abſurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits ſuch a fact, upon account of that very circumſtance, which ought to deſtroy all its authority. The paſſion of *ſurprize* and *wonder*, ariſing from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a ſenſible tendency towards the belief of thoſe events, from which it is derived. And this goes ſo far, that even thoſe who cannot enjoy this pleaſure immediately, nor can believe thoſe miracu-

lous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the ſatisfaction at ſecond-hand, or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.

WITH what greedineſs are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their deſcriptions of ſea and land monſters, their relations of wonderful adventures, ſtrange men, and uncouth manners? But if the ſpirit of religion join itſelf to the love of wonder, there is an end of common ſenſe; and human teſtimony, in theſe circumſtances, loſes all pretenſions to authority. A religioniſt may be an enthuſiaſt, and imagine he ſees what has no reality: He may know his narration to be falſe, and yet perſevere in it, with the beſt intentions in the world, for the ſake of promoting ſo holy a cauſe: Or even where this deluſion has no place, vanity, excited by ſo ſtrong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the reſt of mankind in any other circumſtances; and ſelf-intereſt with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not ſufficient judgment to canvaſs his evidence: What judgment they have, they renounce by principle, in theſe ſublime and myſterious ſubjects: Or if they were ever ſo willing to employ it, paſſion and a heated imagination diſturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increaſes his impudence: And his impudence over-powers their credulity.

ELOQUENCE, when in its higheſt pitch, leaves little room for reaſon or reflection; but addreſſing itſelf entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and ſubdues their underſtanding. Happily, this pitch it ſeldom attains. But what a CICERO or a DEMOSTHENES could ſcarcely operate over a ROMAN or ATHENIAN audience, every *Capuchin*, every itinerant or ſtationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching ſuch groſs and vulgar paſſions *.

THIRDLY. It forms a very ſtrong preſumption againſt all ſupernatural and miraculous relations, that they are obſerved chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admiſſion to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous anceſtors, who tranſmitted them with that inviolable ſanction and authority, which always attend antient and received opinions. When we peruſe the firſt hiſtories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourſelves tranſported into ſome new world, where the whole frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations in a different manner, from what it does at preſent. Battles, revolutions, peſtilences, famines, and dearth are never the effects of thoſe natural cauſes,

* The many inſtances of forged miracles, and prophecies and ſupernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themſelves by their abſurdity, mark ſufficiently the ſtrong propenſity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous, and ought reaſonably to beget a ſuſpicion againſt all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the moſt common and moſt credible events. For inſtance: There is no kind of report, which riſes ſo eaſily, and ſpreads ſo quickly, eſpecially in country places and provincial towns, as theſe concerning marriages; inſomuch that two young perſons of equal condition never ſee each other twice, but the whole neighborhood immediately join them together. The pleaſure of telling a piece of news ſo intereſting, of propagating it, and of being the firſt reporters of it, ſpreads the intelligence. And this is ſo well known, that no man of ſenſe gives attention to theſe reports, till he finds them confirmed by ſome greater evidence. Do not the ſame paſſions, and others ſtill ſtronger, incline the generality of mankind to the believing and reporting, with the greateſt vehemence and aſſurance, all religious miracles?

which

which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles, judgments quite obſcure the few natural events, that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages of ſcience and knowlege, we ſoon learn, that there is nothing myſterious or ſupernatural in the caſe, but that all proceeds from the uſual propenſity of mankind towards the marvellous, and that tho' this inclination may at intervals receive a check from ſenſe and learning, it can never thoroughly be extirpated from human nature.

'Tis ſtrange, a judicious reader is apt to ſay, upon the peruſal of theſe wonderful hiſtorians, *that ſuch prodigious events never happen in our days*. But 'tis nothing ſtrange, I hope, that men ſhould lie in all ages. You muſt ſurely have ſeen inſtances enow of that frailty. You have yourſelf heard many ſuch marvellous relations ſtarted, which being treated with ſcorn by all the wiſe and judicious, have at laſt been abandoned, even by the vulgar. Be aſſured, that thoſe renowned lies, which have ſpred and flouriſhed to ſuch a monſtrous height, aroſe from like beginnings; but being ſown in a more proper ſoil, ſhot up at laſt into prodigies almoſt equal to thoſe, which they relate.

'TWAS a wiſe policy in that cunning impoſtor, ALEXANDER, who, tho' now forgotten, was once ſo famous, to lay the firſt ſcene of his impoſtures in PAPHLAGONIA, where, as LUCIAN tells us, the people were extremely ignorant and ſtupid, and ready to ſwallow even the groſſeſt deluſion. People at a diſtance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The ſtories come magnified to them by a hundred circumſtances. Fools are induſtrious to propagate the deluſion; while the wiſe and learned are contented, in general, to deride its abſurdity, without informing themſelves of the particular facts, by which it may be diſtinctly refuted. And thus the impoſtor above-mentioned was enable to proceed, from his ignorant PAPHLAGONIANS, to the inliſting of votaries, even among the GRECIAN philoſophers, and men of the moſt eminent rank and diſtinction in ROME. Nay could engage the attention of that ſage emperor MARCUS AURELIUS; ſo far as to make him truſt the ſucceſs of a military expedition to his deluſive prophecies.

THE advantages are ſo great of ſtarting an impoſtor among an ignorant people, that even tho' the deluſion ſhould be too groſs to impoſe on the generality of them *(which, tho' ſeldom, is ſometimes the caſe)* it has a much better chance of ſucceeding in remote countries, than if the firſt ſcene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowlege. The moſt ignorant and barbarous of theſe barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have large enough correſpondence or ſufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the deluſion. Mens inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to diſplay itſelf. And thus a ſtory, which is univerſally exploded in the place where it was firſt ſtarted, ſhall paſs for certain at a thouſand miles diſtance. But had ALEXANDER fixed his reſidence at ATHENS, the philoſophers of that renowned mart of learning, had immediately ſpred, thro' the whole ROMAN empire, their ſenſe of the matter, which, being ſupported by ſo great authority, and diſplayed by all the force of reaſon and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. 'Tis true; LUCIAN paſſing by chance thro' PAPHLAGONIA had an opportunity of performing this good office. But, tho' much to be wiſhed, it does not always happen, that every

ALEXANDER meets with a LUCIAN, ready to expoſe and detect his impoſtures [f].

I MAY add as a *fourth* reaſon, which diminiſhes the authority of prodigies, that there is no teſtimony for any, even thoſe which have not been expreſsly detected, that is not oppoſed by an infinite number of witneſſes; ſo that not only the miracle deſtroys the credit of the teſtimony, but even the teſtimony deſtroys itſelf. To make this the better underſtood, let us conſider that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary, and that 'tis impoſſible the religions of antient ROME, of TURKEY, of SIAM, and of CHINA ſhould, all of them, be eſtabliſhed on any ſolid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of theſe religions (and all of them abound in miracles) as its direct ſcope is to eſtabliſh the particular ſyſtem, to which it is attributed; ſo has it the ſame force, tho' more indirectly, to overthrow every other ſyſtem. In deſtroying a rival ſyſtem, it likewiſe deſtroys the credit of thoſe miracles, on which that ſyſtem was eſtabliſhed; ſo that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of theſe prodigies, whether weak or ſtrong, as oppoſite to each other. According to this method of reaſoning, when we believe any miracle of MAHOMET or any of his ſucceſſors, we have for our warrant the teſtimony of a few barbarous ARABIANS: And on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of TITUS LIVIUS, PLUTARCH, TACITUS, and in ſhort of all the authors and witneſſes, GRECIAN, CHINESE, and ROMAN CATHOLIC, who have related any miracles in their particular religion; I ſay, we are to regard their teſtimony in the ſame light as if they had mentioned that MAHOMETAN miracle, and had in expreſs terms contradicted it, with the ſame certainty as they have for the miracles they relate. This argument may appear over ſubtile and refined; but is not in reality different from the reaſoning of a judge, who ſuppoſes, that the credit of two witneſſes, maintaining a crime againſt any one, is deſtroyed by the teſtimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues diſtant, at the ſame inſtant when the crime is ſaid to have been committed.

ONE of the beſt atteſted miracles in all prophane hiſtory, is that which TACITUS reports of VESPASIAN, who cured a blind man in ALEXANDRIA, by means of his ſpittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a viſion of the god, SERAPIS, who had enjoined them to have recourſe to the emperor, for theſe miraculous and extraordinary cures. The ſtory may be ſeen in that fine hiſtorian [g]; where every circumſtance ſeems to add weight to the teſtimony, and might be diſplayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous ſuperſtition. The gravity, ſolidity, age, and probity of ſo great

[f] It may here, perhaps, be objected, that I proceed raſhly, and form my notions of ALEXANDER merely from the account given of him by LUCIAN, a profeſſed enemy. It were, indeed, to be wiſhed, that ſome of the accounts publiſhed by his followers and accomplices had remained. The oppoſition and contraſt betwixt the character and conduct of the ſame man, as drawn by a friend or an enemy is as ſtrong, even in common life, much more in theſe religious matters, as that betwixt any two men in the world, betwixt ALEXANDER and St. PAUL, for inſtance. See a letter to GILBERT WEST, Eſq; on the converſion and apoſtleſhip of St. PAUL.

[g] Hiſt. Lib. 5 Cap. 8. SUETONIUS gives the ſame account *in vita* VESP.

an emperor, who, thro' the whole courſe of his life, converſed in a familiar way with his friends and courtiers, and never affected thoſe extraordinary airs of divinity, aſſumed by ALEXANDER and DEMETRIUS. The hiſtorian, a cotemporary writer, noted for candor and veracity, and withal, the greateſt and moſt penetrating genius, perhaps of all antiquity; and ſo free from any tendency to ſuperſtition and credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputation, of atheiſm and prophaneneſs: The perſons, from whoſe teſtimony he related the miracle, of eſtabliſhed character for judgment and veracity, as we may well preſume; eye-witneſſes of the fact, and confirming their verdict, after the FLAVIAN family were deſpoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie. *Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, poſtquam nullum mendacio pretium.* To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be ſuppoſed ſtronger for ſo groſs and ſo palpable a falſhood.

THERE is alſo a very memorable ſtory related by Cardinal DE RETZ, and which may well deſerve our conſideration. When that intriguing politician fled into SPAIN, to avoid the perſecution of his enemies, he paſſed thro' SARAGOSSA, the capital of ARRAGON, where he was ſhewn, in the cathedral, a man, who had ſerved twenty years as a door-keeper, and was well known to every body in town, that had ever paid their devotions at that church. He had been ſeen, for ſo long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the ſtump; and the cardinal aſſures us that he ſaw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church; and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact; whom the cardinal found, by their zealous devotion, to be thorow believers of the miracle. Here the relater was alſo cotemporary to the ſuppoſed prodigy, of an incredulous and libertine character as well as of great genius, the miracle of ſo *ſingular* a nature as could ſcarce admit of a counterfeit, and the witneſſes very numerous, and all of them, in a manner, ſpectators of the fact, to which they gave their teſtimony. And what adds mightily to the force of the evidence, and may double our ſurprize on this occaſion, is, that the cardinal himſelf, who relates the ſtory, ſeems not to give any credit to it, and conſequently cannot be ſuſpected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He conſidered juſtly, that it was not requiſite, in order to reject a fact of this nature, to be able accurately to diſprove the teſtimony, and to trace its falſhood, thro' all the circumſtances of knavery and credulity, which produced it. He knew, that as this was commonly altogether impoſſible at any ſmall diſtance of time and place; ſo was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately preſent, by reaſon of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning and roguery of a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a juſt reaſoner, that ſuch an evidence carried falſhood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle ſupported by any human teſtimony, was more properly a ſubject of deriſion than of argument.

THERE ſurely never was ſo great a number of miracles aſcribed to one perſon, as thoſe, which were lately ſaid to have been wrought in FRANCE upon the tomb of Abbé PARIS, the famous JANSENIST, with whoſe ſanctity the people were ſo long deluded. The curing of the ſick, giving hearing to the deaf, and ſight to the blind, were every where talked of, as the uſual effects of that holy ſepulchre. But what

what is more extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved, upon the ſpot, before judges of unqueſtioned integrity, atteſted by witneſſes of credit and diſtinction, in a learned age, and on the moſt eminent theatre, that is now in the world. Nor is this all: A relation of them was publiſhed, and diſperſed every where; nor were the *Jeſuits*, tho' a learned body, ſupported by the civil magiſtrate, and determined enemies to thoſe opinions, in whoſe favor the miracles were ſaid to have been wrought, ever able diſtinctly to refute or detect them [h].

Where

[h] This book was wrote by Monſ. de MONTGERON, counſellor or judge of the parliament of PARIS, a man of figure and character, who was alſo a martyr to the cauſe, and is now ſaid to be ſomewhere in a dungeon on account of his book.

There is another book in three volumes (called *Recueil des Miracles de l'Abbé* PARIS) giving an account of many of theſe miracles, and accompanied with prefatory diſcourſes, which are very well wrote. There runs, however, thro' the whole of theſe a ridiculous compariſon betwixt the miracles of our Saviour and thoſe of the Abbé; wherein 'tis aſſerted, that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former: As if the teſtimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of God himſelf, who conducted the pen of the inſpired writers. If theſe writers, indeed, were to be conſidered merely as human teſtimony, the FRENCH author is very moderate in his compariſon; ſince he might, with ſome appearance of reaſon, pretend, that the JANSENIST miracles much ſurpaſs the others in evidence and authority. The following circumſtances are drawn from authentic papers, inſerted in the above-mentioned book.

Many of the miracles of Abbé PARIS were proved immediately by witneſſes before the officiality or biſhop's court of PARIS, under the eye of cardinal NOAILLES, whoſe character for integrity and capacity was never conteſted even by his enemies.

His ſucceſſor in the archbiſhopric was an enemy to the JANSENISTS, and for that reaſon promoted to the ſee by the court. Yet 22 rectors or *cures* of PARIS, with infinite earneſtneſs, preſs him to examine thoſe miracles, which they aſſert to be known to the whole world, and indiſputably certain: But he wiſely forbore.

The MOLINIST party had tried to diſcredit theſe miracles in one inſtance, that of Madamoiſelle le FRANC. But beſides, that their proceedings were in many reſpects the moſt irregular in the world, particularly in citing only a few of the JANSENISTS witneſſes, whom they tampered with: Beſides this, I ſay, they ſoon found themſelves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witneſſes, one hundred and twenty in number, moſt of them perſons of credit and ſubſtance in PARIS, who gave oath for the miracle. This was accompanied with a ſolemn and earneſt appeal to the parliament. But the parliament were forbid by authority to meddle in the affair. It was at laſt obſerved that where men are heated by zeal and enthuſiaſm, there is no degree of human teſtimony ſo ſtrong as may not be procured for the greateſt abſurdity: And thoſe who will be ſo ſilly as to examine the affair by that medium, and ſeek particular flaws in the teſtimony, are almoſt ſure to be confounded. It muſt be a miſerable impoſture, indeed, that does not prevail in that conteſt.

All who have been in FRANCE about that time have heard of the great reputation of Monſ. HERAUT, the *lieutenant de Police*, whoſe vigilance, penetration, activity, and extenſive intelligence have been much talked of. This magiſtrate, who by the nature of his office is almoſt abſolute, was inveſted with full powers, on purpoſe to ſuppreſs or diſcredit theſe miracles; and he frequently ſeized immediately, and examined the witneſſes and ſubjects of them: But never could reach any thing ſatisfactory againſt them.

In the caſe of Madamoiſelle THIBAUT he ſent the famous De SYLVA to examine her; whoſe evidence is very curious. The phyſician declares, that it was impoſſible ſhe could have been ſo ill as was proved by witneſſes; becauſe it was impoſſible ſhe could, in ſo ſhort a time, have recovered ſo perfectly as he found her. He reaſoned like a man of ſenſe, from natural cauſes; but the oppoſite party to'd him, that the whole was a miracle, and that his evidence was the very beſt proof of it.

The MOLINISTS were in a ſad dilemma. They durſt not aſſert the abſolute inſufficiency of human evidence to prove a miracle: They were obliged to ſay, that theſe miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil. But they were told, that this was the reſource of the JEWS of old.

No JANSENIST was ever embarraſſed to account for the ceſſation of the miracles, when the churchyard was ſhut up by the king's edict. It was the touch of the tomb, which operated theſe extraordinary effects; and when no one could approach the tomb, no effects could be expected. God, indeed, could have thrown down the walls in a moment; but he is maſter of his own graces and works, and it belongs not to us to account for them.

Where ſhall we find ſuch a number of circumſtances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppoſe to ſuch a cloud of witneſſes, but the abſolute impoſſibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this ſurely, in the eyes of all reaſonable people, will alone be regarded as a ſufficient refutation.

Is the conſequence juſt, becauſe ſome human teſtimony has the utmoſt force and authority in ſome caſes, when it relates the battles of PHILIPPI or PHARSALIA, for inſtance; that therefore all kinds of teſtimony muſt, in all caſes, have equal force and authority? Suppoſe that the CÆSAREAN and POMPEIAN factions had, each of them, claimed the victory in theſe battles, and that the hiſtorians of each party had uniformly aſcribed the advantage to their own ſide; how could mankind, at this diſtance, have been able to determine between them? The contrariety is equally ſtrong between the miracles related by HERODOTUS or PLUTARCH, and thoſe delivered by MARIANA, BEDE, or any monkiſh hiſtorian.

THE wiſe lend a very academic faith to every report, which favors the paſſion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himſelf, or in any other way ſtrikes in with his natural inclinations and propenſities. But what greater temptation than to appear a miſſionary, a prophet, an ambaſſador from heaven? Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain ſo ſublime a character? Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man has firſt made a convert of himſelf and entered ſeriouſly into the deluſion; who ever ſcruples to make uſe of pious frauds, in ſupport of ſo holy and meritorious a cauſe?

them. He did not throw down the walls of every city like thoſe of JERICHO, on the ſounding of the rams-horns, nor break up the priſon of every apoſtle, like that of St. PAUL.

No leſs a man, than the Duc de CHATILLON, a duke and peer of FRANCE of the higheſt rank and family, gives evidence of a miraculous cure, performed upon a ſervant of his, who had lived ſeveral years in his houſe with a viſible and palpable infirmity.

I ſhall conclude with obſerving, that no clergy are more celebrated for ſtrictneſs of life and manners than the ſecular clergy of FRANCE, particularly the rectors or curés of PARIS, who bear ſuch teſtimony to theſe impoſtures.

The learning, genius, and probity of the gentlemen and the auſterity of the nuns of PORT-ROYAL have been much celebrated all over EUROPE. Yet they all give evidence for a miracle, wrought on the niece of the famous PASCHAL, whoſe ſanctity of life, as well as extraordinary capacity, is well known. The famous RACINE gives an account of this miracle in his famous hiſtory of PORT-ROYAL, and fortifies it with all the proofs, which a multitude of nuns, prieſts, phyſicians, and men of the world, all of them of undoubted credit, could beſtow upon it. Several men of letters, particularly the biſhop of TOURNAY, thought this miracle ſo certain, as to employ it in the refutation of atheiſts and free-thinkers. The queen-regent of FRANCE, who was extremely prejudiced againſt the PORT-ROYAL, ſent her own phyſician to examine the miracle, who returned an abſolute convert. In ſhort, the ſupernatural cure was ſo unconteſtable, that it ſaved, for a time, that famous monaſtery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the Jeſuits. Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected by ſuch ſagacious and powerful antagoniſts, and muſt have haſtened the ruin of the contrivers. Our divines, who can build up a formidable caſtle from ſuch deſpicable materials; what a prodigious fabric could they have reared from theſe and many other circumſtances, which I have not mentioned! How oft would the great names of PASCHAL, RACINE, ARNAUD, NICOLE, have reſounded in our ears? But if they be wiſe, they had better adopt the miracle, as being more worth, a thouſand times, than all the reſt of their collection. Beſides, it may ſerve very much to their purpoſe. For that miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy prickle of the holy thorn, which compoſed the holy crown, which, &c.

THE ſmalleſt ſpark may here kindle into the greateſt flame; becauſe the materials are always prepared for it. The *avidum genus auricularum* [i], the gazing populace receive greedily, without examination, whatever ſooths ſuperſtition, and promotes wonder.

How many ſtories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards ſunk into neglect and oblivion? Where ſuch reports, therefore, fly about, the ſolution of the phænomenon is obvious; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and obſervation, when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and deluſion. And ſhall we, rather than have a recourſe to ſo natural a ſolution, allow of a miraculous violation of the moſt eſtabliſhed laws of nature?

I NEED not mention the difficulty of detecting a falſhood in any private or even public hiſtory, at the time and place, where it is ſaid to happen; much more where the ſcene is removed to ever ſo ſmall a diſtance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment, which they can employ, find themſelves often at a loſs to diſtinguiſh between truth and falſhood in the moſt recent actions. But the matter never comes to any iſſue, if truſted to the common method of altercation and debate and flying rumors; eſpecially when men's paſſions have taken party on either ſide.

IN the infancy of new religions, the wiſe and learned commonly eſteem the matter too inconſiderable to deſerve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the ſeaſon is now gone, and the records and witneſſes, which might clear up the matter, have periſhed beyond recovery.

No means of detection remain, but thoſe which muſt be drawn from the very teſtimony itſelf of the reporters: And theſe, tho' always ſufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehenſion of the vulgar.

UPON the whole, then, it appears, that no teſtimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much leſs to a proof; and that even ſuppoſing it amounted to a proof, it would be oppoſed by another proof, derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavor to eſtabliſh. 'Tis experience only, which gives authority to human teſtimony; and 'tis the ſame experience, which aſſures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, theſe two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but ſubſtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one ſide or the other, with that aſſurance, which ariſes from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this ſubſtraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may eſtabliſh it as a maxim, that no human teſtimony can have ſuch force as to prove a miracle, and make it a juſt foundation for any ſuch ſyſtem of religion [k].

I AM

[i] LUCRET.

[k] I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I ſay, that a miracle can never be proved, ſo as to be the foundation of a ſyſtem of religion. For I own, that otherwiſe, there may poſſibly be miracles, or violations of the uſual courſe of nature, of ſuch a kind as to admit of proof from human teſtimony; tho', perhaps,

I AM the better pleaſed with this method of reaſoning, as I think it may ſerve to confound thoſe dangerous friends or diguiſed enemies to the *Chriſtian Religion*, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reaſon. Our moſt holy religion is founded on *Faith*, not on reaſon; and 'tis a ſure method of expoſing it to put it to ſuch a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us examine thoſe miracles, related in ſcripture; and not to loſe ourſelves in too wide a field, let us confine ourſelves to ſuch as we find in the *Pentateuch*, which we ſhall examine, according to the principles of theſe pretended Chriſtians, not as the word or teſtimony of God himſelf, but as the production of a mere human writer and hiſtorian. Here then we are firſt to conſider a book,

haps, it will be impoſſible to find any ſuch in all the records of hiſtory. Thus, ſuppoſe, all authors, in all languages, agree, that from the firſt of JANUARY, 1600, there was a total darkneſs over the whole earth for eight days: Suppoſe that the tradition of this extraordinary event, is ſtill ſtrong and lively among the people: That all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the ſame tradition, without the leaſt variation or contradiction: 'Tis evident, that our preſent philoſophers, inſtead of doubting of that fact, ought to receive it for certain, and ought to ſearch for the cauſes, whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and diſſolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by ſo many analogies, that any phænomenon, which ſeems to have a tendency towards that cataſtrophe, comes within the reach of human teſtimony, if that teſtimony be very extenſive, and uniform.

But ſuppoſe, that all the hiſtorians, who treat of ENGLAND, ſhould agree, that on the firſt of JANUARY, 1600, queen ELIZABETH died; that both before and after her death ſhe was ſeen by her phyſicians and the whole court, as is uſual with perſons of her rank; that her ſucceſſor was acknowleged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being interred a month, ſhe again appeared, took poſſeſſion of the throne, and governed ENGLAND for three years: I muſt confeſs, I ſhould be ſurprized at the concurrence of ſo many odd circumſtances, but ſhould not have the leaſt inclination to believe ſo miraculous an event. I ſhould not doubt of her pretended death, and of thoſe other public circumſtances, that followed it: I ſhould only aſſert it to have been pretended, and that it neither was, nor poſſibly could be real. You would in vain object to me the difficulty, and almoſt impoſſibility of deceiving the world in an affair of ſuch conſequence; the wiſdom and integrity of that renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which ſhe could reap from ſo poor an artifice: All this might aſtoniſh me; but I would ſtill reply, that the knavery and folly of men are ſuch common phænomena, that I ſhould rather believe the moſt extraordinary events to ariſe from their concurrence than admit ſo ſignal a violation of the laws of nature.

But ſhould this miracle be aſcribed to any new ſyſtem of religion; men, in all ages, have been ſo much impoſed on by ridiculous ſtories of that kind; that this very circumſtance would be a full proof of a cheat, and ſufficient, with all men of ſenſe, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without farther examination. Tho' the Being to whom the miracle is aſcribed, be, in this caſe, Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; ſince 'tis impoſſible for us to know the attributes or actions of ſuch a being, otherwiſe than from the experience, which we have, of his productions, in the uſual courſe of nature. This ſtill reduces us to paſt obſervation, and obliges us to compare the inſtances of the violations of truth in the teſtimony of men with thoſe of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is moſt likely and probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the teſtimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact; this muſt diminiſh very much the authority of the former teſtimony, and make us form a general reſolution never to lend any attention to it, with whatever ſpecious pretext it may be covered.

My lord BACON ſeems to have embraced the ſame principles of reaſoning. "Facienda "enim eſt congeries ſive hiſtoria naturalis parti- "cularis omnium monſtrorum & partuum naturæ "prodigioſorum; omnis denique novitatis & ra- "ritatis & inconſueti in natura. Hoc vero faci- "endum eſt cum ſeveriſſimo delectu, ut conſtet "fides. Maxime autem habenda ſunt pro ſuſpec- "tis quæ pendent quomodocunque ex religione, "ut prodigia LIVII: Nec minus quæ inveniun- "tur in ſcriptoribus magiæ naturalis, aut etiam "alchymiæ, & hujuſmodi hominibus; qui tan- "quam proci ſunt & amatores fabularum."

Nov. Organ. Lib. 2. Aph. 29.

preſented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, wrote in an age when they were ſtill more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it relates; corroborated by no concurring teſtimony, and reſembling thoſe fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a ſtate of the world and of human nature entirely different from the preſent: Of our fall from that ſtate: Of the age of man, extended to near a thouſand years: Of the deſtruction of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice of one people, as the favorites of heaven; and that people, the countrymen of the author: Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the moſt aſtoniſhing imaginable: I deſire any one to lay his hand upon his heart, and after ſerious conſideration declare, whether he thinks, that the falſhood of ſuch a book, ſupported by ſuch a teſtimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however, neceſſary to make it be received, according to the meaſures of probability above eſtabliſhed.

WHAT we have ſaid of miracles may be applied, without any variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as ſuch only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretel future events, it would be abſurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine miſſion or authority from heaven. So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the *Chriſtian Religion*, not only was at firſt attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reaſonable perſon without one. Mere reaſon is inſufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by *Faith* to aſſent to it is conſcious of a continued miracle in his own perſon, which ſubverts all the principles of his underſtanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is moſt contrary to cuſtom and experience.

SECTION XI.

OF A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE AND OF A FUTURE STATE.

I WAS lately engaged in converſation with a friend who loves ſceptical paradoxes; where, tho' he advanced many principles, of which I can by no means approve, yet as they ſeem to be curious, and to bear ſome relation to the chain of reaſoning carried on thro' theſe eſſays, I ſhall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can, in order to ſubmit them to the judgment of the reader.

OUR converſation began with my admiring the ſingular good fortune of philoſophy, which, as it requires intire liberty, above all other privileges, and floriſhes chiefly from the free oppoſition of ſentiments and argumentation, received its firſt birth in an age and country of freedom and toleration, and was never cramped, even in its moſt extravagant principles, by any creeds, confeſſions, or penal

penal ſtatutes. For except the baniſhment of PROTAGORAS, and the death of SOCRATES, which laſt event proceeded partly from other motives, there are ſcarce any inſtances to be met with, in antient hiſtory, of this bigotted jealouſy, with which the preſent age is ſo much infeſted. EPICURUS lived at ATHENS to an advanced age, in peace and tranquility: EPICUREANS [k] were even admitted to receive the ſacerdotal character, and to officiate at the altar, in the moſt ſacred rites of the eſtabliſhed religion: And the public encouragement [l] of penſions and ſallaries was afforded equally, by the wiſeſt of all the ROMAN emperors [m], to the profeſſors of every ſect of philoſophy. How requiſite ſuch kind of treatment was to philoſophy, in its firſt origin, will eaſily be conceived, if we reflect, that even at preſent, when it may be ſuppoſed more hardy and robuſt, it bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the ſeaſons, and thoſe harſh winds of calumny and perſecution, which blow upon it.

YOU admire, ſays my friend, as the ſingular good-fortune of philoſophy, what ſeems to reſult from the natural courſe of things, and to be unavoidable in every age and nation. This pertinacious bigotry, of which you complain, as ſo fatal to philoſophy, is really her offspring, who, after allying with ſuperſtition, ſeparates himſelf intirely from the intereſt of his parent, and becomes her moſt inveterate enemy and perſecutor. Speculative dogmas of religion, the preſent occaſions of ſuch furious diſpute, could not poſſibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages of the world; when mankind, being wholly illiterate, formed an idea of religion, more ſuitable to their weak apprehenſion, and compoſed their ſacred tenets chiefly of ſuch tales as were the objects of traditional belief, more than of argument or diſputation. After the firſt alarm, therefore, was over, which aroſe from the new paradoxes and principles of the philoſophers; theſe teachers ſeem, ever after, during the ages of antiquity, to have lived in great harmony with the eſtabliſhed ſuperſtitions, and to have made a fair partition of mankind betwixt them; the former claiming all the learned and the wiſe, and the latter poſſeſſing all the vulgar and illiterate.

IT ſeems then, ſays I, that you leave politics intirely out of the queſtion, and never ſuppoſe, that a wiſe magiſtrate can juſtly be jealous of certain tenets of philoſophy, ſuch as thoſe of EPICURUS, which denying a divine exiſtence, and conſequently a providence and a future ſtate, ſeem to looſen, in a great meaſure, the ties of morality, and may be ſuppoſed, for that reaſon, pernicious to the peace of civil ſociety.

I KNOW, replied he, that in fact theſe perſecutions never, in any age, proceeded from calm reaſon, or any experience of the pernicious conſequences of philoſophy; but aroſe entirely from paſſion and prejudice. But what if I ſhould advance farther, and aſſert, that if EPICURUS had been accuſed before the people, by any of the *ſycophants* or informers of thoſe days, he could eaſily have defended his cauſe, and proved his principles of philoſophy to be as ſalutary as thoſe of his adverſaries, who endeavored, with ſuch zeal, to expoſe him to the public hatred and jealouſy?

I WISH, ſaid I, you would try your eloquence upon ſo extraordinary a topic, and make a ſpeech for EPICURUS, which might ſatisfy, not the mob of ATHENS,

[k] LUCIANI *Cynic.* [l] Id. *ibidem.* [m] Id. & Dio.

if you will allow that antient and polite city to have contained any mob, but the more philoſophical part of his audience, ſuch as might be ſuppoſed capable of comprehending his arguments.

THE matter would not be difficult, upon ſuch conditions, replied he: And if you pleaſe, I ſhall ſuppoſe myſelf EPICURUS for a moment, and make you ſtand for the ATHENIAN people, and ſhall deliver you ſuch an harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans, and leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adverſaries.

VERY well: pray proceed upon theſe ſuppoſitions.

I COME hither, O ye ATHENIANS, to juſtify in your aſſembly what I maintained in my ſchool, and find myſelf impeached by furious antagoniſts, inſtead of reaſoning with calm and diſpaſſionate enquirers. Your deliberations, which of right ſhould be directed to queſtions of public good, and the intereſt of the commonwealth, are diverted to the diſquiſitions of ſpeculative philoſophy; and theſe magnificent, but, perhaps, fruitleſs enquiries, take place of your more familiar but more uſeful occupations. But ſo far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuſe. We ſhall not here diſpute concerning the origin and government of worlds. We ſhall only enquire how far ſuch queſtions concern the public intereſt. And if I can perſuade you, that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of ſociety and ſecurity of government, I hope that you will preſently ſend us back to our ſchools, there to examine at leiſure the queſtion the moſt ſublime, but, at the ſame time, the moſt ſpeculative of all philoſophy.

THE religious philoſophers, not ſatisfied with the traditions of your forefathers, and doctrines of your prieſts (in which I willingly acquieſce) indulge a raſh curioſity, in trying how far they can eſtabliſh religion upon the principles of reaſon; and they thereby excite, inſtead of ſatisfying the doubts, which naturally ariſe from a diligent and ſcrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the moſt magnificent colors, the order, beauty, and wiſe arrangement of the univerſe; and then aſk, if ſuch a glorious diſplay of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourſe of atoms, or if chance could produce what the higheſt genius can never ſufficiently admire. I ſhall not examine the juſtneſs of this argument. I ſhall allow it to be as ſolid as my antagoniſts and accuſers can deſire. 'Tis ſufficient, if I can prove, from this very reaſoning, that the queſtion is entirely ſpeculative, and that when, in my philoſophical diſquiſitions, I deny a providence and a future ſtate, I undermine not the foundations of ſociety, but advance principles, which they themſelves, upon their own topics, if they argue conſiſtently, muſt allow to be ſolid and ſatisfactory.

YOU then, who are my accuſers, have acknowleged, that the chief or ſole argument for a divine exiſtence (which I never queſtioned) is derived from the order of nature; where there appear ſuch marks of intelligence and deſign, that you think it extravagant to aſſign for its cauſe, either chance, or the blind and unguided force of matter. You allow, that this is an argument, drawn from effects to cauſes. From the order of the work, you infer, that there muſt have been project and forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you allow, that your concluſion fails; and you pretend not to eſtabliſh the concluſion in a greater latitude than the phænomena of nature will juſtify. Theſe are your conceſſions. I deſire you to mark the conſequences.

WHEN we infer any particular cauſe from an effect, we muſt proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to aſcribe to the cauſe any qualities, but what are exactly ſufficient to produce the effect. A body of ten ounces raiſed in any ſcale may ſerve as a proof, that the counter-ballancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a reaſon, that it exceeds a hundred. If the cauſe, aſſigned for any effect, be not ſufficient to produce it, we muſt either reject that cauſe, or add to it ſuch qualities as will give it a juſt proportion to the effect. But if we aſcribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we can only indulge the licence of conjecture, and arbitrarily ſuppoſe the exiſtence of qualities and energies, without reaſon or authority.

THE ſame rule holds, whether the cauſe aſſigned be brute unconſcious matter or a rational intelligent being. If the cauſe be known only by the effect, we never ought to aſſign to it any qualities, beyond what are preciſely requiſite to produce the effect: nor can we, by any rules of juſt reaſoning, return back from the cauſe, and infer other effects from it, beyond thoſe by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the ſight of one of ZEUXIS's pictures, could know, that he was alſo a ſtatuary or architect, and was an artiſt no leſs ſkilful in ſtone and marble than in colors, the talents and taſte diſplayed in the particular work before us; theſe we may ſafely conclude the workman to be poſſeſſed of. The cauſe muſt be proportioned to the effect: And if we exactly and preciſely proportion it, we ſhall never find in it any qualities that point farther, or afford an inference concerning any other deſign or performance. Such qualities muſt be ſomewhat beyond what is merely requiſite to produce the effect, which we examine.

ALLOWING, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the exiſtence or order of the univerſe; it follows, that they poſſeſs that preciſe degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their workmanſhip; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the aſſiſtance of exaggeration and flattery to ſupply the defects of argument and reaſoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at preſent, appear, ſo far may we conclude theſe attributes to exiſt. The ſuppoſition of farther attributes is mere hypotheſis; much more, the ſuppoſition, that, in diſtant periods of place and time, there has been, or will be a more magnificent diſplay of theſe attributes, and a ſcheme of adminiſtration more ſuitable to ſuch imaginary virtues. We can never be allowed to mount up from the univerſe, the effect, to JUPITER, the cauſe; and then deſcend downwards, to infer any new effect from that cauſe; as if the preſent effects alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes which we aſcribe to that deity. The knowlege of the cauſe being derived ſolely from the effect, they muſt be exactly adjuſted to each other, and the one can never point towards any thing farther, or be the foundation of any new inference and concluſion.

You find certain phænomena in nature. You ſeek a cauſe or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become ſo enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impoſſible but he muſt produce ſomething greater, and more perfect than the preſent ſcene of things, which is ſo full of ill and diſorder. You forget, that this ſuperlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or at leaſt, without any foundation in reaſon; and that you have no ground to aſcribe to him any qualities, but what you ſee he has actually exerted and diſplayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore,

O philoſophers, be ſuited to the preſent appearances of nature: And preſume not to alter theſe appearances by arbitrary ſuppoſitions, in order to ſuit them to the attributes, which you ſo fondly aſcribe to your deities.

When prieſts and poets, ſupported by your authority, O Athenians, talk of a golden or a ſilver age, which preceded the preſent ſcene of vice and miſery, I hear them with attention and with reverence. But when philoſophers, who pretend to neglect authority, and to cultivate reaſon, hold the ſame diſcourſe, I pay them not, I own, the ſame obſequious ſubmiſſion and pious deference. I aſk; Who carried them into the celeſtial regions, who admitted them into the councils of the gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus raſhly affirm that their deities have executed, or will execute, any purpoſe, beyond what has actually appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the ſteps or by the gradual aſcent of reaſon, and by drawing inferences from effects to cauſes, I ſtill inſiſt, that they have aided the aſcent of reaſon by the wings of imagination; otherwiſe they could not thus change their manner of inference, and argue from cauſes to effects; preſuming, that a more perfect production than the preſent world would be more ſuitable to ſuch perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting, that they have no reaſon to aſcribe to theſe celeſtial beings any perfection or any attribute, but what can be found in the preſent world.

Hence all the fruitleſs induſtry to account for the ill appearances of nature, and ſave the honor of the gods; while we muſt acknowlege the reality of that evil and diſorder, with which the world ſo much abounds. The obſtinate and intractable qualities of matter, we are told, or the obſervance of general laws, or ſome ſuch reaſon is the ſole cauſe, which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him to create mankind and every ſenſible creature ſo imperfect and ſo unhappy. Theſe attributes, then, are, it ſeems, beforehand, taken for granted, in their greateſt latitude. And upon that ſuppoſition, I own, that ſuch conjectures may, perhaps, be admitted as plauſible ſolutions of the ill phænomena. But ſtill I aſk; Why take theſe attributes for granted, or why aſcribe to the cauſe any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to juſtify the courſe of nature upon ſuppoſitions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the courſe of nature?

The religious hypotheſis, therefore, muſt be conſidered only as a particular method of accounting for the viſible phænomena of the univerſe: But no juſt reaſoner will ever preſume to infer from it any ſingle fact, and alter or add to the phænomena, in any ſingle particular. If you think, that the appearances of things prove ſuch cauſes, 'tis allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the exiſtence of theſe cauſes. In ſuch complicated and ſublime ſubjects, every one ſhould be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument. But here you ought to reſt. If you come backward, and arguing from your inferred cauſes, conclude, that any other fact has exiſted, or will exiſt, in the courſe of nature, which may ſerve for a fuller diſplay of particular attributes; I muſt admoniſh you, that you have departed from the method of reaſoning, attached to the preſent ſubject, and muſt certainly have added ſomething to the attributes of the cauſe, beyond what appears in the effect; otherwiſe you could never, with tolerable ſenſe or

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propriety, add any thing to the effect, in order to render it more worthy of the cauſe.

WHERE, then, is the odiouſneſs of that doctrine, which I teach in my ſchool, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole queſtion, wherein the ſecurity of good morals, or the peace and order of ſociety is in the leaſt concerned?

I DENY a providence, you ſay, and ſupreme governor of the world, who guides the courſe of events, and puniſhes the vicious with infamy and diſappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honor and ſucceſs, in all their undertakings. But ſurely, I deny not the courſe itſelf of events, which lies open to every one's enquiry and examination. I acknowlege, that, in the preſent order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice; and meets with a more favorable reception from the world. I am ſenſible, that, according to the paſt experience of mankind, friendſhip is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only ſource of tranquility and happineſs. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious courſe of life; but am ſenſible, that, to a well diſpoſed mind, every advantage is on the ſide of the former. And what can you ſay more, allowing all your ſuppoſitions and reaſonings? You tell me, indeed, that this diſpoſition of things proceeds from intelligence and deſign. But whatever it proceeds from, the diſpoſition itſelf, on which depends our happineſs or miſery, and conſequently our conduct and deportment in life, is ſtill the ſame. 'Tis ſtill open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behavior, by my experience of paſt events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a ſupreme diſtributive juſtice in the univerſe, I ought to expect ſome more particular reward of the good, and puniſhment of the bad, beyond the ordinary courſe of events; I here find the ſame fallacy, which I have before endeavored to detect. You perſiſt in imagining, that, if we grant that divine exiſtence, for which you ſo earneſtly contend, you may ſafely infer conſequences from it, and add ſomething to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attributes, which you aſcribe to your gods. You ſeem not to remember, that all your reaſonings on this ſubject can only be drawn from effects to cauſes; and that every argument, deduced from cauſes to effects, muſt of neceſſity be a groſs ſophiſm; ſince it is impoſſible for you to know any thing of the cauſe, but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but diſcovered to the-full, in the effect.

BUT what muſt a philoſopher judge of thoſe vain reaſoners, who, inſtead of regarding the preſent ſcene of things, as the ſole object of their contemplation, ſo far reverſe the whole courſe of nature, as to render this life merely a paſſage to ſomething farther; a porch, which leads to a greater, and vaſtly different building; a prologue, which ſerves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence, do you think, can ſuch philoſophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination ſurely. For if they derived it from the preſent phænomena, it would never point to any thing farther, but muſt be exactly adjuſted to them. That the divinity may *poſſibly* poſſeſs attributes, which we have never ſeen exerted; may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot diſcover to be ſatisfied: All this will freely be allowed. But ſtill this is mere *poſſibility* and hypotheſis. We never can have reaſon to *infer* any attributes,

or any principles of action in him, but ſo far as we know them to have been exerted and ſatisfied.

Are there any marks of a diſtributive juſtice in the world? If you anſwer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, ſince juſtice here exerts itſelf, it is ſatisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude, that you have then no reaſon to aſcribe juſtice to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by ſaying, that the juſtice of the gods, at preſent, exerts itſelf in part, but not in its full extent; I anſwer, that you have no reaſon to give it any particular extent, but only ſo far as you ſee it, *at preſent*, exert itſelf.

THUS I bring the diſpute, O ATHENIANS, to a ſhort iſſue with my antagoniſts. The courſe of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as theirs. The experienced train of events is the great ſtandard by which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing elſe can be appealed to in the field, or in the ſenate. Nothing elſe ought ever to be heard of, in the ſchool, or in the cloſet. In vain, would our limited underſtandings break thro' thoſe boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond imaginations. While we argue from the courſe of nature, and infer a particular intelligent cauſe, which firſt beſtowed, and ſtill preſerves order in the univerſe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and uſeleſs. 'Tis uncertain; becauſe the ſubject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. 'Tis uſeleſs; becauſe our knowlege of this cauſe being derived entirely from the courſe of nature, we can never, according to the rules of juſt reaſoning, return back from the cauſe with any new inferences, or making additions to the common and experienced courſe of nature, eſtabliſh any new principles of conduct and behavior.

I OBSERVE (ſays I, finding he had finiſhed his harangue) that you neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old; and as you was pleaſed to make me ſtand for the people, you inſinuate yourſelf into my favor, by embracing thoſe principles, to which, you know, I have always expreſſed a particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience (as indeed I think you ought) the only ſtandard of our judgment concerning this, and all other queſtions of fact; I doubt not but, from the very ſame experience, to which you appeal, it may be poſſible to refute this reaſoning, which you have put into the mouth of EPICURUS. If you ſaw, for inſtance, a half-finiſhed building ſurrounded with heaps of brick and ſtone and mortar, and all the inſtruments of maſonry; could you not *infer* from the effect, that it was a work of deſign and contrivance? And could you not return again, from this inferred cauſe, to infer new additions to the effect, and conclude, that the building would ſoon be finiſhed, and receive all the farther improvements, which art could beſtow upon it? If you ſaw, upon the ſea ſhore, the print of one human foot, you would conclude, that a man had paſſed that way, and that he had alſo left the traces of the other foot, tho' effaced by the rolling of the ſands or inundation of the waters. Why then do you refuſe to admit the ſame method of reaſoning with regard to the order of nature? Conſider the world and the preſent life only as an imperfect building, from which you can infer a ſuperior intelligence; and arguing from that ſuperior intelligence, which can leave nothing imperfect; why may you not infer a more finiſhed ſcheme or plan, which will receive its completion in ſome diſtant period of ſpace or time? Are not theſe methods of reaſoning exactly parallel? And under what pretext can you embrace the one while you reject the other?

THE infinite difference of the ſubjects, replied he, is a ſufficient foundation for this difference in my concluſions. In works of *human* art and contrivance, 'tis allowable to advance from the effect to the cauſe, and returning back from the cauſe, form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations, which it has probably undergone, or may ſtill undergo. But what is the foundation of this method of reaſoning? Plainly this; that man is a being, whom we know by experience, whoſe motives and deſigns we are acquainted with, and whoſe projects and inclinations have a certain connexion and coherence, according to the laws, which nature has eſtabliſhed for the government of ſuch a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work has proceeded from the ſkill and induſtry of man; as we are otherwiſe acquainted with the nature of the animal; we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and theſe inferences will all be founded on experience and obſervation. But did we know man only from the ſingle work or production, which we examine, it were impoſſible for us to argue in this manner; becauſe our knowlege of all the qualities, which we aſcribe to him, being in that caſe derived from the production, 'tis impoſſible they could point to any thing farther, or be the foundation of any new inferences. The print of a foot in the ſand can only prove, when conſidered alone, that there was ſome figure adapted to it, by which it was produced: But the print of a human foot proves likewiſe, from our other experience, that there was probably another foot, which alſo left its impreſſion, tho' effaced by time or other accidents. Here we mount from the effect to the cauſe; and deſcending again from the cauſe, infer alterations in the effect; but this is not a continuation of the ſame ſimple chain of reaſoning. We comprehend in this caſe a hundred other experiences and obſervations, concerning the *uſual* figure and members of that ſpecies of animal, without which this method of argument muſt be conſidered as fallacious and ſophiſtical.

THE caſe is not the ſame with our reaſonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a ſingle being in the univerſe, not comprehended under any ſpecies or genus, from whoſe experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the univerſe ſhews wiſdom and goodneſs, we infer wiſdom and goodneſs: As it ſhows a particular degree of theſe perfections, we infer a particular degree of them, preciſely adapted to the effect, which we examine. But farther attributes or farther degrees of the ſame attributes, we can never be authorized to infer or ſuppoſe, by any rules of juſt reaſoning. Now without ſome ſuch licence of ſuppoſition, 'tis impoſſible for us to argue from the cauſe, or infer any alteration in the effect, beyond what has immediately fallen under our obſervation. Greater good produced by this Being muſt ſtill prove a greater degree of goodneſs: More impartial diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments muſt proceed from a ſuperior regard to juſtice and equity. Every ſuppoſed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the author of nature; and conſequently, being entirely unſupported by any reaſon or argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypotheſis °.

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° In general, it may, I think, be eſtabliſhed as a maxim, that where any cauſe is known only by its particular effects, it muſt be impoſſible to infer any new effects from that cauſe; ſince the qualities,

THE great ſource of our miſtake in this ſubject, and of the unbounded licence of conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly conſider ourſelves, as in the place of the ſupreme Being, and conclude, that he will, on every occaſion, obſerve the ſame conduct, which we ourſelves, in his ſituation, would have embraced as reaſonable and eligible. But beſides, that the ordinary courſe of nature may convince us, that almoſt every thing is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours; beſides this, I ſay, it muſt evidently appear contrary to all rule of analogy to reaſon from the intentions and projects of men to thoſe of a being ſo different, and ſo much ſuperior. In human nature, there is a certain experienced coherence of deſigns and inclinations; ſo that when, from any facts, we have diſcovered one intention of any man, it may often be reaſonable, from experience, to infer another, and draw a long chain of concluſions concerning his paſt or future conduct. But this method of reaſoning never can have place with regard to a Being, ſo remote and incomprehenſible, who bears leſs analogy to any other Being in the univerſe than the ſun to a waxen taper, and who diſcovers himſelf only by ſome faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to aſcribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine to be a ſuperior perfection may really be a defect. Or were it ever ſo much a perfection, the aſcribing it to the ſupreme Being, where it appears not to have been really exerted, to the full, in his works, ſavors more of flattery and panegyric, than of juſt reaſoning and ſound philoſophy. All the philoſophy, therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is nothing but a ſpecies of philoſophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the uſual courſe of experience, or give us meaſures of conduct and behavior, different from thoſe which are furniſhed by reflections on common life. No new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypotheſis; no event foreſeen or foretold; no reward or puniſhment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already known by practice and obſervation. So that my apology for EPICURUS will ſtill appear ſolid and ſatisfactory; nor have the political intereſts of ſociety any connexion with the philoſophical diſputes concerning metaphyſics and religion.

THERE is ſtill one circumſtance, replied I, which you ſeem to have overlooked. Tho' I ſhould allow your premiſes, I muſt ſtill deny your concluſion. You conclude, that religious doctrines and reaſonings *can* have no influence on life, becauſe they *ought* to have no influence; never conſidering, that men reaſon not in the ſame manner you do, but draw many conſequences from the belief of a divine exiſtence, and ſuppoſe that the Deity will inflict puniſhments on vice, and beſtow

ties, which are requiſite to produce theſe new effects along with the former, muſt either be different, or ſuperior, or of more extenſive operation, than thoſe which ſimply produced the effect, whence alone the cauſe is ſuppoſed to be known to us. We can never, therefore, have any reaſon to ſuppoſe the exiſtence of theſe qualities. To ſay that the new effects proceed only from a continuation of the ſame energy, which is already known from the firſt effects, will not remove the difficulty. For even granting this to be the caſe, (which can ſeldom be ſuppoſed) the very continuation and exertion of a like energy (for 'tis impoſſible it can be abſolutely the ſame) I ſay, this exertion of a like energy in a different period of ſpace and time is a very arbitrary ſuppoſition, and what there cannot poſſibly be any traces of in the effects, from which all our knowlege of the cauſe is originally derived. Let the *inferred* cauſe be exactly proportioned (as it ſhould be) to the known effect; and 'tis impoſſible that it can poſſeſs any qualities, from which new or different effects can be *inferred*.

rewards

rewards on virtue, beyond what appear in the ordinary courſe of nature. Whether this reaſoning of theirs be juſt or not, is no matter. Its influence on their life and conduct muſt ſtill be the ſame. And thoſe who may attempt to diſabuſe them of ſuch prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good reaſoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians; ſince they free men from one reſtraint upon their paſſions, and make the infringement of the laws of ſociety, in one reſpect, more eaſy and ſecure.

AFTER all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general concluſion in favor of liberty, tho' upon different premiſes from thoſe, on which you endeavor to found it. I think that the ſtate ought to tolerate every principle of philoſophy; nor is there an inſtance that any government has ſuffered in its political intereſts by ſuch indulgence. There is no enthuſiaſm among philoſophers; their doctrines are not very alluring to the people; and no reſtraint can be put upon their reaſonings, but what muſt be of dangerous conſequence to the ſciences, and even to the ſtate, by paving the way for perſecution and oppreſſion in points, where the generality of mankind are more deeply intereſted and concerned.

BUT there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to your main topic, a difficulty, which I ſhall juſt propoſe to you, without inſiſting on it; leſt it lead into reaſonings of too nice and delicate a nature. In a word, I much doubt whether it be poſſible for a cauſe to be known only by its effect (as you have all along ſuppoſed) or to be of ſo ſingular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no ſimilarity with any other cauſe or object, that has ever fallen under our obſervation. 'Tis only when two *ſpecies* of objects are found to be conſtantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect preſented, which was entirely ſingular, and could not be comprehended under any known *ſpecies*; I do not ſee, that we could form any conjecture, or inference at all concerning its cauſe. If experience and obſervation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reaſonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cauſe muſt bear a ſimilarity and reſemblance to other effects and cauſes which we know, and which we have found in many inſtances, to be conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own reflections to proſecute the conſequences of this principle. I ſhall juſt obſerve, that as the antagoniſts of EPICURUS always ſuppoſe the univerſe, an effect quite ſingular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cauſe no leſs ſingular and unparalleled; your reaſonings, upon that ſuppoſition, ſeem, at leaſt, to merit our attention. There is, I own, ſome difficulty, how we can ever return from the cauſe to the effect, and reaſoning from our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any addition to it.

SECTION

SECTION XII.

OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART I.

THERE is not a greater number of philoſophical reaſonings, diſplayed upon any ſubject, than thoſe, which prove the exiſtence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of *Atheiſts*; and yet the moſt religious philoſophers ſtill diſpute whether any man can be ſo blinded as to be a ſpeculative atheiſt. How ſhall we reconcile theſe contradictions? The knight-errants, who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants, never entertained the leaſt doubt with regard to the exiſtence of theſe monſters.

THE *Sceptic* is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philoſophers; tho' 'tis certain, that no man ever met with any ſuch abſurd creature, or converſed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any ſubject, either of action or ſpeculation. This begets a very natural queſtion; What is meant by a ſceptic? And how far it is poſſible to puſh theſe philoſophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?

THERE is a ſpecies of ſcepticiſm, *antecedent* to all ſtudy and philoſophy, which is much inculcated by DES CARTES and others, as a ſovereign preſervative againſt error and precipitate judgment. It recommends an univerſal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but alſo of our very faculties; of whoſe veracity, ſay they, we muſt aſſure ourſelves, by a chain of reaſoning, deduced from ſome original principle, which cannot poſſibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any ſuch original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are ſelf-evident and convincing: Or if there were, could we advance a ſtep beyond it, but by the uſe of theſe very faculties, of which we are ſuppoſed to be already diffident. The CARTESIAN doubt, therefore, were it ever poſſible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reaſoning could ever bring us to a ſtate of aſſurance and conviction upon any ſubject.

IT muſt, however, be confeſſed, that this ſpecies of ſcepticiſm, when more moderate, may be underſtood in a very reaſonable ſenſe, and is a neceſſary preparative to the ſtudy of philoſophy, by preſerving a proper impartiality in our judgments, and weaning our mind from all thoſe prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or raſh opinion. To begin with clear and ſelf-evident principles, to advance by timorous and ſure ſteps, to review frequently our concluſions, and examine accurately all their conſequences; tho' by this means we ſhall make both a ſlow and a ſhort progreſs in our ſyſtems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper ſtability and certainty in our determinations.

THERE

THERE is another ſpecies of ſcepticiſm, *conſequent* to ſcience and enquiry, where men are ſuppoſed to have diſcovered, either the abſolute fallaciouſneſs of their mental faculties, or their unfitneſs to reach any fixed determination in all thoſe curious ſubjects of ſpeculation, about which they are commonly employed. Even our very ſenſes are brought into diſpute, by a certain ſpecies of philoſophers; and the maxims of common life are ſubjected to the ſame doubt as the moſt profound principles or concluſions of metaphyſics and theology. As theſe paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in ſome philoſophers, and the refutation of them in ſeveral, they naturally excite our curioſity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which they may be founded.

I NEED not inſiſt upon the more trite topics, employed by the ſceptics in all ages, againſt the evidence of *ſenſe*; ſuch as thoſe derived from the imperfection and fallaciouſneſs of our organs, on numberleſs occaſions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the various aſpects of objects, according to their different diſtances; the double images, which ariſe from the preſſing one eye; with many other appearances of a like nature; theſe ſceptical topics, indeed, are only ſufficient to prove, that the ſenſes alone are not implicitely to be depended on; but that we muſt correct their evidence by reaſon, and by conſiderations, derived from the nature of the medium, the diſtance of the object, and the diſpoſition of the organ, in order to render them, within their ſphere, the proper *criteria* of truth and falſhood. There are other more profound arguments againſt the ſenſes, which admit not of ſo eaſy a ſolution.

IT ſeems evident, that men are carried, by a natural inſtinct or prepoſſeſſion, to repoſe faith in their ſenſes; and that, without any reaſoning, or even almoſt before the uſe of reaſon, we always ſuppoſe an external univerſe, which depends not on our perception, but would exiſt, tho' we and every ſenſible creature were abſent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preſerve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, deſigns, and actions.

IT ſeems alſo evident, that when men follow this blind and powerful inſtinct of nature, they always ſuppoſe the very images, preſented by the ſenſes, to be the external objects, and never entertain any ſuſpicion, that the one are nothing but repreſentations of the other. This very table, which we ſee white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exiſt, independent of our perception, and to be ſomething external to our mind, which perceives it. Our preſence beſtows not being on it: Our abſence annihilates it not. It preſerves its exiſtence uniform and entire, independent of the ſituation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.

BUT this univerſal and primary opinion of all men is ſoon deſtroyed by the ſlighteſt philoſophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be preſent to the mind but an image or perception, and that the ſenſes are only the inlets, thro' which theſe images are received, without being ever able to produce any immediate intercourſe between the mind and the object. The table, which we ſee, ſeems to diminiſh, as we remove farther from it: But the real table which exiſts independent of us, ſuffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was preſent to the mind. Theſe are the obvious dictates of reaſon; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the exiſtences, which we conſider, when we ſay,

this

this house and *that tree* are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or repreſentations of other exiſtences, which remain uniform and independent.

So far, then, are we neceſſitated by reaſoning to contradict or depart from the primary inſtincts of nature, and to embrace a new ſyſtem with regard to the evidence of our ſenſes. But here philoſophy finds itſelf extremely embarraſſed, when it would juſtify this new ſyſtem, and obviate the cavils and objections of the ſceptics. It can no longer plead the infallible and irreſiſtible inſtinct of nature: For that led us to a quite different ſyſtem, which is acknowleged fallible and even erroneous. And to juſtify this pretended philoſophical ſyſtem, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.

By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind muſt be cauſed by external objects, entirely different from them, tho' reſembling them (if that be poſſible) and could not ariſe either from the energy of the mind itſelf, or from the ſuggeſtion of ſome inviſible and unknown ſpirit, or from ſome other cauſe ſtill more unknown to us? 'Tis acknowleged, that, in fact, many of theſe perceptions ariſe not from any thing external, as in dreams, madneſs, and other diſeaſes. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body ſhould ſo operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itſelf to a ſubſtance ſuppoſed of ſo different, and even contrary a nature.

'Tis a queſtion of fact, whether the perceptions of the ſenſes be produced by external objects, reſembling them: How ſhall this queſtion be determined? By experience ſurely; as all other queſtions of a like nature. But here experience is, and muſt be entirely ſilent. The mind has never any thing preſent to it but the perceptions, and cannot poſſibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The ſuppoſition of ſuch a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reaſoning.

To have recourſe to the veracity of the ſupreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our ſenſes, is ſurely making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our ſenſes would be entirely infallible; becauſe it is not poſſible that he can ever deceive. Not to mention, that if the external world be once called in doubt, we ſhall be at a loſs to find arguments, by which we may prove the exiſtence of that Being or any of his attributes.

This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philoſophical ſceptics will always triumph, when they endeavor to introduce an univerſal doubt into all ſubjects of human knowlege and enquiry. Do you follow the inſtincts and propenſities of nature, may they ſay, in aſſenting to the veracity of ſenſe? But theſe lead you to believe, that the very perception or ſenſible image is the external object. Do you diſclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only repreſentations of ſomething external? You here depart from your natural propenſities and more obvious ſentiments; and yet are not able to ſatisfy your reaſon, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.

There is another ſceptical topic of a like nature, derived from the moſt profound philoſophy; which might merit our attention, were it requiſite to dive ſo deep, in order to diſcover arguments and reaſonings, which can ſerve ſo little any

ſerious purpoſe. 'Tis univerſally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the ſenſible qualities of objects, ſuch as hard, ſoft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely ſecondary, and exiſt not in the objects themſelves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they repreſent. If this be allowed, with regard to ſecondary qualities, it muſt alſo follow with regard to the ſuppoſed primary qualities of extenſion and ſolidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former. The idea of extenſion is entirely acquired from the ſenſes of ſight and feeling; and if all the qualities, perceived by the ſenſes, be in the mind, not in the object, the ſame concluſion muſt reach the idea of extenſion, which is wholly dependent on the ſenſible ideas or the ideas of ſecondary qualities. Nothing can ſave us from this concluſion, but the aſſerting, that the ideas of thoſe primary qualities are attained by *Abſtraction*; which, if we examine accurately, we ſhall find to be unintelligible, and even abſurd. An extenſion, that is neither tangible nor viſible, cannot poſſibly be conceived: And a tangible or viſible extenſion, which is neither hard nor ſoft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception. Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general, which is neither *Iſoſceles*, nor *Scalenum*, nor has any particular length nor proportion of ſides; and he will ſoon perceive the abſurdity of all the ſcholaſtic notions with regard to abſtraction and general ideas [a].

THUS the firſt philoſophical objection to the evidence of ſenſe or to the opinion of external exiſtence conſiſts in this, that ſuch an opinion, if reſted on natural inſtinct, is contrary to reaſon, and if referred to reaſon, is contrary to natural inſtinct, and at the ſame time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer. The ſecond objection goes farther, and repreſents this opinion as contrary to reaſon; at leaſt, if it be a principle of reaſon, that all ſenſible qualities are in the mind, not in the object.

PART II.

IT may ſeem a very extravagant attempt of the ſceptics to deſtroy *reaſon* by argument and ratiocination; yet is this the grand ſcope of all their enquiries and diſputes. They endeavor to find objections, both to our abſtract reaſonings, and to thoſe which regard matter of fact and exiſtence.

THE chief objection againſt all *abſtract* reaſonings is derived from the ideas of ſpace and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a careleſs view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they paſs thro' the ſcrutiny of the profound ſciences (and they are the chief object of theſe ſciences) afford principles which ſeem

[a] This argument is drawn from Dr. BERKLEY; and indeed moſt of the writings of that very ingenious author form the beſt leſſons of ſcepticiſm, which are to be found either among the antient or modern philoſophers, BAYLE not excepted. He profeſſes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have compoſed his book againſt the ſceptics as well as againſt the atheiſts and free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, tho' otherwiſe intended, are, in reality, merely ſceptical, appears from this, *that they admit of no anſwer and produce no conviction.* Their only effect is to cauſe that momentary amazement and irreſolution and confuſion, which is the reſult of ſcepticiſm.

full of abſurdity and contradiction. No prieſtly *dogmas*, invented on purpoſe to tame and ſubdue the rebellious reaſon of mankind, ever ſhocked common ſenſe more than the doctrine of the infinite diviſibility of extenſion, with its conſequences; as they are pompouſly diſplayed by all geometricians and metaphyſicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation. A real quantity, infinitely leſs than any finite quantity, containing quantities, infinitely leſs than itſelf, and ſo on, *in infinitum*; this is an edifice ſo bold and prodigious, that it is too weighty for any pretended demonſtration to ſupport, becauſe it ſhocks the cleareſt and moſt natural principles of human reaſon [b]. But what renders the matter more extraordinary, is, that theſe ſeemingly abſurd opinions are ſupported by a chain of reaſoning, the cleareſt and moſt natural; nor is it poſſible for us to allow the premiſes without admitting the conſequences. Nothing can be more convincing and ſatisfactory than all the concluſions concerning the properties of circles and triangles; and yet, when theſe are once received, how can we deny, that the angle of contact betwixt a circle and its tangent is infinitely leſs than any rectilineal angle, that as you may encreaſe the diameter of the circle *in infinitum*, this angle of contact becomes ſtill leſs, even *in infinitum*, and that the angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely leſs than thoſe between any circle and its tangent, and ſo on, *in infinitum?* The demonſtration of theſe principles ſeems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones; tho' the latter opinion be natural and eaſy, and the former big with contradiction and abſurdity. Reaſon here ſeems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and ſuſpence, which, without the ſuggeſtions of any ſceptic, gives her a diffidence of herſelf, and of the ground on which he treads. She ſees a full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon the moſt profound darkneſs. And betwixt theſe ſhe is ſo dazzled and confounded, that ſhe ſcarce can pronounce with certainty and aſſurance concerning any one object.

THE abſurdity of theſe bold determinations of the abſtract ſciences ſeems to become, if poſſible, ſtill more palpable with regard to time than extenſion. An infinite number of real parts of time, paſſing in ſucceſſion, and exhauſted one after another, appears ſo evident a contradiction, that no man, one ſhould think, whoſe judgment is not corrupted, inſtead of being improved, by the ſciences, would ever be able to admit of it.

YET ſtill reaſon muſt remain reſtleſs and unquiet, even with regard to that ſcepticiſm, to which ſhe is led by theſe ſeeming abſurdities and contradictions. How any clear, diſtinct idea can contain circumſtances, contradictory to itſelf, or to any other clear, diſtinct idea, is abſolutely incomprehenſible; and is, perhaps, as abſurd as any propoſition, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more ſceptical, or more full of doubt and heſitation, than this ſcepticiſm itſelf, which

[b] Whatever diſputes there may be about mathematical points, we muſt allow that there are phyſical points; that is, parts of extenſion, which cannot be divided or leſſened, either by the eye or imagination. Theſe images, then, which are preſent to the fancy or ſenſes, are abſolutely inviſible, and conſequently muſt be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely leſs than any real part of extenſion; and yet nothing appears more certain to reaſon, than that an infinite number of them compoſes an infinite extenſion. How much more an infinite number of thoſe infinitely ſmall parts of extenſion, which are ſtill ſuppoſed infinitely diviſible.

ariſes

ariſes from ſome of the paradoxical concluſions of geometry or the ſcience of quantity [c].

THE ſceptical objections to *moral* evidence or to the reaſonings concerning matter of fact are either *popular* or *philoſophical*. The popular objections are derived from the natural weakneſs of human underſtanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgment in ſickneſs and health, youth and old age, proſperity and adverſity; the perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and ſentiments; with many other topics of that kind. 'Tis needleſs to inſiſt farther on this head. Theſe objections are but weak. For as, in common life, we reaſon every moment concerning fact and exiſtence, and cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt, without continually employing this ſpecies of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, muſt be inſufficient to deſtroy that evidence. The great ſubverter of *Pyrrhoniſm* or the exceſſive principles of ſcepticiſm, is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. Theſe principles may floriſh and triumph in the ſchools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impoſſible to refute them. But as ſoon as they leave the ſhade, and by the preſence of the real objects, which actuate our paſſions and ſentiments, are put in oppoſition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vaniſh like ſmoak, and leave the moſt determined ſceptic in the ſame condition as other mortals.

THE ſceptic, therefore, had better keep in his proper ſphere, and diſplay thoſe *philoſophical* objections, which ariſe from more profound reſearches. Here he ſeems to have ample matter of triumph; while he juſtly inſiſts, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond the teſtimony of ſenſe or memory, is derived entirely from the relation of cauſe and effect; that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently *conjoined* together; that we have no arguments to convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will likewiſe, in other inſtances, be conjoined in the ſame manner; and that nothing leads us to this inference but cuſtom or a certain inſtinct of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to reſiſt, but which, like other inſtincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the ſceptic inſiſts upon theſe topics, he ſhews his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weakneſs; and ſeems, for the time at leaſt, to deſtroy all aſſurance and conviction. Theſe arguments might be diſplayed at greater length, if any durable good or benefit to ſociety could ever be expected to reſult from them.

[c] It ſeems to me not impoſſible to avoid theſe abſurdities and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no ſuch thing as abſtract or general ideas, properly ſpeaking; but that all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attached to a general term, which recalls, upon occaſion, other particular ones, that reſemble, in certain circumſtances, the idea, preſent to the mind. Thus when the term Horſe is pronounced, we immediately figure to ourſelves the idea of a black or a white animal, of a particular ſize or figure: But as that term is alſo uſed to be applied to animals of other colors, figures and ſizes, theſe ideas, tho' not actually preſent to the imagination, are eaſily recalled, and our reaſoning and concluſion proceed in the ſame way, as if they were actually preſent. If this be admitted (as ſeems reaſonable) it follows that all the ideas of quantity, upon which mathematicians reaſon, are nothing but particular, and ſuch as are ſuggeſted by the ſenſes and imagination, and conſequently, cannot be infinitely diviſible. 'Tis ſufficient to have dropt this hint at preſent, without proſecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns all lovers of ſcience not to expoſe themſelves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their concluſions; and this ſeems the readieſt ſolution of theſe difficulties.

For here is the chief and moſt confounding objection to *exceſſive* ſcepticiſm, that no durable good can ever reſult from it; while it remains in its full force and vigor. We need only aſk ſuch a ſceptic, *What his meaning is? And what he propoſes by all theſe curious reſearches?* He is immediately at a loſs, and knows not what to anſwer. A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who ſupports each his different ſyſtem of aſtronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain, conſtant and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean diſplays principles, which may not only be durable, but which have a mighty effect on conduct and behavior. But a Pyrrhonian cannot propoſe, that his philoſophy will have any conſtant influence on the mind: Or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to ſociety. On the contrary, he muſt acknowlege, if he will acknowlege any thing, that all human life muſt periſh, were his principles univerſally and ſteadily to prevail. All diſcourſe, all action would immediately ceaſe; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the neceſſities of nature, unſatisfied, put an end to their miſerable exiſtence. 'Tis true; ſo fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too ſtrong for principle. And tho' a Pyrrhonian may throw himſelf or others into a momentary amazement and confuſion by his profound reaſonings; the firſt and moſt trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and ſcruples, and leave him the ſame, in every point of action and ſpeculation, with the philoſophers of every other ſect, or with thoſe who never concerned themſelves in any philoſophical reſearches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the firſt to join in the laugh againſt himſelf, and to confeſs, that all his objections are mere amuſements, and can have no other tendency than to ſhow the whimſical condition of manknid, who muſt act and reaſon and believe; tho' they are not able, by their moſt diligent enquiry, to ſatisfy themſelves concerning the foundation of theſe operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raiſed againſt them.

PART III.

There is, indeed, a more *mitigated* ſcepticiſm or *academical* philoſophy, which may be both durable and uſeful, and which may, in part, be the reſult of this Pyrrhonism, or *exceſſive* ſcepticiſm, when its undiſtinguiſhed doubts are, in ſome meaſure, corrected by common ſenſe and reflexion. The greateſt part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they ſee objects only on one ſide, and have no idea of any counterpoiſing arguments, they throw themſelves precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for thoſe who entertain oppoſite ſentiments. To heſitate or balance perplexes their underſtandings, checks their paſſion, and ſuſpends their actions. They are, therefore, impatient till they eſcape from a ſtate, which to them is ſo uneaſy; and they think, that they can never remove themſelves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obſtinacy of their belief. But could ſuch dogmatical reaſoners become ſenſible of the ſtrange infirmities of human underſtanding, even in its moſt perfect ſtate, and when moſt accurate and cautious in its determinations; ſuch a reflection would naturally inſpire them with more modeſty and reſerve, and diminiſh their fond opinion of themſelves, and their prejudice againſt antagoniſts. The illiterate may reflect on

the diſpoſition of the learned, who, amidſt all the advantages of ſtudy and reflection, are commonly ſtill diffident in their determinations: And if any of the learned are inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtineſs and obſtinacy, a ſmall tincture of PYRRHONISM may abate their pride, by ſhowing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconſiderable, if compared with the univerſal perplexity and confuſion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modeſty, which, in all kinds of ſcrutiny and deciſion, ought for ever to accompany a juſt reaſoner.

ANOTHER ſpecies of *mitigated* ſcepticiſm, which may be of advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural reſult of the PYRRHONIAN doubts and ſcruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to ſuch ſubjects as are beſt adapted to the narrow capacity of human underſtanding. The *imagination* of man is naturally ſublime, delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the moſt diſtant parts of ſpace and time, in order to avoid the objects, which cuſtom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct *Judgment* obſerves a contrary method; and avoiding all diſtant and high enquiries, confines itſelf to common life, and to ſuch ſubjects as fall under daily practice and experience; leaving the more ſublime topics to the embelliſhment of poets and orators, or to the arts of prieſts and politicians. To bring us to ſo ſalutary a determination, nothing can be more ſerviceable, than to be once thorowly convinced of the force of the PYRRHONIAN doubt, and of the impoſſibility that any thing but the ſtrong power of natural inſtinct, could free us from it. Thoſe who have a propenſity to philoſophy, will ſtill continue their reſearches; becauſe they reflect, that, beſides the immediate pleaſure, attending ſuch an occupation, philoſophical deciſions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, ſo long as they conſider the imperfection of thoſe faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we cannot give a ſatisfactory reaſon, why we believe after a thouſand experiments, that a ſtone will fall, or fire burn; can we ever ſatisfy ourſelves concerning any determinations which we may form with regard to the origin of worlds, and the ſituation of nature, from, and to eternity?

THIS narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every reſpect, ſo reaſonable, that it ſuffices to make the ſlighteſt examination into the natural powers of the human hind, and compare them to their objects, in order to recommend it to us. We ſhall then find what are the proper ſubjects of ſcience and enquiry.

IT ſeems to me, that the only objects of the abſtract ſciences or of demonſtration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect ſpecies of knowlege beyond theſe bounds are mere ſophiſtry and illuſion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely ſimilar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as uſeful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, thro' their different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly diſtinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by all our ſcrutiny, than to obſerve this diverſity and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another.

Or

Or if there be any difficulty in theſe deciſions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juſter definitions. That *the ſquare of the Hypotenuſe is equal to the ſquares of the other two ſides*, cannot be known, let the terms be ever ſo exactly defined, without a train of reaſoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this propoſition, *that where there is no property there can be no injuſtice*, 'tis only neceſſary to define the terms, and explain injuſtice to be a violation of property. This propoſition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. 'Tis the ſame caſe with all thoſe pretended ſyllogiſtical reaſonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the ſciences of quantity and number; and theſe may ſafely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowlege and demonſtration.

ALL other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and exiſtence; and theſe are evidently incapable of demonſtration. Whatever *is* may *not be*. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-exiſtence of any being, without exception, is as clear and diſtinct an idea as its exiſtence. The propoſition, which affirms it not to be, however falſe, is no leſs conceivable and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be. The caſe is different with the ſciences, properly ſo called. Every propoſition, which is not true, is there confuſed and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is a falſe propoſition, and can never be diſtinctly conceived. But that CÆSAR, or the angel GABRIEL, or any being never exiſted, may be a falſe propoſition, but ſtill is perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction.

THE exiſtence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cauſe or its effect; and theſe arguments are founded entirely on experience. If we reaſon *à priori*, any thing may appear able to produce any thing. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguiſh the ſun; or the wiſh of a man control the planets in their orbits. 'Tis only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cauſe and effect, and enables us to infer the exiſtence of one object from that of another [n]. Such is the foundation of moral reaſoning, which forms the greateſt part of human knowlege, and is the ſource of all human action and behavior.

MORAL reaſonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former; as alſo all diſquiſitions in hiſtory, chronology, geography, and aſtronomy.

THE ſciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philoſophy, phyſic, chymiſtry, *&c.* where the qualities, cauſes, and effects of a whole ſpecies of objects are enquired into.

DIVINITY or Theology, as it proves the exiſtence of a Deity, and the immortality of ſouls, is compoſed partly of reaſonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in *reaſon*, ſo far as it is ſupported by experience. But its beſt and moſt ſolid foundation is *faith* and divine revelation.

[n] That impious maxim of the antient philoſophy, *Ex nihilo, nihil fit*, by which the creation of matter was excluded, ceaſes to be a maxim, according to this philoſophy. Not only the will of the ſupreme Being may create matter; but, for aught we know *à priori*, the will of any other being might create it, or any other cauſe, that the moſt whimſical imagination can aſſign.

MORALS and criticiſm are not ſo properly objects of the underſtanding as of taſte and ſentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reaſon concerning it, and endeavor to fix its ſtandard, we regard a new fact, *viz.* the general taſte of mankind, or of ſome ſuch fact, which may be the object of reaſoning and enquiry.

When we run over libraries, perſuaded of theſe principles, what havoc muſt we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or ſchool metaphyſics, for inſtance; let us aſk, *Does it contain any abſtract reaſonings concerning quantity of number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reaſonings concerning matters of fact or exiſtence?* No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but ſophiſtry and illuſion.

A DIS-

A

DISSERTATION

ON THE

PASSIONS.

SECT. I.

1. SOME objects produce immediately an agreeable ſenſation, by the original ſtructure of our organs, and are thence denominated GOOD; as others, from their immediate diſagreeable ſenſation, acquire the appellation of EVIL. Thus moderate warmth is agreeable and good; exceſſive heat painful and evil.

SOME objects again, by being naturally conformable or contrary to paſſion, excite an agreeable or painful ſenſation; and are thence called *Good* or *Evil.* The puniſhment of an adverſary, by gratifying revenge, is good; the ſickneſs of a companion, by affecting friendſhip, is evil.

2. ALL good or evil, whence-ever it ariſes, produces various paſſions and affections, according to the light, in which it is ſurveyed.

WHEN good is certain or very probable, it produces JOY: When evil is in the ſame ſituation, there ariſes GRIEF or SORROW.

WHEN either good or evil is uncertain, it gives riſe to FEAR or HOPE, according to the degrees of uncertainty on one ſide or the other.

DESIRE ariſes from good conſidered ſimply; and AVERSION, from evil. The WILL exerts itſelf, when either the preſence of the good or abſence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body.

3. NONE of theſe paſſions ſeem to contain any thing curious or remarkable except *Hope* and *Fear*, which, being derived from the probability of any good or evil, are mixed paſſions, that merit our attention.

PROBABILITY ariſes from an oppoſition of contrary chances or cauſes, by which the mind is not allowed to fix on either ſide; but is inceſſantly toſſed from one to another, and in one moment is determined to conſider an object as exiſtent, and in another moment as the contrary. The imagination or underſtanding, call it which you pleaſe, fluctuates betwixt the oppoſite views; and tho' perhaps it may be oftener turned to one ſide than the other, it is impoſſible for it, by reaſon of the oppoſition of cauſes or chances, to reſt on either. The *pro* and *con* of the queſtion

queſtion alternately prevail; and the mind, ſurveying the objects in their oppoſite cauſes, finds ſuch a contrariety as utterly deſtroys all certainty or eſtabliſhed opinion.

SUPPOSE, then, that the object, concerning which we are doubtful, produces either deſire or averſion; it is evident, that, according as the mind turns itſelf to one ſide or the other, it muſt feel a momentary impreſſion of joy or ſorrow. An object, whoſe exiſtence we deſire, gives ſatisfaction, when we think of thoſe cauſes, which produce it; and for the ſame reaſon, excites grief or uneaſineſs from the oppoſite conſideration. So that, as the underſtanding, in probable queſtions, is divided betwixt the contrary points of view, the heart muſt in the ſame manner be divided betwixt oppoſite emotions.

Now, if we conſider the human mind, we ſhall obſerve, that with regard to the paſſions, it is not like a wind-inſtrument of muſic, which, in running over all the notes, immediately loſes the ſound when the breath ceaſes; but rather reſembles a ſtring-inſtrument, where, after each ſtroke, the vibrations ſtill retain ſome ſound, which gradually and inſenſibly decays. The imagination is extremely quick and agile; but the paſſions, in compariſon, are ſlow and reſtive: For which reaſon, when any object is preſented, which affords a variety of views to the one and emotions to the other; tho' the fancy may change its views with great celerity; each ſtroke will not produce a clear and diſtinct note of paſſion, but the one paſſion will always be mixed and confounded with the other. According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the paſſion of grief or joy predominates in the compoſition; and theſe paſſions being intermingled by means of the contrary views of the imagination, produce by the union the paſſions of hope or fear.

4. As this theory ſeems to carry its own evidence along with it, we ſhall be more conciſe in our proofs.

THE paſſions of fear and hope may ariſe, when the chances are equal on both ſides, and no ſuperiority can be diſcovered in one above the other. Nay, in this ſituation the paſſions are rather the ſtrongeſt, as the mind has then the leaſt foundation to reſt upon, and is toſt with the greateſt uncertainty. Throw in a ſuperior degree of probability to the ſide of grief, you immediately ſee that paſſion diffuſe itſelf over the compoſition, and tincture it into fear. Encreaſe the probability, and by that means the grief; the fear prevails ſtill more and more, 'till at laſt it runs inſenſibly, as the joy continually diminiſhes, into pure grief. After you have brought it to this ſituation, diminiſh the grief, by a contrary operation to that, which encreaſed it, to wit, by diminiſhing the probability on the melancholy ſide; and you will ſee the paſſion clear every moment, 'till it changes inſenſibly into hope; which again runs, by ſlow degrees, into joy, as you encreaſe that part of the compoſition, by the increaſe of the probability. Are not theſe as plain proofs, that the paſſions of fear and hope are mixtures of grief and joy, as in optics it is a proof, that a colored ray of the ſun, paſſing thro' a priſm, is a compoſition of two others, when as you diminiſh or encreaſe the quantity of either, you find it prevail proportionably, more or leſs, in the compoſition?

5. PROBABILITY is of two kinds; either when the object is itſelf uncertain, and to be determined by chance; or when, tho' the object be already certain, yet is it uncertain to our judgment, which finds a number of proofs or preſumptions on each ſide of the queſtion. Both theſe kinds of probability cauſe fear and hope;

which muſt proceed from that property, in which they agree; to wit, the uncertainty and fluctuation which they beſtow on the paſſion, by that contrariety of views, which is common to both.

6. It is a probable good or evil, which commonly cauſes hope or fear; becauſe probability, producing an inconſtant and wavering ſurvey of an object, occaſions naturally a like mixture and uncertainty of paſſion. But we may obſerve, that, wherever, from other cauſes, this mixture can be produced, the paſſions of fear and hope will ariſe; even tho' there be no probability.

An evil, conceived as barely *poſſible*, ſometimes produces fear; eſpecially if the evil be very great. A man cannot think of exceſſive pain and torture without trembling, if he runs the leaſt riſque of ſuffering them. The ſmallneſs of the probability is compenſated by the greatneſs of the evil.

But even *impoſſible* evils cauſe fear; as when we tremble on the brink of a precipice, tho' we know ourſelves to be in perfect ſecurity, and have it in our choice, whether we will advance a ſtep farther. The immediate preſence of the evil influences the imagination and produces a ſpecies of belief; but being oppoſed by the reflection on our ſecurity, that belief is immediately retracted, and cauſes the ſame kind of paſſion, as when, from a contrariety of chances, contrary paſſions are produced.

Evils, which are *certain*, have ſometimes the ſame effect as the poſſible or impoſſible. A man, in a ſtrong priſon, without the leaſt means of eſcape, trembles at the thoughts of the rack, to which he is ſentenced. The evil is here fixed in itſelf; but the mind has not courage to fix upon it; and this fluctuation gives riſe to a paſſion of a ſimilar appearance with fear.

7. But it is not only where good or evil is uncertain as to its *exiſtence*, but alſo as to its *kind*, that fear or hope ariſes. If any one were told that one of his ſons is ſuddenly killed; the paſſion, occaſioned by this event, would not ſettle into grief, 'till he got certain information, which of his ſons he had loſt. Tho' each ſide of the queſtion produces here the ſame paſſion; that paſſion cannot ſettle, but receives from the imagination, which is unfixed, a tremulous unſteady motion, reſembling the mixture and contention of grief and joy.

8. Thus all kinds of uncertainty have a ſtrong connexion with fear, even tho' they do not cauſe any oppoſition of paſſions, by the oppoſite views, which they preſent to us. Should I leave a friend in any malady, I ſhould feel more anxiety upon his account, than if he were preſent; tho' perhaps I am not only incapable of giving him aſſiſtance, but likewiſe of judging concerning the event of his ſickneſs. There are a thouſand little circumſtances of his ſituation and condition, which I deſire to know: and the knowlege of them would prevent that fluctuation and uncertainty, ſo nearly allied to fear. Horace has remarked this phænomenon.

Ut aſſidens implumibus pullus avis
Serpentum allapſis timet,
Magis relictis; non, ut adſit, auxilî
Latura plus præſentibus.

A VIRGIL

A VIRGIN on her bridal-night goes to bed full of fears and apprehenſions, tho' ſhe expects nothing but pleaſure. The confuſion of wiſhes and joys, the newneſs and greatneſs of the unknown event, ſo embarraſs the mind, that it knows not in what image or paſſion to fix itſelf.

9. CONCERNING the mixture of affections, we may remark, in general, that when contrary paſſions ariſe from objects no way connected together, they take place alternately. Thus when a man is afflicted for the loſs of a law-ſuit, and joyful for the birth of a ſon, the mind, running from the agreeable to the calamitous object; with whatever celerity it may perform this motion, can ſcarcely temper the one affection with the other, and remain betwixt them in a ſtate of indifference.

IT more eaſily attains that calm ſituation, when the *ſame* event is of a mixed nature, and contains ſomething adverſe and ſomething proſperous in its different circumſtances. For in that caſe, both the paſſions, mingling with each other by means of the relation, often become mutually deſtructive, and leave the mind in perfect tranquillity.

BUT ſuppoſe, that the object is not a compound of good and evil, but is conſidered as probable or improbable in any degree; in that caſe, the contrary paſſions will both of them be preſent at once in the ſoul, and inſtead of ballancing and tempering each other, will ſubſiſt together, and by their union, produce a third impreſſion or affection, ſuch as hope or fear.

THE influence of the relations of ideas (which we ſhall afterwards explain more fully) is plainly ſeen in this affair. In contrary paſſions, if the objects be *totally different*, the paſſions are like two oppoſite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other. If the objects be intimately *connected*, the paſſions are like an *alcali* and an *acid*, which, being mingled, deſtroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect, and conſiſts in the *contradictory* views of the *ſame* object, the paſſions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate.

THE effect of a mixture of paſſions, when one of them is predominant and ſwallows up the other, ſhall be explained afterwards.

SECT. II.

1. BESIDES thoſe paſſions above-mentioned, which ariſe from a direct purſuit of good and averſion to evil, there are others which are of a more complicated nature, and imply more than one view or conſideration. Thus *Pride* is a certain ſatisfaction in ourſelves, on account of ſome accompliſhment or poſſeſſion, which we enjoy: *Humility*, on the other hand, is a diſſatisfaction with ourſelves, on account of ſome defect or infirmity.

LOVE or *Friendſhip* is a complacency in another, on account of his accompliſhments or ſervices: *Hatred*, the contrary.

2. IN theſe two ſets of paſſions, there is an obvious diſtinction to be made betwixt the *object* of the paſſion and its *cauſe*. The object of pride and humility is ſelf: The cauſe of the paſſion is ſome excellence in the former caſe; ſome fault, in the latter. The object of love and hatred is ſome other perſon: The cauſes, in like manner, are either excellencies or faults.

WITH regard to all theſe paſſions, the cauſes are what excite the emotion; the object is what the mind directs its view to when the emotion is excited. Our merit, for inſtance, raiſes pride; and it is eſſential to pride to turn our view on ourſelf with complacency and ſatisfaction.

Now as the cauſes of theſe paſſions are very numerous and various, tho' their object be uniform and ſimple; it may be a ſubject of curioſity to conſider, what that circumſtance is, in which all theſe various cauſes agree; or, in other words, what is the real, efficient cauſe of the paſſion. We ſhall begin with pride and humility.

3. IN order to explain the cauſes of theſe paſſions, we muſt reflect on certain properties, which tho' they have a mighty influence on every operation, both of the underſtanding and paſſions, are not commonly much inſiſted on by philoſophers. The firſt of theſe is the *aſſociation* of ideas, or that principle, by which we make an eaſy tranſition from one idea to another. However uncertain and changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. They uſually paſs with regularity, from one object, to what reſembles it, is contiguous to it, or produced by it [a]. When one idea is preſent to the imagination; any other, united by theſe relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility, by means of that introduction.

THE *ſecond* property, which I ſhall obſerve in the human mind, is a like aſſociation of impreſſions or emotions. All *reſembling* impreſſions are connected together; and no ſooner one ariſes, than the reſt naturally follow. Grief and diſappointment give riſe to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again. In like manner, our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itſelf into love, generoſity, courage, pride, and other reſembling affections.

IN the *third* place, it is obſervable of theſe two kinds of aſſociation, that they very much aſſiſt and forward each other, and that the tranſition is more eaſily made, where they both concur in the ſame object. Thus, a man, who by any injury from another, is very much diſcompoſed and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred ſubjects of hatred, diſcontent, impatience, fear, and other uneaſy paſſions; eſpecially if he can diſcover theſe ſubjects in or near the perſon, who was the object of his firſt emotion. Thoſe principles which forward the tranſition of ideas, here concur with thoſe, which operate on the paſſions; and both, uniting in one action, beſtow on the mind a double impulſe.

UPON this occaſion, I may cite a paſſage from an elegant writer, who expreſſes himſelf in the following manner [b]. "As the fancy delights in every thing, that "is great, ſtrange, or beautiful, and is ſtill the more pleaſed the more it finds "of theſe perfections in the *ſame* object, ſo it is capable of receiving new ſatisfac-"tion by the aſſiſtance of another ſenſe. Thus, any continual ſound, as the mu-"ſic of birds, or a fall of waters, awakens every moment the mind of the be-"holder, and makes him more attentive to the ſeveral beauties of the place, that "lie before him. Thus, if there ariſes a fragrancy of ſmells or perfumes, they "heighten the pleaſure of the imagination, and make even the colors and ver-"dure of the landſcape appear more agreeable; for the ideas of both ſenſes re-

[a] See Enquiry concerning Human Underſtanding, Sect. III.
[b] ADDISON, Spectator, N° 412.

"commend

" commend each other, and are pleaſanter together than where they enter the " mind ſeparately: As the different colors of a picture, when they are well-diſ- " poſed, ſet off one another, and receive an additional beauty from the advantage " of the ſituation." In theſe phænomena, we may remark the aſſociation both of impreſſions and ideas; as well as the mutual aſſiſtance theſe aſſociations lend to each other.

4. It ſeems to me, that both theſe ſpecies of relation have place in producing *Pride* or *Humility*, and are the real, efficient cauſes of the paſſion.

With regard to the firſt relation, that of ideas, there can be no queſtion. Whatever we are proud of, muſt, in ſome manner, belong to us. It is always *our* knowlege, *our* ſenſe, beauty, poſſeſſions, family, on which we value ourſelves. Self, which is the *object* of the paſſion, muſt ſtill be related to that quality or circumſtance, which *cauſes* the paſſion. There muſt be a connexion betwixt them; an eaſy tranſition of the imagination; or a facility of the conception in paſſing from one to the other. Where this connexion is wanting, no object can either excite pride or humility; and the more you weaken the connexion, the more you weaken the paſſion.

5. The only ſubject of enquiry is, whether there be a like relation of impreſſions or ſentiments, wherever pride or humility is felt; whether the circumſtance, which cauſes the paſſion, produces antecedently a ſentiment ſimilar to the paſſion; and whether there be an eaſy transfuſion of the one into the other.

The feeling or ſentiment of pride is agreeable; of humility, painful. An agreeable ſenſation is, therefore, related to the former; a painful, to the latter. And if we find, after examination, that every object, which produces pride, produces alſo a ſeparate pleaſure; and every object, that cauſes humility, excites in like manner a ſeparate uneaſineſs; we muſt allow, in that caſe, that the preſent theory is fully proved and aſcertained. The double relation of ideas and ſentiments will be acknowleged inconteſtable.

6. To begin with perſonal merit and demerit, the moſt obvious cauſes of theſe paſſions; it would be entirely foreign to our preſent purpoſe to examine the foundation of moral diſtinctions. It is ſufficient to obſerve, that the foregoing theory concerning the origin of the paſſions may be defended on any hypotheſis. The moſt probable ſyſtem, which has been advanced to explain the difference betwixt vice and virtue, is, that either from a primary conſtitution of nature, or from a ſenſe of public or private intereſt, certain characters, upon the very view and contemplation, produce uneaſineſs; and others, in like manner, excite pleaſure. The uneaſineſs and ſatisfaction, produced in the ſpectator, are eſſential to vice and virtue. To approve of a character, is to feel a delight upon its appearance. To diſapprove of it, is to be ſenſible of an uneaſineſs. The pain and pleaſure therefore, being, in a manner, the primary ſource of blame or praiſe, muſt alſo be the cauſes of all their effects; and conſequently, the cauſes of pride and humility, which are the unavoidable attendants of that diſtinction.

But ſuppoſing this theory of morals ſhould not be received; it is ſtill evident that pain and pleaſure, if not the ſources of moral diſtinctions, are at leaſt inſeparable from them. A generous and noble character affords a ſatisfaction even in the ſurvey; and when preſented to us, tho' only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight us. On the other hand, cruelty and treachery diſpleaſe from their very nature; nor is it poſſible ever to reconcile us to theſe qualities, either in

ourſelves or others. Virtue, therefore, produces always a pleaſure diſtinct from the pride or ſelf ſatisfaction, which attends it: Vice, an uneaſineſs ſeparate from the humility or remorſe.

But a high or low conceit of ourſelves ariſes not from thoſe qualities alone of the mind, which, according to common ſyſtems of ethics, have been defined parts of moral duty; but from any other, which have a connexion with pleaſure or uneaſineſs. Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleaſing by our wit, good-humor, or any other accompliſhment; and nothing gives us a more ſenſible mortification, than a diſappointment in any attempt of that kind. No one has ever been able to tell preciſely, what *wit* is, and to ſhew why ſuch a ſyſtem of thought muſt be received under that denomination, and ſuch another rejected. It is by taſte alone we can decide concerning it; nor are we poſſeſt of any other ſtandard, by which we can form a judgment of this nature. Now what is this *taſte*, from which true and falſe wit in a manner receive their being, and without which no thought can have a title to either of theſe denominations? It is plainly nothing but a ſenſation of pleaſure from true wit, and of diſguſt from falſe, without our being able to tell the reaſons of that ſatisfaction or uneaſineſs. The power of exciting theſe oppoſite ſenſations is, therefore, the very eſſence of true or falſe wit; and conſequently, the cauſe of that vanity or mortification, which ariſes from one or the other.

7. Beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and ſatisfaction; as deformity produces pain, upon whatever ſubject it may be placed, and whether ſurveyed in an animate or inanimate object. If the beauty or deformity belong to our own face, ſhape, or perſon, this pleaſure or uneaſineſs is converted into pride or humility; as having in this caſe all the circumſtances requiſite to produce a perfect tranſition, according to the preſent theory.

It would ſeem, that the very eſſence of beauty conſiſts in its power of producing pleaſure. All its effects, therefore, muſt proceed from this circumſtance: And if beauty is ſo univerſally the ſubject of vanity, it is only from its being the cauſe of pleaſure.

Concerning all other bodily accompliſhments, we may obſerve in general, that whatever in ourſelves is either uſeful, beautiful, or ſurprizing, is an object of pride; and the contrary, of humility. Theſe qualities agree in producing a ſeparate pleaſure; and agree in nothing elſe.

We are vain of the ſurprizing adventures which we have met with, the eſcapes which we have made, the dangers to which we have been expoſed; as well as of our ſurpriſing feats of vigor and activity. Hence the origin of vulgar lying; where men, without any intereſt, and merely out of vanity, heap up a number of extraordinary events, which are either the fictions of their brain; or, if true, have no connexion with themſelves. Their fruitful invention ſupplies them with a variety of adventures; and where that talent is wanting, they appropriate ſuch as belong to others, in order to gratify their vanity: For betwixt that paſſion, and the ſentiment of pleaſure, there is always a cloſe connexion.

8. But tho' pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body, that is, of ſelf, for their natural and more immediate cauſes; we find by experience, that many other objects produce theſe affections. We found vanity upon houſes, gardens, equipage, and other external objects; as well as upon perſonal merit and accompliſhments.

accompliſhments. This happens when external objects acquire any particular relation to ourſelves, and are aſſociated orconnected with us. A beautiful fiſh in the ocean, a well proportioned animal in a foreſt, and indeed, any thing, which neither belongs nor is related to us, has no manner of influence on our vanity; whatever extraordinary qualities it may be endowed with, and whatever degree of ſurprize and admiration it may naturally occaſion. It muſt be ſomeway aſſociated with us, in order to touch our pride. Its idea muſt hang, in a manner, upon that of ourſelves; and the tranſition from the one to the other muſt be eaſy and natural.

MEN are vain of the beauty either of *their* country, or *their* county, or even of *their* pariſh. Here the idea of beauty plainly produces a pleaſure. This pleaſure is related to pride. The object or cauſe of this pleaſure is, by the ſuppoſition, related to ſelf, the object of pride. By this double relation of ſentiments and ideas, a tranſition is made from one to the other.

MEN are alſo vain of the temperature of the climate, in which they are born; of the fertility of their native ſoil; of the goodneſs of the wines, fruits, or victuals, produced by it; of the ſoftneſs or force of their language, with other particulars of that kind. Theſe objects have plainly a reference to the pleaſures of the ſenſes, and are originally conſidered as agreeable to the feeling, taſte, or hearing. How could they become cauſes of pride, except by means of that tranſition above explained?

THERE are ſome, who diſcover a vanity of an oppoſite kind, and affect to depreciate their own country, in compariſon of thoſe, to which they have travelled. Theſe perſons find, when they are at home, and ſurrounded with their countrymen, that the ſtrong relation betwixt them and their own nation is ſhared with ſo many, that it is in a manner loſt to them; whereas, that diſtant relation to a foreign country, which is formed by their having ſeen it, and lived in it, is augmented by their conſidering how few have done the ſame. For this reaſon, they always admire the beauty, utility, and rarity of what they have met with abroad, above what they find at home.

SINCE we can be vain of a country, climate, or any inanimate object, which bears a relation to us; it is no wonder we ſhould be vain of the qualities of thoſe, who are connected with us by blood or friendſhip. Accordingly we find, that any qualities which, when belonging to ourſelf, produce pride, produce alſo, in a leſs degree, the ſame affection, when diſcovered in perſons, related to us. The beauty, addreſs, merit, credit, and honors of their kindred are carefully diſplayed by the proud, and are conſiderable ſources of their vanity.

AS we are proud of riches in ourſelves, we deſire, in order to gratify our vanity, that every one, who has any connexion with us, ſhould likewiſe be poſſeſt of them, and are aſhamed of ſuch as are mean or poor among our friends and relations. Our forefathers being conceived as our neareſt relations; every one naturally affects to be of a good family, and to be deſcended from a long ſucceſſion of rich and honorable anceſtors.

THOSE, who boaſt of the antiquity of their families, are glad when they can join this circumſtance, that their anceſtors, for many generations, have been uninterrupted proprietors of the *ſame* portion of land, and that their family has never changed its poſſeſſions, or been tranſplanted into any other county or province.

It

It is an additional ſubject of vanity, when they can boaſt, that theſe poſſeſſions have been tranſmitted thro' a deſcent, compoſed entirely of males, and that the honors and fortune have never paſſed thro' any female. Let us endeavor to explain theſe phænomena from the foregoing theory.

When any one values himſelf on the antiquity of his family, the ſubjects of his vanity are not merely the extent of time and number of anceſtors (for in that reſpect all mankind are alike) but theſe circumſtances, joined to the riches and credit of his anceſtors, which are ſuppoſed to reflect a luſtre on himſelf, upon account of his connexion with them. Since therefore the paſſion depends on the connexion, whatever ſtrengthens the connexion muſt alſo encreaſe the paſſion, and whatever weakens the connexion muſt diminiſh the paſſion. But 'tis evident, that the ſameneſs of the poſſeſſions muſt ſtrengthen the relation of ideas, ariſing from blood and kindred, and convey the fancy with greater facility from one generation to another; from the remoteſt anceſtors to their poſterity, who are both their heirs and their deſcendants. By this facility, the ſentiment is tranſmitted more entire, and excites a greater degree of pride and vanity.

The caſe is the ſame with the tranſmiſſion of the honors and fortune, thro' a ſucceſſion of males, without their paſſing thro' any female. It is an obvious quality of human nature, that the imagination naturally turns to whatever is important and conſiderable; and where two objects are preſented, a ſmall and a great, it uſually leaves the former, and dwells entirely on the latter. This is the reaſon, why children commonly bear their fathers name, and are eſteemed to be of a nobler or meaner birth, according to *his* family. And tho' the mother ſhould be poſſeſt of ſuperior qualities to the father, as often happens, the *general rule* prevails, notwithſtanding the exception, according to the doctrine, which ſhall be explained afterwards. Nay, even when a ſuperiority of any kind is ſo great, or when any other reaſons have ſuch an effect, as to make the children rather repreſent the mother's family than the father's, the general rule ſtill retains an efficacy, ſufficient to weaken the relation, and make a kind of breach in the line of anceſtors. The imagination runs not along them with the ſame facility, nor is able to transfer the honor and credit of the anceſtors to their poſterity of the ſame name and family ſo readily, as when the tranſition is conformable to the general rules, and paſſes thro' the male line, from father to ſon, or from brother to brother.

9. But *property*, as it gives us the fulleſt power and authority over any object, is the relation, which has the greateſt influence on theſe paſſions.

Every thing, belonging to a vain man, is the beſt that is any where to be found. His houſes, equipage, furniture, cloaths, horſes, hounds, excel all others in his conceit; and it is eaſy to obſerve, that, from the leaſt advantage in any of theſe, he draws a new ſubject of pride and vanity. His wine, if you will believe him, has a finer flavor than any other; his cookery is more exquiſite; his table more orderly; his ſervants more expert; the air, in which he lives, more healthful; the ſoil, which he cultivates, more fertile; his fruits ripen earlier, and to greater perfection: Such a thing is remarkable for its novelty; ſuch another for its antiquity: This is the workmanſhip of a famous artiſt; that belonged once to ſuch a prince or great man. All objects, in a word, which are uſeful, beautiful, or ſurprizing, or are related to ſuch, may, by means of property, give riſe to this paſſion. Theſe all agree

agree in giving pleaſure. This alone is common to them; and therefore muſt be the quality, that produces the paſſion, which is their common effect. As every new inſtance is a new argument, and as the inſtances are here without number; it would ſeem, that this theory is ſufficiently confirmed by experience.

RICHES imply the power of acquiring whatever is agreeable; and as they comprehend many particular objects of vanity, neceſſarily become one of the chief cauſes of that paſſion.

10. OUR opinions of all kinds are ſtrongly affected by ſociety and ſympathy, and it is almoſt impoſſible for us to ſupport any principle or ſentiment, againſt the univerſal conſent of every one, with whom we have any friendſhip or correſpondence. But of all our opinions, thoſe, which we form in our own favor; however lofty or preſuming; are, at bottom, the fraileſt, and the moſt eaſily ſhaken by the contradiction and oppoſition of others. Our great concern, in this caſe, makes us ſoon alarmed, and keeps our paſſions upon the watch: Our conſciouſneſs of partiality ſtill makes us dread a miſtake: And the very difficulty of judging concerning an object, which is never ſet at a due diſtance from us, nor is ſeen in a proper point of view, makes us hearken anxiouſly to the opinions of others, who are better qualified to form juſt opinions concerning us. Hence that ſtrong love of fame, with which all mankind are poſſeſt. It is in order to fix and confirm their favorable opinion of themſelves, not from any original paſſion, that they ſeek the applauſes of others. And when a man deſires to be praiſed, it is for the ſame reaſon, that a beauty is pleaſed with ſurveying herſelf in a favorable looking-glaſs, and ſeeing the reflexion of her own charms.

THO' it be difficult in all points of ſpeculation to diſtinguiſh a cauſe, which encreaſes an effect, from one, which ſolely produces it; yet in the preſent caſe the phænomena ſeem pretty ſtrong and ſatisfactory in confirmation of the foregoing principle.

WE receive a much greater ſatisfaction from the approbation of thoſe whom we ourſelves eſteem and approve of, than of thoſe, whom we contemn and deſpiſe.

WHEN eſteem is obtained after a long and intimate acquaintance, it gratifies our vanity in a peculiar manner.

THE ſuffrage of thoſe, who are ſhy and backward in giving praiſe, is attended with an additional reliſh and enjoyment, if we can obtain it in our favor.

WHERE a great man is nice in his choice of favorites, every one courts with greater earneſtneſs his countenance and protection.

PRAISE never gives us much pleaſure, unleſs it concur with our own opinion, and extol us for thoſe qualities, in which we chiefly excel.

THESE phænomena ſeem to prove, that the favorable opinions of others are regarded only as authorities, or as confirmations of our own opinion. And if they have more influence on this ſubject than in any other, it is eaſily accounted for from the nature of the ſubject.

11. THUS few objects, however related to us, and whatever pleaſure they produce, are able to excite a great degree of pride or ſelf-ſatisfaction; unleſs they be alſo obvious to others, and engage the approbation of the ſpectators. What diſpoſition of mind ſo deſirable as the peaceful, reſigned, contented; which readily ſubmits to all the diſpenſations of providence, and preſerves a conſtant ſerenity

amidſt the greateſt misfortunes and diſappointments? Yet this diſpoſition, tho' acknowleged to be a virtue or excellence, is ſeldom the foundation of great vanity or ſelf-applauſe; having no brilliancy or exterior luſtre, and rather cheering the heart, than animating the behavior and converſation. The caſe is the ſame with many other qualities of the mind, body, or fortune; and this circumſtance, as well as the double relations above mentioned, muſt be admitted to be of conſequence in the production of theſe paſſions.

A SECOND circumſtance, which is of conſequence in this affair, is the conſtancy and duration of the object. What is very caſual and inconſtant, beyond the common courſe of human affairs, gives little joy, and leſs pride. We are not much ſatisfied with the thing itſelf; and are ſtill leſs apt to feel any new degree of ſelf-ſatisfaction upon its account. We foreſee and anticipate its change; which makes us little ſatisfied with the thing itſelf: We compare it to ourſelves, whoſe exiſtence is more durable; by which means its inconſtancy appears ſtill greater. It ſeems ridiculous to make ourſelves the object of a paſſion, on account of a quality or poſſeſſion, which is of ſo much ſhorter duration, and attends us during ſo ſmall a part of our exiſtence.

A THIRD circumſtance, not to be neglected, is, that the objects, in order to produce pride or ſelf-value, muſt be peculiar to us, or at leaſt, common to us with a few others. The advantages of ſun-ſhine, weather, climate, &c. diſtinguiſh us not from any of our companions, and give us no preference or ſuperiority. The compariſon, which we are every moment apt to make, preſents no inference to our advantage; and we ſtill remain, notwithſtanding theſe enjoyments, on a level with all our friends and acquaintance.

As health and ſickneſs vary inceſſantly to all men, and there is no one, who is ſolely or certainly fixed in either; theſe accidental bleſſings and calamities are in a manner ſeparated from us, and are not conſidered as a foundation for vanity or humiliation. But wherever a malady of any kind is ſo rooted in our conſtitution, that we no longer entertain any hopes of recovery, from that moment it damps our ſelf-conceit; as is evident in old men, whom nothing mortifies more than the conſideration of their age and infirmities. They endeavor, as long as poſſible, to conceal their blindneſs and deafneſs, their rheums and gouts; nor do they ever avow them without reluctance and uneaſineſs. And tho' young men are not aſhamed of every head-ach or cold which they fall into; yet no topic is more proper to mortify human pride, and make us entertain a mean opinion of our nature, than this, that we are every moment of our lives ſubject to ſuch infirmities. This proves, that bodily pain and ſickneſs are in themſelves proper cauſes of humility; tho' the cuſtom of eſtimating every thing, by compariſon, more than by its intrinſic worth and value, makes us overlook thoſe calamities, which we find incident to every one, and cauſes us to form an idea of our merit and character, independent of them.

WE are aſhamed of ſuch maladies as affect others, and are either dangerous or diſagreeable to them. Of the epilepſy; becauſe it gives a horror to every one preſent: Of the itch; becauſe it is infectious: Of the king's evil; becauſe it often goes to poſterity. Men always conſider the ſentiments of others in their judgment of themſelves.

A FOURTH

A FOURTH circumſtance, which has an influence on theſe paſſions, is *general rules*; by which we form a notion of different ranks of men, ſuitable to the power or riches of which they are poſſeſſed; and this notion is not changed by any peculiarities of the health or temper of the perſons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment in their poſſeſſions. Cuſtom readily carries us beyond the juſt bounds in our paſſions, as well as in our reaſonings.

IT may not be amiſs to obſerve on this occaſion, that the influence of general rules and maxims on the paſſions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all the principles or internal mechaniſm, which we here explain. For it ſeems evident, that, if a perſon full-grown, and of the ſame nature with ourſelves, were on a ſudden tranſported into our world, he would be very much embaraſſed with every object, and would not readily determine what degree of love or hatred, of pride or humility, or of any other paſſion ſhould be excited by it. The paſſions are often varied by very inconſiderable principles; and theſe do not always play with perfect regularity, eſpecially on the firſt trial. But as cuſtom or practice has brought to light all theſe principles, and has ſettled the juſt value of every thing; this muſt certainly contribute to the eaſy production of the paſſions, and guide us, by means of general eſtabliſhed rules, in the proportions, which we ought to obſerve in prefering one object to another. This remark may, perhaps, ſerve to obviate difficulties, that may ariſe concerning ſome cauſes, which we here aſcribe to particular paſſions, and which may be eſteemed too refined to operate ſo univerſally and certainly, as they are found to do.

SECT. III.

1. IN running over all the cauſes, which produce the paſſion of pride or that of humility; it would readily occur, that the ſame circumſtance, if transferred from ourſelf to another perſon, would render him the object of love or hatred, eſteem or contempt. The virtue, genius, beauty, family, riches, and authority of others beget favorable ſentiments in their behalf; and their vice, folly, deformity, poverty and meanneſs excite the contrary ſentiments. The double relation of impreſſions and ideas ſtill operates on theſe paſſions of love and hatred; as on the former of pride and humility. Whatever gives a ſeparate pleaſure or pain, and is related to another perſon or connected with him, makes him the object of our affection or diſguſt.

HENCE too injury or contempt is one of the greateſt ſources of hatred; ſervices or eſteem, of friendſhip.

2. SOMETIMES a relation to ourſelf excites affection towards any perſon. But there is always here implied a relation of ſentiments, without which the other relation would have no influence [a].

A PERSON, who is related to us, or connected with us, by blood, by ſimilitude of fortune, of adventures, profeſſion, or country, ſoon becomes an agreeable companion to us; becauſe we enter eaſily and familiarly into his ſentiments and

[a] The affection of parents to children ſeems founded on an original inſtinct. The affection towards other relations depends on the principles here explained.

conceptions: Nothing is ſtrange or new to us: Our imagination, paſſing from ſelf, which is ever intimately preſent to us, runs ſmoothly along the relation or connexion, and conceives with a full ſympathy the perſon, who is nearly related to ſelf. He renders himſelf immediately acceptable, and is at once on an eaſy footing with us: No diſtance, no reſerve has place, where the perſon introduced is ſuppoſed ſo cloſely connected with us.

RELATION has here the ſame influence as cuſtom or acquaintance, in exciting affection; and from like cauſes. The eaſe and ſatisfaction, which, in both caſes, attend our intercourſe or commerce, is the ſource of the friendſhip.

3. THE paſſions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevolence and anger. It is this conjunction, which chiefly diſtinguiſhes theſe affections, from pride and humility. For pride and humility are pure emotions in the ſoul, unattended with any deſire, and not immediately exciting us to action. But love and hatred are not compleat within themſelves, nor reſt in that emotion, which they produce; but carry the mind to ſomething farther. Love is always followed by a deſire of happineſs to the perſon beloved, and an averſion to his miſery: As hatred produces a deſire of the miſery, and an averſion to the happineſs of the perſon hated. Theſe oppoſite deſires ſeem to be originally and primarily conjoined with the paſſions of love and hatred. It is a conſtitution of nature, of which we can give no farther explication.

4. COMPASSION frequently ariſes, where there is no preceding eſteem or friendſhip; and compaſſion is an uneaſineſs in the ſufferings of another. It ſeems to ſpring from the intimate and ſtrong conception of his ſufferings; and our imagination proceeds by degrees, from the lively idea, to the real feeling of another's miſery.

MALICE and envy alſo ariſe in the mind without any preceding hatred or injury; tho' their tendency is exactly the ſame with that of anger and ill-will. The compariſon of ourſelves with others ſeems the ſource of envy and malice. The more unhappy another is, the more happy do we ourſelves appear in our own conception.

5. THE ſimilar tendency of compaſſion to that of benevolence, and of envy to anger, forms a very cloſe relation betwixt theſe two ſets of paſſions; tho' of a different kind from that inſiſted on above. It is not a reſemblance of feeling or ſentiment, but a reſemblance of tendency or direction. Its effect, however, is the ſame, in producing an aſſociation of paſſions. Compaſſion is ſeldom or never felt without ſome mixture of tenderneſs or friendſhip; and envy is naturally accompanied with anger or ill-will. To deſire the happineſs of another, from what ever motive, is a good preparative to affection: And to delight in another's miſery almoſt unavoidably begets averſion towards him.

EVEN where intereſt is the ſource of our concern, it is commonly attended with the ſame conſequences. A partner is a natural object of friendſhip; a rival of enmity.

6. POVERTY, meanneſs, diſappointment, produce contempt and diſlike: But when theſe misfortunes are very great, or are repreſented to us in very ſtrong colors, they excite compaſſion, and tenderneſs, and friendſhip. How is this contradiction to be accounted for? The poverty and meanneſs of another, in their common appearance, gives us uneaſineſs, by a ſpecies of imperfect ſympathy;

and this uneaſineſs produces averſion or diſlike, from the reſemblance of ſentiment. But when we enter more intimately into another's concerns, and wiſh for his happineſs, as well as feel his miſery, friendſhip or good-will ariſes, from the ſimilar tendency of the inclinations.

7. In reſpect, there is a mixture of humility with the eſteem or affection: In contempt, a mixture of pride.

The amorous paſſion is uſually compounded of complacency in beauty, a bodily appetite, and friendſhip or affection. The cloſe relation of theſe ſentiments is very obvious, as well as their origin from each other, by means of that relation. Were there no other phænomenon to reconcile us to the preſent theory, this alone, methinks, were ſufficient.

SECT. IV.

1. The preſent theory of the paſſions depends entirely on the double relations of ſentiments and ideas, and the mutual aſſiſtance, which theſe relations lend to each other. It may not, therefore, be improper to illuſtrate theſe principles by ſome farther inſtances.

2. The virtues, talents, accompliſhments, and poſſeſſions of others, make us love and eſteem them: Becauſe theſe objects excite a pleaſant ſenſation, which is related to love; and having alſo a relation or connexion with the perſon, this union of ideas forwards the union of ſentiments, according to the foregoing reaſoning.

But ſuppoſe, that the perſon, whom we love, is alſo related to us, by blood, country, or friendſhip; it is evident, that a ſpecies of pride muſt alſo be excited by his accompliſhments and poſſeſſions; there being the ſame double relation, which we have all along inſiſted on. The perſon is related to us, or there is an eaſy tranſition of thought from him to us; and the ſentiments, excited by his advantages and virtues, are agreeable, and conſequently related to pride. Accordingly we find, that people are naturally vain of the good qualities or high fortune of their friends and countrymen.

3. But it is obſervable, that, if we reverſe the order of the paſſions, the ſame effect does not follow. We paſs eaſily from love and affection to pride and vanity; but not from the latter paſſions to the former, tho' all the relations be the ſame. We love not thoſe related to us on account of our own merit; tho' they are naturally vain on account of our merit. What is the reaſon of this difference? The tranſition of the imagination to ourſelves, from objects related to us, is always very eaſy; both on account of the relation, which facilitates the tranſition, and becauſe we there paſs from remoter objects to thoſe which are contiguous. But in paſſing from ourſelves to objects, related to us; tho' the former principle forwards the tranſition of thought, yet the latter oppoſes it; and conſequently there is not the ſame eaſy transfuſion of paſſions from pride to love as from love to pride.

4. The virtues, ſervices, and fortune of one man inſpire us readily with eſteem and affection for another related to him. The ſon of our friend is naturally entitled to our friendſhip: The kindred of a very great man value themſelves, and are valued by others, on account of that relation. The force of the double relation is here fully diſplayed.

5. The

5. THE following are inſtances of another kind, where the operation of theſe principles may ſtill be diſcovered. Envy ariſes from a ſuperiority in others; but it is obſervable, that it is not the greateſt diſproportion betwixt us, which excites that paſſion, but on the contrary, our proximity. A great diſproportion cuts off the relation of the ideas, and either keeps us from comparing ourſelves with what is remote from us, or diminiſhes the effects of the compariſon.

A POET is not apt to envy a philoſopher, or a poet of a different kind, of a different nation, or of a different age. All theſe differences, if they do not prevent, at leaſt weaken the compariſon, and conſequently the paſſion.

THIS too is the reaſon, why all objects appear great or little, merely by a compariſon with thoſe of the ſame ſpecies. A mountain neither magnifies nor diminiſhes a horſe in our eyes: But when a FLEMISH and a WELSH horſe are ſeen together, the one appears greater and the other leſs, than when viewed apart.

FROM the ſame principle we may account for that remark of hiſtorians, that any party, in a civil war, or even factious diviſion, always chooſe to call in a foreign enemy at any hazard rather than ſubmit to their fellow-citizens. GUICCIARDIN applies this remark to the wars in ITALY; where the relations betwixt the different ſtates are, properly ſpeaking, nothing but of name, language, and contiguity. Yet even theſe relations, when joined with ſuperiority, by making the compariſon more natural, make it likewiſe more grievous, and cauſe men to ſearch for ſome other ſuperiority, which may be attended with no relation, and by that means, may have a leſs ſenſible influence on the imagination. When we cannot break the aſſociation, we feel a ſtronger deſire to remove the ſuperiority. This ſeems to be the reaſon, why travellers, tho' commonly laviſh of their praiſes to the CHINESE and PERSIANS, take care to depreciate thoſe neighboring nations, which may ſtand upon a footing of rivalſhip with their native country.

6. THE fine arts afford us parallel inſtances. Should an author compoſe a treatiſe, of which one part was ſerious and profound, another light and humorous; every one would condemn ſo ſtrange a mixture, and would blame him for the neglect of all rules of art and criticiſm. Yet we accuſe not PRIOR for joining his *Alma* and *Solomon* in the ſame volume; tho' that amiable poet has ſucceeded perfectly in the gaiety of the one, as well as in the melancholy of the other. Even ſuppoſe the reader ſhould peruſe theſe two compoſitions without any interval, he would feel little or no difficulty in the change of the paſſions. Why? but becauſe he conſiders theſe performances as entirely different; and by that break in the ideas, breaks the progreſs of the affections, and hinders the one from influencing or contradicting the other.

AN heroic and burleſque deſign, united in one picture, would be monſtrous; tho' we place two pictures of ſo oppoſite a character in the ſame chamber, and even cloſe together, without any ſcruple.

7. IT needs be no matter of wonder, that the eaſy tranſition of the imagination ſhould have ſuch an influence on all the paſſions. It is this very circumſtance, which forms all the relations and connexions amongſt objects. We know no real connection betwixt one thing and another. We know only, that the idea of one thing is aſſociated with that of another, and that the imagination makes an eaſy tranſition betwixt them. And as the eaſy tranſition of ideas, and that of ſentiments mutually aſſiſt each other; we might beforehand expect, that this principle

muſt have a mighty influence on all our internal movements and affections. And experience ſufficiently confirms the theory.

For, not to repeat all the foregoing inſtances: Suppoſe, that I were travelling with a companion thro' a country, to which we are both utter ſtrangers; it is evident, that, if the proſpects be beautiful, the roads agreeable, and the fields finely cultivated; this may ſerve to put me in good humor, both with myſelf and fellow-traveller. But as the country has no connexion with myſelf or friend, it can never be the immediate cauſe either of ſelf-value or of regard to him: And therefore, if I found not the paſſion on ſome other object, which bears to one of us a cloſer relation, my emotions are rather to be conſidered as the overflowings of an elevated or humane diſpoſition, than as an eſtabliſhed paſſion. But ſuppoſing the agreeable proſpect before us to be ſurveyed either from his country-ſeat or from mine; this new connexion of ideas gives a new direction to the ſentiment of pleaſure, proceeding from the proſpect, and raiſes the emotion of regard or vanity, according to the nature of the connexion. There is not here, methinks, much room for doubt or difficulty.

SECT. V.

1. It ſeems evident, that reaſon, in a ſtrict ſenſe, as meaning the judgment of truth and falſhood, can never, of itſelf, be any motive to the will, and can have no influence but ſo far as it touches ſome paſſion or affection. *Abſtract relations* of ideas are the object of curioſity, not of volition. And *matters of fact*, where they are neither good nor evil, where they neither excite deſire nor averſion, are totally indifferent; and whether known or unknown, whether miſtaken or rightly apprehended, cannot be regarded as any motive to action.

2. What is commonly, in a popular ſenſe, called reaſon, and is ſo much recommended in moral diſcourſes, is nothing but a general and a calm paſſion, which takes a comprehenſive and a diſtant view of its object, and actuates the will, without exciting any ſenſible emotion. A man, we ſay, is diligent in his profeſſion from reaſon; that is, from a calm deſire of riches and a fortune. A man adheres to juſtice from reaſon; that is, from a calm regard to a character with himſelf and others.

3. The ſame objects, which recommend themſelves to reaſon in this ſenſe of the word, are alſo the objects of what we call paſſion, when they are brought near to us, and acquire ſome other advantages, either of external ſituation, or congruity to our internal temper; and by that means, excite a turbulent and ſenſible emotion. Evil, at a great diſtance, is avoided, we ſay, from reaſon: Evil, near at hand, produces averſion, horror, fear, and is the object of paſſion.

4. The common error of metaphyſicians has lain in aſcribing the direction of the will entirely to one of theſe principles, and ſuppoſing the other to have no influence. Men often act knowingly againſt their intereſt: It is not therefore the view of the greateſt poſſible good which always influences them. Men often counteract a violent paſſion, in proſecution of their diſtant intereſts and deſigns: It is not therefore the preſent uneaſineſs alone, which determines them. In general, we may obſerve, that both theſe principles operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or preſent

preſent diſpoſition of the perſon. What we call *ſtrength of mind* implies the prevalence of the calm paſſions above the violent; tho' we may eaſily obſerve, that there is no perſon ſo conſtantly poſſeſſed of this virtue, as never, on any occaſion, to yield to the ſollicitation of violent affections and deſires. From theſe variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding concerning the future actions and reſolutions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and paſſions.

SECT. VI.

1. We ſhall here enumerate ſome of thoſe circumſtances, which render a paſſion calm or violent, which heighten or diminiſh any emotion.

It is a property in human nature, that any emotion, which attends a paſſion, is eaſily converted into it; tho' in their natures they be originally different from, and even contrary to each other. It is true, in order to cauſe a perfect union amongſt paſſions, and make one produce the other, there is always required a double relation, according to the theory above delivered. But when two paſſions are already produced by their ſeparate cauſes, and are both preſent in the mind, they readily mingle and unite; tho' they have but one relation, and ſometimes without any. The predominant paſſion ſwallows up the inferior, and converts it into itſelf. The ſpirits, when once excited, eaſily receive a change in their direction; and it is natural to imagine, that this change will come from the prevailing affection. The connexion is in many caſes cloſer betwixt any two paſſions, than betwixt any paſſion and indifference.

When a perſon is once heartily in love, the little faults and caprices of his miſtreſs, the jealouſies and quarrels, to which that commerce is ſo ſubject; however unpleaſant they be, and rather connected with anger and hatred; are yet found, in many inſtances, to give additional force to the prevailing paſſion. It is a common artifice of politicians, when they would affect any perſon very much by a matter of fact, of which they intend to inform him, firſt to excite his curioſity; delay as long as poſſible the ſatisfying it; and by that means raiſe his anxiety and impatience to the utmoſt, before they give him a full inſight into the buſineſs. They know, that this curioſity will precipitate him into the paſſion, which they purpoſe to raiſe, and will aſſiſt the object in its influence on the mind. A ſoldier, advancing to battle, is naturally inſpired with courage and confidence, when he thinks on his friends and fellow-ſoldiers; and is ſtruck with fear and terror, when he reflects on the enemy. Whatever new emotion, therefore, proceeds from the former naturally encreaſes the courage; as the ſame emotion proceeding from the latter, augments the fear. Hence in martial diſcipline, the uniformity and luſtre of habit, the regularity of figures and motions, with all the pomp and majeſty of war, encourage ourſelves and our allies; while the ſame objects in the enemy ſtrike terror into us, tho' agreeable and beautiful in themſelves.

Hope is, in itſelf, an agreeable paſſion, and allied to friendſhip and benevolence; yet is it able ſometimes to blow up anger, when that is the predominant paſſion. *Spes addita ſuſcitat iras.* Virg.

2. Since

2. SINCE paſſions, however independent, are naturally transfuſed into each other, if they are both preſent at the ſame time; it follows, that when good or evil is placed in ſuch a ſituation as to cauſe any particular emotion, beſides its direct paſſion of deſire or averſion, that latter paſſion muſt acquire new force and violence.

3. THIS often happens, when any object excites contrary paſſions. For it is obſervable, that an oppoſition of paſſions commonly cauſes a new emotion in the ſpirits, and produces more diſorder than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force. This new emotion is eaſily converted into the predominant paſſion, and in many inſtances, is obſerved to encreaſe its violence, beyond the pitch, at which it would have arrived, had it met with no oppoſition. Hence we naturally deſire what is forbid, and often take a pleaſure in performing actions, merely becauſe they are unlawful. The notion of duty, when oppoſite to the paſſions, is not always able to overcome them; and when it fails of that influence, is apt rather to increaſe and irritate them, by producing an oppoſition in our motives and principles.

4. THE ſame effect follows, whether the oppoſition ariſes from internal motives or external obſtacles. The paſſion commonly acquires new force in both caſes. The efforts, which the mind makes to ſurmount the obſtacle, excite the ſpirits, and enliven the paſſion.

5. UNCERTAINTY has the ſame effect as oppoſition. The agitation of the thought, the quick turns which it makes from one view to another, the variety of paſſions, which ſucceed each other, according to the different views: All theſe produce an agitation in the mind; and this agitation transfuſes itſelf into the predominant paſſion.

SECURITY, on the contrary, diminiſhes the paſſions. The mind, when left to itſelf, immediately languiſhes; and in order to preſerve its ardor, muſt be every moment ſupported by a new flow of paſſion. For the ſame reaſon, deſpair, tho' contrary to ſecurity, has a like influence.

6. NOTHING more powerfully excites any affection than to conceal ſome part of its object, by throwing it into a kind of ſhade, which, at the ſame time, that it ſhows enough to prepoſſeſs us in favor of the object, leaves ſtill ſome work for the imagination. Beſides, that obſcurity is always attended with a kind of uncertainty; the effort, which the fancy makes to compleat the idea, rouzes the ſpirits, and gives an additional force to the paſſion.

7. As deſpair and ſecurity, tho' contrary, produce the ſame effects; ſo abſence is obſerved to have contrary effects, and in different circumſtances, either encreaſes or diminiſhes our affection. ROCHEFOUCAULT has very well remarked, that abſence deſtroys weak paſſions, but encreaſes ſtrong; as the wind extinguiſhes a candle, but blows up a fire. Long abſence naturally weakens our idea, and diminiſhes the paſſion: But where the paſſion is ſo ſtrong and lively as to ſupport itſelf, the uneaſineſs, ariſing from abſence, encreaſes the paſſion, and gives it new force and influence.

8. WHEN the ſoul applies itſelf to the performance of any action, or the conception of any object, to which it is not accuſtomed, there is a certain unpliableneſs in the faculties, and a difficulty of the ſpirits moving in their new direction. As this difficulty excites the ſpirits, it is the ſource of wonder, ſurprize, and of

all the emotions, which ariſe from novelty; and is in itſelf, very agreeable, like every thing, which inlivens the mind to a moderate degree. But tho' ſurpriſe be agreeable in itſelf, yet as it puts the ſpirits in agitation, it not only augments our agreeable affections, but alſo our painful, according to the foregoing principle. Hence every thing, that is new, is moſt affecting, and gives us either more pleaſure or pain, than what, ſtrictly ſpeaking, ſhould naturally follow from it. When it often returns upon us, the novelty wears off; the paſſions ſubſide; the hurry of the ſpirits is over; and we ſurvey the object with greater tranquillity.

9. THE imagination and affections have a cloſe union together. The vivacity of the former, gives force to the latter. Hence the proſpect of any pleaſure, with which we are acquainted, affects us more than any other pleaſure, which we may own ſuperior, but of whoſe nature we are *wholly* ignorant. Of the one we can form a particular and determinate idea: The other, we conceive under the general notion of pleaſure.

ANY ſatisfaction, which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is freſh and recent, operates on the will with more violence, than another of which the traces are decayed and almoſt obliterated.

A PLEASURE, which is ſuitable to the way of life, in which we are engaged, excites more our deſires and appetites than another, which is foreign to it.

NOTHING is more capable of infuſing any paſſion into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are repreſented in the ſtrongeſt and moſt lively colors. The bare opinion of another, eſpecially when inforced with paſſion, will cauſe an idea to have an influence upon us, tho' that idea might otherwiſe have been entirely neglected.

IT is remarkable, that lively paſſions commonly attend a lively imagination. In this reſpect, as well as others, the force of the paſſion depends as much on the temper of the perſon, as on the nature and ſituation of the object.

WHAT is diſtant, either in place or time, has not equal influence with what is near and contiguous.

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I PRETEND not here to have exhauſted this ſubject. It is ſufficient for my purpoſe, if I have made it appear, that, in the production and conduct of the paſſions, there is a certain regular mechaniſm, which is ſuſceptible of as accurate a diſquiſition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydroſtatics, or any part of natural philoſophy.

AN

AN

ENQUIRY

CONCERNING

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.

SECTION I.

OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.

DISPUTES with perſons, pertinaciouſly obſtinate in their principles, are, of all others, the moſt irkſome; except, perhaps, thoſe with perſons, entirely diſingenuous, who really do not believe the opinion they defend, but engage in the controverſy, from affectation, from a ſpirit of oppoſition, or from a deſire of ſhowing wit and ingenuity, ſuperior to the reſt of mankind. The ſame blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the ſame contempt of their antagoniſts; and the ſame paſſionate vehemence, in inforcing ſophiſtry and falſhood. And as reaſoning is not the ſource, whence either diſputant derives his tenets; 'tis in vain to expect, that any logic, which ſpeaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace ſounder principles.

THOSE who have denied the reality of moral diſtinctions, may be ranked among the diſingenuous diſputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever ſeriouſly believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one. The difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is ſo wide, and this difference is ſtill ſo much farther widened, by education, example, and habit, that where the oppoſite extremes come at once under our apprehenſion, there is no ſcepticiſm ſo ſcrupulous, and ſcarce any aſſurance ſo determined, as abſolutely to deny all diſtinction between them. Let a man's inſenſibility be ever ſo great, he muſt often be touched with the images of RIGHT and WRONG; and let his prejudices be ever ſo obſtinate, he muſt obſerve, that others are ſuſceptible of like impreſſions. The only way, therefore, of converting an antagoniſt of this kind, is to leave him to himſelf. For, finding that no-body keeps up the controverſy with him, 'tis probable he will, at laſt, of himſelf, form mere wearineſs, come over to the ſide of common ſenſe and reaſon.

THERE has been a controverſy ſtarted of late, much better worth examination, concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they are derived from REASON or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowlege of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal ſenſe; whether, like all ſound judgment of truth and falſhood, they ſhould be the ſame to every rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they are founded entirely on the particular fabric and conſtitution of the human ſpecies.

THE antient philoſophers, tho' they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reaſon, yet, in general, ſeem to conſider morals as deriving their

exiſtence from taſte and ſentiment. On the other hand, our modern enquirers, tho' they alſo talk much of the beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavored to account for theſe diſtinctions by metaphyſical reaſonings, and by deductions from the moſt abſtract principles of human underſtanding. Such confuſion reigned in theſe ſubjects, that an oppoſition of the greateſt conſequence could prevail between one ſyſtem and another, and even in the parts almoſt of each individual ſyſtem; and yet no-body, till very lately, was ever ſenſible of it. The elegant lord SHAFTESBURY, who firſt gave occaſion to remark this diſtinction, and who, in general, adhered to the principles of the antients, is not, himſelf, entirely free from the ſame confuſion.

IT muſt be acknowleged, that both ſides of the queſtion are ſuſceptible of ſpecious arguments. Moral diſtinctions, it may be ſaid, are diſcernable by pure *reaſon:* Elſe, whence the many diſputes, that reign, in common life, as well as in philoſophy, with regard to this ſubject: The long chain of proofs often produced on both ſides; the examples cited, the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies detected, the inferences drawn, and the ſeveral concluſions adjuſted to their proper principles. Truth is diſputable; not, taſte: What exiſts in the nature of things is the ſtandard of our judgment; what each man feels within himſelf is the ſtandard of ſentiment. Propoſitions in geometry may be proved, ſyſtems in phyſics may be controverted; but the harmony of verſe, the tenderneſs of paſſion, the brilliancy of wit muſt give immediate pleaſure. No man reaſons concerning another's beauty; but frequently concerning the juſtice or injuſtice of his actions. In every trial the firſt object of the criminals is to diſprove the facts alleged, and deny the actions imputed to them: The ſecond to prove, that even if theſe actions were real, they might be juſtified, as innocent and lawful. 'Tis confeſſedly by deductions of the underſtanding, that the firſt point is aſcertained: How can we ſuppoſe, that a different faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other?

ON the other hand, thoſe, who would reſolve all moral determinations into *ſentiment*, may endeavor to ſhow, that 'tis impoſſible for reaſon ever to draw concluſions of this nature. To virtue, ſay they, it belongs to be *amiable*, and vice *odious*. This forms their very nature or eſſence. But can reaſon or argumentation diſtribute theſe different epithets to any ſubjects, and pronounce beforehand, that this muſt produce love, and that hatred? Or what other reaſon can we ever aſſign for theſe affections, but the original fabric and formation of the human mind, which is naturally adapted to receive them?

THE end of all moral ſpeculations is to teach us our duty; and by proper repreſentations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, beget correſpondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from inferences and concluſions of the underſtanding, which of themſelves, have no hold of the affections, nor ſet in motion the active powers of men? They diſcover truths; but where the truths which they diſcover, are indifferent, and beget no deſire or averſion, they can have no influence on conduct and behavior. What is honorable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes poſſeſſion of the heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the

the cool aſſent of the underſtanding; and gratifying a ſpeculative curioſity, puts an end to our reſearches.

EXTINGUISH all the warm feelings and prepoſſeſſions in favor of virtue, and all diſguſt or averſion againſt vice: Render men totally indifferent towards theſe diſtinctions; and morality is no longer a practical ſtudy, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions.

THESE arguments on each ſide (and many more might be produced) are ſo plauſible, that I am apt to ſuſpect, they may, the one as well as the other, be ſolid and ſatisfactory, and that *reaſon* and *ſentiment* concur in almoſt all moral determinations and concluſions. The final ſentence, 'tis probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praiſe-worthy or blameable; that which ſtamps on them the mark of honor or infamy, approbation or cenſure; that which renders morality an active principle, and conſtitutes virtue our happineſs, and vice our miſery: 'Tis probable, I ſay, that this final ſentence depends on ſome internal ſenſe or feeling, which nature has made univerſal to the whole ſpecies. For what elſe can have an influence of this nature? But in order to pave the way for ſuch a ſentiment, and give a proper diſcernment of its object, 'tis often neceſſary, we find, that much reaſoning ſhould precede, that nice diſtinctions be made, juſt concluſions drawn, diſtant compariſons formed, accurate relations examined, and general facts fixed and aſcertained. Some ſpecies of beauty, eſpecially the natural kinds, on their firſt appearance, command our affection, and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, 'tis impoſſible for any reaſoning to repreſs their influence, or adapt them better to our taſte and ſentiment. But in many orders of beauty, particularly thoſe of the finer arts, 'tis requiſite to employ much reaſoning, in order to feel the proper ſentiment; and a falſe reliſh may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are juſt grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter ſpecies, and demands the aſſiſtance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a ſuitable influence on the human mind.

BUT tho' this queſtion, concerning the general principles of morals, be extremely curious and important; 'tis needleſs for us, at preſent, to employ farther care in our reſearches concerning it. For if we can be ſo happy, in the courſe of this enquiry, as to fix the juſt origin of morals, it will then eaſily appear how far ſentiment or reaſon enter into all determinations of this nature [k]. Mean while, it will ſcarce be poſſible for us, ere this controverſy is fully decided, to proceed in that accurate manner, required in the ſciences; by beginning with exact definitions of VIRTUE and VICE, which are the objects of our preſent enquiry. But we ſhall do what may juſtly be eſteemed as ſatisfactory. We ſhall conſider the matter as an object of experience. We ſhall call *every quality or action of the mind*, virtuous, *which is attended with the general approbation of mankind:* And we ſhall denominate vicious, *every quality, which is the object of general blame or cenſure.* Theſe qualities we ſhall endeavor to collect; and after examining, on both ſides, the ſeveral circumſtances, in which they agree, 'tis hoped we may, at laſt, reach the foundation of ethics, and find thoſe univerſal principles, from which all moral cenſure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a queſtion of fact,

[k] See Appendix firſt.

not of abſtract ſcience, we can only expect ſucceſs, by following this experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a compariſon of particular inſtances. The other ſcientifical method; where a general abſtract principle is firſt eſtabliſhed, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and concluſions, may be more perfect in itſelf, but ſuits leſs the imperfection of human nature, and is a common ſource of illuſion and miſtake in this as well as in other ſubjects. Men are now cured of their paſſion for hypotheſes and ſyſtems in natural philoſophy, and will hearken to no arguments but thoſe derived from experience. 'Tis full time that they ſhould begin a like reformation in all moral diſquiſitions; and reject every ſyſtem of ethics, however ſubtile or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and obſervation.

SECTION II.

OF BENEVOLENCE.

PART I.

THERE is a principle, ſuppoſed to prevail among many, which is utterly incompatible with all virtue or moral ſentiment; and as it can proceed from nothing but the moſt depraved diſpoſition, ſo in its turn it tends ſtill farther to encourage that depravity. This principle is, that all *benevolence* is mere hypocriſy, friendſhip a cheat, public ſpirit a farce, fidelity a ſnare to procure truſt and confidence; and while all of us, at the bottom, purſue only our private intereſt, we wear theſe fair diſguiſes, in order to put others off their guard, and expoſe them the more to our wiles and machinations. What heart one muſt be poſſeſſed of, who profeſſes ſuch principles, and who feels no internal ſentiment that belies ſo pernicious a theory, 'tis eaſy to imagine: And alſo, what degree of affection and benevolence he can bear to a ſpecies, whom he repreſents under ſuch odious colors, and ſuppoſes ſo little ſuſceptible of gratitude or any return of affection. Or if we will not aſcribe theſe principles wholly to a corrupted heart, we muſt, at leaſt, account for them from the moſt careleſs and precipitant examination. Superficial reaſoners, indeed, obſerving many falſe pretences among mankind, and feeling, perhaps, no very ſtrong reſtraint in their own diſpoſition, might draw a general and a haſty concluſion, that all is equally corrupted, and that men, different from all other animals, and indeed from all other ſpecies of exiſtence, admit of no degrees of good or bad, but are, in every inſtance, the ſame creatures, under different diſguiſes and appearances.

THERE is another principle, ſomewhat reſembling the former; which has been much inſiſted on by philoſophers, and has been the foundation of many a ſyſtem; that whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he feels for others, no paſſion is, or can be diſintereſted; that the moſt generous friendſhip, however ſincere, is a modification of ſelf-love; and that even unknown to ourſelves, we ſeek only our own gratification,

fication, while we appear the moſt deeply engaged in ſchemes for the liberty and happineſs of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by a refinement of reflection, by an enthuſiaſm of paſſion, we ſeem to take part in the intereſts of others, and imagine ourſelves diveſted of all ſelfiſh conſiderations: But at bottom, the moſt generous patriot and moſt niggardly miſer, the braveſt hero and moſt abject coward, have, in every action, an equal regard to their own happineſs and welfare.

WHOEVER concludes, from the ſeeming tendency of this opinion, that thoſe, who make profeſſion of it, cannot poſſibly feel the true ſentiments of benevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find himſelf, in practice, very much miſtaken. Probity and honor were no ſtrangers to EPICURUS and his ſect. ATTICUS and HORACE ſeem to have enjoyed from nature, and cultivated by reflection, as generous and friendly diſpoſitions as any diſciple of the auſterer ſchools. And among the moderns, HOBBES and LOCKE, who maintained the ſelfiſh ſyſtem of morals, lived moſt irreproachable lives; tho' the former lay not under any reſtraint of religion, which might ſupply the defects of his philoſophy.

AN EPICUREAN or a HOBBIST readily allows, that there is ſuch a thing as friendſhip in the world, without hypocriſy or diſguiſe; tho' he may attempt, by a philoſophical chymiſtry, to reſolve the elements of this paſſion, if I may ſo ſpeak, into thoſe of another, and explain every affection to be ſelf-love, twiſted and moulded into a variety of appearances. But as the ſame turn of imagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the ſame direction to the original paſſion; this is ſufficient, even according to the ſelfiſh ſyſtem, to make the wideſt difference in human characters, and denominate one man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly intereſted. I eſteem the man, whoſe ſelf-love, by whatever means, is ſo directed as to give him a concern for others, and render him ſerviceable to ſociety: As I hate or deſpiſe him, who has no regard to any thing beyond his own gratifications and enjoyments. In vain would you ſuggeſt, that theſe characters, tho' ſeemingly oppoſite, are, at bottom, the ſame, and that a very inconſiderable turn of imagination forms the whole difference between them. Each character, notwithſtanding theſe inconſiderable differences, appears to me, in practice, pretty durable and untranſmutable. And I find not, in this, more than in other ſubjects, that the natural ſentiments, ariſing from the general appearances of things, are eaſily deſtroyed by ſubtile reflections concerning the minute origin of theſe appearances. Does not the lively, cheerful color of a countenance inſpire me with complacency and pleaſure; even tho' I learn from philoſophy, that all difference of complexion ariſes from the moſt minute differences of thickneſs, in the moſt minute parts of the ſkin; by means of which a ſuperficies is qualified to reflect one of the original colors of light, and abſorb the others?

BUT tho' the queſtion, concerning the univerſal or partial ſelfiſhneſs of man, be not ſo material, as is uſually imagined, to morality and practice, it is certainly of conſequence in the ſpeculative ſcience of human nature, and is a proper object of curioſity and enquiry. It may not, therefore, be improper, in this place, to beſtow a few reflections upon it [1].

THE

[1] Benevolence naturally divides into two kinds, the *general* and *particular*. The firſt is, where we have no friendſhip or connexion or eſteem for the perſon, but feel only a general ſympathy with

THE moſt obvious objection to the ſelfiſh hypotheſis, is, that being contrary to common feeling and our moſt unprejudiced notions; there is required the higheſt ſtretch of philoſophy to eſtabliſh ſo extraordinary a paradox. To the moſt careleſs obſerver, there appear to be ſuch diſpoſitions as benevolence and generoſity; ſuch affections as love, friendſhip, compaſſion, gratitude. Theſe ſentiments have their cauſes, effects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and obſervation, and plainly diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of the ſelfiſh paſſions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it muſt be admitted; till ſome hypotheſis be diſcovered, which, by penetrating deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitleſs, and ſeem to have proceeded entirely from that love of *ſimplicity*, which has been the ſource of much falſe reaſoning in philoſophy. I ſhall not here enter into any detail on the preſent ſubject. Many able philoſophers have ſhown the inſufficiency of theſe ſyſtems. And I ſhall take for granted what, I believe, the ſmalleſt reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer.

BUT the nature of the ſubject furniſhes the ſtrongeſt preſumption, that no better ſyſtem will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to account for the origin of the benevolent from the ſelfiſh affections, and reduce all the various emotions of the human mind to a perfect ſimplicity. The caſe is not the ſame in this ſpecies of philoſophy as in phyſics. Many an hypotheſis in nature, contrary to firſt appearances, has been found, on more accurate ſcrutiny, ſolid and ſatisfactory. Inſtances of this kind are ſo frequent, that a judicious, as well as witty philoſopher * has ventured to affirm, if there be more than one way, in which any phænomenon may be produced, that there is a general preſumption for its ariſing from the cauſes, which are the leaſt obvious and familiar. But the preſumption always lies on the other ſide, in all enquiries concerning the origin of our paſſions, and the internal operations of the human mind. The ſimpleſt and moſt obvious cauſe, which can there be aſſigned for any phænomenon, is probably the true one. When a philoſopher, in the explication of his ſyſtem, is obliged to have recourſe to ſome very intricate and refined reflections, and to ſuppoſe them eſſential to the production of any paſſion or emotion, we have reaſon to be extremely on our guard againſt ſo fallacious an hypotheſis. The affections are not ſuſceptible of any impreſſion from the refinements of reaſon or imagination; and 'tis always found, that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties, neceſſarily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, deſtroys all activity in the former. Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourſelves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives which the mind, from vanity or ſelf-conceit, is deſirous of ſuppoſing more prevalent: But there is no inſtance, that a concealment of this nature has ever ariſen from the abſtruſeneſs and intricacy of the mo-

with him or a compaſſion for his pains, and a congratulation with his pleaſures. The other ſpecies of benevolence is founded on an opinion of virtue, on ſervices done us, or on ſome particular connexions. Both theſe ſentiments muſt be allowed real in human nature; but whether they will reſolve into ſome nice conſiderations of ſelf-love, is a queſtion more curious than important. The former ſentiment, viz. that of general benevolence or humanity or ſympathy, we ſhall have occaſion frequently to treat of in the courſe of this enquiry; and I aſſume it as real, from general experience, without any other proof.

* Monſ. FONTENELLE.

tive,

tive. A man, who has loſt a friend and patron, may flatter himſelf, that all his grief ariſes from generous ſentiments, without any mixture of narrow or intereſted conſiderations: But a man, who grieves for a valuable friend, who needed his patronage and protection; how can we ſuppoſe, that his paſſionate tenderneſs ariſes from ſome metaphyſical regards to a ſelf-intereſt, which has no foundation or reality? We may as well imagine, that minute wheels and ſprings, like thoſe of a watch, give motion to a loaded waggon, as account for the origin of paſſion from ſuch abſtruſe reflections.

ANIMALS are found ſuſceptible of kindneſs, both to their own ſpecies and to ours; nor is there, in this caſe, the leaſt ſuſpicion of diſguiſe or artifice. Shall we account for all *their* ſentiments too, from refined deductions of ſelf-intereſt? Or if we admit a diſintereſted benevolence in the inferior ſpecies, by what rule of analogy can we refuſe it in the ſuperior?

LOVE between the ſexes begets a complacency and good-will, very diſtinct from the gratification of an appetite. Tenderneſs to their offſpring, in all ſenſible beings, is commonly able alone to counterballance the ſtrongeſt motives of ſelf-love, and has no manner of dependance on that affection. What intereſt can a fond mother have in view, who loſes her health by aſſiduous attendance on her ſick child, and afterwards languiſhes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the ſlavery of that attendance?

Is gratitude no affection of the human breaſt, or is that a word merely, without any meaning or reality? Have we no ſatisfaction in one man's company above another's, and no deſire of the welfare of our friend, even tho' abſence or death ſhould prevent us from all participation in it? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any participation in it, even while alive and preſent, but our affection and regard to him?

THESE and a thouſand other inſtances are marks of a generous benevolence in human nature, where no *real* intereſt binds us to the object. And how an *imaginary* intereſt, known and avowed for ſuch, can be the origin of any paſſion or emotion, ſeems difficult to explain. No ſatisfactory hypotheſis of this kind has yet been diſcovered; nor is there the ſmalleſt probability, that the future induſtry of men will ever be attended with more favorable ſucceſs.

BUT farther, if we conſider rightly of the matter, we ſhall find, that the hypotheſis, which allows of a diſintereſted benevolence, diſtinct from ſelf-love, has really more *ſimplicity* in it, and is more conformable to the analogy of nature, than that which pretends to reſolve all friendſhip and humanity into this latter principle. There are bodily wants or appetites, acknowleged by every one, which neceſſarily precede all ſenſual enjoyment, and carry us directly to ſeek poſſeſſion of the object. Thus, hunger and thirſt have eating and drinking for their end; and from the gratification of theſe primary appetites ariſes a pleaſure, which may become the object of another ſpecies of deſire or inclination, that is ſecondary and intereſted. In the ſame manner, there are mental paſſions, by which we are impelled immediately to ſeek particular objects, ſuch as fame or power, or vengeance, without any regard to intereſt; and when theſe objects are attained, a pleaſing enjoyment enſues, as the conſequence of our indulged affections. Nature muſt, by the internal frame and conſtitution of the mind, give an original propenſity to fame, ere we can reap any pleaſure from that acquiſition, or purſue it from motives of

ſelf-love, and a deſire of happineſs. If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praiſe: If I be void of ambition, power gives no enjoyment: If I be not angry, the puniſhment of an adverſary is totally indifferent to me. In all theſe caſes, there is a paſſion, which points immediately to the object, and conſtitutes it our good or happineſs; as there are other ſecondary paſſions, which afterwards ariſe, and purſue it as a part of our happineſs, when once it is conſtituted ſuch, by our original affections. Were there no appetites of any kind, antecedent to ſelf-love, that propenſity could ſcarce ever exert itſelf; becauſe we ſhould, in that caſe, have felt few and ſlender pains or pleaſures, and have little miſery or happineſs, to avoid or to purſue.

Now where is the difficulty of conceiving, that this may likewiſe be the caſe with benevolence and friendſhip, and that, from the original frame of our temper, we may feel a deſire of another's happineſs or good, which, by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is afterwards purſued, from the conjoined motives of benevolence and ſelf-enjoyment? Who ſees not that vengeance, from the force alone of paſſion, may be ſo eagerly purſued, as to make us knowingly neglect every conſideration of eaſe, intereſt, or ſafety; and, like ſome vindictive animals, infuſe our very ſouls into the wounds which we give an enemy *? And what a malignant philoſophy muſt it be, that will not allow, to humanity and friendſhip, the ſame privileges, which are indiſputably granted to the darker paſſions of enmity and reſentment? Such a philoſophy is more like a ſatyr than a true delineation or deſcription of human nature; and may be a good foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery, but is a very bad one for any ſerious argument or reaſoning.

PART II.

IT may be eſteemed, perhaps, a ſuperfluous taſk to prove, that the benevolent or ſofter affections are VIRTUOUS; and wherever they appear, engage the eſteem, approbation, and good-will of mankind. The epithets *ſociable*, *good-natured*, *humane*, *merciful*, *grateful*, *friendly*, *generous*, *beneficent*, are known in all languages, and univerſally expreſs the higheſt merit, which *human nature* is capable of attaining. Where theſe amiable qualities are attended with birth and power and eminent abilities, and diſplay themſelves in the good government or uſeful inſtruction of mankind, they ſeem even to raiſe the poſſeſſors of them above the rank of *human nature*, and approach them in ſome meaſure to the divine. Exalted capacity, undaunted courage, proſperous ſucceſs; theſe may only expoſe a hero or politician to the envy and malignity of the public: But as ſoon as the praiſes are added of humane and beneficent; when inſtances are diſplayed of lenity, tenderneſs, or friendſhip; envy itſelf is ſilent, or joins the general voice of applauſe and acclamation.

WHEN PERICLES, the great ATHENIAN ſtateſman and general, was on his death-bed, his ſurrounding friends, deeming him now inſenſible, began to indulge their ſorrow for their expiring patron, by enumerating his great qualities and

* Animaſque in vulnere ponunt. VIRG.
Dum alteri noceat, ſui negligens, ſays SENECA of Anger, De Ira, L. 1.

ſucceſſes,

ſucceſſes, his conqueſts and victories, the unuſual length of his adminiſtration, and his nine trophies, erected over the enemies of the republic. *You forget*, cries the dying hero, who had heard all, *you forget the moſt eminent of my praiſes, while you dwell ſo much on thoſe vulgar advantages, in which fortune had a principal ſhare. You have not obſerved, that no citizen has ever yet wore mourning on my account* †.

In men of more ordinary talents and capacity, the ſocial virtues become, if poſſible, ſtill more eſſentially requiſite; there being nothing eminent, in that caſe, to compenſate for the want of them, or preſerve the perſon from our ſevereſt hatred, as well as contempt. A high ambition, an elevated courage, is apt, ſays CICERO, in leſs perfect characters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity. The more ſocial and ſofter virtues are there chiefly to be regarded. Theſe are always good and amiable ‡.

The principal advantage, which JUVENAL diſcovers in the extenſive capacity of the human ſpecies, is, that it renders our benevolence alſo more extenſive, and gives us larger opportunities of ſpreading our kindly influence than what are indulged to the inferior creation ‖. It muſt, indeed, be confeſſed, that by doing good only, can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being eminent. His exalted ſtation, of itſelf, but the more expoſes him to danger and tumult. His ſole prerogative is to afford ſhelter to inferiors, who repoſe themſelves under his cover and protection.

But I forget, that it is not my preſent buſineſs to recommend generoſity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colors, all the genuine charms of the ſocial virtues. Theſe, indeed, ſufficiently engage every heart, on the firſt apprehenſion of them; and 'tis difficult to abſtain from ſome ſally of panegyric, as often as they occur in diſcourſe or reaſoning. But our object here being more the ſpeculative, than the practical part of morals, it will ſuffice to remark, (what will readily, I believe, be allowed) that no qualities are more entitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind, than beneficence and humanity, friendſhip and gratitude, natural affection and public ſpirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender ſympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and ſpecies. Theſe, wherever they appear, ſeem to transfuſe themſelves, in a manner, into each beholder, and to call forth, in their own behalf, the ſame favorable and affectionate ſentiments, which they exert on all around.

PART III.

We may obſerve, that, in diſplaying the praiſes of any humane, beneficent man, there is one circumſtance, which never fails to be amply inſiſted on, *viz.* the happineſs and ſatisfaction, derived to ſociety from his intercourſe and good offices. To his parents, we are apt to ſay, he endears himſelf by his pious attachment and duteous care, ſtill more than by the connexions of nature. His children never feel his authority, but when employed for their advantage. With him, the ties of love are conſolidated, by beneficence and friendſhip. The ties of friendſhip approach, in a fond obſervance of each obliging office, to thoſe of love and inclination. His domeſtics and dependants have in him a ſure reſource; and no longer dread the power of fortune, but ſo far as ſhe exerciſes it over him. From

† PLUT. in PERICLE. ‡ Cic. de Officiis, lib. I. ‖ Sat. xv. 139, & ſeq.

him

him the hungry receive food, the naked clothing, the ignorant and ſlothful ſkill and induſtry. Like the ſun, an inferior miniſter of providence, he cheers, invigorates, and ſuſtains the ſurrounding world.

If confined to private life, the ſphere of his activity is narrower; but his influence is all benign and gentle. If exalted into a higher ſtation, mankind and poſterity reap the fruit of his labors.

As theſe topics of praiſe never fail to be employed, and with ſucceſs, where we would inſpire eſteem for any one; may it not thence be concluded, that the UTILITY, reſulting from the ſocial virtues, forms, at leaſt, a *part* of their merit, and is one ſource of that approbation and regard ſo univerſally paid them.

When we recommend even an animal or plant as *uſeful* and *beneficial*, we give it an applauſe and recommendation ſuited to its nature. As on the other hand, reflection on the baneful influence of any of theſe inferior beings always inſpires us with the ſentiment of averſion. The eye is pleaſed with the proſpect of cornfields and loaded vineyards; horſes grazing, and flocks paſturing: But flies the view of bryars and brambles, affording ſhelter to wolves and ſerpents.

A machine, a piece of furniture, a veſtment, a houſe, well contrived for uſe and conveniency, is ſo far beautiful, and is contemplated with pleaſure and approbation. An experienced eye is here ſenſible to many excellencies, which eſcape perſons ignorant and uninſtructed.

Can any thing ſtronger be ſaid in praiſe of a profeſſion, ſuch as merchandize or manufacture, than to obſerve the advantages, which it procures to ſociety? And is not a monk and inquiſitor enraged, when we treat his order as uſeleſs or pernicious to mankind?

The hiſtorian exults in diſplaying the benefit ariſing from his labors. The writer of romances alleviates or denies the bad conſequences aſcribed to his manner of compoſition.

In general, what praiſe is implied in the ſimple epithet, *uſeful!* What reproach in the contrary!

Your Gods, ſays Cicero *, in oppoſition to the Epicureans, cannot juſtly claim any worſhip or adoration, with whatever imaginary perfections you may ſuppoſe them endowed. They are totally uſeleſs and inactive. Even the Egyptians, whom you ſo much ridicule, never conſecrated any animal but on account of its utility.

The ſceptics aſſert †, tho' abſurdly, that the origin of all religious worſhip was derived from the utility of inanimate objects, as the ſun and moon to the ſupport and well-being of mankind. This is alſo the common reaſon, aſſigned by hiſtorians, for the deification of eminent heroes and legiſlators ‡.

To plant a tree, to cultivate a field, to beget children; meritorious acts, according to the religion of Zoroaster.

In all determinations of morality, this circumſtance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever diſputes ariſe, either in philoſophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the queſtion cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by aſcertaining, on any ſide, the true intereſts of mankind. If any falſe opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as ſoon as farther experience, and ſounder reaſoning have given us

* De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. † Sext. Emp. adverſus Math. lib. 8. ‡ Diod. Sic. paſſim.

juſter notions of human affairs; we retract our firſt ſentiments, and adjuſt a-new the boundaries of moral good and evil.

GIVING alms to common beggars is naturally praiſed; becauſe it ſeems to carry relief to the diſtreſſed and indigent: But when we obſerve the encouragement thence ariſing to idleneſs and debauchery, we regard that ſpecies of charity rather as a weakneſs than a virtue.

Tyrannicide or the aſſaſſination of uſurpers and oppreſſive princes was highly praiſed in antient times; becauſe it both freed mankind from many of theſe monſters, and ſeemed to keep the others in awe, whom the ſword or poniard could not reach. But hiſtory and experience having ſince convinced us, that this practice encreaſes the jealouſy and cruelty of princes, a TIMOLEON and a BRUTUS, tho' treated with indulgence on account of the prejudices of their times, are now conſidered as very improper models for imitation.

LIBERALITY in princes is regarded as a mark of beneficence: But when it occurs, that the homely bread of the honeſt and induſtrious is often thereby converted into delicious cates for the idle and the prodigal, we ſoon retract our heedleſs praiſes. The regrets of a prince, for having loſt a day, were noble and generous: But had he intended to have ſpent it in acts of generoſity to his greedy courtiers, it was better loſt than miſemployed after that manner.

LUXURY, or a refinement on the pleaſures and conveniencies of life, had long been ſuppoſed the ſource of every corruption in government, and the immediate cauſe of faction, ſedition, civil wars, and the total loſs of liberty. It was, therefore, univerſally regarded as a vice, and was an object of declamation to all ſatyriſts and ſevere moraliſts. Thoſe, who prove, or attempt to prove, that ſuch refinements rather tend to the encreaſe of induſtry, civility, and arts, regulate anew our *moral* as well as *political* ſentiments, and repreſent as laudable and innocent, what had formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable.

UPON the whole, then, it ſeems undeniable, *that* there is ſuch a ſentiment in human nature as diſintereſted benevolence; *that* nothing can beſtow more merit on any human creature than the poſſeſſion of it in an eminent degree; and *that* a *part*, at leaſt, of its merit ariſes from its tendency to promote the intereſts of our ſpecies, and beſtow happineſs on human ſociety. We carry our view into the ſalutary conſequences of ſuch a character and diſpoſition; and whatever has ſo benign an influence, and forwards ſo deſirable an end, is beheld with complacency and pleaſure. The ſocial virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful. The happineſs of mankind, the order of ſociety, the harmony of families, the mutual ſupport of friends are always conſidered as the reſult of their gentle dominion over the breaſts of men.

How conſiderable a *part* of their merit we ought to aſcribe to their utility, will better appear from future diſquiſitions *; as well as the reaſon, why this circumſtance has ſuch a command over our eſteem and approbation †.

* Sect. 3d and 4th. † Sect. 5th.

SEC-

SECTION III.

OF JUSTICE.

PART I.

THAT JUSTICE is useful to society, and consequently that *part* of its merit, at least, must arise from that consideration, it would be a superfluous undertaking to prove. That public utility is the *sole* origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the *sole* foundation of its merit; this proposition, being more curious and important, will better deserve our examination and enquiry.

LET us suppose, that nature has bestowed on human race such profuse *abundance* of all *external* conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individual finds himself fully provided of whatever his most voracious appetites can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire. His natural beauty, we shall suppose, surpasses all acquired ornaments: The perpetual clemency of the seasons renders useless all cloaths or covering: The raw herbage affords him the most delicious fare; the clear fountain, the richest beverage. No laborious occupation required: No tillage: No navigation. Music, poetry, and contemplation form his sole business: Conversation, mirth, and friendship his sole amusement.

IT seems evident, that, in such a happy state, every other social virtue would flourish, and receive a tenfold encrease; but the cautious, jealous virtue of justice would never once have been dreamt of. For what purpose make a partition of goods, where every one has already more than enough? Why give rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any injury? Why call this object *mine*, when, upon the seizure of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself of what is equally valuable? Justice, in that case, being totally USELESS, would be an idle ceremonial, and could never possibly have place among the catalogue of virtues.

WE see even in the present necessitous condition of mankind, that, wherever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an unlimited abundance, we leave it always in common among the whole human race, and make no subdivisions of right and property. Water and air, tho' the most necessary of all objects, are not challenged as the property of individuals; nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish use and enjoyment of these blessings. In fertile, extensive countries, with few inhabitants, land is regarded on the same footing. And no topic is so much insisted on by those, who defend the liberty of the seas, as the unexhausted use of them in navigation. Were the advantages, procured by navigation, as inexhaustible, these reasoners had never had any adversaries to refute; nor had any claims been ever advanced of a separate, exclusive dominion over the ocean.

IT may happen in some countries, at some periods, that there be established a property in water, none in land *; if the latter be in greater abundance than can

* GENESIS, chap. xiii. and xxi.

be

be uſed by the inhabitants, and the former be found, with difficulty, and in very ſmall quantities.

AGAIN; ſuppoſe, that, tho' the neceſſities of human race continue the ſame as at preſent, yet the mind is ſo enlarged, and ſo replete with friendſhip and generoſity, that every man has the utmoſt tenderneſs for every man, and feels no more concern for his own intereſt than for that of his fellows: It ſeems evident, that the USE of juſtice would, in this caſe, be ſuſpended by ſuch an extenſive benevolence, nor would the diviſions and barriers of property and obligation have ever been thought of. Why ſhould I bind another, by a deed or promiſe, to do me any good-office, when I know he is already prompted, by the ſtrongeſt inclination, to ſeek my happineſs, and would, of himſelf, perform the deſired ſervice; except the hurt, he thereby receives, be greater than the benefit accruing to me? In which caſe, he knows, that from my innate humanity and friendſhip, I ſhould be the firſt to oppoſe myſelf to his imprudent generoſity. Why raiſe land-marks between my neighbor's field and mine, when my heart has made no diviſion between our intereſts; but ſhares all his joys and ſorrows with equal force and vivacity as if originally my own? Every man, upon this ſuppoſition, being a ſecond-ſelf to another, would truſt all his intereſts to the diſcretion of every man; without jealouſy, without partition, without diſtinction. And the whole race of mankind would form only one family; where all would lie in common, and be uſed, freely, without regard to property; but cautiouſly too, with as entire regard to the neceſſities of each individual, as if our own intereſts were moſt intimately concerned.

IN the preſent diſpoſition of the human heart, it would, perhaps, be difficult to find compleat inſtances of ſuch enlarged affections; but ſtill we may obſerve, that the caſe of families approaches towards it; and the ſtronger the mutual benevolence is among the individuals, the nearer it approaches; 'till all diſtinction of property be, in a great meaſure, loſt and confounded among them. Between married perſons, the cement of friendſhip is by the laws ſuppoſed ſo ſtrong as to aboliſh all diviſion of poſſeſſions; and has often, in reality, the force aſcribed to it. And 'tis obſervable, that, during the ardor of new enthuſiaſms, where every principle is inflamed into extravagance, the community of goods has frequently been attempted; and nothing but experience of its inconveniencies, from the returning or diſguiſed ſelfiſhneſs of men, could make the imprudent fanatics adopt a-new the ideas of juſtice and of ſeparate property. So true is it, that that virtue derives its exiſtence entirely from its neceſſary *uſe* to the intercourſe and ſocial ſtate of mankind.

To make this truth more evident, let us reverſe the foregoing ſuppoſitions; and carrying every thing to the oppoſite extreme, conſider what would be the effect of thoſe new ſituations. Suppoſe a ſociety to fall into ſuch want of all common neceſſaries, that the utmoſt frugality and induſtry cannot preſerve the greateſt number from periſhing, and the whole from extreme ſufferance: It will readily, I believe, be admitted, that the ſtrict laws of juſtice are ſuſpended, in ſuch a preſſing emergence, and give place to the ſtronger motives of neceſſity and ſelf-preſervation. Is it any crime, after a ſhipwreck, to ſeize whatever means or inſtrument of ſafety one can lay hold of, without regard to former limitations of property? Or if a city beſieged were periſhing with hunger; can we imagine, that men will

ſee any means of preſervation before them, and loſe their lives, from a ſcrupulous regard to what, in other ſituations, would be the rules of equity and juſtice? The USE and TENDENCY of that virtue is to procure happineſs and ſecurity, by preſerving order in ſociety: But where the ſociety is ready to periſh from extreme neceſſity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injuſtice; and every man may now provide for himſelf, by all the means, which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit. The public, even in leſs urgent neceſſities, opens granaries, without the conſent of proprietors; as juſtly ſuppoſing, that the authority of magiſtracy may, conſiſtent with equity, extend ſo far: But were any number of men to aſſemble, without the tye of laws or civil juriſdiction; would an equal partition of bread in a famine, even without the proprietor's conſent, be regarded as criminal or injurious?

SUPPOSE likewiſe, that it ſhould be a virtuous man's fate to fall into the ſociety of ruffians, remote from the protection of laws and government; what conduct muſt he embrace in that melancholy ſituation? He ſees ſuch a deſperate rapaciouſneſs prevail; ſuch a diſregard to equity, ſuch contempt of order, ſuch ſtupid blindneſs to future conſequences, as muſt immediately have the moſt tragical concluſion, and muſt terminate in deſtruction to the greater number, and in a total diſſolution of ſociety to the reſt. He, mean while, can have no other expedient, than to arm himſelf, to whomever the ſword he ſeizes, or the buckler may belong: Make proviſion of all means of defence and ſecurity: And his particular regard to juſtice being no longer of USE to his own ſafety or that of others, he muſt conſult alone the dictates of ſelf-preſervation, without concern for thoſe who no longer merit his care and attention.

WHEN any man, even in political ſociety, renders himſelf, by his crimes, obnoxious to the public, he is puniſhed by the laws in his goods and perſon; that is, the ordinary rules of juſtice are, with regard to him, ſuſpended for a moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict on him, for the *benefit* of ſociety, what, otherwiſe, he could not ſuffer without wrong or injury.

THE rage and violence of public war; what is it but a ſuſpenſion of juſtice among the warring parties, who perceive, that that virtue is now no longer of any *uſe* or advantage to them? The laws of war, which then ſucceed to thoſe of equity and juſtice, are rules calculated for the *advantage* and *utility* of that particular ſtate, in which men are now placed. And were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who obſerved no rules even of war; the former muſt alſo ſuſpend their obſervance of them, where they no longer ſerve to any purpoſe; and muſt render every action or rencounter as bloody and pernicious as poſſible to the firſt aggreſſors.

THUS the rules of equity or juſtice depend entirely on the particular ſtate and condition, in which men are placed, and owe their origin and exiſtence to that UTILITY, which reſults to the public from their ſtrict and regular obſervance. Reverſe, in any conſiderable circumſtance, the condition of men: Produce extreme abundance or extreme neceſſity: Implant in the human breaſt perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciouſneſs and malice: By rendering juſtice totally *uſeleſs*, you thereby totally deſtroy its eſſence, and ſuſpend its obligation upon mankind.

THE

THE common ſituation of ſociety is a medium amidſt all theſe extremes. We are naturally partial to ourſelves, and to our friends; but are capable of learning the advantage reſulting from a more equitable conduct. Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of nature; but by art, labor, and induſtry, we can extract them in great abundance. Hence the ideas of property become neceſſary in all civil ſociety: Hence juſtice derives its uſefulneſs to the public: And hence alone ariſes its merit and moral obligation.

THESE concluſions are ſo natural and obvious, that they have not eſcaped even the poets, in their deſcriptions of the felicity, attending the golden age or the reign of SATURN. The ſeaſons, in that firſt period of nature, were ſo temperate, if we credit theſe agreeable fictions, that there was no neceſſity for men to provide themſelves with cloaths and houſes, as a ſecurity againſt the violence of heat and cold: The rivers flowed with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and nature ſpontaneouſly produced her greateſt delicacies. Nor were theſe the chief advantages of that happy age. Tempeſts were not alone removed from nature; but thoſe more furious tempeſts were unknown to human breaſts, which now cauſe ſuch uproar, and engender ſuch confuſion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, ſelfiſhneſs, were never heard of: Cordial affection, compaſſion, ſympathy, were the only movements, with which the mind was yet acquainted. Even the punctilious diſtinction of *mine* and *thine* was baniſhed from among that happy race of mortals, and carried with it the very notion of property and obligation, juſtice and injuſtice.

THIS *poetical* fiction of the *golden age* is, in ſome reſpects, of a piece with the *philoſophical* fiction of the *ſtate of nature*; only that the former is repreſented as the moſt charming and moſt peaceable condition, which can poſſibly be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a ſtate of mutual war and violence, attended with the moſt extreme neceſſity. On the firſt origin of mankind, as we are told, their ignorance and ſavage nature were ſo prevalent, that they could give no mutual truſt, but muſt each depend upon himſelf, and his own force or cunning for protection and ſecurity. No law was heard of: No rule of juſtice known: No diſtinction of property regarded: Power was the only meaſure of right; and a perpetual war of all againſt all was the reſult of men's untamed ſelfiſhneſs and barbarity [h].

WHETHER

[h] This fiction of a ſtate of nature, as a ſtate of war, was not firſt ſtarted by Mr. HOBBES, as is commonly imagined. PLATO endeavors to refute an hypotheſis very like it in the 2d, 3d and 4th books de republica. CICERO, on the contrary, ſuppoſes it certain and univerſally acknowleged in the following paſſage, which is the only authority I ſhall cite for theſe reaſonings: Not imitating in this the example of PUFFENDORF, nor even that of GROTIUS, who think a verſe from OVID or PLAUTUS or PETRONIUS a neceſſary warrant for every moral truth; or the example of Mr. WOOLASTON, who has conſtant recourſe to HEBREW and ARABIC authors for the ſame purpoſe. "Quis enim veſtrûm, judices, ignorat, "ita naturam rerum tuliſſe, ut quodam tempore "homines, nondum neque naturali, neque civili "jure deſcripto, fuſi per agros, ac diſperſi vagarentur, tantumque haberent quantum manu "ac viribus, per cædem ac vulnera, aut eripere, "aut retinere potuiſſent? Qui igitur primi virtute "& conſilio præſtanti extiterunt, ii perſpecto genere humanæ docilitatis atque ingenii, diſſipatos, unum in locum congregarunt, eoſque ex feritate illa ad juſtitiam ac manſuetudinem tranſduxerunt. Tum res ad communem utilitatem, "quas publicas appellamus, tum conventicula "hominum, quæ poſtea civitates nominatæ ſunt, "tum domicilia conjuncta, quas urbes dicamus, "invento & divino & humano jure, mœnibus ſep-

WHETHER ſuch a condition of human nature could ever exiſt, or if it did, could continue ſo long as to merit the appellation of a *ſtate*, may juſtly be doubted. Men are neceſſarily born in a family-ſociety, at leaſt; and are trained up by their parents to ſome rule of conduct and behavior. But this muſt be admitted, that if ſuch a ſtate of mutual war and violence was ever real, the ſuſpenſion of all laws of juſtice from their abſolute inutility, is a neceſſary and infallible conſequence.

THE more we vary our views of human life, and the newer and more unuſual the lights are, in which we ſurvey it, the more ſhall we be convinced, that the origin here aſſigned for the virtue of juſtice is real and ſatisfactory.

WERE there a ſpecies of creatures, intermingled with men, which, tho' rational, were poſſeſt of ſuch inferior ſtrength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all reſiſtance, and could never, upon the higheſt provocation, make us feel the effects of their reſentment; the neceſſary conſequence, I think, is, that we ſhould be bound, by the laws of humanity, to give gentle uſage to theſe creatures, but ſhould not, properly ſpeaking, lie under any reſtraint of juſtice with regard to them, nor could they poſſeſs any right or property, excluſive of ſuch arbitrary lords. Our intercourſe with them could not be called ſociety, which ſuppoſes a degree of equality; but abſolute command on the one ſide, and ſervile obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they muſt inſtantly reſign: Our permiſſion is the only tenure, by which they hold their poſſeſſions: Our compaſſion and kindneſs the only check, by which they curb our lawleſs will: And as no inconvenience ever reſults from the exerciſe of a power, ſo firmly eſtabliſhed in nature, the reſtraints of juſtice and property, being totally *uſeleſs*, would never have place in ſo unequal a confederacy.

THIS is plainly the ſituation of men, with regard to animals; and how far theſe may be ſaid to poſſeſs reaſon, I leave it to others to determine. The great ſuperiority of civilized EUROPEANS above barbarous INDIANS, tempted us to imagine ourſelves on the ſame footing with regard to them, and made us throw off all reſtraints of juſtice, and even of humanity, in our treatment of them. In many nations, the female ſex are reduced to like ſlavery, and are rendered incapable of all property, in oppoſition to their lordly maſters. But tho' the males, when united, have, in all countries, bodily force ſufficient to maintain this ſevere tyranny; yet ſuch are the inſinuation, addreſs, and charms of their fair companions, that they are commonly able to break the confederacy, and ſhare with the other ſex in all the rights and privileges of ſociety.

WERE the human ſpecies ſo framed by nature as that each individual poſſeſt within himſelf every faculty, requiſite both for his own preſervation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all ſociety and intercourſe cut off between man and man, by the primary intention of the ſupreme Creator: It ſeems evident, that ſo ſolitary a being would be as much incapable of juſtice, as of ſocial diſcourſe and converſation. Where mutual regards and forbearance ſerve no manner of purpoſe, they would never direct the conduct of any reaſonable man. The headlong

" ſerunt. Atque inter hanc vitam, perpolitam " humanitate, & illam immanem, nihil tam in- " tereſt quam JUS atque VIS. Horum utro " uti nolimus, altero eſt utendum. Vim volu- " mus extingui? Jus valeat neceſſe eſt, id eſt, ju- " dicia, quibus omne jus conſtinetur. Judicia " diſplicent, aut nulla ſunt? vis dominetur ne- " ceſſe eſt? Hæc vident omnes." *Pro Sext.* l. 42.

principles excited ſuch horror in mankind, as ſoon obliged the dangerous enthuſiaſts to renounce, or at leaſt conceal their tenets. Perhaps, the *levellers*, who claimed an equal diſtribution of property, were a kind of *political* fanatics, which aroſe from the religious ſpecies, and more openly avowed their pretenſions; as carrying a more plauſible appearance, of being practicable in themſelves, as well as uſeful to human ſociety.

It muſt, indeed, be confeſſed, that nature is ſo liberal to mankind, that were all her preſents equally divided among the ſpecies, and improved by art and induſtry, every individual would enjoy all the neceſſaries, and even moſt of the comforts of life; nor would ever be liable to any ills, but ſuch as might accidentally ariſe from the ſickly frame and conſtitution of his body. It muſt alſo be confeſſed, that, wherever we depart from this equality, we rob the poor of more ſatisfaction than we add to the rich, and that the ſlight gratification of a frivolous vanity, in one individual, frequently coſts more than bread to many families, and even provinces. It may appear withal, that the rule of equality, as it would be highly *uſeful*, is not altogether *impracticable*; but has taken place, at leaſt, in an imperfect degree, in ſome republics; particularly that of SPARTA; where it was attended, as 'tis ſaid, with the moſt beneficial conſequences. Not to mention, that the AGRARIAN laws, ſo frequently claimed in ROME, and carried to execution in many GREEK cities, proceeded, all of them, from a general idea of the utility of this principle.

BUT hiſtorians, and even common ſenſe, may inform us, that however ſpecious theſe ideas of *perfect* equality may ſeem, they are really, at the bottom, *impracticable*; and were they not ſo, would be extremely *pernicious* to human ſociety. Render poſſeſſions ever ſo equal, men's different degrees of art, care, and induſtry, will immediately break that equality. Or if you check theſe virtues, you reduce ſociety to the extremeſt indigence; and inſtead of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the whole community. The moſt rigorous inquiſition too, is requiſite to watch every inequality on its firſt appearance; and the moſt ſevere juriſdiction, to puniſh and redreſs it. But beſides, that ſo much authority muſt ſoon degenerate into tyranny, and be exerted with great partialities; who can poſſibly be poſſeſſed of it, in ſuch a ſituation as is here ſuppoſed? Perfect equality of poſſeſſions, deſtroying all ſubordination, weakens extremely the authority of magiſtracy, and muſt reduce all power nearly to a level, as well as property.

WE may conclude, therefore, that, in order to eſtabliſh laws for the regulation of property, we muſt be acquainted with the nature and ſituation of man; muſt reject appearances, which may be falſe, tho' ſpecious; and muſt ſearch for thoſe rules, which are, on the whole, moſt *uſeful* and *beneficial*. Vulgar ſenſe and ſlight experience are ſufficient for this purpoſe; where men give not way to too ſelfiſh avidity, or too extenſive enthuſiaſm.

WHO ſees not, for inſtance, that whatever is produced or improved by a man's art or induſtry ought, for ever, to be ſecured to him, in order to give encouragement to ſuch *uſeful* habits and accompliſhments? That the property ought alſo to deſcend to children and relations, for the ſame *uſeful* purpoſe? That it may be alienated by conſent, in order to beget that commerce and intercourſe, which is ſo *beneficial* to human ſociety? And that all contracts and promiſes ought carefully to be

WHAT is a man's property? Any thing, which it is lawful for him, and for him alone, to uſe. *But what rule have we, by which we can diſtinguiſh theſe objects?* Here we muſt have recourſe to ſtatutes, cuſtoms, precedents, analogies, and a hundred other circumſtances; ſome of which are conſtant and inflexible, ſome variable and arbitrary. But the ultimate point, in which they all profeſſedly terminate, is, the intereſt and happineſs of human ſociety. Where this enters not into conſideration, nothing can appear more whimſical, unnatural, and even ſuperſtitious, than all or moſt of the laws of juſtice and of property.

THOSE, who ridicule vulgar ſuperſtitions, and expoſe the folly of particular regards to meats, days, places, poſtures, apparel, have an eaſy taſk; while they conſider all the qualities and relations of the objects, and diſcover no adequate cauſe for that affection or antipathy, veneration or horror, which have ſo mighty an influence over a conſiderable part of mankind. A SYRIAN would have ſtarved rather than taſte pigeon; an EGYPTIAN would not have approached bacon: But if theſe ſpecies of food be examined by the ſenſes of ſight, ſmell, or taſte, or ſcrutinized by the ſciences of chymiſtry, medicine, or phyſics; no difference is ever found between them and any other ſpecies, nor can that preciſe circumſtance be pitched on, which may afford a juſt foundation for the religious paſſion. A fowl on Thurſday is lawful food; on Friday, abominable: Eggs in this houſe, and in this dioceſe are permitted during Lent; a hundred paces farther, to eat them is a damnable ſin. This earth or building, yeſterday, was prophane; to day, by the muttering of certain words, it has become holy and ſacred. Such reflections, as theſe, in the mouth of a philoſopher, one may ſafely ſay, are too obvious to have any influence; becauſe they muſt always, to every man, occur at firſt ſight; and where they prevail not, of themſelves, they are ſurely obſtructed by education, prejudice and paſſion, not by ignorance or miſtake.

IT may appear, to a careleſs view; or rather, a too abſtracted reflection; that there enters a like ſuperſtition into all the regards of juſtice; and that, if a man

that, in my opinion, never will reconcile with true philoſophy. Father MALEBRANCHE, as far as I can learn, was the firſt, that ſtarted this abſtract theory of morals, which was afterwards adopted by Dr. CLARKE and others; and as it excludes all ſentiment, and pretends to found every thing on reaſon, it has not wanted followers in this philoſophic age. See Section 1. and Appendix 1. With regard to juſtice, the virtue here treated of, the inference againſt this theory ſeems ſhort and concluſive. Property is allowed to be dependant on civil laws: Civil laws are allowed to have no object but the intereſt of ſociety: This therefore muſt be allowed to be the ſole foundation of property and juſtice. Not to mention, that our obligation itſelf to obey the magiſtrate and his laws is founded on nothing but the intereſts of ſociety.

If the ideas of juſtice, ſometimes, do not follow the diſpoſitions of civil law; we ſhall find, that theſe caſes, inſtead of objections, are confirmations of the theory delivered above. Where a civil law is ſo perverſe as to croſs all the intereſts of ſociety, it loſes all its authority, and men judge by the ideas of natural juſtice, which are conformable to thoſe intereſts. Sometimes alſo civil laws, for uſeful purpoſes, require a ceremony or form; and where that is wanting, their decrees run contrary to the uſual tenor of juſtice; but one, who takes advantage of ſuch chicanes, is not regarded as an honeſt man. Thus, the intereſts of ſociety require, that contracts be fulfilled; and there is not a more material article either of natural or civil juſtice: But the omiſſion of a trifling circumſtance will often, by law, invalidate a contract, *in foro humano*, but not *in foro conſcientiæ*, as divines expreſs themſelves. In theſe caſes, the magiſtrate is ſuppoſed only to withdraw his power of enforcing the right, not to have altered the right. Where his intention extends to the right, and is conformable to the intereſts of ſociety; it never fails to alter the right; a clear proof of the origin of juſtice and of property, as aſſigned above.

ſubjects

ſubjects its objects, or what we call property, to the ſame ſcrutiny of ſenſe and ſcience, he will not, by the moſt accurate enquiry, find any foundation for the difference made by moral ſentiment. I may lawfully nouriſh myſelf from this tree; but the fruit of another of the ſame ſpecies, ten paces off, 'tis criminal for me to touch. Had I worne this apparel an hour ago, I had merited the ſevereſt puniſhment; but a man, by pronouncing a few magical ſyllables, has now rendered it fit for my uſe and ſervice. Were this houſe placed in the neighboring territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell in it; but being built on this ſide the river, it is ſubject to a different municipal law, and I incur no blame or cenſure. The ſame ſpecies of reaſoning, it may be thought, which ſo ſucceſsfully expoſes ſuperſtition, is alſo applicable to juſtice; nor is it poſſible, in the one caſe more than in the other, to point out, in the object, that preciſe quality or circumſtance, which is the foundation of the ſentiment.

But there is this material difference between *ſuperſtition* and *juſtice*, that the former is frivolous, uſeleſs, and burthenſome; the latter is abſolutely requiſite to the well-being of mankind and exiſtence of ſociety. When we abſtract from this circumſtance (for 'tis too apparent ever to be overlooked) it muſt be confeſſed, that all regards to right and property, ſeem entirely without foundation, as much as the groſſeſt and moſt vulgar ſuperſtition. Were the intereſts of ſociety no way concerned, 'tis as unintelligible, why another's articulating certain ſounds, implying conſent, ſhould change the nature of my actions with regard to a particular object, as why the reciting of a liturgy by a prieſt, in a certain habit and poſture, ſhould dedicate a heap of brick and timber, and render it, thenceforth and for ever, ſacred *.

These

* 'Tis evident, that the will or conſent alone never transfers property, nor cauſes the obligation of a promiſe (for the ſame reaſoning extends to both) but the will muſt be expreſſed by words or ſigns, in order to impoſe a tye upon any man. The expreſſion, being once brought in as ſubſervient to the will, ſoon becomes the principal part of the promiſe; nor will a man be leſs bound by his word, tho' he ſecretly give a different direction to his intention, and with-hold the aſſent of his mind. But tho' the expreſſion makes, on moſt occaſions, the whole of the promiſe, yet it does not always ſo; and one who ſhould make uſe of any expreſſion, of which he knows not the meaning, and which he uſes without any ſenſe of the conſequences, would not certainly be bound by it. Nay, tho' he know its meaning, yet if he uſes it in jeſt only, and with ſuch ſigns as ſhow evidently, that he has no ſerious intention of binding himſelf, he would not lie under any obligation of performance; but 'tis neceſſary, that the words be a perfect expreſſion of the will, without any contrary ſigns. Nay, even this we muſt not carry ſo far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our quickneſs of underſtanding, we conjecture, from certain ſigns, to have an intention of deceiving us, is not bound by his expreſſion or verbal promiſe, if we accept of it; but muſt limit this concluſion to thoſe caſes, where the ſigns are of a different nature from thoſe of deceit. All thoſe contradictions are eaſily accounted for, if juſtice ariſes entirely from its uſefulneſs to ſociety; but will never be explained on any other hypotheſis.

'Tis remarkable, that the moral deciſions of the *Jeſuits* and other relaxed caſuiſts, were commonly formed in proſecution of ſome ſuch ſubtilities of reaſoning as are here pointed out, and proceeded as much from the habit of ſcholaſtic refinement as from any corruption of the heart, if we may follow the authority of Monſ. Bayle. See his dictionary, article Loyola. And why has the indignation of mankind roſe ſo high againſt theſe caſuiſts; but becauſe every one perceived, that human ſociety could not ſubſiſt were ſuch practices authorized, and that morals muſt always be handled with a view to public intereſt, more than philoſophical regularity? If the ſecret direction of the intention, ſaid every man of ſenſe, could invalidate a contract; where is our ſecurity? And yet a metaphyſical ſchoolman might think, that where an intention was ſuppoſed to be requiſite, if that intention really had not place, no conſequence ought to follow, and no obligation be impoſed. The caſuiſtical ſubtilities may not be

THESE reflections are far from weakening the obligations of juſtice, or diminiſhing any thing from the moſt ſacred attention to property. On the contrary, ſuch ſentiments muſt acquire new force from the preſent reaſoning. For what ſtronger foundation can be deſired or conceived for any duty than to obſerve, that human ſociety, or even human nature could not ſubſiſt, without the eſtabliſhment of it; and will ſtill arrive at greater degrees of happineſs and perfection, the more inviolable the regard is, which is paid to that duty?

IF juſtice aroſe from a ſimple, original inſtinct in the human breaſt, without any reflection, even on thoſe obvious intereſts of ſociety, which abſolutely require that virtue; it muſt follow, that property, which is the object of juſtice, is alſo diſtinguiſhed by a ſimple, original inſtinct, and is not aſcertained by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard of ſuch an inſtinct? Or is this a ſubject, in which new diſcoveries will be made? We may as well expect to diſcover, in the body, new ſenſes, which had before eſcaped all mankind.

BUT farther, tho' it ſeems a very ſimple propoſition to ſay, that nature, by an inſtinctive ſentiment, diſtinguiſhes property, yet in reality we ſhall find, that there are required for that purpoſe ten thouſand different inſtincts, and theſe employed about objects of the greateſt intricacy and niceſt diſcernment. For when a definition of *property* is demanded, that relation is found to reſolve itſelf into any poſſeſſion acquired by occupation, by induſtry, by preſcription, by inheritance, by contract, &c. Can we think, that nature, by an original inſtinct, inſtructs us in all theſe methods of acquiſition?

THESE words too, inheritance and contract, ſtand for ideas infinitely complicated; and to define them exactly, a thouſand volumes of laws, and innumerable volumes of commentators, have not been found ſufficient. Does nature, whoſe inſtincts in men are all ſimple, embrace ſuch complicated and artificial objects, and create a rational creature, without truſting any thing to the operation of his reaſon?

BUT even tho' all this were admitted, it would not be ſatisfactory. Poſitive laws can certainly tranſfer property. Is it by another original inſtinct, that we recognize the authority of kings and ſenates, and mark all the boundaries of their juriſdiction? Judges too, even tho' their ſentence be erroneous and illegal, muſt be allowed, for the ſake of peace and order, to have deciſive authority, and ultimately to determine property. Have we original, innate ideas of prætors and chancellors and juries? Who ſees not, that all theſe inſtitutions ariſe merely from the neceſſities of human ſociety?

ALL birds of the ſame ſpecies, in every age and country, build their neſts alike: In this, we ſee the force of inſtinct. Men, in different times and places, frame their houſes differently: Here we perceive the influence of reaſon and cuſtom. A like inference may be drawn from comparing the inſtinct of generation and the inſtitution of property.

HOWEVER great the variety of municipal laws, it muſt be confeſſed, that their great lines pretty regularly concur; becauſe the purpoſes, to which they tend, are

greater than the ſubtilities of lawyers, hinted at above; but as the former are *pernicious*, and the latter *innocent* and even *neceſſary*, this is the reaſon of the very different reception they meet with from the world.

every

every where exactly ſimilar. In like manner, all houſes have a roof and walls, and windows and chimneys; tho' infinitely diverſified in their ſhape, figure, and materials. The purpoſes of the latter, directed to the conveniencies of human life, beſpeak not more plainly their origin from reaſon and reflection, than do thoſe of the former, which point all to a like end.

I NEED not mention the variations which all the rules of property receive from the finer turns and connexions of the imagination, and from the ſubtilities and abſtractions of law topics and reaſonings. There is no poſſibility of reconciling this obſervation to the notion of original inſtincts.

WHAT alone will beget a doubt of the theory, on which I inſiſt, is the influence of education and acquired habits, by which we are ſo accuſtomed to blame injuſtice, that we are not, in every inſtance, conſcious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious conſequences of it. The views the moſt familiar to us are apt, for that very reaſon, to eſcape us; and what we have very frequently performed from certain motives, we are apt likewiſe to continue mechanically, without recalling, on every occaſion, the reflections, which firſt determined us. The convenience or rather neceſſity, which leads to juſtice, is ſo univerſal, and every where points ſo much to the ſame rules, that the habit takes place in all ſocieties; and it is not without ſome ſcrutiny, that we are able to aſcertain its true origin. The matter, however, is not ſo obſcure, but that, even in common life, we have, every moment, recourſe to the principle of utility, and aſk, *What muſt become of the world, if ſuch practices prevail? How could ſociety ſubſiſt under ſuch diſorders? Were the diſtinction or ſeparation of poſſeſſions entirely uſeleſs, can any one conceive, that it ever ſhould have obtained in ſociety?*

THUS we ſeem, upon the whole, to have attained a knowlege of the force of that principle here inſiſted on, and can determine what degree of eſteem or moral approbation may reſult from reflections on public intereſt and utility. The neceſſity of juſtice to the ſupport of ſociety is the SOLE foundation of that virtue; and ſince no moral excellence is more highly eſteemed, we may conclude, that this circumſtance of uſefulneſs has, in general, the ſtrongeſt energy, and moſt entire command over our ſentiments. It muſt, therefore, be the ſource of a conſiderable part of the merit, aſcribed to humanity, benevolence, friendſhip, public ſpirit, and other ſocial virtues of that ſtamp; as it is the SOLE ſource of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, juſtice, veracity, integrity, and thoſe other eſtimable and uſeful qualities and principles. 'Tis entirely agreeable to the rules of philoſophy, and even of common reaſon; where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one inſtance, to aſcribe to it a like energy in all ſimilar inſtances †.

† This is Sir ISAAC NEWTON's ſecond rule of philoſophizing, *Principia*, lib. 3.

SECTION IV.

OF POLITICAL SOCIETY.

HAD every man ſufficient *ſagacity* to perceive, at all times, the ſtrong intereſt, which binds him to the obſervance of juſtice and equity, and *ſtrength of mind* ſufficient to perſevere in a ſteady adherence to a general and a diſtant intereſt, in oppoſition to the allurements of preſent pleaſure and advantage: There had never, in that caſe, been any ſuch thing as government or political ſociety, but each man following his natural liberty, had lived in entire peace and harmony with all others. What need of poſitive laws, where natural juſtice is, of itſelf, a ſufficient reſtraint? Why create magiſtrates, where there never ariſes any diſorder or iniquity? Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every inſtance, the utmoſt exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial? 'Tis evident, that, if government were totally uſeleſs, it never could have place, and that the SOLE foundation of the duty of ALLEGIANCE is the *advantage* which it procures to ſociety, by preſerving peace and order among mankind.

WHEN a number of political ſocieties are erected, and maintain a great intercourſe together, a new ſet of rules are immediately diſcovered to be *uſeful* in that particular ſituation; and accordingly take place, under the title of LAWS of NATIONS. Of this kind are, the ſacredneſs of the perſons of ambaſſadors, abſtaining from poiſoned arms, quarter in war, with others of that kind; which are plainly calculated for the *advantage* of ſtates and kingdoms, in their intercourſe with each other.

THE rules of juſtice, ſuch as prevail among individuals, are not entirely ſuſpended among political ſocieties. All princes pretend a regard to the rights of others; and ſome, no doubt, without hypocriſy. Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent ſtates, which would only be ſo much waſte of parchment, if they were not found, by experience, to have *ſome* influence and authority. But here is the difference betwixt kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot, by any means, ſubſiſt, without the aſſociation of individuals; and that aſſociation never could have place, were no regard paid to the laws of equity and juſtice. Diſorder, confuſion, the war of all againſt all, are the neceſſary conſequences of ſuch a licentious conduct. But nations can ſubſiſt without intercourſe. They may even ſubſiſt, in ſome degree, under a general war. The obſervance of juſtice, tho' uſeful among them, is not guarded by ſo ſtrong a neceſſity as among individuals; and the *moral obligation* holds proportion with the *uſefulneſs*. All politicians will allow, and moſt philoſophers, that REASONS of STATE may, in particular emergencies, diſpenſe with the rules of juſtice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the ſtrict obſervance of it would be prejudicial, in a conſiderable degree, to either of the contracting parties. But nothing leſs than the extremeſt neceſſity, 'tis confeſt, can juſtify individuals in a breach of promiſe, or an invaſion of the properties of others.

In a confederated commonwealth, ſuch as the Achæan republic of old, or the Swiss cantons and united provinces in modern times; as the league has here a peculiar *utility*, the conditions of union have a peculiar ſacredneſs and authority, and a violation of them would be equally criminal, or even more criminal, than any private injury or injuſtice.

The long and helpleſs infancy of man requires the combination of parents for the ſubſiſtence of their young; and that combination requires the virtue of CHASTITY or fidelity to the marriage-bed. Without ſuch an *utility*, it will readily be owned, that ſuch a virtue would never have been thought of *.

An infidelity of this nature is much more *pernicious* in *women* than in *men*. Hence the laws of chaſtity are much ſtricter over the one ſex than over the other †.

Thoſe who live in the ſame family have ſo frequent opportunities of licence of this kind, that nothing could preſerve purity of manners, were marriage allowed among the neareſt relations, or any intercourſe of love between them ratified by law and cuſtom. INCEST, therefore, being *pernicious* in a ſuperior degree, has alſo a ſuperior turpitude and moral deformity, annexed to it.

What is the reaſon, why, by the Greek laws, one might marry a half-ſiſter by the father, but not by the mother? Plainly this. The manners of the Greeks were ſo reſerved, that a man was never permitted to approach the women's apartment, even in the ſame family, unleſs where he viſited his own mother. His ſtep-mother and her children were as much ſhut up from him as the women of any other family, and there was as little danger of any criminal correſpondence between them. Uncles and nieces, for a like reaſon, might marry at Athens; but neither theſe nor half-brothers and ſiſters could contract that alliance at Rome, where the intercourſe was more open betwixt the ſexes. Public utility is the cauſe of all theſe variations.

To repeat, to a man's prejudice, any thing that eſcaped him in private converſation, or to make any ſuch uſe of his private letters, is highly blamed:

* The only ſolution, which Plato gives to all the objections, that might be raiſed againſt the community of women, eſtabliſhed in his imaginary commonwealth, is, Καλλιστα γαρ δη τυδο και λεγεται και λελεξεται, οτι το μεν ωφελιμον καλον. Το δε βλαβερον αισχρον. *Scite enim iſtud & dicitur & dicetur, Id quod utile ſit honeſtum eſſe, quod autem inutile ſit turpe eſſe.* De Rep. lib. 5. p. 457. Ex edit. Serr. And this maxim will admit of no doubt, where public utility is concerned; which is Plato's meaning. And indeed to what other purpoſe do all the ideas of chaſtity and modeſty ſerve? *Niſi utile eſt quod facimus, fruſtra eſt gloria*, ſays Phædrus. Καλον των βλαβερων ουδεν, ſays Plutarch *de vitioſo pudore.* Nihil eorum quæ damnoſa ſunt, pulchrum eſt. The ſame was the opinion of the Stoics. Φασιν γαρ οι Στωικοι αγαθον ειναι ωφελειαν η δε στερεαν ωφελειας, ωφελειν μεν λεγοντες την αρετην και την σπουδαιαν σοφιαν. Sext. Emp. lib. 3. cap. 20.

† Theſe rules have all a reference to generation; and yet women paſt child-bearing are no more ſuppoſed to be exempted from them than thoſe in the flower of their youth and beauty. *General rules* are often extended beyond the principle, whence they firſt ariſe; and this in all matters of taſte and ſentiment. 'Tis a vulgar ſtory at Paris, that during the rage of the Missisippi, a hump backed fellow went every day into the Rue de Quincempoix, where the ſtock-jobbers met in great crowds, and was well paid for allowing them to make uſe of his hump as a deſk, in order to ſign their contracts upon it. Would the fortune which he raiſed by this invention make him a handſome fellow; tho' it be confeſt, that perſonal beauty ariſes very much from ideas of utility? The imagination is influenced by aſſociations of ideas; which, tho' they ariſe, at firſt, from the judgment, are not eaſily altered by every particular exception, that occurs to us. To which we may add, in the preſent caſe of chaſtity, that the example of the old would be pernicious to the young; and that women continually thinking, that a certain time would bring them the liberty of indulgence, would naturally advance that period, and think more lightly of this whole duty, ſo requiſite to ſociety.

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The free and ſocial intercourſe of minds muſt be extremely checked, where no ſuch rules of fidelity are eſtabliſhed.

Even in repeating ſtories, whence we can ſee no ill conſequences to reſult, the giving one's authors is regarded as a piece of indiſcretion, if not of immorality. Theſe ſtories, in paſſing from hand to hand, and receiving all the uſual variations, frequently come about to the perſons concerned, and produce animoſities and quarrels among people, whoſe intentions are the moſt innocent and inoffenſive.

To pry into ſecrets, to open or even read the letters of others, to play the ſpy upon their words and looks and actions: what habits more inconvenient in ſociety? What habits, of conſequence, more blameable?

This principle is alſo the foundation of moſt of the laws of good-manners; a kind of leſſer morality calculated for the eaſe of company and converſation. Too much or too little ceremony are both blamed, and every thing, which promotes eaſe, without an indecent familiarity, is uſeful and laudable.

Constancy in friendſhips, attachments, and familiarities is commonly very commendable, and is requiſite to ſupport truſt and good correſpondence in ſociety. But in places of general, tho' caſual concourſe, where the purſuit of health and pleaſure brings people promiſcuouſly together, public conveniency has diſpenſed with this maxim; and cuſtom there promotes an unreſerved converſation for the time, by indulging the privilege of dropping afterwards every indifferent acquaintance, without breach of civility or good-manners.

Even in ſocieties, which are eſtabliſhed on principles the moſt immoral, and the moſt deſtructive to the intereſts of the general ſociety, there are required certain rules, which a ſpecies of falſe honor, as well as private intereſt, engages the members to obſerve. Robbers and pyrates, it has often been remarked, could not maintain their pernicious confederacy, did they not eſtabliſh a new diſtributive juſtice among themſelves, and recall thoſe laws of equity, which they have violated with the reſt of mankind.

I hate a drinking companion, ſays the Greek proverb, who never forgets. The follies of the laſt debauch ſhould be buried in eternal oblivion, in order to give full ſcope to the follies of the next.

Among nations, where an immoral gallantry, if covered with a thin veil of myſtery, is, in ſome degree, authorized by cuſtom, there immediately ariſe a ſet of rules, calculated for the conveniency of that attachment. The famous court or parliament of love in Provence decided formally all difficult caſes of this nature.

In ſocieties for play, there are laws required for the conduct of the game, and theſe laws are different in each game. The foundation, I own, of ſuch ſocieties is frivolous; and the laws are, in a great meaſure, tho' not altogether, capricious and arbitrary. So far is there a material difference between them and the rules of juſtice, fidelity and loyalty. The general ſocieties of men are abſolutely requiſite for the ſubſiſtence of the ſpecies; and the public conveniency, which regulates morals, is inviolably eſtabliſhed in the nature of man, and of the world, in which he lives. The compariſon, therefore, in theſe reſpects, is very imperfect. We may only learn from it the neceſſity of rules, wherever men have any intercourſe with each other.

They cannot even paſs each other on the road without rules. Waggoners, coachmen, and poſtilions have principles, by which they give way; and theſe are chiefly founded on mutual eaſe and convenience. Sometimes alſo they are arbitrary, at leaſt dependant on a kind of capricious analogy, like many of the reaſonings of lawyers *.

To carry the matter farther, we may obſerve, that 'tis impoſſible for men ſo much as to murther each other without ſtatutes and maxims, and an idea of juſtice and honor. War has its laws as well as peace; and even that ſportive kind of war carried on among wreſtlers, boxers, cudgel-players, gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles. Common intereſt and utility beget infallibly a ſtandard of right and wrong among the parties concerned.

SECTION V.

WHY UTILITY PLEASES.

PART I.

It ſeems ſo natural a thought to aſcribe to their utility the praiſe which we beſtow on the ſocial virtues, that one would expect to meet with this principle everywhere in moral writers, as the chief foundation of their reaſoning and inquiry. In common life, we may obſerve, that the circumſtance of utility is always appealed to; nor is it ſuppoſed, that a greater eulogy can be given to any man, than to diſplay his uſefulneſs to the public, and enumerate the ſervices which he has performed to mankind and ſociety. What praiſe, even of an inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance of its parts deſtroy not its fitneſs for any uſeful purpoſe! And how ſatisfactory an apology for any diſproportion or ſeeming deformity, if we can ſhow the neceſſity of that particular conſtruction for the uſe intended! A ſhip appears infinitely more beautiful to an artiſt, or one moderately ſkilled in navigation, where its prow is wide and ſwelling beyond its poop, than if it were framed with a preciſe geometrical regularity, in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics. A building, whoſe doors and windows were exact ſquares, would hurt the eye by that very proportion; as ill adapted to the human figure, for whoſe ſervice the fabric was intended. What wonder then, that a man, whoſe habits and conduct are hurtful to ſociety, and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an intercourſe with him, ſhould, on that account, be an object of

* That the lighter machine yields to the heavier, and in machines of the ſame kind, that the empty yield to the loaded: This rule is founded on convenience. That thoſe who are going to the capital take place, of thoſe who are coming from it; this ſeems to be founded on ſome idea of the dignity of the great city, and of the preference of the future to the paſt. From like reaſons, among foot-walkers, the right-hand entitles a man to the wall, and prevents joſtling, which peaceable people find very diſagreeable and inconvenient.

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diſapprobation, and communicate to every ſpectator the ſtrongeſt ſentiments of diſguſt and hatred *?

But perhaps the difficulty of accounting for theſe effects of uſefulneſs, or its contrary, has kept philoſophers from admitting them into their ſyſtems of ethics, and has induced them rather to employ any other principle, in explaining the origin of moral good and evil. But 'tis no juſt reaſon for rejecting any principle, confirmed by experience, that we cannot give a ſatisfactory account of its origin, nor are able to reſolve it into other more general principles. And if we would employ a little thought on the preſent ſubject, we need be at no loſs to account for the influence of utility, and to deduce it from principles, the moſt known and avowed in human nature.

From the apparent uſefulneſs of the ſocial virtues, it has readily been inferred by ſceptics, both antient and modern, that all moral diſtinctions ariſe from education, and were, at firſt, invented, and afterwards encouraged, by the art of politicians, in order to render men tractable, and ſubdue their natural ferocity and ſelfiſhneſs, which incapacitated them for ſociety. This principle indeed of precept and education, muſt be ſo far owned to have a powerful influence, that it may frequently encreaſe or diminiſh, beyond their natural ſtandard, the ſentiments of approbation or diſlike; and may even, in particular inſtances, create, without any natural principle, a new ſentiment of this kind; as is evident in all ſuperſtitious practices and obſervances: But that *all* moral affection or diſlike ariſes from this origin, will never ſurely be allowed by any judicious enquirer. Had nature made no ſuch diſtinction, founded in the original conſtitution of the mind, the words, *honorable* and *ſhameful*, *lovely* and *odious*, *noble* and *deſpicable*, had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented theſe terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience. So that nothing can be more ſuperficial than this paradox of the ſceptics; and it were well, if, in the abſtruſer ſtudies of logic and metaphyſics, we could as eaſily get rid of the cavils of that ſect, as in the more practical and intelligible ſciences of politics and morals.

The ſocial virtues muſt, therefore, be allowed to have a natural beauty and amiableneſs, which, at firſt, antecedent to all precept or education, recommends them to the eſteem of uninſtructed mankind, and engages their affections. And

* We ought not to imagine, becauſe an inanimate object may be uſeful as well as a man, that therefore it ought alſo, according to this ſyſtem, to merit the appellation of *virtuous*. The ſentiments, excited by utility, are, in the two caſes, very different; and the one is mixed with affection, eſteem, approbation, &c. and not the other. In like manner, an inanimate object may have good color and proportions as well as a human figure. But can we ever be in love with the former? There are a numerous ſet of paſſions and ſentiments, of which thinking rational beings are, by the original conſtitution of nature, the only proper objects: And tho' the very ſame qualities be transferred to an inſenſible, inanimate being, they will not excite the ſame ſentiments. The beneficial qualities of herbs and minerals are, indeed, ſometimes called their *virtues*; but this is an effect of the caprice of language, which ought not to be regarded in reaſoning. For tho' there be a ſpecies of approbation, attending even inanimate objects, when beneficial, yet this ſentiment is ſo weak, and ſo different from what is directed to beneficent magiſtrates or ſtateſmen, that they ought not to be ranked under the ſame claſs or appellation.

A very ſmall variation of the object, even where the ſame qualities are preſerved, will deſtroy a ſentiment. Thus; the ſame beauty, transferred to a different ſex, excites no amorous paſſion, where nature is not extremely perverted.

as the utility of these virtues is the chief circumstance, whence they derive their merit, it follows, that the end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be some way agreeable to us, and take hold of some natural affection. It must please, either from considerations of self-interest, or from more generous motives and regards.

It has often been asserted, that, as every man has a strong connexion with society, and perceives the impossibility of his solitary subsistence, he becomes, on that account, favorable to all those habits or principles, which promote order in society, and ensure to him the quiet possession of so inestimable a blessing. As much as we value our own happiness and welfare, as much must we value the practice of justice and humanity, by which alone the social confederacy can be maintained, and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and assistance.

This deduction of morals from self-love, or a regard to private interest, is a very obvious thought, and has not arisen wholly from the wanton sallies and sportive assaults of the sceptics. To mention no others, Polybius, one of the gravest and most judicious, as well as most moral writers of antiquity, has assigned this selfish origin to all our sentiments of virtue [g]. But tho' the solid, practical sense of that author, and his aversion to all vain subtilties, render his authority on the present subject very considerable; yet this is not an affair to be decided by authority; and the voice of nature and experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory.

We frequently bestow praises on virtuous actions, performed in very distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty of imagination would not discover any appearance of self-interest, or find any connexion of our present happiness and security with events so widely separated from us.

A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adversary, commands our approbation; while in its consequences it may be acknowleged prejudicial to our particular interests.

Where private advantage concurs with general affection for virtue, we readily perceive and avow the mixture of these distinct sentiments, which have a very different feeling and influence on the mind. We praise, perhaps, with more alacrity, where the generous, humane action contributes to our particular interest: But the topics of praise which we insist on are very wide of this circumstance. And we may attempt to bring over others to our sentiments, without endeavoring to convince them, that they reap any advantage from the actions, which we recommend to their approbation and applause.

Frame the model of a praise-worthy character, consisting of all the most amiable moral virtues: Give instances, in which these display themselves, after an eminent and extraordinary manner: You readily engage the esteem and approbation of all your audience, who never so much as enquire in what age and country the

[g] Undutifulness to parents, is disapproved of by mankind, προορωμενους το μελλον, και συλλογιζομενους οτι το παραπλησιον εκαστοις αυτων συγκυρησει. Ingratitude for a like reason (tho' he seems there to mix a more generous regard) συναγανακτουντας μεν τω πελας, αναφεροντας δ' επ αυτους το παραπλησιον εξ ων υπογιγνεται τις ενοια παρεκαστω του καθηκοντος δυναμεως και θεωριας. Lib. 6. cap. 4. Perhaps the historian only meant, that our sympathy and humanity was more enlivened, by our considering the similarity of our case with that of the persons suffering; which is a just sentiment.

perſon lived, who poſſeſſed theſe noble qualities: A circumſtance, however, of all others, the moſt material to ſelf-love, or a concern for our own individual happineſs.

ONCE on a time, a ſtateſman, in the ſhock and concurrence of parties, prevailed ſo far as to procure, by his eloquence, the baniſhment of an able adverſary; whom he ſecretly followed, offering him money for his ſupport during his exile, and ſoothing him with topics of conſolation on his misfortunes. *Alas!* cries the baniſhed ſtateſman, *with what regret muſt I leave my friends in this city, where even enemies are ſo generous!* Virtue, tho' in an enemy, here pleaſed him: And we alſo give it the juſt tribute of praiſe and approbation; nor do we retract theſe ſentiments, when we hear, that the action paſt at ATHENS, about two thouſand years ago, and that the perſons names were ESCHINES and DEMOSTHENES.

WHAT is that to me? There are few occaſions, when this queſtion is not pertinent: And had it that univerſal, infallible influence ſuppoſed, it would turn into ridicule every compoſition, and almoſt every converſation, which contain any praiſe or cenſure of men and manners.

'TIS but a weak ſubterfuge, when preſſed by theſe facts and arguments, to ſay, that we tranſport ourſelves, by the force of imagination, into diſtant ages and countries, and conſider the advantage, which we ſhould have reaped from theſe characters, had we been contemporaries, and had any commerce with the perſons. 'Tis not conceivable, how a *real* ſentiment or paſſion can ever ariſe from a known *imaginary* intereſt; eſpecially when our *real* intereſt is ſtill kept in view, and is often acknowleged to be entirely diſtinct from the imaginary, and even ſometimes oppoſite to it.

A MAN, brought to the brink of a precipice, cannot look down without trembling; and the ſentiment of *imaginary* danger actuates him, in oppoſition to the opinion and belief of *real* ſafety. But the imagination is here aſſiſted by the preſence of a ſtriking object; and yet prevails not, except it be alſo aided by novelty, and the unuſual appearance of the object. Cuſtom ſoon reconciles us to heights and precipices, and wears off theſe falſe and deluſive terrors. The reverſe is obſervable in the eſtimates which we form of characters and manners; and the more we habituate ourſelves to an accurate ſcrutiny of the moral ſpecies, the more delicate feeling do we aequire of the moſt minute diſtinctions between vice and virtue. Such frequent occaſion, indeed, have we, in common life, to pronounce all kinds of moral determinations, that no object of this kind can be new or unuſual to us; nor could any *falſe* views or prepoſſeſſions maintain their ground againſt an experience, ſo common and familiar. Experience being chiefly what forms the aſſociations of ideas, 'tis impoſſible, that any aſſociation could eſtabliſh and ſupport itſelf, in direct oppoſition to that principle.

USEFULNESS is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily obſervation. But, *uſeful?* For what? For ſome body's intereſt, ſurely. Whoſe intereſt then? Not our own only: For our approbation frequently extends farther. It muſt, therefore, be the intereſt of thoſe, who are ſerved by the character or action approved of; and theſe we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we ſhall diſcover the great ſource of moral diſtinctions.

PART

PART II.

SELF-LOVE is a principle in human nature of ſuch extenſive energy, and the intereſt of each individual is, in general, ſo cloſely connected with that of the community, that thoſe philoſophers were excuſable, who fancied, that all our concern for the public might be reſolved into a concern for our own happineſs and preſervation. They ſaw, every moment, inſtances of approbation or blame, ſatisfaction or diſpleaſure towards characters and actions; they denominated the objects of theſe ſentiments, *virtues* or *vices*; they obſerved, that the former had a tendency to encreaſe the happineſs, and the latter the miſery of ſociety; they aſked, whether it was poſſible that we could have any general concern for ſociety, or any diſintereſted reſentment of the welfare or injury of others; they found it ſimpler to conſider all theſe ſentiments as modifications of ſelf-love; and they diſcovered a pretext, at leaſt, for this unity of principle, in that cloſe union of intereſt, which is ſo obſervable between the public and each individual.

BUT notwithſtanding this frequent confuſion of intereſts, 'tis eaſy to attain what natural philoſophers, after my lord BACON, have affected to call the *experimentum crucis*, or that experiment, which points out the right way in any doubt or ambiguity. We have found inſtances, in which private intereſt was ſeparated from public; in which it was even contrary: And yet we obſerved the moral ſentiment to continue, notwithſtanding this disjunction of intereſts. And wherever theſe diſtinct intereſts ſenſibly concurred, we always found a ſenſible encreaſe of the ſentiment, and a more warm affection to virtue, and deteſtation of vice, or what we properly call, *gratitude* and *revenge*. Compelled by theſe inſtances, we muſt renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral ſentiment by the principle of ſelf-love. We muſt adopt a more public affection, and allow, that the intereſts of ſociety are not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us. Uſefulneſs is only a tendency to a certain end; and 'tis a contradiction in terms, that any thing pleaſes as means to an end, where the end itſelf no way affects us. If therefore uſefulneſs be a ſource of moral ſentiment, and if this uſefulneſs be not always conſidered with a reference to ſelf; it follows, that every thing, which contributes to the happineſs of ſociety, recommends itſelf directly to our approbation and good-will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality: And what need we ſeek for abſtruſe and remote ſyſtems, when there occurs one ſo obvious and natural [h]?

[h] 'Tis needleſs to puſh our reſearches ſo far as to aſk, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. 'Tis ſufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. We muſt ſtop ſomewhere in our examination of cauſes; and there are, in every ſcience, ſome general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general. No man is abſolutely indifferent to the happineſs and miſery of others. The firſt has a natural tendency to give pleaſure; the ſecond, pain. This every one may find in himſelf. It is not probable, that theſe principles can be reſolved into principles more ſimple and univerſal, whatever attempts may have been made to that purpoſe. But if it were poſſible, it belongs not to the preſent ſubject; and we may here ſafely conſider theſe principles as original: Happy, if we can render all the conſequences ſufficiently plain and perſpicuous.

HAVE we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity and benevolence? Or to conceive, that the very aſpect of happineſs, joy, proſperity, gives pleaſure; that of pain, ſuffering, ſorrow, communicates uneaſineſs? The human countenance, ſays HORACE†, borrows ſmiles or tears from the human countenance. Reduce a perſon to ſolitude, and he loſes all enjoyment, except merely of the ſpeculative kind; and that becauſe the movements of his heart are not forwarded by correſpondent movements in his fellow-creatures. The ſigns of ſorrow and mourning, tho' arbitrary, affects us with melancholy; but the natural ſymptoms, tears and cries and groans, never fail to infuſe compaſſion and uneaſineſs. And if the effects of miſery touch us in ſo lively a manner; can we be ſuppoſed altogether inſenſible or indifferent towards its cauſes; when a malicious or treacherous character and behavior are preſented to us?

WE enter, I ſhall ſuppoſe, into a convenient, warm, well-contrived apartment: We neceſſarily receive a pleaſure from its very ſurvey; becauſe it preſents us with the pleaſing ideas of eaſe, ſatisfaction, and enjoyment. The hoſpitable, good-humored, humane landlord appears. This circumſtance ſurely muſt embelliſh the whole; nor can we eaſily forbear reflecting, with pleaſure, on the ſatisfaction which reſults to every one from his intercourſe and good-offices.

HIS whole family, by the freedom, eaſe, confidence, and calm enjoyment, diffuſed over their countenances, ſufficiently expreſs their happineſs. I have a pleaſing ſympathy in the proſpect of ſo much joy, and can never conſider the ſource of it, without the moſt agreeable emotions.

HE tells me, that an oppreſſive and powerful neighbor had attempted to diſpoſſeſs him of his inheritance; and had long diſturbed all his innocent and ſocial pleaſures. I feel an immediate indignation ariſe in me againſt ſuch violence and injury.

BUT 'tis no wonder, he adds, that a private wrong ſhould proceed from a man, who had enſlaved provinces, depopulated cities, and made the field and ſcaffold ſtream with human blood. I am ſtruck with horror at the proſpect of ſo much miſery, and am actuated by the ſtrongeſt antipathy againſt its author.

IN general, 'tis certain, that wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converſe about; every thing ſtill preſents us with the view of human happineſs or miſery, and excites in our breaſts a ſympathetic movement of pleaſure or uneaſineſs. In our ſerious occupations, in our careleſs amuſements, this principle ſtill exerts its active energy.

A MAN, who enters the theatre, is immediately ſtruck the view of ſo great a multitude, participating of one common amuſement; and experiences from their very aſpect, a ſuperior ſenſibility or diſpoſition of being affected with every ſentiment, which he ſhares with his fellow-creatures.

HE obſerves the actors to be animated by the appearance of a full audience; and raiſed to a degree of enthuſiaſm, which they cannot command in any ſolitary or calm moment.

EVERY movement of the theatre, by a ſkilful poet, is communicated, as it were by magic, to the ſpectators; who weep, tremble, reſent, rejoice, and

† Uti ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent
Humani vultus. HOR.

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are enflamed with all the variety of paſſions, which actuate the ſeveral perſonages of the drama.

WHERE any event croſſes our wiſhes, and interrupts the happineſs of the favorite perſonages, we feel a ſenſible anxiety and concern. But where their ſufferings proceed from the treachery, cruelty, or tyranny of an enemy, our breaſts are affected with the livelieſt reſentment againſt the author of theſe calamities.

'TIS here eſteemed contrary to the rules of art to repreſent any thing cool and indifferent. A diſtant friend, or a confident, who has no immediate intereſt in the cataſtrophe, ought, if poſſible, to be avoided by the poet; as communicating a like indifference to the audience, and checking the progreſs of the paſſions.

No ſpecies of poetry is more entertaining than *paſtoral*; and every one is ſenſible, that the chief ſource of its pleaſure ariſes from thoſe images of a gentle and tender tranquillity, which it repreſents in its perſonages, and of which it communicates a like ſentiment to the reader. SANNAZARIUS, who transferred the ſcene to the ſea-ſhore, tho' he preſented the moſt magnificent object in nature, is confeſſed to have erred in his choice. The idea of toil, labor, and danger, ſuffered by the fiſhermen, is painful; by an unavoidable ſympathy, which attends every conception of human happineſs or miſery.

WHEN I was twenty, ſays a FRENCH poet, OVID was my choice: Now I am forty, I declare for HORACE. We enter, to be ſure, more readily into ſentiments, which reſemble thoſe we feel every moment: But no paſſion, when well repreſented, can be entirely indifferent to us; becauſe there is none, of which every man has not within him, at leaſt, the ſeeds and firſt principles. 'Tis the buſineſs of poetry to approach every object by lively imagery and deſcription, and make it look like truth and reality: A certain proof, that wherever that reality is found, our minds are diſpoſed to be ſtrongly affected by it.

ANY recent event or piece of news, by which the fortunes of ſtates, provinces or many individuals are affected, is extremely intereſting even to thoſe whoſe welfare is not immediately engaged. Such intelligence is propagated with celerity, heard with avidity, and enquired into with attention and concern. The intereſts of ſociety appear, on this occaſion, to be, in ſome degree, the intereſt of each individual. The imagination is ſure to be affected; tho' the paſſions excited may not always be ſo ſtrong and ſteady as to have great influence on the conduct and behavior.

THE peruſal of a hiſtory ſeems a calm entertainment; but would be no entertainment at all, did not our hearts beat with correſpondent movements to thoſe deſcribed by the hiſtorian.

THUCYDIDES and GUICCIARDIN ſupport with difficulty our attention; while the former deſcribes the trivial rencounters of the ſmall cities of GREECE, and the latter the harmleſs wars of PISA. The few perſons intereſted, and the ſmall intereſt fill not the imagination, and engage not the affections. The deep diſtreſs of the numerous ATHENIAN army before SYRACUSE; the danger, which ſo nearly threatens VENICE; theſe excite compaſſion; theſe move terror and anxiety.

THE indifferent, unintereſting ſtile of SUETONIUS, equally with the maſterly pencil of TACITUS, may convince us of the cruel depravity of NERO or TIBERIUS: But what a difference of ſentiment! While the former coldly relates the facts;

facts; and the latter ſets before our eyes the venerable figures of a SORANUS and a THRASEA, intrepid in their fate, and only moved by the melting ſorrows of their friends and kindred. What ſympathy then touches every human heart! What indignation againſt the tyrant, whoſe cauſeleſs fear or unprovoked malice, gave riſe to ſuch deteſtable barbarity!

IF we bring theſe ſubjects nearer: If we remove all ſuſpicion of fiction and deceit: What powerful concern is excited, and how much ſuperior, in many inſtances, to the narrow attachments of ſelf-love and private intereſt! Popular ſedition, party zeal, a devoted obedience to factious leaders; theſe are ſome of the moſt viſible, tho' leſs laudable effects of this ſocial ſympathy in human nature.

THE frivolouſneſs of the ſubject too, we may obſerve, is not able to detach us entirely from what carries an image of human ſentiment and affection.

WHEN a perſon ſtutters, and pronounces with difficulty, we even ſympathize with this trivial uneaſineſs, and ſuffer for him. And 'tis a rule in criticiſm, that every combination of ſyllables or letters, which gives pain to the organs of ſpeech in the recital, appears alſo, from a ſpecies of ſympathy, harſh and diſagreeable to the ear. Nay, when we run over a book with our eye, we are ſenſible of ſuch unharmonious compoſition; becauſe we ſtill imagine, that a perſon recites it to us, and ſuffers from the pronunciation of theſe jarring ſounds. So delicate is our ſympathy!

EASY and unconſtrained poſtures and motions are always beautiful: An air of health and vigor is agreeable: Cloaths which warm, without burthening the body; which cover, without impriſoning the limbs, are well-faſhioned. In every judgment of beauty, the ſentiments and feelings of the perſons affected enter into conderation, and communicate to the ſpectator ſimilar touches of pain or pleaſure[i]. What wonder, then, if we can pronounce no judgment concerning the character and conduct of men without conſidering the tendencies of their actions, and the happineſs or miſery, which thence ariſes to ſociety? What aſſociation of ideas would ever operate, were that principle here totally inactive[k]?

IF any man, from a cold inſenſibility, or narrow ſelfiſhneſs of temper, is unaffected with the images of human happineſs or miſery, he muſt be equally indifferent to the images of vice and virtue: As on the other hand, 'tis always found,

[i] "Decentior equus cujus aſtricta ſunt ilia; ſed "idem velocior. Pulcher aſpectu ſit athleta, "cujus lacertos exercitatio expreſſit; idem certa- "mini paratior. Numquam enim *ſpecies* ab *utili-* "*tate* dividitur. Sed hoc quidem diſcernere mo- "dici judicii eſt." QUINTILIAN Inſt. lib. 8. cap. 3.

[k] In proportion to the ſtation which a man poſſeſſes, according to the relations in which he is placed; we always expect from him a greater or leſs degree of good, and when diſappointed, blame his inutility; and much more, do we blame him, if any ill or prejudice ariſes from his conduct and behavior. When the intereſts of one country interfere with thoſe of another, we eſtimate the merits of a ſtateſman by the good or ill, which reſults to his own country from his meaſures and councils, without regard to the prejudice which he brings on its enemies and rivals. His fellow-citizens are the objects, which lie neareſt the eye, while we determine his character. And as nature has implanted in every one a ſuperior affection to his own country, we never expect any regard to diſtant nations, where the ſmalleſt competition ariſes. Not to mention, that while every man conſults the good of his own community, we are ſenſible, that the general intereſt of mankind is better promoted, than by any looſe indeterminate views to the good of a ſpecies, whence no beneficial action could ever reſult, for want of a duly limited object, on which they could exert themſelves.

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the cruelty of NERO be allowed entirely voluntary, and not rather the effect of conſtant fear and reſentment; 'tis evident, that TIGELLINUS, preferably to SENECA or BURRHUS, muſt have poſſeſſed his ſteady and uniform approbation.

A STATESMAN or patriot, who ſerves our own country, in our own time, has always a more paſſionate regard paid him, than one whoſe beneficial influence operated on diſtant ages or remote nations; where the good, reſulting from his generous humanity, being leſs connected with us, ſeems more obſcure, and affects us with a leſs lively ſympathy. We may own the merit to be equally great, tho' our ſentiments are not raiſed to an equal height, in both caſes. The judgment here corrects the inequalities of our internal emotions and perceptions; in like manner, as it preſerves us from error, in the ſeveral variations of images, preſented to our external ſenſes. The ſame object, at a double diſtance, really throws on the eye a picture of but half the bulk; and yet we imagine it appears of the ſame ſize in both ſituations; becauſe we know, that, on our approach to it, its image would expand on the ſenſes, and that the difference conſiſts not in the object itſelf, but in our poſition with regard to it. And, indeed, without ſuch correction of appearances, both in internal and external ſentiment, men could never think or talk ſteadily, on any ſubject; while their fluctuating ſituations produce a continual variation on objects, and throw them into ſuch different and contrary lights and poſitions [m].

THE more we converſe with mankind, and the greater ſocial entercourſe we maintain, the more ſhall we be familiarized to theſe general preferences and diſtinctions, without which our converſation and diſcourſe could ſcarcely be rendered intelligible to each other. Every man's intereſt is peculiar to himſelf, and the averſions and deſires, which reſult from it, cannot be ſuppoſed to affect others in a like degree. General language, therefore, being formed for general uſe, muſt be moulded on ſome more general views, and muſt affix the epithets of praiſe or blame, in conformity to ſentiments, which ariſe from the general intereſts of the community. And if theſe ſentiments, in moſt men, be not ſo ſtrong as thoſe, which have a reference to private good; yet ſtill they muſt make ſome diſtinction, even in perſons the moſt depraved and ſelfiſh; and muſt attach the notion of good to a beneficent conduct, and of evil to the contrary. Sympathy, we ſhall allow, is much fainter than our concern for ourſelves, and ſympathy with perſons, remote from us, much fainter than that with perſons, near and contiguous; but for this very reaſon, 'tis neceſſary for us, in our calm judgments and diſcourſe concerning the characters of men, to neglect all theſe differences, and render our

[m] For a like reaſon, the tendencies of actions and characters, not their real accidental conſequences, are alone regarded in our moral determinations or general judgments; tho' in our real feeling or ſentiment, we cannot help paying greater regard to one whoſe ſtation, joined to virtue, renders him really uſeful to ſociety, than to one, who exerts the ſocial virtues only in good intentions and benevolent affections. Separating the character from the fortune, by an eaſy and neceſſary effort of thought, we pronounce theſe perſons alike, and give them the ſame general praiſe. The judgment corrects or endeavors to correct the appearance: But is not able entirely to prevail over ſentiment.

Why is this peach-tree ſaid to be better than that other; but becauſe it produces more or better fruit? And would not the ſame praiſe be given it, tho' ſnails or vermin had deſtroyed the fruit, before it came to full maturity? In morals too, is not *the tree known by the fruit*? And cannot we eaſily diſtinguiſh betwixt nature and accident, in the one caſe as well as in the other?

ſentiments more public and ſocial. Beſides, that we ourſelves often change our ſituation in this particular, we every day meet with perſons, who are in a different ſituation from us, and who could never converſe with us, were we to remain conſtantly in that poſition and point of view, which is peculiar to ourſelf. The entercourſe of ſentiments, therefore, in ſociety and converſation, makes us form ſome general unalterable ſtandard, by which we may approve or diſapprove of characters and and manners. And tho' the heart takes not part entirely with thoſe general notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred, by the univerſal, abſtract differences of vice and virtue, without regard to ſelf or the perſons, with whom we are more immediately connected; yet have theſe moral differences a conſiderable influence, and being ſufficient, at leaſt, for diſcourſe, ſerve all our purpoſes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the ſchools *.

Thus, in whatever light we take this ſubject, the merit aſcribed to the ſocial virtues, appears ſtill uniform, and ariſes chiefly from that regard, which the natural ſentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the intereſts of mankind and ſociety. If we conſider the principles of the human make; ſuch as they appear to daily experience and obſervation; we muſt, *a priori*, conclude it impoſſible for ſuch a creature as man to be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himſelf, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular byaſs, that what promotes their happineſs is good, what tends to their miſery is evil, without any farther regard or conſideration. Here then are the faint rudiments, at leaſt, or outlines, of a *general* diſtinction between actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the perſon is ſuppoſed to encreaſe, his connexion to thoſe injured or benefited, and his lively conception of their miſery or happineſs; his conſequent cenſure or approbation acquires proportionable vigor. There is no neceſſity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old hiſtory, or remote gazette, ſhould communicate any ſtrong feelings of applauſe and admiration. Virtue, placed at ſuch a diſtance, is like a fixed ſtar, which, tho', to the eye of reaſon, it may appear as luminous as the ſun in his meridian, is ſo infinitely removed, as to affect the ſenſes, neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the perſons, or even by an eloquent recital of the caſe; our hearts are immediately caught, our ſympathy enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmeſt ſentiments of friendſhip and regard. Theſe ſeem neceſſary and infallible conſequences of the general principles of human nature, as diſcovered in common life and practice.

Again; reverſe theſe views and reaſonings: Conſider the matter *a poſteriori*; and weighing the conſequences, enquire, if the merit of all ſocial virtue is not derived from the feelings of humanity, with which it affects the ſpectators. It appears to be matter of fact, that the circumſtance of *utility*, in all ſubjects, is

* 'Tis wiſely ordained by nature, that private connexions ſhould commonly prevail over univerſal views and conſiderations; otherwiſe our affections and actions would be diſſipated and loſt, for want of a proper limited object. Thus a ſmall benefit done to ourſelves, or our near friends, excites more lively ſentiments of love and approbation than a great benefit to a diſtant common-wealth: But ſtill we know here, as in all the ſenſes, to correct theſe inequalities by reflection, and retain a general ſtandard of vice and virtue, founded chiefly on general uſefulneſs.

ſource of praiſe and approbation: That it is conſtantly appealed to in all moral deciſions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is the *ſole* ſource of that high regard paid to juſtice, fidelity, honor, allegiance and chaſtity: That it is inſeparable from all the other ſocial virtues, humanity, generoſity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy and moderation: And in a word, that it is the foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures.

It appears alſo, in our general approbation of characters and manners, that the uſeful tendency of the ſocial virtues moves us not by any regards to ſelf-intereſt, but has an influence much more univerſal and extenſive. It appears, that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and order in ſociety, by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engages us on the ſide of the ſocial virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that theſe principles of humanity and ſympathy enter ſo deep into all our ſentiments, and have ſo powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the ſtrongeſt cenſure and applauſe. The preſent theory is the ſimple reſult of all theſe inferences, each of which ſeems founded on uniform experience and obſervation.

Were it doubtful, whether there was any ſuch principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for others, yet when we ſee, in numberleſs inſtances, that, whatever has a tendency to promote the intereſts of ſociety, is ſo highly approved of, we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle; ſince 'tis impoſſible for any thing to pleaſe as means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubtful whether there was, implanted in our natures, any general principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we ſee, in numberleſs inſtances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that 'tis impoſſible, but that every thing, which promotes the intereſts of ſociety, muſt communicate pleaſure, and what is pernicious give uneaſineſs. But when theſe different reflections and obſervations concur in eſtabliſhing the ſame concluſion, muſt they not beſtow an undiſputed evidence upon it?

'Tis however hoped, that the progreſs of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the preſent theory, by ſhowing the riſe of other ſentiments of eſteem and regard from the ſame or like principles.

SECT.

SECTION VI.

OF QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES.

PART I.

NOTHING is more uſual, than for philoſophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians; and to engage in diſputes of words, while they imagine, that they are handling controverſies of the deepeſt importance and concern. Thus, were we here to aſſert or to deny, *that all laudable qualities of the mind were to be conſidered as virtues or moral attributes*, many would imagine, that we had entered upon one of the profoundeſt ſpeculations of ethics; tho' 'tis probable, all the while, that the greateſt part of the diſpute would be found entirely verbal. To avoid, therefore, all frivolous ſubtilties and altercations, as much as poſſible, we ſhall content ourſelves with obſerving, *firſt*, that in common life, the ſentiments of cenſure or approbation, produced by mental qualities of every kind, are very ſimilar; and *ſecondly*, that all antient moraliſts, (the beſt models) in treating of them, make little or no difference among them.

FIRST. It ſeems certain, that the *ſentiment* of conſcious worth, the ſelf-ſatisfaction, proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character; it ſeems certain, I ſay, that this ſentiment, which tho' the moſt common of all others, has no proper name in our language [a], ariſes from the endowments of courage and capacity, induſtry and ingenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies. Who, on the other hand, is not deeply mortified with reflecting on his own folly or diſſoluteneſs, and feels not a ſecret ſting or compunction, whenever his memory preſents any paſt occurrence, where he behaved with ſtupidity or ill-manners? No time can efface the cruel ideas of a man's own ill-conduct, or of affronts, which cowardice or impudence has brought upon him. They ſtill haunt his ſolitary hours, damp his moſt aſpiring thoughts, and ſhow him, even to himſelf, in the moſt contemptible and moſt odious colors imaginable.

WHAT is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than ſuch blunders, infirmities, and meanneſſes, or more dread to have expoſed by raillery and ſatyre? And is not the chief object of vanity, our bravery or learning, our wit or breeding, our eloquence or addreſs, our taſte or ability? Theſe we diſplay with care, if not with oſtentation; and commonly ſhow more ambition of excelling in them, than even in the ſocial virtues themſelves, which are, in reality, of ſuch ſuperior excellence. Good-nature and honeſty, eſpecially the latter, are ſo indiſpenſibly required, that, tho' the greateſt cenſure attends any violation of theſe du-

[a] The term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad ſenſe; but this ſentiment ſeems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other circumſtances which accompany it. The FRENCH expreſs this ſentiment by the term, *amour propre*, but as they alſo expreſs ſelf-love as well as vanity, by the ſame term, there ariſes thence a great confuſion in ROCHEFOUCAULT, and many of their moral writers.

ties, no eminent praiſe follows ſuch common inſtances of them, as ſeem eſſential to the ſupport of human ſociety. And hence the reaſon, in my opinion, why, tho' men often praiſe ſo liberally the qualities of their heart, they are ſhy of commending the endowments of their head: Becauſe the latter virtues, being ſuppoſed more rare and extraordinary, are obſerved to be the more uſual objects of pride and ſelf-conceit; and when boaſted of, beget a ſtrong ſuſpicion of theſe ſentiments.

'Tis hard to tell, whether you hurt a man's character moſt by calling him a knave or a coward, and whether a beaſtly glutton or drunkard be not as odious and contemptible, as a ſelfiſh, ungenerous miſer. Give me my choice; and I would rather, for my own happineſs and ſelf-enjoyment, have a friendly, humane heart than poſſeſs all the other virtues of DEMOSTHENES and PHILIP united: But I would rather paſs with the world for one endowed with extenſive genius and intrepid courage, and ſhould thence expect ſtronger inſtances of general applauſe and admiration. The figure which a man makes in life, the reception which he meets with in company, the eſteem paid him by his acquaintance; all theſe advantages depend as much upon his good ſenſe and judgment, as upon any other part of his character. Had a man the beſt intentions in the world, and were the fartheſt removed from all injuſtice and violence, he would never be able to make himſelf be much regarded, without a moderate ſhare, at leaſt, of parts and underſtanding.

WHAT is it then we can here diſpute about? If ſenſe and courage, temperance and induſtry, wit and knowlege confeſſedly form a conſiderable part of *perſonal merit*: If a man poſſeſſed of theſe qualities is both better ſatisfied with himſelf, and better entitled to the good-will, eſteem, and ſervices of others, than one entirely devoid of them; if, in ſhort, the *ſentiments* be ſimilar, which ariſe from theſe endowments and from the ſocial virtues; is there any reaſon for being ſo extremely ſcrupulous about a *word*, or doubting whether they are entitled to the denomination of virtue [b]? It may, indeed, be pretended, that the ſentiment of approbation, which thoſe accompliſhments produce, beſides its being *inferior*, is alſo ſomewhat *different* from that, which attends the virtues of juſtice and humanity. But this ſeems not a ſufficient reaſon for ranking them entirely under different claſſes and appellations. The character of CÆSAR and that of CATO, as drawn by SALUST, are both of them virtuous, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word; but in a different way: Nor are the ſentiments entirely the ſame, which ariſe from them. The one produces love; the other, eſteem: The one is amiable; the other awful: We could wiſh to meet the one character in a friend; of the other we ſhould be ambitious in ourſelves. In like manner the approbation, which attends natural abilities or temperance or induſtry, may be ſomewhat different from that which is paid to the ſocial virtues, without making them entirely of a differ-

[b] It ſeems to me, that in our language, courage, temperance, induſtry, frugality, &c. according to popular ſtile, are called *virtues*; but when a man is ſaid to be *virtuous*, or is denominated a man of virtue, we chiefly regard his ſocial qualities. 'Tis needleſs for a moral, philoſophical diſcourſe to enter into all theſe caprices of language, which are ſo variable in different dialects, and in different ages of the ſame dialect. The *ſentiments* of men being more uniform, as well as more important, are a fitter ſubject of ſpeculation: Tho' at the ſame time, we may juſt obſerve, that wherever the ſocial virtues are talked of, 'tis plainly implied, by this diſtinction, that there are alſo other virtues of a different nature.

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ent ſpecies. And indeed, we may obſerve, that the natural abilities, no more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the ſame kind of approbation. Good ſenſe and genius beget eſteem and regard: Wit and humor excite love and affection [c].

Most people, I believe, will naturally, without premeditation, aſſent to the definition of the elegant and judicious poet.

> Virtue (for mere good-nature is a fool)
> Is ſenſe and ſpirit, with humanity [d].

What pretenſions has a man to our generous aſſiſtance or good-offices, who has diſſipated his wealth in profuſe expences, idle vanities, chimerical projects, diſſolute pleaſures, or extravagant gaming? Theſe vices (for we ſcruple not to call them ſuch) bring miſery unpitied, and contempt on every one addicted to them.

Achæus, a wiſe and prudent prince, fell into a fatal ſnare, which coſt him his crown and life, after having uſed every reaſonable precaution to guard himſelf againſt it. On that account, ſays the hiſtorian, he is a juſt object of regard and compaſſion: His betrayers alone of hatred and contempt [e].

The precipitate flight and improvident negligence of Pompey, at the beginning of the civil wars, appeared ſuch notorious blunders to Cicero, as quite palled his friendſhip towards that great man. *In the ſame manner*, ſays he, *as want of cleanlineſs, decency, or diſcretion in a miſtreſs, are found to alienate our affections.* For ſo he expreſſes himſelf, where he talks, not in the character of a philoſopher, but in that of a ſtateſman and man of the world, to his friend Atticus [f].

But *ſecondly*, the ſame Cicero, in imitation of all the antient moraliſts, when he reaſons as a philoſopher, enlarges very much his ideas of virtue, and comprehends every laudable quality or endowment of the mind, under that honorable appellation. The *prudence*, explained in his *offices* [g], is that ſagacity, which leads to the diſcovery of truth, and preſerves us from error and miſtake. *Magnanimity*, *temperance*, *decency*, are there alſo at large diſcourſed of. And as that eloquent moraliſt followed the common received diviſion of the four cardinal virtues, our ſocial duties form but one head, in the general diſtribution of his ſubject.

[c] Love and eſteem are nearly the ſame paſſion, and ariſe from ſimilar cauſes. The qualities, which produce both, are ſuch as communicate pleaſure. But where this pleaſure is ſevere and ſerious; or where its object is great and makes a ſtrong impreſſion, or where it produces any degree of humility and awe: In all theſe caſes, the paſſion, which ariſes from the pleaſure, is more properly denominated eſteem than love. Benevolence attends both: But is connected with love in a more eminent degree. There ſeems to be ſtill a ſtronger mixture of pride in contempt than of humility in eſteem; and the reaſon would not be difficult to one, who ſtudied accurately the paſſions. All theſe various mixtures and compoſitions and appearances of ſentiment form a very curious ſubject of ſpeculation, but are wide of our preſent purpoſe. Thro'out this enquiry, we always conſider in general, what qualities are a ſubject of praiſe or of cenſure, without entering into all the minute differences of ſentiment, which they excite. 'Tis evident, that whatever is contemned, is alſo diſliked, as well as what is hated; and we here endeavor to take objects, according to their moſt ſimple views and appearances. Theſe ſciences are but too apt to appear abſtract to common readers, even with all the precautions which we can take to clear them from ſuperfluous ſpeculations, and bring them down to every capacity.

[d] The art of preſerving health. Book 4.

[e] Polybius, lib. 8. cap. 2.

[f] Lib. 9. epiſt. 10.

[g] Lib 1. cap. 6.

We need only peruſe the titles of chapters in ARISTOTLE's ethics to be convinced, that he ranks courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, modeſty, prudence, and a manly freedom, among the virtues, as well as juſtice and friendſhip.

To *ſuſtain* and to *abſtain*, that is, to be patient and continent, appeared to ſome of the antients, a ſummary comprehenſion of all morals.

EPICTETUS has ſcarce ever mentioned the ſentiment of humanity and compaſſion, but in order to put his diſciples on their guard againſt it. The virtue of the *Stoics* ſeems to conſiſt chiefly in a firm temper and a ſound underſtanding. With them, as with SOLOMON and the eaſtern moraliſts, folly and wiſdom are equivalent to vice and virtue.

MEN will praiſe thee, ſays DAVID [h], when thou doſt well unto thyſelf. I hate a wiſe man, ſays the GREEK poet, who is not wiſe to himſelf [i].

PLUTARCH is no more cramped by ſyſtems in his philoſophy than in his hiſtory. Where he compares the great men of GREECE and ROME, he fairly ſets in oppoſition all their blemiſhes and accompliſhments of whatever kind, and omits nothing conſiderable, which can either depreſs or exalt their characters. His moral diſcourſes contain the ſame free and natural cenſure of men and manners.

THE character of HANNIBAL, as drawn by LIVY [k], is eſteemed partial, but allows him many eminent virtues. Never was there a genius, ſays the hiſtorian, more equally fitted for thoſe oppoſite offices of command and obedience; and it were, therefore, difficult to determine whether he rendered himſelf *dearer* to the general or to the army. To none, would HASDRUBAL entruſt more willingly the conduct of any dangerous enterprize; under none, did the ſoldiers diſcover more courage and confidence. Great boldneſs in facing danger; great prudence in the midſt of it. No labor could fatigue his body or ſubdue his mind. Cold and heat were indifferent to him: Meat and drink he ſought as ſupplies to the neceſſities of nature, not as gratifications of his voluptuous appetites: Waking or reſt he uſed indiſcriminately, by night or by day.——Theſe great VIRTUES were ballanced by great VICES: Inhuman cruelty; perfidy more than *punic*; no truth, no faith, no regard to oaths, promiſes or religion.

THE character of ALEXANDER the ſixth, to be found in GUICCIARDIN [l], is pretty ſimilar, but juſter; and is a proof, that even the moderns, where they ſpeak naturally, hold the ſame language with the antients. In this pope, ſays he, there was a ſingular capacity and judgment: Admirable prudence; a wonderful talent of perſuaſion; and in all momentous enterprizes, a diligence and dexterity incredible. But theſe *virtues* were infinitely overballanced by his *vices*; no faith, no religion, inſatiable avarice, exorbitant ambition, and a more than barbarous cruelty.

POLYBIUS [m], reprehending TIMÆUS for his partiality againſt AGATHOCLES, whom he himſelf allows to be the moſt cruel and impious of all tyrants, ſays: If he took refuge in SYRACUSE, as aſſerted by that hiſtorian, flying the dirt and

[h] Pſalm 49th.
[i] Μισω σοφιστην ὁστις μη αυτω σοφος. EURIPIDES.
[k] Lib. 21. cap. 4.
[l] Lib. 1.
[m] Lib. 12.

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ſmoke and toil of his former profeſſion of a potter; and if, proceeding from ſuch ſlender beginnings, he became maſter, in a little time, of all SICILY; brought the CARTHAGINIAN ſtate into the utmoſt danger; and at laſt died in an old age, and in poſſeſſion of kingly dignity: Muſt he not be allowed ſomething prodigious and extraordinary, and to have poſſeſſed great talents and capacity for buſineſs and action? His Hiſtorian, therefore, ought not to have alone related what tended to his reproach and infamy; but alſo what might redound to his PRAISE and HONOUR.

IN general, we may obſerve, that the diſtinction of voluntary or involuntary was little regarded by the antients in their moral reaſonings; where they frequently treated the queſtion as very doubtful, *whether virtue could be taught or not*[n]? They juſtly conſidered, that cowardice, meanneſs, levity, anxiety, impatience, folly, and many other qualities of the mind, might appear ridiculous and deformed, contemptible and odious, tho' independant of the will. Nor could it be ſuppoſed, at all times, in every man's power to attain every kind of mental, more than of exterior beauty.

BUT modern philoſophers, treating all morals, as on a like footing with civil laws, guarded by the ſanctions of reward and puniſhment, were neceſſarily led to render this circumſtance, of *voluntary* or *involuntary*, the foundation of their whole theory. Every one may employ *terms* in what ſenſe he pleaſes: But this, in the mean time, muſt be allowed, that *ſentiments* are every day experienced of blame and praiſe, which have objects beyond the dominion of the will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as moraliſts, as ſpeculative philoſophers at leaſt, to give ſome ſatisfactory theory and explication.

A BLEMISH, a fault, a vice, a crime; theſe expreſſions ſeem to denote different degrees of cenſure and diſapprobation; which are, however, all of them, at the bottom, pretty nearly of the ſame kind or ſpecies. The explication of one will lead us eaſily into a juſt conception of the others.

PART II.

IT ſeems evident, that where a quality or habit is ſubjected to our examination, if it appear, in any reſpect, prejudicial to the perſon, poſſeſſed of it, or ſuch as incapacitates him for buſineſs and action, it is inſtantly blamed, and ranked among his faults and imperfections Indolence, negligence, want of order and method, obſtinacy, fickleneſs, raſhneſs, credulity; no one ever eſteemed theſe qualities, indifferent to a character; much leſs, extolled them as accompliſhments or virtues. The prejudice, reſulting from them, immediately ſtrikes our eye, and gives us the ſentiment of pain and diſapprobation.

No quality, 'tis allowed, is abſolutely either blameable or praiſe-worthy. 'Tis all according to its degree. A due medium, ſay the PERIPATETICS, is the characteriſtic of virtue. But this medium is chiefly determined by utility. A proper celerity, for inſtance, and diſpatch in buſineſs, is commendable. When defective,

[n] Vid. PLATO in MENONE, SENECA *de otio ſap.* cap. 31. So alſo HORACE, *Virtutem doctrina paret, naturane donet.* Epiſt. lib. 1. ep. 18. ÆSCHINES SOCRATICUS. Dial. 1.

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no progreſs is ever made in the execution of any purpoſe: When exceſſive, it engages us in precipitate, and ill-concerted meaſures and enterprizes: By ſuch reaſonings as theſe we fix the proper and commendable mediocrity in all moral and prudential diſquiſitions; and never loſe view of the advantages, which reſult from any character or habit.

Now as theſe advantages are enjoyed by the perſon, poſſeſſed of the character, it can never be *ſelf-love*, which renders the proſpect of them agreeable to us, the ſpectators, and prompts our eſteem and approbation. No force of imagination can convert us into another perſon, and make us fancy, that we, being that perſon, reap benefit from thoſe valuable qualities, which belong to him. Or if it did, no celerity of imagination could immediately tranſport us back, into ourſelves, and make us love and eſteem the perſon, as different from us. Views and ſentiments, ſo oppoſite to known truth, and to each other, could never have place, at the ſame time, in the ſame perſon. All ſuſpicion, therefore, of ſelfiſh regards, is here totally excluded. 'Tis a quite different principle, which actuates our boſom, and intereſts us in the felicity of the perſon whom we contemplate. Where his natural talents and acquired abilities give us the proſpect of elevation, advancement, a figure in life, proſperous ſucceſs, a ſteady command over fortune, and the execution of great or advantageous undertakings; we are ſtruck with ſuch agreeable images, and feel a complacency and regard immediately ariſe towards him. The ideas of happineſs, joy, triumph, proſperity, are connected with every circumſtance of his character, and diffuſe over our minds a pleaſing ſentiment of ſympathy and humanity [*].

LET us ſuppoſe a perſon originally ſo framed as to have no manner of concern for his follow-creatures, but to regard the happineſs and miſery of all ſenſible beings with greater indifference even than two contiguous ſhades of the ſame color. Let us ſuppoſe, if the proſperity of nations were laid on the one hand, and their ruin on the other, and he were deſired to chooſe; that he would ſtand, like the ſchoolman's aſs, irreſolute and undetermined, between equal motives; or rather, like the ſame aſs between two pieces of wood or marble, without any inclination or propenſity to either ſide. The conſequence, I believe, muſt be allowed juſt, that ſuch a perſon, being abſolutely unconcerned, either in the public good of a community or the private utility of others, would look on every quality, however pernicious, or however beneficial, to ſociety, or to its poſſeſſor, with the ſame indifference as on the moſt common and unintereſting object.

BUT if, inſtead of this fancied monſter, we ſuppoſe a *man* to form a judgment or determination in the caſe, there is to him a plain foundation of preference, where

[*] One may venture to affirm, that there is no human creature, to whom the appearance of happineſs, (where envy or revenge has no place) does not give pleaſure, that of miſery, uneaſineſs. This ſeems inſeparable from our make and conſtitution. But they are only the more generous minds, that are thence prompted to ſeek zealouſly the good of others, and to have a real paſſion for their welfare. With men of narrow and ungenerous ſpirits, this ſympathy goes not beyond a ſlight feeling of the imagination, which ſerves only to excite ſentiments of complacency or cenſure, and makes them apply to the object either honorable or diſhonorable appellations. A griping miſer, for inſtance, praiſes extreme'y *induſtry* and *frugality* even in others, and ſets them, in his eſtimation, above all the other virtues. He knows the good, that reſults from them, and feels that ſpecies of happineſs with a more lively ſympathy, than any other you could repreſent to him; tho' perhaps he would not part with a ſhilling to make the fortune of the induſtrious man, whom he praiſes ſo highly.

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every thing elſe is equal; and however cool his choice may be, if his heart be ſelfiſh, or if the perſons intereſted be remote from him; there muſt ſtill be a choice, or diſtinction between what is uſeful, and what is pernicious. Now this diſtinction is the ſame in all its parts, with the *moral diſtinction*, whoſe foundation has been ſo often, and ſo much in vain, enquired after. The ſame endowments of the mind, in every circumſtance, are agreeable to the ſentiment of morals and to that of humanity; the ſame temper is ſuſceptible of high degrees of the one ſentiment and of the other; and the ſame alteration in the objects, by their nearer approach or by connexions, enlivens the one and the other. By all the rules of philoſophy, therefore, we muſt conclude, that theſe ſentiments are originally the ſame; ſince, in each particular, even the moſt minute, they are governed by the ſame laws, and are moved by the ſame objects.

WHY do philoſophers infer, with the greateſt certainty, that the moon is kept in its orbit by the ſame force of gravity, which make bodies fall near the ſurface of the earth, but becauſe theſe effects are, upon computation, found ſimilar and equal? And muſt not this argument bring as ſtrong conviction, in moral as in natural diſquiſitions?

TO prove, by any long detail, that all the qualities, uſeful to the poſſeſſor, are approved, and the contrary cenſured, would be ſuperfluous. The leaſt reflection, on what is every day experienced in life, will be ſufficient. We ſhall only mention a few inſtances, in order to remove, if poſſible, all doubt and heſitation.

THE quality the moſt neceſſary for the execution of any uſeful enterprize, is DISCRETION; by which we carry on a ſafe intercourſe with others, give due attention to our own and to their character, weigh each circumſtance of the buſineſs which we undertake, and employ the ſureſt and ſafeſt means for the attainment of any end or purpoſe. To a CROMWEL, perhaps, or a DE RETZ, diſcretion may appear an alderman-like virtue, as Dr. SWIFT calls it; and being incompatible with thoſe vaſt deſigns, to which their courage and ambition prompted them, it might really, in them, be a fault or imperfection. But in the conduct of ordinary life, no virtue is more requiſite, not only to obtain ſucceſs, but to avoid the moſt fatal miſcarriages and diſappointments. The greateſt parts without it, as obſerved by an elegant writer, may be fatal to their owner; as POLYPHEMUS deprived of his eye was only the more expoſed, on account of his enormous ſtrength and ſtature.

THE beſt character, indeed, were it not rather too perfect for human nature, is that which gives nothing to temper of any kind; but alternately employs enterprize and caution, as each is *uſeful* to the particular purpoſe intended. Such is the excellence which St. EVREMOND aſcribes to mareſchal TURENNE, who diſplayed every campaign, as he grew older, more temerity in his military enterprizes; and being now, from long experience, perfectly acquainted with every incident in war, he advanced with greater firmneſs and ſecurity, in a road ſo well known to him. FABIUS, ſays MACHIAVEL, was cautious; SCIPIO enterprizing: And both ſucceeded, becauſe the ſituation of the ROMAN affairs, during the command of each, was peculiarly adapted to his genius; but both would have failed, had theſe ſituations been inverted. He is happy, whoſe circumſtances ſuit his temper; but he is more excellent, who can ſuit his temper to any circumſtances.

WHAT need is there to diſplay the praiſes of INDUSTRY, and to extol its advantages, in the acquiſition of power and riches, or in raiſing what we call a *fortune* in the world? The tortoiſe, according to the fable, by his aſſiduity, gained the race of the hare, tho' poſſeſſed of much ſuperior ſwiftneſs. A man's time, when well huſbanded, is like a cultivated field, of which a few acres produce more of what is uſeful to life, than extenſive provinces, even of the richeſt ſoil, when over-run with weeds and brambles.

BUT all proſpect of ſucceſs in life, or even of tolerable ſubſiſtence, muſt fail, where a reaſonable FRUGALITY is wanting. The heap, inſtead of increaſing, diminiſhes daily, and leaves its poſſeſſor ſo much more unhappy, that not having been able to confine his expences to a large revenue, he will ſtill leſs be able to live contentedly on a ſmaller. The ſouls of men, according to PLATO[p], inflamed with impure appetites, and loſing the body, which alone afforded means of ſatisfaction, hover about the earth, and haunt the places, where their bodies are depoſited; poſſeſt with a longing deſire to recover the loſt organs of ſenſation. So may we ſee worthleſs prodigals, having conſumed their fortunes in wild debauches, thruſting themſelves into every plentiful table, and every party of pleaſure, hated even by the vicious, and deſpiſed even by fools.

THE one extreme of frugality is *avarice*, which, as it both deprives a man of all uſe of his riches, and checks hoſpitality and every ſocial enjoyment, is juſtly cenſured on a double account. *Prodigality*, the other extreme, is commonly more hurtful to a man himſelf; and each of theſe extremes is blamed above the other, according to the temper of the perſon who cenſures, and according to his greater or leſs ſenſibility to pleaſure, either ſocial or ſenſual.

ALL men, 'tis allowed, are equally deſirous of happineſs; but few are ſucceſsful in the purſuit: One chief cauſe is the want of STRENGTH of MIND, which might enable them to reſiſt the temptation of preſent eaſe or pleaſure, and carry them forward in the ſearch of more diſtant profit and enjoyment. Our affections, on a general proſpect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain meaſures of preference of one above another: And theſe deciſions, tho' really the reſult of our calm paſſions, and propenſities, (for what elſe can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?) are yet ſaid, by a natural abuſe of terms, to be the determinations of pure *reaſon* and reflection. But when ſome of theſe objects approach nearer us, or acquire the advantages of favorable lights and poſitions, which catch the heart or imagination; our general reſolutions are frequently confounded, a ſmall enjoyment preferred, and laſting ſhame and ſorrow entailed upon us. And however poets may employ their wit and eloquence, in celebrating preſent pleaſure, and rejecting all diſtant views to fame, health, or fortune; 'tis obvious, that this practice is the ſource of all diſſoluteneſs and diſorder, repentance and miſery. A man of a ſtrong and determined temper adheres tenaciouſly to his general reſolutions, and is neither ſeduced by the allurements of pleaſure, nor terrified by the menaces of pain; but keeps ſtill in view thoſe diſtant purſuits, by which he, at once, enſures his happineſs and his honor.

SELF-SATISFACTION, at leaſt in ſome degree, is an advantage, which equally attends the FOOL and the WISE-MAN: But 'tis the only one; nor is there

[p] Phædo.

any

any other circumſtance in the conduct of life, where they are upon an equal footing. Buſineſs, books, converſation; for all of theſe, a fool is totally incapacitated, and except condemned by his ſtation to the coarſeſt drudgery, remains a *uſeleſs* burthen upon the earth. Accordingly, 'tis found, that men are infinitely jealous of their character in this particular; and many inſtances are ſeen of profligacy and treachery, the moſt avowed, and unreſerved; none of bearing patiently the imputation of ignorance and ſtupidity. DICAEARCHUS, the MACEDONIAN general, who, as POLYBIUS tells us [q], openly erected one altar to impiety, and another to injuſtice, in order to bid defiance to mankind; even he, I am well aſſured, would have ſtarted at the epithet of *fool*, and have meditated revenge for ſo injurious an appellation. Except the affection of parents, the ſtrongeſt and moſt indiſſoluble bond in nature, no connexion has ſtrength ſufficient to ſupport the diſguſt ariſing from this character. Love itſelf, which can ſubſiſt under treachery, ingratitude, malice, and infidelity, is immediately extinguiſhed by it, when perceived and acknowleged; nor are deformity and old-age more fatal to the dominion of that paſſion. So dreadful are the ideas of an utter incapacity for any purpoſe or undertaking, and of continued error and miſconduct in life!

WHEN 'tis aſked, whether a quick or a ſlow apprehenſion be moſt valuable? Whether one, that, at firſt view, penetrates far into a ſubject, but can perform nothing upon ſtudy; or a contrary character, which muſt work out every thing by dint of application? Whether a clear head or a copious invention? Whether a profound genius or a ſure judgment? In ſhort, what character, or peculiar turn of underſtanding is more excellent than another? 'Tis evident, that we can anſwer none of theſe queſtions, without conſidering which of thoſe qualities capacitates a man beſt for the world, and carries him fartheſt in any undertaking.

IF refined ſenſe and exalted ſenſe be not ſo *uſeful* as common ſenſe, their rarity their novelty, and the nobleneſs of their objects make ſome compenſation, and render them the admiration of mankind: As gold, tho' leſs ſerviceable than iron, acquires, from its ſcarcity, a value, which is much ſuperior.

THE defects of judgment can be ſupplied by no art or invention; but thoſe of MEMORY frequently may, both in buſineſs and in ſtudy, by method and induſtry, and by diligence in committing every thing to paper; and we ſcarce ever hear a ſhort memory given as a reaſon for a man's want of ſucceſs in any undertaking. But in antient times, when no man could make a figure without the talent of ſpeaking, and when the audience were too delicate to bear ſuch crude, undigeſted harangues as our extemporary orators offer to public aſſemblies; the faculty of memory was then of the utmoſt conſequence, and was accordingly much more valued than at preſent. Scarce any great genius is mentioned in antiquity, who is not celebrated for this talent; and CICERO enumerates it among the other ſublime qualities of CÆSAR himſelf [r].

PARTICULAR cuſtoms and manners alter the uſefulneſs of qualities: They alſo alter their merit. Particular ſituations and accidents have, in ſome degree, the ſame influence. He will always be more eſteemed, who poſſeſſes thoſe talents and accompliſhments, which ſuit his ſtation, and profeſſion, than he whom fortune

[q] Lib. 17. cap. 35. [r] Fuit in illo ingenium, ratio, memoria, literæ, cura, cogitatio, diligentia, &c. PHILIP. 2.

has miſplaced in the part which ſhe has aſſigned him. The private or ſelfiſh virtues are, in this reſpect, more arbitrary than the public and ſocial. In other reſpects, they are, perhaps, leſs liable to doubt and controverſy.

In this kingdom, ſuch continued oſtentation, of late years, has appeared among men in *active* life, with regard to *public ſpirit*, and among thoſe in *ſpeculative* with regard to *benevolence*; and ſo many falſe pretenſions to each have been, no doubt, detected, that men of the world are apt, without any bad intention, to diſcover a ſullen incredulity on the head of theſe moral endowments, and even ſometimes abſolutely to deny their exiſtence and reality. In like manner, I find, that, of old, the perpetual cant of the *Stoics* and *Cynics* concerning *virtue*, their magnificent profeſſions and ſlender performances, bred a diſguſt in mankind; and Lucian, who, tho' licentious with regard to pleaſure, is yet, in other reſpects, a very moral writer, cannot, ſometimes, talk of virtue, ſo much boaſted, without betraying ſymptoms of ſpleen and irony [a]. But ſurely, this peeviſh delicacy, whence-ever it ariſes, can never be carried ſo far as to make us deny the exiſtence of every ſpecies of virtue, and all diſtinction of manners and behavior. Beſides *diſcretion*, *caution*, *enterprize*, *induſtry*, *aſſiduity*, *frugality*, *œconomy*, *good-ſenſe*, *prudence*, *diſcernment*; beſides theſe virtues, I ſay, whoſe very names force an avowal of their merit, there are many others, to which the moſt determined ſcepticiſm cannot, for a moment, refuſe the tribute of praiſe and approbation. *Temperance*, *ſobriety*, *patience*, *conſtancy*, *perſeverance*, *forethought*, *conſiderateneſs*, *ſecrecy*, *order*, *inſinuation*, *addreſs*, *preſence of mind*, *quickneſs of conception*, *facility of expreſſion*; theſe and a thouſand more of the ſame kind, no man will ever deny to be excellencies and endowments. As their merit conſiſts in their tendency to ſerve the perſon, poſſeſſed of them, without any magnificent claims of public and ſocial deſert, we are the leſs jealous of their pretenſions, and readily admit them into the catalogue of laudable qualities. We are not ſenſible, that, by this conceſſion, we have paved the way for all the other moral excellencies, and cannot conſiſtently heſitate any longer, with regard to diſintereſted benevolence, patriotiſm, and humanity.

It ſeems, indeed, certain, that firſt appearances are here, as uſual, extremely deceitful, and that 'tis more difficult, in a ſpeculative way, to reſolve into ſelf-love, the merit which we aſcribe to the ſelfiſh virtues above-mentioned, than that even of the ſocial virtues, juſtice and beneficence. For this latter purpoſe, we need but ſay, that whatever conduct promotes the good of the community, is loved, praiſed, and eſteemed by the community, on account of that utility and intereſt, of which every one partakes: And tho' this affection and regard be, in reality, gratitude, not ſelf-love, yet a diſtinction, even of this obvious nature, may not readily be made by ſuperficial reaſoners; and there is room, at leaſt, to ſupport the cavil and diſpute for a moment. But as qualities, which tend only to the utility of their poſſeſſor, without any reference to us, or to the community, are yet eſteemed and valued; by what theory or ſyſtem can we account for this

[a] Αρετην τινα και ασωματα και λογους μεγαλη τη φωνη ξυνειροντων. Luc. Timon. Again, Και συναγαγοντες (οι φιλοσοφοι) ενιξαπατητα μειρακια τινα πολυθρυλλητον αρετην τραγωδουσι. Icuro-men. In another place, Ητις γαρ εστιν η πολυθρυλλητος αρετη, και φυσις, και ειμαρμενη, και τυχη, ανυποστατα και κενα πραγματων ονοματα. Deor. Concil.

ſentiment by ſelf-love, or deduce it from that favorite origin? There ſeems here a neceſſity of confeſſing that the happineſs and miſery of others are not ſpectacles entirely indifferent to us; but that the view of the former, whether in its cauſes or effects, like ſun-ſhine or the proſpect of well-cultivated plains, (to carry our pretenſions no higher) communicates a ſecret joy and ſatisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud or barren landſkip, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination. And this conceſſion being once made, the difficulty is over; and a natural, unforced interpretation of the phænomena of human life will afterwards, we may hope, prevail among all ſpeculative enquirers.

PART III.

IT may not be improper, in this place, to examine the influence of bodily endowments, and of the goods of fortune, over our ſentiments of regard and eſteem, and to conſider whether theſe phænomena fortify or weaken the preſent theory.

'TIS evident, that one conſiderable ſource of *beauty* in all animals is the advantage which they reap from the particular ſtructure of their limbs and members, ſuitable to the particular manner of life, to which they are by nature deſtined. The juſt proportions of a horſe, deſcribed by XENOPHON and VIRGIL, are the ſame, which are received at this day by our modern jockeys; becauſe the foundation of them is the ſame, to wit, experience of what is detrimental or uſeful in the animal.

BROAD ſhoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs; all theſe are beautiful in our ſpecies, becauſe ſigns of force and vigor. Ideas of utility and its contrary, tho' they do not entirely determine what is handſome or deformed, are evidently the ſource of a conſiderable part of approbation or diſlike.

IN ancient times, bodily ſtrength and dexterity, being of greater *uſe* and importance in war, was alſo much more eſteemed and valued, than at preſent. Not to inſiſt on HOMER and the poets, we may obſerve, that hiſtorians ſcruple not to mention *force of body* among the other accompliſhments even of EPAMINONDAS, whom they acknowlege to be the greateſt hero, ſtateſman, and general of all the GREEKS [t]. A like praiſe is given to POMPEY, one of the greateſt of the ROMANS [u]. This inſtance is ſimilar to what we obſerved above, with regard to memory.

WHAT deriſion and contempt, with both ſexes, attend *impotence*; while the unhappy object is regarded as one deprived of ſo capital a pleaſure in life, and at the ſame time, as diſabled from communicating it to others. *Barrenneſs* in women, being alſo a ſpecies of *inutility*, is a reproach, but not in the ſame degree: Of which the reaſon is very obvious, according to the preſent theory.

[t] DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. 15. It may not be improper to give the character of EPAMINONDAS, as drawn by the hiſtorian, in order to ſhow the ideas of perfect merit, which prevailed in thoſe ages. In other illuſtrious men, ſays he, you will obſerve, that each poſſeſſed ſome one ſhining quality, which was the foundation of his fame: In EPAMINONDAS all the *virtues* are found united; force of body, eloquence of expreſſion, vigor of mind, contempt of riches, gentleneſs of diſpoſition, and *what is chiefly to be regarded*, courage and conduct in war.

[u] *Cum alacribus, ſaltu; cum velocibus, curſu; cum validis recte certabat.* SALLUST apud VEGET.

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THERE is no rule in painting or ſtatuary more indiſpenſible than that of ballancing the figures, and placing them with the greateſt exactneſs on their proper center of gravity. A figure, which is not juſtly ballanced is ugly; becauſe it conveys the diſagreeable ideas of fall, harm and pain [m].

A DISPOSITION or turn of mind, which qualifies a man to riſe in the world, and advance his fortune, is entitled to eſteem and regard, as has been already explained. It may, therefore, naturally be ſuppoſed, that the actual poſſeſſion of riches and authority will have a conſiderable influence over theſe ſentiments.

LET us examine any hypotheſis, by which we can account for the regard paid the rich and powerful: We ſhall find none ſatisfactory but that which derives it from the enjoyment, communicated to the ſpectator by the images of proſperity, happineſs, eaſe, plenty, command, and the gratification of every appetite. Self-love, for inſtance, which ſome affect ſo much to conſider as the ſource of every ſentiment, is plainly inſufficient to this purpoſe. Where no good-will or friendſhip appears, 'tis difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches of others; tho' we naturally reſpect the rich, even before they diſcover any ſuch favorable diſpoſition towards us.

WE are affected with the ſame ſentiments, when we lie ſo much out of the ſphere of their activity, that they cannot even be ſuppoſed to poſſeſs the power of ſerving us. A priſoner of war, in all civilized nations, is treated with a regard ſuited to his condition; and riches, 'tis evident, go far towards fixing the condition of any perſon. If birth and quality enter for a ſhare, this ſtill affords us an argument to our preſent purpoſe. For what is it we call a man of birth, but one, who is deſcended from a long ſucceſſion of rich and powerful anceſtors, and who acquires our eſteem by his connexion with perſons, whom we eſteem? His anceſtors, therefore, tho' dead, are reſpected, in ſome meaſure, on account of their riches; and conſequently, without any kind of expectation.

BUT not to go ſo far as priſoners of war or the dead, to find inſtances of this diſintereſted regard for riches; we may only obſerve, with a little attention, thoſe phænomena, which occur in common life and converſation. A man, who is himſelf, we ſhall ſuppoſe, of a competent fortune, and of no profeſſion, being introduced to a company of ſtrangers, naturally treats them with different degrees of reſpect, as he is informed of their different fortunes and conditions; tho' 'tis impoſſible that he can ſo ſuddenly propoſe, and perhaps he would not accept of, any pecuniary advantage from them. A traveller is always admitted into company, and meets with civility, in proportion as his train and equipage ſpeak him a man of great or moderate fortune. In ſhort, the different ranks of men are, in a great

[m] All men are equally liable to pain and diſeaſe and ſickneſs; and may again recover health and eaſe. Theſe circumſtances, as they make no diſtinction between one man and another, are no ſource of pride or humility, regard or contempt. But comparing our own ſpecies to ſuperior ones, 'tis a very mortifying conſideration, that we ſhould be ſo liable to all diſeaſes and infirmities; and divines accordingly employ this topic, in order to depreſs ſelf-conceit and vanity. They would have more ſucceſs, if the common bent of our thoughts were not perpetually turned to compare ourſelves with each other. The infirmities of old age are mortifying; becauſe a compariſon with the young may take place. The king's evil is induſtriouſly concealed, becauſe it affects others, and is tranſmitted to poſterity. The caſe is nearly the ſame with ſuch diſeaſes as convey any nauſeous or frightful images; the epilepſy, for inſtance, ulcers, ſores, ſcabs, &c.

meaſure, regulated by riches; and that with regard to ſuperiors as well as inferiors, ſtrangers as well as acquaintance.

WHAT remains, therefore, but to conclude, that as riches are deſired for ourſelf only as the means of gratifying our appetites, either at preſent or in ſome imaginary future period; they beget eſteem in others merely from their having that influence. This indeed is their very nature or eſſence: They have a direct reference to the commodities, conveniencies, and pleaſures of life: A banker's bill, who is broke, or gold in a deſert iſland, would otherwiſe be full as valuable. When we approach a man, who is, as we ſay, at his eaſe, we are preſented with the pleaſing ideas of plenty, ſatisfaction, cleanlineſs, warmth; a chearful houſe, elegant furniture, ready ſervice, and whatever is deſirable in meat, drink, or apparel. On the contrary, when a poor man appears, the diſagreeable images of want, penury, hard labor, dirty furniture, coarſe or ragged cloaths, nauſeous meat and diſtaſteful liquor, immediately ſtrike our fancy. What elſe do we mean by ſaying that the one is rich, the other poor? And as regard or contempt is the natural conſequence of theſe different ſituations in life; 'tis eaſily ſeen what additional light and evidence this throws on our preceding theory, with regard to all moral diſtinctions[n].

A MAN, who has cured himſelf of all ridiculous prepoſſeſſions, and is fully, ſincerely, and ſteadily convinced, from experience as well as philoſophy, that the differences of fortune make leſs difference in happineſs than is vulgarly imagined; ſuch a one does not meaſure out degrees of eſteem according to the rent-rolls of his acquaintance. He may, indeed, externally pay a ſuperior deference to the great lord above the vaſſal; becauſe riches are the moſt convenient, being the moſt fixed and determinate, ſource of diſtinction: But his internal ſentiments are more regulated by the perſonal characters of men, than by the accidental and capricious favors of fortune.

IN moſt countries of EUROPE, family, that is, hereditary riches, marked with titles and ſymbols from the ſovereign, is the chief ſource of diſtinction. In ENGLAND, more regard is paid to preſent opulence and plenty. Each practice has its advantages and diſadvantages. Where birth is reſpected, unactive ſpiritleſs minds remain in haughty indolence, and dream of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies: The generous and ambitious ſeek honor and command and reputation and favor. Where riches are the chief idol, corruption, venality, rapine prevail: Arts, manufactures, commerce, agriculture, floriſh. The former prejudice, being favorable to military virtue, is more ſuited to monarchies. The latter, being the chief

[n] There is ſomething very extraordinary, and ſeemingly unaccountable in the operation of our paſſions, when we conſider the fortune and ſituation of others. Very often another's advancement and proſperity produces envy, which has a ſtrong mixture of hatred, and ariſes chiefly from the compariſon of ourſelves with the perſon. At the very ſame time, or at leaſt, in very ſhort intervals, we may feel the paſſion of reſpect, which is a ſpecies of affection or good will, with a mixture of humility. On the other hand, the misfortunes of our fellows often cauſe pity, which has in it a ſtrong mixture of good-will. This ſentiment of pity is nearly allied to contempt, which is a ſpecies of diſlike, along with a mixture of pride. I only point out theſe phænomena, as a ſubject of ſpeculation to ſuch as are curious with regard to moral enquiries. 'Tis ſufficient for the preſent purpoſe to obſerve in general, that power and riches commonly cauſe reſpect, poverty and meanneſs contempt, tho' particular views and incidents may ſometimes raiſe the paſſions of envy and of pity.

ſpur to induſtry, agrees better with a republican government. And we accordingly find, that each of theſe forms of government, by varying the *utility* of thoſe cuſtoms, has commonly a proportionable effect on the ſentiments of mankind.

SECTION VII.

OF QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OURSELVES.

WHOEVER has paſſed an evening with ſerious melancholy people, and has obſerved how ſuddenly the converſation was animated, and what ſprightlineſs diffuſed itſelf over the countenance, diſcourſe, and behavior of the whole circle, on the acceſſion of a good-humored, lively companion; ſuch a one will eaſily allow, that CHEERFULNESS carries great merit with it, and naturally conciliates the good-will of mankind. No quality, indeed, more readily communicates itſelf to all around; becauſe no-one has a greater propenſity to diſplay itſelf, in jovial talk and pleaſant entertainment. The flame ſpreads thro' the whole circle; and the moſt ſullen and moroſe are often caught by it. That the melancholy hate the merry, even tho' HORACE ſays it, I have ſome difficulty to allow; becauſe I have always obſerved, that where the jollity is moderate and decent, ſerious people are ſo much the more delighted, that it diſſipates the gloom, with which they are commonly oppreſſed; and gives them an unuſual enjoyment.

FROM this influence of cheerfulneſs, both to communicate itſelf, and to engage approbation, we may perceive, that there are another ſet of virtues, which, without any utility or any tendency to farther good, either of the community or of the poſſeſſor, diffuſe a ſatisfaction on the beholders, and procure friendſhip and regard. Their immediate ſenſation, to the perſon poſſeſſed of them, is agreeable: Others enter into the ſame humor, and catch the ſentiment, by a contagion or natural ſympathy: And as we cannot forbear loving whatever pleaſes, a kindly emotion ariſes towards the perſon, who communicates ſo much ſatisfaction. He is a more animating ſpectacle: His preſence diffuſes over us more ſerene complacency and enjoyment: Our imagination, entering into his feelings and diſpoſition, is affected in a more agreeable manner, than if a melancholy, dejected, ſullen, anxious temper, were preſented to us. Hence the affection and approbation, which attend the former: The averſion and diſguſt, with which we regard the latter [o].

[o] There is no man, who on particular occaſions, is not affected with all the diſagreeable paſſions, fear, anger, dejection, grief, melancholy, anxiety, &c. But theſe, ſo far as they are natural, and univerſal, make no difference betwixt one man and another, and can never be the object of blame. 'Tis only when the diſpoſition gives a *propenſity* to any of theſe diſagreeable paſſions, that they diſfigure the character, and by giving uneaſineſs, convey the ſentiment of diſapprobation to the ſpectator.

FEW

FEW men would envy the character, which CÆSAR gives of CASSIUS.

> He loves no play,
> As thou do'ſt, ANTHONY: He hears no muſic:
> Seldom he ſmiles; and ſmiles in ſuch a ſort,
> As if he mockt himſelf, and ſcorn'd his ſpirit
> That could be moved to ſmile at any thing.

Not only ſuch men, as CÆSAR adds, are commonly *dangerous*, but alſo, having little enjoyment within themſelves, they can never become agreeable to others, or contribute any thing to ſocial entertainment. In all polite nations and ages, a reliſh of pleaſure, if accompanied with temperance and decency, is eſteemed a conſiderable merit, even in the greateſt men; and becomes ſtill more requiſite in thoſe of inferior rank and character. 'Tis an agreeable repreſentation, which a FRENCH writer gives of the ſituation of his own mind in this particular. *Virtue I love*, ſays he, *without auſterity: Pleaſure without effeminacy: And life, without fearing its end* [q].

WHO is not ſtruck with any ſignal inſtance of GREATNESS of MIND or Dignity of character; with elevation of ſentiments, diſdain of ſlavery, and with that noble pride and ſpirit, which ariſes from conſcious virtue? The ſublime, ſays LONGINUS, is often nothing but the echo or image of magnanimity; and where this quality appears in any one, even tho' a ſyllable be not uttered, it excites our applauſe and admiration; as may be obſerved of the famous ſilence of AJAX in the ODYSSEY, which expreſſes more noble diſdain and reſolute indignation, than any language can convey [r]?

Were I ALEXANDER, ſaid PARMENIO, *I would accept of theſe offers made by* DARIUS. *So would I too*, replied ALEXANDER, *were I* PARMENIO. This ſaying is admirable, ſays LONGINUS, from a like principle [s].

GO! cries the ſame hero to his ſoldiers, when they refuſed to follow him to the INDIES, *go tell your countrymen, that you left* ALEXANDER *compleating the conqueſt of the world.* "ALEXANDER," ſaid the prince of CONDE', who always admired this paſſage, "abandoned by his ſoldiers, among Barbarians, not yet fully "ſubdued, felt in himſelf ſuch a dignity and right of empire, that he could not "believe it poſſible that any one would refuſe to obey him. Whether in EUROPE "or in ASIA, among GREEKS or PERSIANS, all was indifferent to him: Where-"ever he found men, he fancied he would find ſubjects."

THE confident of MEDEA in the tragedy recommends caution and ſubmiſſion; and enumerating all the diſtreſſes of that unfortunate heroine, aſks her, what ſhe has to ſupport her againſt ſo many enemies. *Myſelf*, replies ſhe; *Myſelf, I ſay, and it is enough.* BOILEAU juſtly recommends this paſſage as an inſtance of true ſublime [t].

[q] "J'aime la vertu, ſans rudeſſe;
"J'aime le plaiſir, ſans mo'eſſe;
"J'aime la vie, & n'en crains point la fin." St. EVREMOND.

[r] Cap. 9. [s] Idem. [t] Reflection 10 ſur Longin.

When Phocion, the modeſt, the gentle Phocion, was led to execution, he turned to one of his fellow-ſufferers, who was lamenting his own hard fate. *Is it not glory enough for you*, ſays he, *that you die with* Phocion[u]?

Place in oppoſition the picture which Tacitus draws of Vitellius, fal'en from empire, prolonging his ignominy from a wretched love of life, delivered over to the mercileſs rabble; toſt, buffetted, and kicked about; and conſtrained, by their holding a ponyard under his chin, to raiſe his head, and expoſe himſelf to every contumely. What abject infamy! What low humiliation! Yet even here, ſays the hiſtorian, he diſcovered ſome ſymptoms of a mind not wholly degenerate. To a tribune, who inſulted him, he replied, *I am ſtill your emperor*[w].

We never excuſe the abſolute want of ſpirit and dignity of character, or a proper ſenſe of what is due to one's ſelf, in ſociety and the common intercourſe of life. This vice conſtitutes what we properly call *meanneſs*; when a man can ſubmit to the baſeſt ſlavery, in order to gain his ends; fawn upon thoſe, who abuſe him; and degrade himſelf by intimacies and familiarities with undeſerving inferiors. A certain degree of generous pride or ſelf-value is ſo requiſite, that the abſence of it in the mind diſpleaſes after the ſame manner, as the want of a noſe, eye, or any of the moſt material features of the face or members of the body[x].

The utility of COURAGE, both to the public and to the perſon poſſeſſed of it, is an obvious foundation of merit: But to any one, who duly conſiders the matter, it will appear, that this quality has a peculiar luſtre, which it derives wholly from itſelf, and from that noble elevation inſeparable from it. Its figure, drawn by painters and by poets, diſplays, in each feature, a ſublimity and daring confidence; which catches the eye, engages the affections, and diffuſes, by ſympathy, a like ſublimity of ſentiment over every ſpectator.

Under what glorious colors does Demosthenes[y] repreſent Philip; where the orator apologizes for his own adminiſtration, and juſtifies that pertinacious love of liberty, with which he had inſpired the Athenians. "I beheld Philip," ſays he, "he with whom was your conteſt, reſolutely, while in purſuit of empire and "dominion, expoſing himſelf to every wound; his eye goared, his neck wreſted, "his arm, his thigh pierced, whatever part of his body fortune ſhould ſeize on, "that cheerfully relinquiſhing; provided that, with what remained, he might "live in honor and renown. And ſhall it be ſaid, that he, born in Pella, a "place heretofore mean and ignoble, ſhould be inſpired with ſo high an ambition "and thirſt of fame: While you, Athenians, *&c.*" Theſe praiſes excite the

[u] Plutarch. in Phoc.

[w] Tacit. hiſt. lib. 3. The author entering upon the narration, ſays, *Laniata veſte, fœdum ſpectaculum ducebatur, multis increpantibus, nullo inlacrimante:* deformitas exitus miſericordiam abſtulerat. To enter thoroughly into this method of thinking, we muſt make allowance for the ancient maxims, that no one ought to prolong his life after it became diſhonorable; but as he had always a right to diſpoſe of it, it then became a duty to part with it.

[x] The abſence of a virtue may often be a vice; and that of the higheſt kind; as in the inſtance of ingratitude, as well as meanneſs. Where we expect a beauty, the diſappointment gives an uneaſy ſenſation, and produces a real deformity. An abjectneſs of character, likewiſe, is diſguſtful and contemptible in another view. Where a man has no ſenſe of value in himſelf, we are not likely to have any higher eſtimation of him. And if the ſame perſon, who crouches to his ſuperiors, is inſolent to his inferiors (as often happens) this contrariety of behavior, inſtead of correcting the former vice, aggravates it extremely, by the addition of a vice, ſtill more odious. See ſect. 8.

[y] Pro corona.

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moſt lively admiration; but the views preſented by the orator, carry us not, we ſee, beyond the hero himſelf, nor ever regard the future advantageous conſequences of his valor.

THE martial temper of the ROMANS, inflamed by continual wars, had raiſed their eſteem of courage ſo high, that, in their language, it was called *virtue*, by way of excellence and of diſtinction from all other moral qualities. *The* SUEVI, in the opinion of TACITUS [z], *dreſt their hair with a laudable intent: Not for the purpoſes of loving or being beloved: They adorned themſelves only for their enemies, and in order to appear more terrible.* A ſentiment of the hiſtorian, which would ſound a little oddly, in other nations and other ages.

THE SCYTHIANS, according to HERODOTUS [a], after fleaing the ſkin from the heads of their enemies, whom they had ſlain, dreſſed it like leather, and uſed it as a towel; and whoever had the moſt of theſe towels was moſt eſteemed among them. So much had martial bravery, in that nation, as well as in many others, deſtroyed the ſentiments of humanity; a virtue ſurely much more uſeful and engaging.

'TIS indeed obſervable, that, among all uncultivated nations who have not, as yet, had full experience of the advantages attending beneficence, juſtice, and the ſocial virtues, courage is the predominant excellence; what is moſt celebrated by poets, recommended by parents and inſtructors, and admired by the public in general. The ethics of HOMER are, in this particular, very different from thoſe of FENELON, his elegant imitator; and ſuch as are well ſuited to an age, in which one hero, as remarked by THUCYDIDES [b], could aſk another, without offence, whether or not he was a robber. Such alſo, very lately, was the ſyſtem of ethics, which prevailed in many barbarous parts of IRELAND; if we may credit SPENSER, in his judicious account of the ſtate of that kingdom [c].

OF the ſame claſs of virtues with courage is that undiſturbed, philoſophical TRANQUILLITY, ſuperior to pain, ſorrow, anxiety, and each aſſault of adverſe fortune. Conſcious of his own virtue, ſay the philoſophers, the ſage elevates himſelf above every accident of life; and ſecurely placed in the temple of wiſdom, looks down on inferior mortals, engaged in purſuit of honors, riches, reputation, and each frivolous enjoyment. Theſe pretenſions, no doubt, when ſtretched to the utmoſt, are far too magnificent for human nature. They carry, however, a grandeur, with them, which ſeizes the ſpectator, and ſtrikes him with admiration. And the nearer we can approach, in practice, to this ſublime tranquillity and indifference (for we muſt diſtinguiſh it from a ſtupid inſenſibility) the more ſecure enjoyment ſhall we attain within ourſelves, and the more greatneſs of mind ſhall we diſcover to the world. The philoſophical tranquillity may, indeed, be conſidered only as a branch of magnanimity.

WHO admires not SOCRATES; his perpetual ſerenity and contentment, amidſt the greateſt poverty and domeſtic vexations; his reſolute contempt of riches, and

[z] De moribus Germ.
[a] Lib. 4. [b] Lib. 1.
[c] It is a common uſe, ſays he, amongſt their gentlemen's ſons, that, as ſoon as they are able to uſe their weapons, they ſtrait gather to themſelves three or four ſtragglers or kern, with whom wandering a while up and down idly the country, taking only meat, he at laſt falleth into ſome bad occaſion, that ſhall be offered; which being once made known, he is thenceforth counted a man of worth, in whom there is courage.

magnanimous care of preſerving liberty, while he refuſed all aſſiſtance from his friends and diſciples, and avoided even the dependence of an obligation? EPICTETUS had not ſo much as a door to his little houſe or hovel; and therefore, ſoon loſt his iron lamp, the only furniture which he had worth taking. But reſolving to diſappoint all robbers for the future, he ſupplied its place with an earthern lamp, of which he very peaceably kept poſſeſſion ever after.

IN antiquity, the heroes of philoſophy, as well as thoſe of war and patriotiſm, have a grandeur and force of ſentiment, which aſtoniſhes our narrow ſouls, and is raſhly rejected as extravagant and ſupernatural. They, in their turn, I allow, would have had equal reaſon to conſider as romantic and incredible, the degree of humanity, clemency, order, tranquillity, and other ſocial virtues, to which, in the adminiſtration of government, we have attained in modern times, had any one been then able to have made a fair repreſentation of them. Such is the compenſation, which nature, or rather education, has made in the diſtribution of excellencies and virtues, in theſe different ages.

THE merit of BENEVOLENCE, ariſing from its utility, and its tendency to the good of mankind, has been already explained, and is, no doubt, the ſource of a *conſiderable* part of that eſteem, which is ſo univerſally paid it. But it will alſo be allowed, that the very ſoftneſs and tenderneſs of the ſentiment, its engaging endearments, its fond expreſſions, its delicate attentions; and all that flow of mutual confidence and regard, which enter into a warm attachment of love and friendſhip: It will be allowed, I ſay, that theſe feelings, being delightful in themſelves, are neceſſarily communicated to the ſpectators, and melt them into the ſame fondneſs and delicacy. The tears naturally ſtart in our eyes on the apprehenſion of a warm ſentiment of this nature: Our breaſt heaves, our heart is agitated, and every humane tender principle of our frame, is ſet in motion, and gives us the pureſt and moſt ſatisfactory enjoyment.

WHEN poets form deſcriptions of ELYZIAN fields, where the bleſſed inhabitants ſtand in no need of each other's aſſiſtance, they yet repreſent them as maintaining a conſtant entercourſe of love and friendſhip, and ſooth our fancy with the pleaſing image of theſe ſoft and gentle paſſions. The idea of tender tranquillity in a paſtoral ARCADIA is agreeable from a like principle, as has been obſerved above [d].

WHO would live amidſt perpetual wrangling, and ſcolding, and mutual reproaches? The roughneſs and harſhneſs of theſe emotions diſturb and diſpleaſe us: We ſuffer by contagion and ſympathy; nor can we remain indifferent ſpectators, even tho' certain, that no pernicious conſequences would ever follow from ſuch angry paſſions.

As a certain proof, that the whole merit of benevolence is not derived from its uſefulneſs, we may obſerve, that, in a kind way of blame, we ſay, a perſon is *too good*; when he exceeds his part in ſociety, and carries his attention for others beyond the proper bounds and meaſure. In like manner, we ſay a man is *too high-ſpirited, too intrepid, too indifferent about fortune:* Reproaches, which really, at the bottom, imply more eſteem than many panegyrics. Being accuſtomed to rate the merit and demerit of characters chiefly by their uſual or pernicious tendencies,

[d] Sect. 5. Part 2.

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we cannot forbear applying the epithet of blame, when we diſcover a ſentiment, which riſes to a degree that is hurtful: But it may happen, at the ſame time, that its noble elevation, or its engaging tenderneſs ſo ſeizes the heart, as rather to encreaſe our friendſhip and concern for the perſon *.

THE amours and attachments of HARRY the IVth, during the civil wars of the league, frequently hurt his intereſt and his cauſe; but all the young, at leaſt, and amorous, who can ſympathize with the tender paſſions, will allow, that this very weakneſs (for they will readily call it ſuch) chiefly endears that hero, and intereſts them in his fortunes.

THE exceſſive bravery and reſolute inflexibility of CHARLES the XIIth ruined his own country, and infeſted all his neighbors: But have ſuch ſplendor and greatneſs in their appearance, as ſtrike us with admiration; and they might, in ſome degree, be even approved of, if they betrayed not ſometimes too evident ſymptoms of madneſs and diſorder.

THE ATHENIANS pretended to the firſt invention of agriculture and of laws; and always valued themſelves extremely on the benefit thereby procured to the whole race of mankind. They alſo boaſted, and with reaſon, of their warlike enterprizes; particularly againſt thoſe innumerable fleets and armies of PERSIANS, which invaded GREECE during the reign of DARIUS and XERXES. But tho' there be no compariſon, in point of utility, between theſe peaceful and military honors; yet we find, that the orators, who have wrote ſuch elaborate panegyrics on that famous city, have chiefly triumphed in diſplaying the warlike atchievements. LYSIAS, THUCYDIDES, PLATO and ISOCRATES diſcover, all of them, the ſame partiality; which, tho' condemned by calm reaſon and reflection, appears ſo natural in the mind of man.

'Tis obſervable, that the great charm of poetry conſiſts in lively pictures of the ſublime paſſions, magnanimity, courage, diſdain of fortune; or thoſe of the tender affections, love and friendſhip; which warm the heart, and diffuſe over it ſimilar ſentiments and emotions. And tho' every kind of paſſion, even the moſt diſagreeable, ſuch as grief and anger, are obſerved, when excited by poetry, to convey a ſatisfaction, from a mechaniſm of nature, not eaſy to be explained: Yet thoſe more elevated or ſofter affections have a peculiar influence, and pleaſe from more than one cauſe or principle. Not to mention, that they alone intereſt us in the fortune of the perſons repreſented, or communicate any eſteem and affection for their character.

AND can it poſſibly be doubted, that this talent itſelf of poets, to move the paſſions, this PATHETIC and SUBLIME of ſentiment, is a very conſiderable merit, and being enhanced by its extreme rarity, may exalt the perſon poſſeſſed of it, above every character of the age, in which he lives? The prudence, addreſs, ſteadineſs, and benign government of AUGUSTUS, adorned with all the ſplendor of his noble birth and imperial crown, render him but an unequal competitor for fame with VIRGIL, who lays nothing into the oppoſite ſcale but the divine beauties of his poetical genius.

* Cheerfulneſs could ſcarce admit of blame from its exceſs, were it not that diſſolute mirth, without a proper cauſe or ſubject, is a ſure ſymptom and characteriſtic of folly, and on that account, diſguſtful.

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THE very ſenſibility to theſe beauties or a DELICACY of taſte, is itſelf a beauty in any character; as conveying the pureſt, the moſt durable, and moſt innocent of all enjoyments.

THESE are ſome inſtances of the ſpecies of virtue, that are praiſed from the immediate pleaſure, which they communicate to the perſon, poſſeſſed of them. No views of utility or of future beneficial conſequences enter into this ſentiment of approbation; yet is it of a kind ſimilar to that other ſentiment, which ariſes from views of public or private utility. The ſame ſocial ſympathy, we may obſerve, or fellow-feeling with human happineſs or miſery, gives riſe to both; and this analogy in all the parts of the preſent theory, may juſtly be regarded as a confirmation of it.

SECTION VIII.

OF QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OTHERS[f].

AS the mutual ſhocks, in *ſociety*, and the oppoſitions of intereſt and ſelf-love have conſtrained mankind to eſtabliſh the laws of *juſtice*; in order to preſerve the advantages of common aſſiſtance and protection: In like manner, the eternal contrarieties, in *company*, of men's pride and ſelf-conceit, have introduced the rules of GOOD-MANNERS or POLITENESS; in order to facilitate the intercourſe of minds, and an undiſturbed commerce and converſation. Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is affected: Contempt of others diſguiſed: Authority concealed: Attention given to each in his turn: And an eaſy ſtream of converſation maintained, without vehemence, without mutual interruption, without eagerneſs for victory, and without any airs of ſuperiority. Theſe attentions and regards are immediately *agreeable* to others, abſtracted from any conſideration of utility or beneficial tendencies: They conciliate affection, promote eſteem, and enhance extremely the merit of the perſon, who regulates his behavior by them.

MANY of the forms of breeding are arbitrary and caſual: But the thing expreſſed by them is ſtill the ſame. A SPANIARD goes out of his own houſe before his gueſt, to ſignify that he leaves him maſter of all. In other countries, the landlord walks out laſt, as a common mark of deference and regard.

BUT, in order to render a man perfect *good-company*, he muſt have WIT and INGENUITY as well as good-manners. What wit is, it may not be

[f] 'Tis the definition of virtue, that 'tis *a quality of the mind agreeable to or approved of by every one, who conſiders or contemplates it.* But ſome qualities produce pleaſure, becauſe they are uſeful to ſociety, or uſeful or agreeable to the perſon himſelf; others produce it more immediately: Which is the claſs of virtues here conſidered.

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eaſy to define; but 'tis eaſy ſurely to determine, that 'tis a quality immediately *agreeable* to others, and communicating, on its firſt appearance, a lively joy and ſatisfaction to every one, who has any comprehenſion of it. The moſt profound metaphyſics, indeed, might be employed, in explaining the various kinds and ſpecies of wit; and many claſſes of it, which are now received on the ſole teſtimony of taſte and ſentiment, might, perhaps, be reſolved into more general principles. But this is ſufficient for our preſent purpoſe, that it does not affect taſte and ſentiment, and beſtowing an immediate enjoyment, is a ſure ſource of approbation and affection.

In countries, where men paſs all their time in converſation, and viſits and aſſemblies, theſe *companionable* qualities, ſo to ſpeak, are of high eſtimation, and form a chief part of perſonal merit. In countries, where men live a more domeſtic life, and either are employed in buſineſs or amuſe themſelves in a narrower circle of acquaintance, the more ſolid qualities are chiefly regarded. Thus I have often obſerved, that, among the French, the firſt queſtions, with regard to a ſtranger, are, *Is he polite? Has he wit?* In our own country, the chief praiſe beſtowed, is always that of a *good-natured, ſenſible fellow.*

In converſation, the lively ſpirit of dialogue is *agreeable*, even to thoſe who deſire not to have any ſhare of the diſcourſe: Hence the teller of long ſtories or a pompous declaimer is very little approved of. But moſt men deſire likewiſe their turn in the converſation, and regard, with a very evil eye, that *loquacity*, which deprives them of a right they are naturally ſo jealous of.

There are a ſet of harmleſs *liars*, frequently to be met with in company, who deal much in the marvelous. Their uſual intention is to pleaſe and entertain; but as men are delighted with nothing but what they conceive to be truth, theſe people miſtake extremely the means of pleaſing, and incur univerſal blame. Some indulgence, however, to lying or fiction is given in *humorous* ſtories; becauſe it is there really agreeable and entertaining; and truth is not of any importance.

Eloquence, genius of all kinds, even good ſenſe, and ſound reaſoning, when it riſes to an eminent degree, and is employed upon ſubjects of any conſiderable dignity and nice diſcernment; all theſe qualities ſeem immediately agreeable, and have a merit diſtinct from their uſefulneſs. Rarity, likewiſe, which ſo much enhances the price of every thing, muſt ſet an additional value on theſe noble talents of the human mind.

Modesty may be underſtood in different ſenſes, even abſtracted from chaſtity, which has been already treated of. It ſometimes means that tenderneſs and nicety of honor, that apprehenſion of blame, that dread of intruſion or injury towards others, that Pudor, which is the proper guardian of every kind of virtue, and a ſure preſervative againſt vice and corruption. But its moſt uſual meaning is when it is oppoſed to *impudence* and *arrogance*, and expreſſes a diffidence of our own judgment, and a due attention and regard to others. In young men chiefly, this quality is a ſure ſign of good ſenſe; and is alſo the certain means of augmenting that endowment, by preſerving their ears open to inſtruction, and making them ſtill graſp after new attainments. But it has a farther charm to every ſpectator; by flattering each man's vanity, and preſenting the appearance of a docile

docile pupil, who receives, with proper attention and reſpect, every word they utter[g].

A DESIRE of fame, reputation, or a character with others, is ſo far from being blameable, that it ſeems inſeparable from virtue, genius, capacity, and a generous or noble diſpoſition. An attention, even to trivial matters, in order to pleaſe, is alſo expected and demanded by ſociety; and no one is ſurprized, if he finds a man in company, to obſerve a greater elegance of dreſs and more pleaſant flow of converſation than when he paſſes his time, at home, and with his own family. Wherein, then, conſiſts VANITY, which is ſo juſtly regarded as a fault or imperfection? It ſeems to conſiſt chiefly in ſuch an intemperate diſplay of our advantages, honors and accompliſhments; in ſuch an importunate and open demand of praiſe and admiration, as is offenſive to others, and encroaches too far on *their* ſecret vanity and ambition. It is beſides a ſure ſymptom of the want of true dignity and elevation of mind, which is ſo great an ornament to any character. For why that impatient deſire of applauſe; as if you were not juſtly entitled to it, and might not reaſonably expect that it would for ever attend you? Why ſo anxious to inform us of the great company which you have kept; the obliging things, which were ſaid to you; the honors, the diſtinctions which you met with;

[g] Men have in general a much greater propenſity to over-value than under-value themſelves; notwithſtanding the opinion of ARISTOTLE. This makes us more jealous of the exceſs on the former ſide, and cauſes us to regard, with a particular indulgence, all tendency to modeſty and ſelf-diffidence; as eſteeming the danger leſs of falling into any vicious extreme of that nature. 'Tis thus, in countries, where men's bodies are apt to exceed in corpulency, perſonal beauty is placed in a much greater degree of ſlenderneſs, than in countries where that is the moſt uſual defect. Being ſo often ſtruck with inſtances of one ſpecies of deformity, men think they can never keep at too great a diſtance from it, and wiſh always to have a leaning to the oppoſite ſide. In like manner, were the door opened to ſelf-praiſe, and were MONTAIGNE's maxim obſerved, that one ſhould ſay as frankly, *I have ſenſe, I have learning, I have courage, beauty, or wit*; as 'tis ſure we often think ſo; were this the caſe, I ſay, every one is ſenſible, that ſuch a flood of impertinence would break in upon us as would render ſociety wholly intolerable. For this reaſon cuſtom has eſtabliſhed it as a rule, in common ſocieties, that men ſhould not indulge themſelves in ſelf-praiſe, nor even ſpeak much of themſelves; and 'tis only among intimate friends or people of very manly behavior, that one is allowed to do himſelf juſtice. No body finds fault with MAURICE, prince of ORANGE, for his reply to one, who aſked him whom he eſteemed the firſt general of the age, *The marquis de* SPINOLA, ſaid he, *is the ſecond*. Tho' 'tis obſervable, that the ſelf-praiſe implied is here better implied, than if it had been directly expreſſed, without any cover or diſguiſe.

He muſt be a very ſuperficial thinker, who imagines, that all inſtances of mutual deference are to be underſtood in earneſt, and that a man would be more eſteemable for being ignorant of his own merits and accompliſhments. A ſmall byaſs towards modeſty, even in the internal ſentiments, is favorably regarded, eſpecially in young people; and a ſtrong byaſs is required in the outward behavior; But this excludes not a noble pride and ſpirit, which may openly diſplay itſelf in its full extent, when one lies under calumny or oppreſſion of any kind. The generous contumacy of SOCRATES, as CICERO calls it, has been highly celebrated in all ages; and when joined to the uſual modeſty of his behavior, forms a moſt ſhining character. IPHICRITES, the ATHENIAN general, being accuſed of betraying the intereſts of his country, aſked his accuſer, *Would you*, ſays he, *on a like occaſion have been guilty of that crime? By no means*, replied the other. *And can you then imagine*, cried the hero, *that* IPHICRATES *would be guilty?* QUINCTIL. lib. 5. cap. 12. In ſhort, a generous ſpirit and ſelf-value, well founded, decently diſguiſed, and courageouſly ſupported under diſtreſs and calumny, is a very great virtue, and ſeems to derive its merit from the noble elevation of its ſentiment, or its immediate agreeableneſs to its poſſeſſor. In ordinary characters, we approve of a byaſs towards modeſty, which is a quality immediately agreeable to others: The vicious exceſs of the former virtue, viz. inſolence or haughtineſs, is immediately diſagreeable to others: The exceſs of the latter is ſo to the poſſeſſor. Thus are the boundaries of theſe duties adjuſted.

as if theſe were not things of courſe, and what we could readily, of ourſelves, have imagined, without being told of them?

DECENCY, or a proper regard to age, ſex, character and ſtation in the world, may be ranked among the qualities, which are immediately agreeable to others, and which, by that means, acquire praiſe and approbation. An effeminate behavior in a man, a rough manner in a woman; theſe are ugly, becauſe unſuitable to each character, and different from the qualities which we expect in the ſexes. 'Tis as if a tragedy abounded in comic beauties, or a comedy in tragic. The diſproportions hurt the eye, and convey a diſagreeable ſentiment to the ſpectators, the ſource of blame and diſapprobation. This is that *indecorum*, which is explained ſo much at large by CICERO in his offices.

AMONG the other virtues, we may alſo give CLEANLINESS a place; ſince it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconſiderable ſource of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in this particular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but ſmaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin than the uneaſy ſenſation, which it excites in others; we may, in this inſtance, ſeemingly ſo trivial, clearly diſcover the origin of moral diſtinctions, about which the learned have involved themſelves in ſuch mazes of perplexity and error.

BUT beſides all the *agreeable* qualities, the origin of whoſe beauty we can, in ſome degree, explain and account for, there ſtill remains ſomething myſterious and inexplicable, which conveys an immediate ſatisfaction to the ſpectator, but how, or why, or for what reaſon, he cannot pretend to determine. There is a MANNER, a grace, a genteelneſs, and I-know-not-what, which ſome men poſſeſs above others, which is very different from external beauty and comelineſs, and which, however, catches our affection almoſt as ſuddenly and powerfully. And tho' this *manner* be chiefly talked of in the paſſion between the ſexes, where the concealed magic is eaſily explained, yet ſurely much of it prevails in all our eſtimation of characters, and forms no inconſiderable part of perſonal merit. This claſs of virtues, therefore, muſt be truſted entirely to the blind, but ſure teſtimony of taſte and ſentiment; and muſt be conſidered as a part of ethics, left by nature to baffle all the pride of philoſophy, and make her ſenſible of her narrow boundaries and ſlender acquiſitions.

WE approve of another, becauſe of his wit, politeneſs, modeſty, decency, or any agreeable quality which he poſſeſſes; altho' he be not of our acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of theſe accompliſhments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives us the ſentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the judgments, which we form concerning morals.

SECTION IX.

CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE.

PART I.

IT may juſtly appear ſurprizing, that any man, in ſo late an age, ſhould find it requiſite to prove, by elaborate reaſonings, that VIRTUE or PERSONAL MERIT conſiſts altogether in the poſſeſſion of mental qualities, *uſeful* or *agreeable* to the *perſon himſelf* or to *others*. It might be expected that this principle would have occurred even to the firſt rude, unpractiſed enquirers concerning morals, and been received, from its own evidence, without any argument or diſputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind, ſo naturally claſſes itſelf under the diviſion of *uſeful* or *agreeable*, the *utile* or the *dulce*, that 'tis not eaſy to imagine, why we ſhould ever ſeek farther, or conſider the queſtion as a matter of nice reſearch or enquiry. And as every thing uſeful or agreeable muſt poſſeſs theſe qualities with regard either to the *perſon himſelf* or to *others*, the compleat delineation or deſcription of merit ſeems to be performed as naturally as a ſhadow is caſt by the ſun, or an image is reflected upon water. If the ground, on which the ſhadow is caſt, be not broken and uneven; nor the ſurface, from which the image is reflected, diſturbed and confuſed; a juſt figure is immediately preſented, without any art or attention. And it ſeems a reaſonable preſumption, that ſyſtems and hypotheſes have perverted our natural underſtanding; when a theory, ſo ſimple and obvious, could ſo long have eſcaped the moſt elaborate examination.

BUT however the caſe may have fared with philoſophy; in common life, theſe principles are ſtill implicitly maintained; nor is any other topic of praiſe or blame ever recurred to, when we employ any panegyric or ſatyre, any applauſe or cenſure of human action and behavior. If we obſerve men, in every intercourſe of buſineſs or pleaſure, in each diſcourſe and converſation; we ſhall find them no where, except in the ſchools, at any loſs upon this ſubject. What ſo natural, for inſtance, as the following dialogue? You are very happy, we ſhall ſuppoſe one to ſay, addreſſing himſelf to another, that you have given your daughter to CLEANTHES. He is a man of honor and humanity. Every one, who has any intercourſe with him, is ſure of *fair* and *kind* treatment [h]. I congratulate you too, ſays another, on the promiſing expectations of this ſon-in-law; whoſe aſſiduous application to the ſtudy of the laws, whoſe quick penetration and early knowlege both of men and buſineſs, prognoſticate the greateſt honors and advancement [i]. You ſurprize me much, replies a third, when you talk of CLEANTHES as a man of buſineſs and application. I met him lately in a circle of the gayeſt company, and he was the very life and ſoul of our converſation: So much wit with good-manners; ſo much gallantry without affectation; ſo much ingenious knowlege ſo

[h] Qualities uſeful to others. [i] Qualities uſeful to the perſon himſelf.

gen-

genteely delivered, I have never before obſerved in any one [k]. You would admire him ſtill more, ſays a fourth, if you knew him more familiarly. That cheerfulneſs, which you might remark in him, is not a ſudden flaſh ſtruck out by company: It runs thro' the whole tenor of his life, and preſerves a perpetual ſerenity on his countenance, and tranquillity in his ſoul. He has met with ſevere trials, misfortunes as well as dangers; and by his greatneſs of mind, was ſtill ſuperior to all of them [l]. The image, gentlemen, which you have here delineated of CLEANTHES, cry I, is that of accompliſhed merit. Each of you has given a ſtroke of the pencil to his figure; and you have unawares exceeded all the pictures drawn by GRATIAN or CASTIGLIONE. A philoſopher might ſelect this character as a model of perfect virtue.

AND as every quality, which is uſeful or agreeable to ourſelves or others, is, in common life, admitted under the denomination of virtue or perſonal merit; ſo no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural, unprejudiced reaſon, without the deluſive gloſſes of ſuperſtition and falſe religion. Celibacy, faſting, penances, mortification, ſelf-denial, humility, ſilence, ſolitude, and the whole train of monkiſh virtues; for what reaſon are they every where rejected by men of ſenſe, but becauſe they ſerve no manner of purpoſe; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of ſociety; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor encreaſe his power of ſelf-enjoyment? We obſerve, on the contrary, that they croſs all theſe deſireable ends; ſtupify the underſtanding and harden the heart, obſcure the fancy and ſower the temper. We juſtly, therefore, transfer them to the oppoſite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any ſuperſtition force ſufficient, among men of the world, to pervert entirely theſe natural ſentiments. A gloomy, hair-brained enthuſiaſt, after his death, may have place in the calendar; but will ſcarce ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and ſociety, except by thoſe who are as delirious and diſmal as himſelf.

IT ſeems a happineſs in the preſent theory, that it enters not into that vulgar diſpute concerning the *degrees* of benevolence or ſelf-love, which prevail in human nature; a diſpute which is never likely to have any iſſue, both becauſe men, who have taken party, are not eaſily convinced, and becauſe the phænomena, which can be produced on either ſide, are ſo diſperſed, ſo uncertain, and ſubject to ſo many interpretations, that 'tis ſcarce poſſible accurately to compare them, or draw from them any determinate inference or concluſion. 'Tis ſufficient for our preſent purpoſe, if it be allowed, what ſurely, without the greateſt abſurdity, cannot be diſputed, that there is ſome benevolence, however ſmall, infuſed into our boſom; ſome ſpark of friendſhip for human kind; ſome particle of the dove, kneaded into our frame, together with the elements of the wolf and ſerpent. Let theſe generous ſentiments be ſuppoſed ever ſo weak; let them be ſufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body; they muſt ſtill direct the determinations of our mind, and where every thing elſe is equal, produce a cool preference of what is uſeful and ſerviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A *moral diſtinction*, therefore, immediately ariſes; a general ſentiment of blame and approba-

[k] Qualities immediately agreeable to others.

[l] Qualities immediately agreeable to the perſon himſelf.

tion; a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the one, and a proportionable averſion to thoſe of the other. Nor will thoſe reaſoners, who ſo earneſtly maintain the predominant ſelfiſhneſs of human kind, be any way ſcandalized at hearing of the weak ſentiments of virtue, implanted in our nature. On the contrary, they are found as ready to maintain the one tenet as the other, and their ſpirit of ſatyre, (for ſuch it appears, rather than of corruption) naturally gives riſe to both opinions; which have, indeed, a great and almoſt indiſſoluble connexion together.

AVARICE, ambition, vanity, and all paſſions, vulgarly, tho' improperly, comprized under the denomination of *ſelf-love*, are here excluded from our theory concerning the origin of morals, not becauſe they are too weak, but becauſe they have not a proper direction, for that purpoſe. The notion of morals implies ſome ſentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the ſame object to general approbation, and makes every man, or moſt men, agree in the ſame opinion or deciſion concerning it. It alſo implies ſome ſentiment, ſo univerſal and comprehenſive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of perſons the moſt remote, an object of applauſe or cenſure, according as they agree or diſagree with that rule of right, which is eſtabliſhed. Theſe two requiſite circumſtances belong alone to the ſentiment of humanity here inſiſted on. The other paſſions produce, in every breaſt, many ſtrong ſentiments of deſire and averſion, affection and hatred; but theſe neither are felt ſo much in common, nor are ſo comprehenſive, as to be the foundation of any general ſyſtem and eſtabliſhed theory of blame or approbation.

WHEN a man denominates another his *enemy*, his *rival*, his *antagoniſt*, his *adverſary*, he is underſtood to ſpeak the language of ſelf-love, and to expreſs ſentiments, peculiar to himſelf, and ariſing from his particular circumſtances and ſituation. But when he beſtows on any man the epithets of *vicious* or *odious* or *depraved*, he then ſpeaks another language, and expreſſes ſentiments, in which, he expects, all his audience are to concur with him. He muſt here, therefore, depart from his private and particular ſituation, and muſt chooſe a point of view, common to him with others: He muſt move ſome univerſal principle of the human frame, and touch a ſtring, to which all mankind have an accord and ſymphony. If he means, therefore, to expreſs, that this man poſſeſſes qualities, whoſe tendency is pernicious to ſociety, he has choſen this common point in view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in ſome degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the ſame elements as at preſent, it will never be wholly indifferent to the good of mankind, nor entirely unaffected with the tendencies of characters and manners. And tho' this affection of humanity may not generally be eſteemed ſo ſtrong, as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any general ſyſtem of conduct and behavior. One man's ambition is not another's ambition; nor will the ſame event or object ſatisfy both: But the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one; and the ſame object touches this paſſion in all human creatures.

BUT the ſentiments, which ariſe from humanity, are not only the ſame in all human creatures, and produce the ſame approbation or cenſure; but they alſo comprehend all human creatures; nor is there any one, whoſe conduct or charac-

ter is not, by their means, an object, to every one, of cenſure or approbation. On the contrary, thoſe other paſſions, commonly denominated ſelfiſh, both produce different ſentiments in each individual, according to his particular ſituation; and alſo contemplate the greateſt part of mankind with the utmoſt indifference and unconcern. Whoever has a high regard and eſteem for me flatters my vanity; whoever expreſſes contempt mortifies and diſpleaſes me: But as my name is known but to a ſmall part of mankind, there are few, who come within the ſphere of this paſſion, or excite, on its account, either my affection or diſguſt. But if you repreſent a tyrannical, inſolent, or barbarous behavior, in any country or in any age of the world; I ſoon carry my eye to the pernicious tendency of ſuch a conduct, and feel the ſentiments of repugnance and diſpleaſure towards it: No character can be ſo remote as to be, in this light, wholly indifferent to me. What is beneficial to ſociety or to the perſon himſelf muſt ſtill be preferred. And every quality or action, of every human being, muſt, by this means, be ranked under ſome claſs or denomination, expreſſive of general cenſure or applauſe.

WHAT more, therefore, can we aſk to diſtinguiſh the ſentiments, dependant on humanity, from thoſe connected with any other paſſion, or to ſatisfy us, why the former are the origin of morals, and not the latter? Whatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching my humanity, procures alſo the applauſe of all mankind, by affecting the ſame principle in them: But what ſerves my avarice or ambition pleaſes only theſe paſſions in me, and affects not the avarice or ambition of the reſt of mankind. No conduct in any man, which has a beneficial tendency, but is agreeable to my humanity, however remote the perſon: But every man, ſo far removed as neither to croſs nor ſerve my avarice and ambition, is regarded as wholly indifferent by thoſe paſſions. The diſtinction, therefore, betwixt theſe ſpecies of ſentiment being ſo great and evident, language muſt ſoon be moulded upon it, and muſt invent a peculiar ſet of terms, in order to expreſs thoſe univerſal ſentiments of cenſure or approbation, which ariſe from humanity, or from views of general uſefulneſs and its contrary. VIRTUE and VICE become then known: Morals are recognized: Certain general ideas are framed of human conduct and behavior: Such meaſures are expected from men, in ſuch ſituations: This action is determined to be conformable to our abſtract rule; that other, contrary. And by ſuch univerſal principles are the particular ſentiments of ſelf-love frequently controuled and limited [a].

[a] It ſeems certain, both from reaſon and experience, that a rude, untaught ſavage regulates chiefly his love and hatred by the ideas of private utility and injury, and has but faint conceptions of a general rule or ſyſtem of behavior. The man who ſtands oppoſite to him in battle, he hates heartily, not only for the preſent moment, which is almoſt unavoidable, but for ever after; nor is he ſatisfied without the moſt extreme puniſhment and vengeance. But we, accuſtomed to ſociety, and to more enlarged reflections, conſider, that this man is ſerving his own country and community; that any man, in the ſame ſituation, would do the ſame; that we ourſelves, in like circumſtances, obſerve a like conduct; that in general human ſociety is beſt ſupported on ſuch maxims: And by theſe ſuppoſitions and views, we correct, in ſome meaſure, our ruder and narrower paſſions. And tho' much of our friendſhip and enmity be ſtill regulated by private conſiderations of benefit and harm, we pay, at leaſt, this homage to general rules, which we are accuſtomed to reſpect, that we commonly pervert our adverſary's conduct, by imputing malice or injuſtice to him, in order to give vent to thoſe paſſions, which ariſe from ſelf-love and private intereſt. When the heart is full of rage, it never wants pretexts of this nature; tho' ſometimes as frivolous, as thoſe, from which HORACE, being almoſt cruſhed by the fall of a tree, affects to accuſe of parricide the firſt planter of it.

FROM

FROM inſtances of popular tumults, ſeditions, factions, panics, and of all paſſions, which are ſhared with a multitude; we may learn the influence of ſociety, in exciting and ſupporting any emotion; while the moſt ungovernable diſorders are raiſed, we find, by that means, from the ſlighteſt and moſt frivolous occaſions. SOLON was no very cruel, tho', perhaps, an unjuſt legiſlator, who puniſhed neuters in civil wars; and few, I believe, would, in ſuch caſes, incur the penalty, were their affection and diſcourſe allowed ſufficient to abſolve them. No ſelfiſhneſs, and ſcarce any philoſophy, have there force ſufficient to ſupport a total coolneſs and indifference; and he muſt be more or leſs than man, who kindles not in the common blaze. What wonder then, that moral ſentiments are found of ſuch influence in life; tho' ſpringing from principles, which may appear, at firſt ſight, ſomewhat ſmall and delicate? But theſe principles, we muſt remark, are ſocial and univerſal: They form, in a manner, the *party* of human-kind againſt vice or diſorder, its common enemy: And as the benevolent concern for others is diffuſed, in a greater or leſs degree, over all men, and is the ſame in all, it occurs more frequently in diſcourſe, is cheriſhed by ſociety and converſation, and the blame and approbation, conſequent to it, are thereby rouzed from that lethargy, into which they are probably lulled, in ſolitary and uncultivated nature. Other paſſions, tho' perhaps originally ſtronger, yet being ſelfiſh and private, are often overpowered by its force, and yield the dominion of our breaſt to thoſe ſocial and public principles.

ANOTHER ſpring of our conſtitution, that brings great addition of force to moral ſentiment, is, the love of fame; which rules, with ſuch uncontrolled authority, in all generous minds, and is often the grand object of all their deſigns and undertakings. By our continual and earneſt purſuit of a character, a name, a reputation in the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and conſider how they appear in the eyes of thoſe, who approach and regard us. This conſtant habit of ſurveying ourſelf, as it were, in reflexion, keeps alive all the ſentiments of right and wrong, and begets in noble natures, a certain reverence for themſelves as well as others; which is the ſureſt guardian of every virtue. The animal conveniencies and pleaſures ſink gradually in their value; while every inward beauty and moral grace is ſtudiouſly acquired, and the mind is accompliſhed in each perfection, which can adorn or embelliſh a rational creature.

HERE is the moſt perfect morality with which we are acquainted: Here is diſplayed the force of many ſympathies. Our moral ſentiment is itſelf a feeling chiefly of that nature: And our regard to a character with others ſeems to ariſe only from a care of preſerving a character with ourſelves, and to obtain this end, we find it neceſſary to prop our tottering judgment on the correſpondent approbation of mankind.

BUT, in order to accommodate matters, and remove, if poſſible, every difficulty, let us allow all theſe reaſonings to be falſe. Let us allow, that when we reſolve the pleaſure, which ariſes from views of utility, into the ſentiments of humanity and ſympathy, we have embraced a wrong hypotheſis. Let us confeſs it neceſſary to find ſome other explication of that applauſe, which is paid to objects, whether inanimate, animate or rational, if they have a tendency to promote the welfare and advantage of mankind. However difficult it be to con-

ceive, that an object is approved of, on account of its tendency to a certain end, while the end itself is totally indifferent; let us swallow this absurdity, and consider what are the consequences. The preceding delineation or definition of VIRTUE must still retain its evidence and authority: It must still be allowed, that every quality of the mind, which is *useful* or *agreeable* to the *person himself* or to *others*, communicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages his esteem, and is admitted under the honorable denomination of virtue or merit. Are not justice, fidelity, honor, veracity, allegiance, chastity, esteemed solely on account of their tendency to promote the good of society? Is not that tendency inseparable from humanity, benevolence, lenity, generosity, gratitude, moderation, tenderness, friendship, and all the other social virtues? Can it possibly be doubted, that industry, discretion, frugality, secrecy, order, perseverance, forethought, judgment, and that whole class of virtues, of which many pages would not contain the catalogue; can it be doubted, I say, that the tendency of these virtues to promote the interest and happiness of their possessor, is the sole foundation of their merit? Who can dispute that a mind, which supports a perpetual serenity and cheerfulness, a noble dignity and undaunted spirit, a tender affection and goodwill to all around; as it has more enjoyment within itself, is also a more animating and rejoicing spectacle, than if dejected with melancholy, tormented with anxiety, irritated with rage, or sunk into the most abject baseness and degeneracy? And as to the qualities, immediately *agreeable to others*, they speak sufficiently for themselves; and he must be unhappy, indeed, either in his own temper, or in his situation and circumstances, who has never perceived the charms of a facetious wit or flowing affability, of a delicate modesty or decent genteelness of address and manner.

I AM sensible, that nothing can be more unphilosophical than to be positive or dogmatical on any subject; and that, even if *excessive* scepticism could be maintained, it would not be more destructive to all just reasoning and enquiry. I am convinced, that, where men are the most sure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there given reins to passion, without that proper deliberation and suspence, which can alone secure them from the grossest absurdities. Yet I must confess, that this enumeration puts the matter in so strong a light, that I cannot, *at present*, be more assured of any truth, which I learn from reasoning and argument, than that virtue consists entirely in the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the person himself possessed of them, or to others, who have any intercourse with him. But when I reflect, that, tho' the bulk and figure of the earth have been measured and delineated, tho' the motions of the tides have been accounted for, the order and œconomy of the heavenly bodies subjected to their proper laws, and INFINITE itself reduced to calculation; yet men still dispute concerning the foundation of their moral duties: When I reflect on this, I say, I fall back into diffidence and scepticism, and suspect, that an hypothesis, so obvious, had it been a true one, would, long ere now, have been received by the unanimous suffrage and consent of mankind.

PART

SECTION IX.

PART II.

HAVING explained the moral *approbation* attending virtue, there remains nothing, but to conſider briefly our intereſted *obligation* to it, and to enquire, whether every man, who has any regard to his own happineſs and welfare, will not beſt find his account in the practice of every moral duty. If this can be clearly aſcertained from the foregoing theory, we ſhall have the ſatisfaction to reflect, that we have advanced principles, which not only, 'tis hoped, will ſtand the teſt of reaſoning and enquiry, but may contribute to the amendment of men's lives, and their improvement in morality and ſocial virtue. And tho' the philoſophical truth of any propoſition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the intereſts of ſociety; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he muſt confeſs, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into thoſe corners of nature, which ſpread a nuiſance all around? Why dig up the peſtilence from the pit, in which it is buried? The ingenuity of your reſearches may be admired; but your ſyſtems will be deteſted: And mankind will agree, if they cannot refute them, to ſink them, at leaſt, in eternal ſilence and oblivion. Truths, which are *pernicious* to ſociety, if any ſuch there be, will yield to errors, which are ſalutary and *advantageous*.

BUT what philoſophical truths can be more advantageous to ſociety, than thoſe here delivered, which repreſent virtue in all her genuine and moſt engaging charms, and make us approach her with eaſe, familiarity, and affection? The diſmal dreſs falls off, with which many divines, and ſome philoſophers had covered her; and nothing appears but gentleneſs, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay even, at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of uſeleſs auſterities and rigors, ſuffering and ſelf-denial. She declares, that her ſole purpoſe is, to make her votaries and all mankind, during every inſtant of their exiſtence, if poſſible, cheerful and happy; nor does ſhe ever willingly part with any pleaſure but in hopes of ample compenſation in ſome other period of their lives. The ſole trouble which ſhe demands is that of juſt calculation, and a ſteddy preference of the greater happineſs. And if any auſtere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and pleaſure, ſhe either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers; or if ſhe admits them in her train, they are ranked, however, among the leaſt favored of her votaries.

AND indeed, to drop all figurative expreſſion, what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice, which we confeſs full of auſterity and rigor? Or what morality can ever ſerve any uſeful purpoſe, unleſs it can ſhow, by a particular detail, that all the duties, which it recommends, are alſo the true intereſt of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing theory, ſeems to be, that it furniſhes proper mediums for that purpoſe.

THAT the virtues which are immediately *uſeful* or *agreeable* to the perſon poſſeſſed of them, are deſireable in a view to ſelf-intereſt, it would ſurely be ſuperfluous to prove. Moraliſts, indeed, may ſpare themſelves all the pains, which they often take in recommending theſe duties. To what purpoſe collect arguments to evince, that temperance is advantageous, and the exceſſes of pleaſure hurtful? When it appears, that theſe exceſſes are only denominated ſuch, be-

cauſe

cauſe they are hurtful; and that, if the unlimited uſe of ſtrong liquors, for inſtance, no more impaired health or the faculties of the mind and body than the uſe of air or water, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable.

It ſeems equally ſuperfluous to prove, that the *companionable* virtues of good-manners and wit, decency and genteelneſs, are more deſirable than the contrary qualities. Vanity alone, without other conſiderations, is a ſufficient motive to make us wiſh the poſſeſſion of theſe accompliſhments. No man was ever willingly deficient in this particular. All our failures here proceed from bad education, want of capacity, or a perverſe and unpliable diſpoſition. Would you have your company coveted, admired, followed; rather than hated, deſpiſed, avoided? Can any one ſeriouſly deliberate in the caſe? As no enjoyment is ſincere, without ſome reference to company and ſociety; ſo no ſociety can be agreeable or even tolerable, where a man feels his preſence unwelcome, and diſcovers all around him ſymptoms of diſguſt and averſion.

But why, in the greater ſociety or confederacy of mankind, ſhould not the caſe be the ſame as in particular clubs and companies? Why is it more doubtful, that the enlarged virtues of humanity, generoſity, beneficence, are deſirable with a view to happineſs and ſelf-intereſt, than the limited endowments of ingenuity and politeneſs? Are we apprehenſive, leſt thoſe ſocial affections have a greater and more immediate interference, than any other purſuits, with private utility, and cannot be gratified, without ſome important ſacrifices of honor and advantage? If ſo, we are but ill inſtructed in the nature of the human paſſions, and are more influenced by verbal diſtinctions than by real differences.

Whatever contradiction may vulgarly be ſuppoſed betwixt the *ſelfiſh* and *ſocial* ſentiments or diſpoſitions, they are really no more oppoſite than ſelfiſh and ambitious, ſelfiſh and revengeful, ſelfiſh and vain. 'Tis requiſite, that there be an original propenſity of ſome kind, in order to be a baſis to ſelf-love, by giving a reliſh to the objects of its purſuit; and none more fit for this pu poſe than benevolence or humanity. The goods of fortune are ſpent in one gratification or other: The miſer, who accumulates his annual income, and lends it out at intereſt, has really ſpent it in the gratification of his avarice. And it would be difficult to ſhow, why a man is more a loſer by a generous action, than by any other method of expence; ſince the utmoſt which he can attain, by the moſt elaborate ſelfiſhneſs, is the indulgence of ſome affection.

Now if life, without paſſion, muſt be altogether inſipid and tireſome; let a man ſuppoſe that he has full power of modelling his own diſpoſition, and let him deliberate what appetite or deſire he would chooſe for the foundation of his happineſs and enjoyment. Every affection, he would obſerve, when gratified by ſucceſs, gives a ſatisfaction proportioned to its force and violence; but beſides this advantage, common to all, the immediate feeling of benevolence and friendſhip, humanity and kindneſs, is ſweet, ſmooth, tender, and agreeable, independent of all fortune and accidents. Theſe virtues are beſides attended with a pleaſing conſciouſneſs or remembrance, and keep us in humor with ourſelves as well as others; while we retain the agreeable reflection of having done our part towards mankind and ſociety. And tho' all men ſhow a jealouſy of our ſucceſs in the purſuits of avarice or ambition; yet are we almoſt ſure of their good-will and good-wiſhes, ſo long as we perſevere in the paths of virtue, and employ ourſelves in the execu-

tion of generous plans and purpoſes. What other paſſion is there where we ſhall find ſo many advantages united; an agreeable ſentiment, a pleaſing conſciouſneſs, a good reputation? But of theſe truths, we may obſerve, men are, of themſelves, pretty much convinced; nor are they deficient in their duty to ſociety, becauſe they would not wiſh to be generous, friendly, and humane; but becauſe they do not feel themſelves ſuch.

TREATING vice with the greateſt candor, and making it all poſſible conceſſions, we muſt acknowlege, that there is not, in any inſtance, the ſmalleſt pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view to ſelf-intereſt; except, perhaps, in the caſe of juſtice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often ſeem to be a loſer by his integrity. And tho' it is allowed, that, without a regard to property, no ſociety could ſubſiſt; yet according to the imperfect way, in which human affairs are conducted, a ſenſible knave, in particular incidents, may think, that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a conſiderable addition to his fortune, without cauſing any conſiderable breach in the ſocial union and confederacy. That *honeſty is the beſt policy*, may be a good general rule; but is liable to many exceptions: And he, it may, perhaps, be judged, conducts himſelf with moſt wiſdom, who obſerves the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.

I MUST confeſs, that if a man thinks, that this reaſoning much requires an anſwer, it will be a little difficult to find any, which will to him appear ſatisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebels not againſt ſuch pernicious maxims, if he feels no reluctance to the thoughts of villany or baſeneſs, he has indeed loſt a conſiderable motive to virtue; and we may expect, that his practice will be anſwerable to his ſpeculation. But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too ſtrong to be counterballanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, conſciouſneſs of integrity, a ſatisfactory review of our own conduct; theſe are circumſtances very requiſite to happineſs, and will be cheriſhed and cultivated by every honeſt man, who feels the importance of them.

SUCH a one has, beſides, the frequent ſatisfaction of ſeeing knaves, with all their pretended cunning and ability, betrayed by their own maxims; and while they purpoſe to cheat with moderation and ſecrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into the ſnare; whence they can never extricate themſelves, without a total loſs of reputation, and the forfeiture of all future truſt and confidence with mankind.

BUT were they ever ſo ſecret and ſucceſsful, the honeſt man, if he has any tincture of philoſophy, or even common obſervation and reflection, will diſcover, that they themſelves are, in the end, the greateſt dupes, and have ſacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themſelves at leaſt, for the acquiſition of worthleſs toys and gewgaws. How little is requiſite to ſupply the *neceſſities* of nature? And in a view to *pleaſure*, what compariſon between the unbought ſatisfactions of converſation, ſociety, ſtudy, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one's own conduct: What compariſon, I ſay, between theſe, and the feveriſh, empty amuſements of luxury and expence? Theſe natural pleaſures, indeed, are really without price; both becauſe they are below all price in their attainment, and above it in their enjoyment.

APPEN-

APPENDIX I.

CONCERNING MORAL SENTIMENT.

IF the foregoing hypotheſis be received, it will now be eaſy for us to determine the queſtion firſt ſtarted [a], concerning the general principles of morals; and tho' we poſtponed the deciſion of that queſtion, leſt it ſhould then involve us in intricate ſpeculations, which are unfit for moral diſcourſes, we may reſume it at preſent, and examine how far either *reaſon* or *ſentiment* enters into all determinations of praiſe or cenſure.

THE chief foundation of moral praiſe being ſuppoſed to lie in the uſefulneſs of any quality or action; 'tis evident, that *reaſon* muſt enter for a conſiderable ſhare in all determinations of this kind; ſince nothing but that faculty can inſtruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial conſequences to ſociety and to their poſſeſſors. In many caſes, this is an affair liable to great controverſy: Doubts may ariſe; oppoſite intereſts occur; and a preference muſt be given to one ſide, from very nice views, and a ſmall overballance of utility. This is particularly remarkable in queſtions with regard to juſtice; as is, indeed, natural to ſuppoſe from that ſpecies of utility, which attends this virtue [b]. Were every ſingle inſtance of juſtice, like that of benevolence, uſeful to ſociety; this would be a more ſimple ſtate of the caſe, and ſeldom liable to great controverſy. But as ſingle inſtances of juſtice are often pernicious in their firſt and immediate tendency, and as the advantage to ſociety reſults only from the obſervance of the general rule, and from the concurrence and combination of ſeveral perſons in the ſame equitable conduct; the caſe here becomes more intricate and involved. The various circumſtances of ſociety; the various conſequences of any practice; the various intereſts, which may be propoſed: Theſe on many occaſions are doubtful, and ſubject to great diſcuſſion and enquiry. The object of municipal laws is to fix all queſtions with regard to juſtice: The debates of civilians; the reflections of politicians; the precedents of hiſtories and public records, are all directed to the ſame purpoſe. And a very accurate *reaſon* or *judgment* is often requiſite, to give the true determination, amidſt ſuch intricate doubts ariſing from obſcure or oppoſite utilities.

BUT tho' reaſon, when fully aſſiſted and improved, be ſufficient to inſtruct us in the pernicious or uſeful tendencies of qualities and actions; it is not alone ſufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we ſhould feel the ſame indifference towards the means. 'Tis requiſite a *ſentiment* ſhould here diſplay itſelf, in order to give a preference to the uſeful above the pernicious tendencies. This ſentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happineſs of mankind, and

[a] Sect. I. [b] See Appendix II.

When 'tis affirmed, that two and three are equal to the half of ten; this relation of equality, I underſtand perfectly. I conceive, that if ten be divided into two parts, of which one has as many unites as the other; and if any of theſe parts be compared to two added to three, it will contain as many unites as that compound number. But when you draw thence a compariſon to moral relations, I own, that I am altogether at a loſs to underſtand you. A moral action, a crime, ſuch as ingratitude, is a complicated object. Does the morality conſiſt in the relation of its parts to each other. How? After what manner? Specify the relation: Be more particular and explicite in your propoſitions; and you will eaſily ſee their falſhood.

No, ſay you, the morality conſiſts in the relation of actions to the rule of right; and they are denominated good or ill, according as they agree or diſagree with it. What then is this rule of right? In what does it conſiſt? How is it determined? By reaſon, you'll ſay, which examines the moral relations of actions. So that moral relations are determined by the compariſon of actions to a rule. And that rule is determined by conſidering the moral relations of objects. Is not this fine reaſoning?

All this is metaphyſics, you cry. That is enough: There needs nothing more to give a ſtrong preſumption of falſhood. Yes, replied I: Here are metaphyſics ſurely: But they are all on your ſide, who advance an abſtruſe hypotheſis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate with any particular inſtance or illuſtration. The hypotheſis which we embrace is plain. It maintains, that morality is determined by ſentiment. It defines virtue to be, *whatever mental action or quality gives to a ſpectator the pleaſing ſentiment of approbation*; and vice the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, *viz.* what actions have this influence: We conſider all the circumſtances, in which theſe actions agree: And from thence endeavor to extract ſome general obſervations with regard to theſe ſentiments. If you call this metaphyſics, and find any thing abſtruſe here, you need only conclude, that your turn of mind is not ſuited to the moral ſciences.

II. When a man, at any time, deliberates concerning his own conduct, (as, whether he had better, in a particular emergence, aſſiſt a brother or a benefactor) he muſt conſider theſe ſeparate relations, with the whole circumſtances and ſituation of the perſons, in order to determine the ſuperior duty and obligation: And in order to determine the proportion of lines in any triangle, 'tis neceſſary to examine the nature of that figure, and the relations, which its ſeveral parts bear to each other. But notwithſtanding this appearing ſimilarity in the two caſes, there is, at the bottom, an extreme difference between them. A ſpeculative reaſoner concerning triangles or circles conſiders the ſeveral known and given relations of the parts of theſe figures; and from thence infers ſome unknown relation, which is dependent on the former. But in moral deliberations, we muſt be acquainted, before-hand, with all the objects, and all the relations to each other; and from a compariſon of the whole, fix our choice or approbation. No new fact to be aſcertained: No new relation to be diſcovered. The whole circumſtances of the caſe are ſuppoſed to be laid before us, ere we can fix any ſentence of blame or approbation. If any material circumſtance be yet unknown or doubtful, we muſt firſt employ our enquiry or intellectual faculties to aſſure us of it; and muſt ſuſpend

for a time all moral decision or ſentiment. While we are ignorant, whether a man was aggreſſor or not, how can we determine whether the perſon, who killed him, be criminal or innocent? But after every circumſtance, every relation is known, the underſtanding has no farther room to operate, nor any object, on which it could employ itſelf. The approbation or blame, which then enſues, cannot be the work of the judgment, but of the heart; and is not a ſpeculative propoſition or affirmation, but an active feeling or ſentiment. In the diſquiſitions of the underſtanding, from known circumſtances and relations, we infer ſome new and unknown. In moral deciſions, the whole circumſtances and relations muſt be antecedently known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the whole, feels ſome new impreſſion of affection or diſguſt, eſteem or contempt, approbation or blame.

HENCE the great difference betwixt a miſtake of *fact* and one of *right*; and hence the reaſon, why the one is commonly criminal and not the other. When OEDIPUS killed LAIUS, he was ignorant of the relation, and from circumſtances, innocent and involuntary, formed erroneous opinions concerning the action which he committed. But when NERO killed AGRIPPINA, all the relations between himſelf and the perſon, and all the circumſtances of the fact were antecedently known to him: But the motive of revenge, or fear or intereſt, prevailed in his ſavage heart, over the ſentiments of duty and humanity. And when we expreſs a deteſtation againſt him, to which he, himſelf, in a little time, became inſenſible; 'tis not, that we ſee any relations, of which he was ignorant, but that, from the rectitude of our diſpoſition, we feel ſentiments, againſt which he was hardened, from flattery and a long perſeverance in the moſt enormous crimes. In theſe ſentiments, then, not a diſcovery of relations of any kind, do all moral determinations conſiſt. Before we can pretend to form any deciſion of this kind, every thing muſt be known and aſcertained on the ſide of the object or action. Nothing remains but to feel, on our part, ſome ſentiment of blame or approbation; whence we pronounce the action criminal or virtuous.

III. THIS doctrine will become ſtill more evident, if we compare moral beauty with natural, to which, in many particulars, it bears ſo near a reſemblance. 'Tis on the proportion, relation, and poſition of parts, that all natural beauty depends; but it would be abſurd thence to infer, that the perception of beauty, like that of truth in geometrical problems, conſiſts wholly in the perception of relations, and was performed entirely by the underſtanding or intellectual faculties. In all the ſciences, our mind, from the known relations, inveſtigates the unknown: But in all deciſions of taſte or external beauty, the whole relations are before-hand obvious to the eye; and we thence proceed to feel a ſentiment of complacency or diſguſt, according to the nature of the object, and diſpoſition of our organs.

EUCLID has fully explained all the qualities of the circle; but has not, in any propoſition, ſaid a word of its beauty. The reaſon is evident. The beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line, whoſe parts are equally diſtant from a common center. It is only the effect, which that figure operates upon the mind, whoſe peculiar fabric or ſtructure renders it ſuſceptible of ſuch ſentiments. In vain would you look for it in the circle, or ſeek it, either by your ſenſes or by mathematical reaſonings, in all the properties of that figure.

ATTEND

ATTEND to PALLADIO and PERRAULT, while they explain all the parts and proportions of a pillar: They talk of the cornice and freeze and baſe and entablature and ſhaft and architrave; and give the deſcription and poſition of each of theſe members. But ſhould you aſk the deſcription and poſition of its beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty is not any of the parts or members of a pillar, but reſults from the whole, when that complicated figure is preſented to an intelligent mind, ſuſceptible of thoſe finer ſenſations. 'Till ſuch a ſpectator appear, there is nothing but a figure of ſuch particular dimenſions and proportions: From his ſentiments alone ariſe its elegance and beauty.

AGAIN; attend to CICERO, while he paints the crimes of a VERRES or a CATILINE; you muſt acknowlege, that the moral turpitude reſults, in the ſame manner, from the contemplation of the whole, when preſented to a being, whoſe organs have ſuch a particular ſtructure and formation. The orator may paint rage, inſolence, barbarity on the one ſide: Meekneſs, ſufferance, ſorrow, innocence on the other: But if you feel no indignation or compaſſion ariſe in you from this complication of circumſtances, you would in vain aſk him, in what conſiſts the crime or villainy, which he ſo vehemently exclaims againſt: At what time, or on what ſubject it firſt began to exiſt: And what has a few months afterwards become of it, when every diſpoſition and thought of all the actors is totally altered, or annihilated. No ſatisfactory anſwer can be given to any of theſe queſtions, upon the abſtract hypotheſis of morals; and we muſt at laſt acknowlege, that the crime or immorality is no particular fact or relation, which can be the object of the underſtanding: But ariſes entirely from the ſentiment of diſapprobation, which, by the ſtructure of human nature, we unavoidably feel on the apprehenſion of barbarity or treachery.

IV. INANIMATE objects may bear to each other all the ſame relations, which we obſerve in moral agents; tho' the former can never be the object of love or hatred, nor are conſequently ſuſceptible of merit or iniquity. A young tree, which over-tops and deſtroys its parent, ſtands in all the ſame relations with NERO, when he murdered AGRIPPINA; and if morality conſiſted in any abſtract relations, would, no doubt, be equally criminal.

V. IT appears evident, that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any caſe, be accounted for by *reaſon*, but recommend themſelves entirely to the ſentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependance on the intellectual faculties. Aſk a man, *why he uſes exerciſe*; he will anſwer, *becauſe he deſires to keep his health*. If you then enquire, *why he deſires health*, he will readily reply, *becauſe ſickneſs is painful*. If you puſh your enquiries farther, and deſire a reaſon, *why he hates pain*, 'tis impoſſible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.

PERHAPS, to your ſecond queſtion, *why he deſires health*, he may alſo reply, that *'tis requiſite for the exerciſe of his calling*. If you aſk, *why he is anxious on that head*, he will anſwer, *becauſe he deſires to get money*. If you demand, *Why? It is the inſtrument of pleaſure*, ſays he. And beyond this, 'tis an abſurdity to aſk for a reaſon. 'Tis impoſſible there can be a progreſs *in infinitum*; and that one thing can always be a reaſon, why another is deſired. Something muſt be deſirable on its own account, and becauſe of its immediate accord or agreement with human ſentiment and affection.

Now

Now as virtue is an end, and is deſirable on its own account, without fee or reward, merely for the immediate ſatisfaction which it conveys; 'tis requiſite that there ſhould be ſome ſentiment, which it touches; ſome internal taſte or feeling, or whatever you pleaſe to call it, which diſtinguiſhes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.

THUS the diſtinct boundaries and offices of *reaſon* and of *taſte* are eaſily aſcertained. The former conveys the knowlege of truth and falſhood: The latter gives the ſentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one diſcovers objects, as they really ſtand in nature, without addition or diminution: The other has a productive faculty, and gilding or ſtaining all natural objects with the colors, borrowed from internal ſentiment, raiſes, in a manner, a new creation. Reaſon, being cool and diſengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulſe, received from appetite or inclination, by ſhowing us the means of obtaining happineſs or avoiding miſery: Taſte, as it gives pleaſure or pain, and thereby conſtitutes happineſs or miſery, becomes a motive to action, and is the firſt ſpring or impulſe to deſire and volition. From circumſtances and relations, known or ſuppoſed, the former leads us to the diſcovery of the concealed and unknown: After all circumſtances and relations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole a new ſentiment of blame or approbation. The ſtandard of the one, being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the ſupreme Being: The ſtandard of the other, ariſing from the internal frame and conſtitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that ſupreme will, which beſtowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the ſeveral claſſes and orders of exiſtence.

APPENDIX II.

SOME FARTHER CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO JUSTICE.

THE intention of this appendix is to give ſome more particular explication of the origin and nature of juſtice, and to mark ſome differences between it and the other virtues.

THE ſocial virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence immediately, by a direct tendency or inſtinct, which keeps chiefly in view the ſimple object, that moves the affections, and comprehends not any ſcheme or ſyſtem, nor the conſequences reſulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others. A parent flies to the relief of his child; tranſported by that natural ſympathy, which actuates him, and which affords no leiſure to reflect on the ſentiments or conduct of the reſt of mankind in like circumſtances. A generous man embraces cheerfully an opportunity of ſerving his friend; becauſe he then feels himſelf under the dominion of the beneficent affections, nor is he concerned whether any other perſon in the univerſe was ever before actuated by ſuch noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their influence. In all theſe caſes, the ſocial paſſions have in view a ſingle individual object, and purſue alone the ſafety or happineſs of the perſon, loved and eſteemed. With this, they are ſatisfied: In this, they acquieſce. And as the good reſulting from their benign influence, is in itſelf compleat and entire, it alſo excites the moral ſentiment of approbation, without any reflection on farther conſequences or more enlarged views of the concurrence or imitation of the other members of ſociety. On the contrary, were the generous friend or diſintereſted patriot to ſtand alone in the practice of beneficence; this would rather inhance his value in our eyes, and join the praiſe of rarity and novelty to his other more exalted merits.

THE caſe is not the ſame with the ſocial virtues of juſtice and fidelity. They are highly uſeful, or indeed abſolutely neceſſary to the well-being of mankind: But the benefit, reſulting from them, is not the conſequence of every individual ſingle act; but ariſes from the whole ſcheme or ſyſtem, concurred in by the whole, or the greateſt part of the ſociety. General peace and order are the attendants of juſtice or a general abſtinence from the poſſeſſions of others: But a particular regard to the particular right of one individual citizen may frequently, conſidered in itſelf, be productive of pernicious conſequences. The reſult of the ſeveral acts is here often directly oppoſite to that of the whole ſyſtem of actions; and the former may be extremely hurtful, while the latter is, to the higheſt degree advantageous. Riches, inherited from a parent, are, in a bad man's hand, the inſtruments of miſchief. The right of ſucceſſion may, in one inſtance, be hurtful. Its benefit ariſes only from the obſervance of the general rule; and 'tis ſufficient, if compenſation be thereby made for all the ills and inconveniencies, which flow from particular characters and ſituations.

CYRUS, young and unexperienced, conſidered only the individual caſe before him, and reflected on its limited fitneſs and convenience, when he aſſigned the long coat to the tall boy, and the ſhort coat to the other of ſmaller ſize. His governor inſtructed him better; while he pointed out more enlarged views and conſequences, and informed his pupil of the general, inflexible rules, requiſite to ſupport general peace and order in ſociety.

THE happineſs and proſperity of mankind, ariſing from the ſocial virtue of benevolence and its ſub-diviſions, may be compared to a wall, built by many hands; which ſtill riſes by each ſtone, that is heaped upon it, and receives proportional encreaſe to the diligence and care of each workman. The ſame happineſs, raiſed by the ſocial virtue of juſtice and its ſubdiviſions, may be compared to the building of a vault, where each individual ſtone would, of itſelf fall to the ground; nor does the whole fabric ſupport itſelf, but by the mutual aſſiſtance and combination of its correſpondent parts.

ALL the laws of nature, which regulate property, as well as all civil laws, are general, and regard alone ſome eſſential circumſtances of the caſe, without taking into conſideration the characters, ſituations and connexions of the perſon concerned, or any particular conſequences, which may reſult from the determination of theſe laws, in every particular caſe which offers. They deprive, without ſcruple, a beneficent man of all his poſſeſſions, if acquired by miſtake, without a good title; in order to beſtow them on a ſelfiſh miſer, who has already heaped up immenſe ſtores of ſuperfluous riches. Public utility requires, that property ſhould be regulated by general inflexible rules; and tho' ſuch rules are adopted as beſt ſerve the ſame end of public utility, 'tis impoſſible for them to prevent all particular hardſhips, or make beneficial conſequences reſult from every individual caſe. 'Tis ſufficient, if the whole plan or ſcheme be neceſſary to the ſupport of civil ſociety, and if the ballance of good, in the main, does thereby preponderate much above that of evil. Even the general laws of the univerſe, tho' planned by infinite wiſdom, cannot exclude all evil or inconvenience, in every particular operation.

IT has been aſſerted by ſome, that juſtice ariſes from HUMAN CONVENTIONS, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, conſent, or combination of mankind. If by *convention* be here meant a *promiſe* (which is the moſt uſual ſenſe of the word) nothing can be more abſurd, than this poſition. The obſervance of promiſes is itſelf one of the moſt conſiderable parts of juſtice; and we are not ſurely bound to keep our word, becauſe we have given our word to keep it. But if by convention be meant a ſenſe of common intereſt; which ſenſe each man feels in his own breaſt, which he obſerves in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or ſyſtem of actions, which tends to public utility; it muſt be owned, that, in this ſenſe, juſtice ariſes from human conventions. For if it be allowed (what is, indeed, evident) that the particular conſequences of a particular act of juſtice may be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals; it follows, that every man, in embracing that virtue, muſt have an eye to the whole plan or ſyſtem, and muſt expect the concurrence of his fellows in the ſame conduct and behavior. Did all his views terminate in the particular conſequences of each particular act of his own, his benevolence and humanity, as well as ſelf-love, might often preſcribe to him meaſures of conduct very different from thoſe, which are agreeable to the ſtrict rules of right and juſtice.

THUS two men pull the oars of a boat, by common convention, for common intereſt, without any promiſe or contract: Thus gold and ſilver are made the meaſures of exchange; thus ſpeech and words and language are fixed, by human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more perſons, if all perform their part; but what loſes all advantage, if only one perform, can ariſe from no other principle. There would otherwiſe be no motive for any one of them to enter into that ſcheme of conduct[g].

THE word, *natural*, is commonly taken in ſo many ſenſes, and is of ſuch looſe ſignification, that it ſeems to little purpoſe to diſpute, whether juſtice be natural or not. If ſelf-love, if benevolence be natural to man; if reaſon and forethought be alſo natural; then may the ſame epithet be applied to juſtice, order, fidelity, property, ſociety. Men's inclination, their neceſſities lead them to combine; their underſtanding and experience tell them, that this combination is impoſſible, where each governs himſelf by no rule, and pays no regard to the poſſeſſions of others: And from theſe paſſions and reflections conjoined, as ſoon as we obſerve like paſſions and reflections in others, the ſentiment of juſtice, thro' all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to ſome degree or other, in every individual of human ſpecies. In ſo ſagacious an animal, what neceſſarily ariſes from the exertion of his intellectual faculties, may juſtly be eſteemed natural[h].

AMONG all civilized nations, it has been the conſtant endeavor to remove every thing arbitrary and partial from the deciſion of property, and to fix the ſentence of judges by ſuch general views and conſiderations, as may be equal to every member of the ſociety. For beſides, that nothing could be more dangerous than to accuſtom the bench, even in the ſmalleſt inſtance, to regard private friendſhip or enmity; 'tis certain, that men, where they imagine, that there was no other reaſon for the preference of their adverſary but perſonal favor, are apt to entertain the ſtrongeſt ill-will againſt the magiſtrates and judges. When natural reaſon, therefore, points out no fixed view of public utility, by which a controverſy of property can be decided, poſitive laws are often framed to ſupply its place, and direct the procedure of all courts of judicature. Where theſe too fail, as often happens,

[g] This theory concerning the origin of property, and conſequently of juſtice is, in the main, the ſame with that hinted at and adopted by GROTIUS. "Hinc diſcimus, quæ fuerit cauſa, ob "quam a primæva communione rerum primo mo- "bilium, deinde & immobilium diſceſſum eſt: "nimirum quod cum non contenti homines veſci "ſponte natis, antra habitare, corpore aut nudo "agere, aut corticibus arborum ferarumve pel- "libus veſtito, vitæ genus exquiſitius delegiſſent, "induſtria opus fuit, quam ſinguli rebus ſingulis "adhiberent: Quo minus autem fructus in com- "mune conferrentur, primum obſtitit locorum, "in quæ homines diſceſſerunt, diſtantia, deinde "juſtitiæ & amoris defectus, per quem fiebat, ut "nec in labore, nec in conſumtione fructuum quæ "debebat, æqualitas ſervaretur. Simul diſcimus, "quomodo res in proprietatem iverint; non ani- "mi actu ſolo, neque enim ſcire alii poterant, "quid alii ſuum eſſe vellent, ut eo abſtinerent, "& idem velle plures poterant; ſed pacto quo- "dam aut expreſſo, ut per diviſionem, aut tacito, "ut per occupationem. De jure belli & pacis." Lib. 2. cap. 2. § 2. art. 4. & 5.

[h] Natural may be oppoſed, either to what is *unuſual*, *miraculous*, or *artificial*. In the two former ſenſes, juſtice and property are undoubtedly natural. But as they ſuppoſe reaſon, forethought, deſign, and a ſocial union and confederacy among men, perhaps, that epithet cannot ſtrictly, in the laſt ſenſe, be applied to them. Had men lived without ſociety, property had never been known, and neither juſtice nor injuſtice had ever exiſted. But ſociety among human creatures, had been impoſſible, without reaſon and forethought. Inferior animals, that unite, are guided by inſtinct, which ſupplies the place of reaſon. But all theſe diſputes are merely verbal.

precedents are called for; and a former deciſion, tho' given itſelf without any ſufficient reaſon, juſtly becomes a ſufficient reaſon for a new deciſion. If direct laws and precedents be wanting, imperfect and indirect ones are brought in aid; and the controverted caſe is ranged under them, by analogical reaſonings and comparifons, and ſimilitudes, and correſpondencies, which are often more fanciful than real. In general, it may ſafely be aſſerted, that juriſprudence is, in this reſpect, different from all the ſciences; and that in many of its nicer queſtions, there cannot properly be ſaid to be truth or falſhood on either ſide. If one pleader brings the caſe under any former law or precedent, by a refined analogy or compariſon; the oppoſite pleader is not at a loſs to find an oppoſite analogy or compariſon: And the preference given by the judge is often founded more on taſte and imagination than on any ſolid argument. Public utility is the general view of all courts of judicature; and this utility too requires a ſtable rule in all controverſies: But where ſeveral rules, nearly equal and indifferent, preſent themſelves, 'tis a very ſlight turn of thought, which fixes the deciſion in favor of either party [1].

We

[1] That there be a ſeparation or diſtinction of poſſeſſions, and that this ſeparation be ſteddy and conſtant; this is abſolutely required by the intereſts of ſociety, and hence the origin of juſtice and property. What poſſeſſions are aſſigned to particular perſons; this is, generally ſpeaking, pretty indifferent; and is often determined by very frivolous views and conſiderations. We ſhall mention a few particulars.

Were a ſociety formed among ſeveral independent members, the moſt obvious rule, which could be agreed on, would be to annex property to *preſent* poſſeſſion, and leave every one a right to what he at preſent enjoys. The relation of poſſeſſion, which takes place betwixt the perſon and the object, naturally draws on the relation of property.

For a like reaſon, occupation or firſt poſſeſſion becomes the foundation of property.

Where a man beſtows labor and induſtry upon any object, which before belonged to no body; as in cutting down and ſhaping a tree, in cultivating a field, &c. the alterations, which he produces, cauſes a relation betwixt him and the object, and naturally engages us to annex it to him by the new relation of property. This cauſe here concurs with the public utility, which conſiſts in the encouragement given to induſtry and labor.

Perhaps too, private humanity towards the poſſeſſor, concurs, in this inſtance, with the other motives, and engages us to leave with him what he has acquired by his ſweat and labor; and what he has flattered himſelf in the conſtant enjoyment of. For tho' private humanity can, by no means, be the origin of juſtice; ſince the latter virtue ſo often contradicts the former; yet when the rule of ſeparate and conſtant poſſeſſion is once formed by the indiſpenſable neceſſities of ſociety, private humanity, and an averſion to the doing a hardſhip to another, may, in a particular inſtance, give riſe to a particular rule of property.

I am much inclined to think, that the right of ſucceſſion or inheritance much depends on theſe connexions of the imagination, and that the relation to a former proprietor begetting a relation to the object, is the cauſe why the property is transferred to a man after the death of his kinſman. 'Tis true; induſtry is more encouraged by the transference of poſſeſſion to children or near relations: But this conſideration will only have place in a cultivated ſociety; whereas the right of ſucceſſion is regarded even among the greateſt Barbarians.

Acquiſition of property by *acceſſion* can be explained no way but by having recourſe to the relations and connexions of the imagination.

The property of rivers, by the laws of moſt nations, and by the natural turn of our thought, is attributed to the proprietors of their banks, excepting ſuch vaſt rivers as the RHINE or the DANUBE, which ſeem too large to follow as an acceſſion the property of the neighboring fields. Yet even theſe rivers are conſidered as the property of that nation, thro' whoſe dominions they run; the idea of a nation being of a ſuitable bulk to correſpond with them, and bear them ſuch a relation in the fancy.

The acceſſions, which are made to land, bordering upon rivers, follow the land, ſay the civilians, provided it be made by what they call *alluvion*, that is, inſenſibly and imperceptibly; which are circumſtances, that aſſiſt the imagination in the conjunction.

Where there is any conſiderable portion torn at once from one bank and added to another, it becomes not *his* property, whoſe land it falls on, till

We may juſtly obſerve, before we conclude this ſubject, that, after the laws of juſtice are fixed by views of general utility, the injury, the hardſhip, the harm, which reſult to any individual from a violation of them, enter very much into conſideration, and are a great ſource of that univerſal blame, which attends every wrong or iniquity. By the laws of ſociety, this coat, this horſe is mine, and *ought* to remain perpetually in my poſſeſſion: I lay my account with the ſecure enjoyment of it: By depriving me of it, you diſappoint my expectations, and doubly diſpleaſe me, and offend every byſtander. 'Tis a public wrong, ſo far as the rules of equity are violated: 'Tis a private harm, ſo far as an individual is injured. And tho' the ſecond conſideration could have no place, were not the former antecedently eſtabliſhed: For otherwiſe the diſtinction of *mine* and *thine* would be unknown in ſociety: Yet there is no queſtion, but the regard to general good is much enforced by the reſpect to particular. What injures the community, without hurting any individual, is often more lightly thought of. But where the greateſt public wrong is alſo conjoined with a conſiderable private one, no wonder the higheſt diſapprobation attends ſo iniquitous a behavior.

till it unite with the land, and till the trees and plants have ſpread their roots into both. Before that, the thought does not ſufficiently join them.

In ſhort, we muſt ever diſtinguiſh betwixt the neceſſity of a ſeparation and conſtancy in men's poſſeſſion, and the rules, which aſſign particular objects to particular perſons. The firſt neceſſity is obvious, ſtrong, and invincible: The latter may depend on a public utility more light and frivolous, on the ſentiment of private humanity and averſion to private hardſhip, on poſitive laws, on precedents, analogies and very fine connexions and turns of the imagination.

A

DIALOGUE.

MY friend, PALAMEDES, who is as great a rambler in his principles as in his perſon, and who has run over, by ſtudy and travel, almoſt every region of the intellectual and material world, ſurprized me lately with an account of a nation, with whom, he told me, he had paſſed a conſiderable part of his life, and whom he found, in the main, a people extremely civilized and intelligent.

THERE is a ſtate, ſaid he, in the world, called FOURLI, no matter for its longitude or latitude, whoſe ways of thinking, in many things, particularly in morals, are diametrically oppoſite to ours. When I came among them, I found that I muſt ſubmit to double pains; firſt to learn the meaning of the terms in their language, and then to know the import of thoſe terms, and the praiſe or blame attached to them. After a word had been explained to me, and the character, which it expreſſed, had been deſcribed, I concluded, that ſuch an epithet muſt neceſſarily be the greateſt reproach in the world; and was extremely ſurprized to find one in a public company, apply it to a perſon, with whom he lived in the ſtricteſt intimacy and friendſhip. *You fancy*, ſaid I, one day, to an acquaintance, *that* CHANGUIS *is your mortal enemy: I love to extinguiſh quarrels; and I muſt, therefore, tell you, that I heard him talk of you in the moſt advantageous manner.* But to my great aſtoniſhment, when I repeated CHANGUIS's words, tho' I had both remembered and underſtood them perfectly, I found, that they were taken for the moſt mortal affront, and that I had very innocently rendered the breach between theſe perſons altogether irreparable.

As it was my fortune to come among this people on a very advantageous footing, I was immediately introduced to the beſt company; and being deſired to live with ALCHEIC, I readily accepted his invitation; as I found him univerſally eſteemed for his perſonal merit, and indeed regarded by every one in FOURLI, as a perfect character.

ONE evening he invited me, as an amuſement, to bear him company in a ſerenade, which he intended to give GULKI, with whom, he told me, he was extremely enamoured; and I ſoon found his taſte was not ſingular: For we met many of his rivals, who had come on the ſame errand. I very naturally concluded, that this miſtreſs of his muſt be one of the fineſt women in town; and I readily felt a ſecret inclination to ſee her, and be acquainted with her. But as the moon began to riſe, I was much ſurprized to find, that we were in the midſt of the univerſity, where GULKI ſtudied: And I was ſomewhat aſhamed for having attended my friend, on ſuch an errand.

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I WAS told afterwards, that ALCHEIC's choice of GULKI was very much approved of by all the good company in town; and that it was expected, while he gratified his own paſſion, he would perform to that young man the ſame good office, which he had himſelf owed to ELCOUF. It ſeems ALCHEIC had been very handſome in his youth, had been courted by many lovers; but had beſtowed his favors chiefly on the ſage ELCOUF; to whom he was ſuppoſed to owe, in a great meaſure, the aſtoniſhing progreſs which he had made in philoſophy and virtue.

IT gave me ſome ſurprize, that ALCHEIC's wife (who by-the-bye happened alſo to be his ſiſter) was no way ſcandalized at this ſpecies of infidelity.

MUCH about the ſame time I diſcovered (for it was not attempted to be kept a ſecret from me or any body) that ALCHEIC was a murderer and a parricide, and had put to death an innocent perſon, the moſt nearly connected with him, and whom he was obliged to protect and defend by all the ties of nature and humanity. When I aſked, with all the caution and deference imaginable, what was his motive for this action; he replied coolly, that he was not then ſo much at his eaſe as he is at preſent, and that he had acted, in that particular, by the advice of all his friends.

HAVING heard ALCHEIC's virtue ſo extremely celebrated, I pretended to join in the general voice of acclamation, and only aſked, by way of curioſity, as a ſtranger, which of all his noble actions was moſt highly applauded; and I ſoon found, that all ſentiments were united in giving the preference to the aſſaſſination of USBEK. This USBEK had been to the laſt moment ALCHEIC's intimate friend, had laid many high obligations upon him, had even ſaved his life on a certain occaſion, and had, by his will, which was found after the murder, made him heir to a conſiderable part of his fortune. ALCHEIC, it ſeems, conſpired with about twenty or thirty more, moſt of them alſo USBEK's friends; and falling all together, on that unhappy man, when he was not aware, they had torne him with a hundred wounds; and given him that reward for all his paſt favors and obligations. USBEK, ſaid the general voice of the people, had many great and good qualities: His very vices were ſhining, magnificent, and generous: But this action of ALCHEIC ſets him far above USBEK in the eyes of all judges of merit; and is one of the nobleſt, that ever perhaps the ſun ſhone upon.

ANOTHER part of ALCHEIC's conduct, which I alſo found highly applauded, was his behavior towards CALISH, with whom he was joined in a project or undertaking of ſome importance. CALISH, being a paſſionate man, gave ALCHEIC, one day, a ſound drubbing; which he took very patiently, waited the return of CALISH's good humor, kept ſtill a fair correſpondence with him; and by that means brought the affair, in which they were joined, to a happy iſſue, and gained himſelf immortal honor by his remarkable temper and moderation.

I HAVE lately received a letter from a correſpondent in FOURLI, by which I learn, that ſince my departure, ALCHEIC, falling into a bad ſtate of health, has fairly hanged himſelf; and has died univerſally regreted and applauded in that country. So virtuous and noble a life, ſays each FOURLIAN, could not be better crowned than by ſo noble an end; and ALCHEIC has proved by this, as well as by all his other actions, what was his conſtant principle during his life, and what

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he boaſted of near his laſt moments, that a wiſe man is ſcarce inferior to the great god, VITZLI. This is the name of the ſupreme deity among the FOURLIANS.

THE notions of this people, continued PALAMEDES, are as extraordinary with regard to good-manners and ſociableneſs, as with regard to morals. My friend ALCHEIC formed once a party for my entertainment, compoſed of all the prime wits and philoſophers of FOURLI; and each of us brought his meſs along with him to the place, where we aſſembled. I obſerved one of them to be worſe provided than the reſt, and offered him a ſhare of my meſs, which happened to be a roaſted pullet: And I could not but remark, that he, and all the reſt of the company ſmiled at my ſimplicity. I was told, that ALCHEIC had once ſo much intereſt with his club as to prevail with them to eat in common, and that he had made uſe of an artifice to that purpoſe. He perſuaded thoſe, whom he obſerved to be *worſt* provided, to offer their meſs to the company; after which, the others, who had brought more delicate fare, were aſhamed not to make the ſame offer. This is regarded as ſo extraordinary an event, that it has ſince, as I learn, been recorded in the hiſtory of ALCHEIC's life, compoſed by one of the greateſt geniuſes of FOURLI.

PRAY, ſays I, PALAMEDES, when you was at FOURLI, did you alſo learn the art of turning your friends into ridicule, by telling them ſtrange ſtories, and then laughing at them, if they believed you. I aſſure you, replied he, had I been diſpoſed to learn ſuch a leſſon, there was no place in the world more proper. My friend, ſo often mentioned, did nothing, from morning to night, but ſneer, and banter, and rally; and you could ſcarce ever diſtinguiſh, whether he was in jeſt or earneſt. But you think then, that my ſtory is improbable; and that I have uſed, or rather abuſed the privilege of a traveller. To be ſure, ſays I, you was but in jeſt. Such barbarous and ſavage manners are not only incompatible with a civilized, intelligent people, ſuch as you ſaid theſe were; but are ſcarce compatible with human nature. They exceed all we ever red of, among the MINGRELIANS, and TOPINAMBOUES.

HAVE a care, cried he, have a care! You are not aware that you are ſpeaking blaſphemy, and are abuſing your favorites, the GREEKS, eſpecially the ATHENIANS, whom I have couched, all along, under theſe bizarre names I employed. If you conſider aright, there is not one ſtroke of the foregoing character, which might not be found in the man of higheſt merit at ATHENS, without diminiſhing, in the leaſt, from the brightneſs of his character. The GREEK love, their marriages [b], and the expoſing of their children cannot but ſtrike you immediately. The death of USBEK is an exact counter-part to that of CÆSAR.

ALL to a trifle, ſaid I, interrupting him: You did not mention, that USBEK was an uſurper.

I DID not, replied he; leſt you ſhould diſcover the parallel I aimed at. But even adding this circumſtance, we ſhould make no ſcruple, according to our ſentiments of morals, to denominate BRUTUS, and CASSIUS, ungrateful traitors and aſſaſſins: Tho' you know, that they are, perhaps, the higheſt characters of all antiquity; and the ATHENIANS erected ſtatues to them; which they placed near

[b] The laws of ATHENS allowed a man to marry his ſiſter by the father. SOLON's law forbid paderaſty to ſlaves, as being an act of too great dignity for ſuch mean perſons.

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thoſe of HARMODIUS and ARISTOGITON, their own deliverers. And if you think this circumſtance, which you mention, ſo material to abſolve theſe patriots, I ſhall compenſate it by another, not mentioned, which will equally aggravate their crime. A few days before the execution of their fatal purpoſe, they all ſwore fealty to CÆSAR; and proteſting to hold his perſon ever ſacred, they touched the altar with thoſe hands, which they had already armed for his deſtruction [c].

I NEED not put you in mind of the famous and applauded ſtory of THEMISTOCLES, and of his patience towards EURYBIADES, the SPARTAN, his commanding officer, who, heated by a debate, lifted his cane to him in a council of war, (the ſame thing as if he had cudgelled him) *Strike!* cries the ATHENIAN, *ſtrike! but hear me.*

YOU are too good a ſcholar not to diſcover the ironical SOCRATES and his ATHENIAN club in my laſt ſtory; and you would certainly obſerve, that it is exactly copied from XENOPHON, with a variation only of the names [d]. And I think I have fairly made appear, that an ATHENIAN man of merit might be ſuch a one as with us would paſs for inceſtuous, a parricide, an aſſaſſin, an ungrateful, perjured traitor, and ſomething elſe too abominable to be named; not to mention his ruſticity and ill-manners. And having lived in this manner, his death may be entirely ſuitable: He may conclude the ſcene by a deſperate act of ſelf-murder, and die with the moſt abſurd blaſphemies in his mouth. And notwithſtanding all this, he ſhall have ſtatues, if not altars, erected to his memory; poems and orations ſhall be compoſed in his praiſe; great ſects ſhall be proud of calling themſelves by his name; and the moſt diſtant poſterity ſhall blindly continue their admiration: Tho' were ſuch a one to ariſe among themſelves, they would juſtly regard him with horror and execration.

I MIGHT have been aware, replied I, of your artifice. You ſeem to take pleaſure in this topic; and are indeed the only man I ever knew, who was well acquainted with the antients, and did not extremely admire them. But inſtead of attacking their philoſophy, their eloquence, or poetry, the uſual ſubjects of controverſy between us, you now ſeem to impeach their morals, and accuſe them of ignorance in a ſcience, which is the only one, in my opinion, in which they are not ſurpaſſed by the moderns. Geometry, phyſics, aſtronomy, anatomy, botany, geography, navigation; in theſe we juſtly claim the ſuperiority: But what have we to oppoſe to their moraliſts? Your repreſentation of things is fallacious. You have no indulgence for the manners and cuſtoms of different ages. Would you try a GREEK or ROMAN by the common-law of ENGLAND? Hear him defend himſelf by his own maxims; and then pronounce.

THERE are no manners ſo innocent or reaſonable, which may not be rendered odious or ridiculous, if meaſured by a ſtandard, unknown to the perſons; eſpecially, if you employ a little art or eloquence, in aggravating ſome circumſtances, and extenuating others, as beſt ſuits the purpoſe of your diſcourſe. All theſe artifices may eaſily be retorted on you. Could I inform the ATHENIANS, for inſtance, that there was a nation, in which adultery, both active and paſſive, ſo to ſpeak, was in the higheſt vogue and eſteem: In which every man of education choſe for his miſtreſs a married woman, the wife, perhaps, of his friend and com-

[c] APPIAN. Bell. Civ. lib. 3. SUETONIUS in vita CÆSARIS. [d] Mem. Soc. lib. 3. ſub fine.

panion; and valued himſelf upon theſe infamous conqueſts, as much as if he had been ſeveral times a conqueror in boxing or wreſtling at the *Olympic* games: In which every man, alſo, took a pride in his tameneſs and facility with regard to his own wife, and was glad to make friends or gain intereſt by allowing her to proſtitute her charms; and even, without any ſuch motive, gave her full liberty and indulgence: I aſk, what ſentiments the ATHENIANS would entertain of ſuch a people; they who never mentioned the crime of adultery but in conjunction with robbery and poiſoning? Which would they admire moſt, the villainy or the meanneſs of ſuch a conduct?

SHOULD I add, that the ſame people were as proud of their ſlavery and dependance as the ATHENIANS of their liberty; and tho' a man among them were oppreſſed, diſgraced, impoveriſhed, inſulted, or impriſoned by the tyrant, he would ſtill regard it as the higheſt merit to love, ſerve, and obey him; and even to die for his ſmalleſt glory or ſatisfaction: Theſe noble GREEKS would probably aſk me, whether I ſpoke of a human ſociety, or of ſome inferior, ſervile ſpecies.

IT was then I might inform my ATHENIAN audience, that theſe people, however, wanted not ſpirit and bravery. If a man, ſays I, tho' their intimate friend, ſhould throw out, in a private company, a raillery againſt them, nearly approaching any of thoſe, with which your generals and demagogues every day regale each other, in the face of the whole city, they never can forgive him; but in order to revenge themſelves, they oblige him immediately to run them thro' the body, or be himſelf murdered. And if a man, who is an abſolute ſtranger to them, ſhould deſire them, at the peril of their own life, to cut the throat of their boſom-companion, they immediately obey, and think themſelves highly obliged and honored by the commiſſion. Theſe are their maxims of honor: This is their favorite morality.

BUT tho' ſo ready to draw their ſword againſt their friends and countrymen; no diſgrace, no infamy, no pain, no poverty will ever engage theſe people to turn the point of it againſt their own breaſt. A man of rank would row in the gallies, would beg his bread, would languiſh in priſon, would ſuffer any tortures; and ſtill preſerve his wretched life. Rather than eſcape his enemies by a generous contempt of death, he would infamouſly receive the ſame death from his enemies, aggravated by their triumphant inſults, and by the moſt exquiſite ſufferings.

'TIS very uſual too, continued I, among this people to erect jails, where every art of plaguing and tormenting the unhappy priſoners is carefully ſtudied and practiſed: And in theſe jails it is uſual for a parent voluntarily to ſhut up ſeveral of his children; in order, that another child, whom he owns to have no greater or rather leſs merit than the reſt, may enjoy his whole fortune, and wallow in every kind of voluptuouſneſs and pleaſure. Nothing ſo virtuous in their opinion as this barbarous partiality.

BUT what is more ſingular in this whimſical nation, ſay I to the ATHENIANS, is, that a frolic of yours during the SATURNALIA [c], when the ſlaves are ſerved

[c] The GREEKS kept the feaſt of SATURN or CHRONUS, as well as the ROMANS. See LUCIAN. Epiſt. SATURN.

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by their maſters, is ſeriouſly continued by them thro' the whole year, and thro' the whole courſe of their lives; accompanied too with ſome circumſtances, which ſtill farther augment the abſurdity and ridicule. Your ſport only elevates for a few days thoſe whom fortune has thrown down, and whom ſhe too, in ſport, may really elevate for ever above you: But this nation gravely exalt thoſe, whom nature has ſubjected to them, and whoſe inferiority and infirmities are abſolutely incurable. The women, tho' without virtue, are their maſters and ſovereigns: Theſe they reverence, praiſe and magnify: To theſe, they pay the higheſt deference and reſpect: And in all places and at all times, the ſuperiority of the females is readily acknowleged and ſubmitted to by every one, who has the leaſt pretenſions to education and politeneſs. Scarce any crime would be ſo univerſally deteſted as an infraction of this rule.

You need go no farther, replied PALAMEDES; I can eaſily conjecture the people whom you aim at. The ſtrokes, with which you have painted them, are pretty juſt; and yet you muſt acknowlege, that ſcarce any people are to be found, either in antient or modern times, whoſe national character is, upon the whole, leſs liable to exception. But I give you thanks for helping me out with my argument. I had no intention of exalting the moderns at the expence of the antients. I only meant to repreſent the uncertainty of all theſe judgments concerning characters; and to convince you, that faſhion, vogue, cuſtom and law, were the chief foundation of all moral determinations. The ATHENIANS ſurely, were a civilized, intelligent people, if ever there was one; and yet their man of merit might, in this age, be held in horror and execration. The FRENCH are alſo, without doubt, a very civilized, intelligent people; and yet their man of merit might, with the ATHENIANS, be an object of the higheſt contempt and ridicule, and even hatred. And what renders the matter more extraordinary: Theſe two people are ſuppoſed to be the moſt ſimilar in their national character of any in antient and modern times; and while the ENGLISH flatter themſelves that they reſemble the ROMANS, their neighbors on the continent draw the parallel between themſelves and thoſe polite GREEKS. What wide difference, therefore, in the ſentiments of morals, muſt be found between civilized nations and Barbarians, or between nations whoſe characters have little in common? How ſhall we pretend to fix a ſtandard for judgments of this nature?

By tracing matters, replied I, a little higher, and examining the firſt principles, which each nation eſtabliſhes, of blame or cenſure. The RHINE flows north, the RHONE ſouth; yet both ſpring from the *ſame* mountain, and are alſo actuated, in their oppoſite directions, by the *ſame* principle of gravity. The different inclinations of the ground, on which they run, cauſe all the difference of their courſes.

In how many circumſtances would an ATHENIAN and FRENCH man of merit certainly reſemble each other? Good-ſenſe, knowlege, wit, eloquence, humanity, fidelity, truth, juſtice, courage, temperance, conſtancy, dignity of mind. Theſe you have all omitted; in order to inſiſt only on the points, in which they may, by accident, differ. Very well: I am willing to comply with you; and ſhall endeavor to account for theſe differences from the moſt univerſal, eſtabliſhed principles of morals.

THE GREEK loves, I care not to examine more particularly. I ſhall only obſerve, that however, blameable, they aroſe from a very innocent cauſe, the frequency of the gymnaſtic exerciſes among that people; and were recommended, tho' abſurdly, as the ſource of friendſhip, ſympathy, mutual attachment, and fidelity [g]; qualities eſteemed in all nations and all ages.

THE marriage of half-brothers and ſiſters ſeems no great difficulty. Love between the nearer relations is contrary to reaſon and public utility; but the preciſe point, where we are to ſtop, can ſcarcely be determined by natural reaſon; and is therefore a very proper ſubject of municipal law or cuſtom. If the ATHENIANS went a little too far on the one ſide, the canon law has ſurely puſhed matters a great way into the other extreme [h].

HAD you aſked a parent at ATHENS, why he bereaved his child of that life, which he had ſo lately given it. 'Tis becauſe I love it, he would reply; and regard the poverty which it muſt inherit from me, as a greater evil than a death, which it is not capable of dreading, feeling, or reſenting [i].

How is public liberty, the moſt valuable of all bleſſings, to be recovered from the hands of an uſurper or tyrant, if his power ſhields him from public rebellion, and our ſcruples from private vengeance? That his crime is capital by law, you acknowlege: And muſt the higheſt aggravation of his crime, the putting himſelf above law, form his full ſecurity? You can reply nothing, but by ſhowing the great inconveniencies of aſſaſſination; which could any one have proved clearly to the antients, he had reformed their ſentiments in this particular.

AGAIN, to caſt your eye on the picture which I have drawn of modern manners; there is almoſt as great difficulty, I acknowlege, to juſtify FRENCH as GREEK gallantry; except only, that the former is much more natural and agreeable than the latter. But our neighbors, it ſeems, have reſolved to ſacrifice ſome of the domeſtic to the ſociable pleaſures; and to prefer eaſe, freedom, and an open commerce to a ſtrict fidelity and conſtancy. Theſe ends are both good, and are ſomewhat difficult to reconcile; nor need we be ſurprized, if the cuſtoms of nations incline too much, ſometimes to the one ſide, ſometimes to the other.

THE moſt inviolable attachment to the laws of our country is every-where acknowleged a capital virtue; and where the people are not ſo happy, as to have any other legiſlature but a ſingle perſon, the ſtricteſt loyalty is, in that caſe, the trueſt patriotiſm.

NOTHING ſurely can be more abſurd and barbarous than the practice of duellings; but thoſe, who juſtify it, ſay, that it begets civility and good manners. And a dueliſt, you may obſerve, always values himſelf upon his courage, his ſenſe of honor, his fidelity and friendſhip; qualities, which are here indeed very oddly directed, but which have been eſteemed univerſally, ſince the foundation of the world.

HAVE the gods forbid ſelf-murder? An ATHENIAN allows, that it ought to be forborn. Has the Deity permitted it? A FRENCHMAN allows, that death is preferable to pain and infamy.

[g] PLAT. ſymp. p. 182. Ex edit. SERR. [h] See Enquiry, Sect. IV. [i] PLUT. de amore prolis, ſub fine.

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You ſee then, continued I, that the principles, upon which men reaſon in morals are always the ſame; tho' the concluſions which they draw are often very different. That they all reaſon aright with regard to this ſubject, more than with regard to any other, it is not incumbent on any moraliſt to ſhow. 'Tis ſufficient, that the original principles of cenſure or blame are uniform, and that erroneous concluſions can be corrected by ſounder reaſoning and a larger experience. Tho' many ages have elapſed ſince the fall of GREECE and ROME; tho' many changes have arrived in religion, language, laws, and cuſtoms; none of theſe revolutions has ever produced any conſiderable innovation in the primary ſentiments of morals, more than in thoſe of external beauty. Some minute differences, perhaps, may be obſerved in both. HORACE [k] celebrates a low forehead, and ANACREON joined eye-brows [l]: But the APOLLO and the VENUS of antiquity are ſtill our models for male and female beauty; in like manner as the character of SCIPIO continues our ſtandard for the glory of heroes, and that of CORNELIA for the honor of matrons.

IT appears, that there never was any quality, recommended by any one, as a virtue or moral excellence; but on account of its being *uſeful*, or *agreeable*, to a man *himſelf*, or to *others*. For what other reaſon can there ever be aſſigned for praiſe or approbation? Or where would be the ſenſe of extolling a *good* character or action, which, at the ſame time, is allowed to be *good for nothing*? All the differences, therefore, in morals may be reduced to this one general foundation, and may be accounted for by the different views, which people take of theſe circumſtances.

SOMETIMES men differ in their judgment about the uſefulneſs of any habit or action: Sometimes alſo the peculiar circumſtances of things render one moral quality more uſeful than others, and give it a peculiar preference.

'TIS not ſurpriſing, that, during a period of war, and diſorder, the military virtues ſhould be more celebrated than the pacific, and attract more the admiration and attention of mankind. "How uſual is it," ſays TULLY [m], "to find "CIMBRIANS, CELTIBERIANS, and other barbarians, who bear, with inflexible "conſtancy, all the fatigues and dangers of the field; but are immediately di"ſpirited under the pain and hazard of a languiſhing diſtemper: while, on the "other hand, the GREEKS patiently endure the ſlow approaches of death, when "armed with ſickneſs and diſeaſe; but timorouſly fly his preſence, when he at"tacks them violently with ſwords and falchions!" So oppoſite is even the ſame virtue of courage among warlike or peaceful nations! And indeed, we may obſerve, that as the difference between war and peace is the greateſt, which ariſes among nations and public ſocieties, it produces alſo the greateſt variations in moral ſentiment, and diverſifies the moſt our idea of virtue and perſonal merit.

SOMETIMES too, magnanimity, greatneſs of mind, diſdain of ſlavery, inflexible rigor and integrity, may ſuit better the circumſtances of one age than thoſe of another, and have a more kindly influence, both on public affairs, and on a man's own ſafety and advancement. Our idea of merit, therefore, will alſo vary a little

[k] Epiſt. lib. 1. epiſt. 7. Alſo lib. 1. ode 3. [l] Ode 28. PETRONIUS (cap. 86.) joins both theſe circumſtances as beauties. [m] Tuſc. Quæſt. lib. 2.

with

with theſe variations; and LABEO, perhaps, be cenſured for the ſame qualities, which procured CATO the higheſt approbation.

A DEGREE of luxury may be ruinous and pernicious in a native of SWITZERLAND, which only foſters the arts, and encourages induſtry in a FRENCHMAN or ENGLISHMAN. We are not, therefore, to expect, either the ſame ſentiments, or the ſame laws in BERNE, which prevail in LONDON or PARIS.

DIFFERENT cuſtoms have alſo ſome influence as well as different utilities; and by giving an early biaſs to the mind, may produce a ſuperior propenſity, either to the uſeful or the agreeable qualities; to thoſe, which regard ſelf, or thoſe, which extend to ſociety. Theſe four ſources of moral ſentiment ſtill ſubſiſt; but particular accidents may, at one time, make any one of them flow with greater abundance than at another.

THE cuſtoms of ſome nations ſhut up the women from all ſocial commerce: Thoſe of others make them ſo eſſential a part of ſociety and converſation, that, except, where buſineſs is tranſacted, the male ſex alone are ſuppoſed almoſt wholly incapable of mutual diſcourſe and entertainment. As this difference is the moſt material, which can happen in private life, it muſt alſo produce the greateſt variation in our moral ſentiments.

OF all nations in the world, where polygamy was not allowed, the GREEKS ſeem to have been the moſt reſerved in their commerce with the fair-ſex, and to have impoſed on them the ſtricteſt laws of modeſty and decency. We have a ſtrong inſtance of this in an oration of LYSIAS [n]. A widow injured, ruined, undone, calls a meeting of a few of her neareſt friends and relations; and tho' never before accuſtomed, ſays the orator, to ſpeak in the preſence of men, the diſtreſs of her circumſtances conſtrained her to lay the caſe before them. The very opening her mouth in ſuch company required, it ſeems, an apology.

WHEN DEMOSTHENES proſecuted his tutors, to make them refund his patrimony, it became neceſſary for him, in the courſe of the law-ſuit, to prove that the marriage of APHOBUS's ſiſter with ONETER was entirely fraudulent, and that, notwithſtanding her ſham-marriage, ſhe had lived with her brother at ATHENS for two years laſt paſt, ever ſince her divorce from her former huſband. And 'tis remarkable, that tho' theſe were people of the firſt fortune and diſtinction in the city, the orator could prove this fact no way, but by calling for her female ſlaves to be put to the queſtion, and by the evidence of one phyſician, who had ſeen her in her brother's houſe during her illneſs [o]. So reſerved were GREEK manners.

WE may be aſſured, that an extreme purity was the conſequence of this reſerve. Accordingly we find, that, except the fabulous ſtories of an HELEN and a CLYTEMNESTRA, there ſcarce is an inſtance of any event in the GREEK hiſtory, which proceeded from the intrigues of women. On the other hand, in modern times, particularly in a neighboring nation, the females enter into all tranſactions and all management of church and ſtate: and no man can expect ſucceſs, who takes not care to obtain their good graces. HARRY the third, by incurring the diſpleaſure of the fair, endangered his crown, and loſt his life, as much as by his indulgence to hereſy.

[n] Orat. 33. [o] In Oneterem.

'Tis needleſs to diſſemble: The conſequence of a very free commerce between the ſexes, and of their living much together, will often terminate in intrigues and gallantry. We muſt ſacrifice ſomewhat of the *uſeful*, if we be very anxious to obtain all the *agreeable* qualities; and cannot pretend to reach alike every kind of advantage. Inſtances of licence, daily multiplying, will weaken the ſcandal with the one ſex, and teach the other, by degrees, to adopt the famous maxim of LA FONTAINE, with regard to female infidelity, *that if one knows it, it is but a ſmall matter; if one knows it not, it is nothing* [p].

SOME people are inclined to think, that the beſt way of adjuſting all differences, and of keeping the proper medium between the *agreeable* and the *uſeful* qualities of the ſex is to live with them after the manner of the ROMANS and the ENGLISH (for the cuſtoms of theſe two nations ſeem ſimilar in this reſpect [q]) that is, without gallantry and without jealouſy. By a parity of reaſon, the cuſtoms of the SPANIARDS and of the ITALIANS of an age ago (for the preſent are very different) muſt be the worſt [illegible]; becauſe they favor both gallantry and jealouſy.

NOR will theſe different cuſtoms of nations affect only the one ſex: The idea of perſonal merit in the males muſt alſo be ſomewhat different with regard, at leaſt, to converſation, addreſs, and humor. The one nation, where the men live much apart, will naturally more approve of prudence; the other, of gaiety. With the one, ſimplicity of manners will be in the higheſt eſteem; with the other, politeneſs. The one will diſtinguiſh themſelves by good-ſenſe and judgment; the other, by taſte and delicacy. The eloquence of the former will ſhine moſt in the ſenate; that of the other, on the theatre.

THESE, I ſay, are the *natural* effects of ſuch cuſtoms. For it muſt be confeſſed, that chance has a great influence on national manners; and many events happen in ſociety, which are not to be accounted for by general rules. Who could imagine, for inſtance, that the ROMANS, who lived freely with their women, ſhould be very indifferent about muſic, and eſteem dancing infamous: While the GREEKS, who never almoſt ſaw a woman but in their own houſes, were continually piping, ſinging, and dancing?

THE differences of moral ſentiment, which naturally ariſe from a republican or monarchical government, are alſo very obvious; as well as thoſe, which proceed from general riches or poverty, union or faction, ignorance or learning. I ſhall conclude this long diſcourſe with obſerving, that different cuſtoms and ſituations vary not the original ideas of merit (however they may, ſome conſequences) in any very eſſential point, and prevail chiefly with regard to young men, who can aſpire to the agreeable qualities, and may attempt to pleaſe. The

[p] Quand on le ſçait c'eſt peu de choſe:
Quand on ne le ſçait pas, ce n'eſt rien.

[q] During the time of the emperors, the ROMANS ſeem to have been more given to intrigues and gallantry than the ENGLISH are at preſent: And the women of condition, in order to retain their lovers, endeavored to fix a name of reproach on thoſe, who were addicted to wenching and low amours. They were called ANCILLARIOLI. See SENECA de beneficiis. Lib. 1. cap. 9. See alſo MARTIAL. lib. 12. epig. 58.

[r] The gallantry here meant is that of amours and attachments, not that of complaiſance, which is as much paid to the fair-ſex in England as in any other country.

MANNER,

MANNER, the ORNAMENTS, the GRACES, which ſucceed in this ſhape, are more arbitrary and caſual: But the merit of riper years is almoſt every-where the ſame; and conſiſts chiefly in integrity, humanity, ability, knowlege and the other more ſolid and uſeful qualities of the human mind.

WHAT you inſiſt on, replied PALAMEDES, may have ſome foundation, when you adhere to the maxims of common life and ordinary conduct. Experience and the practice of the world readily correct any great extravagance on either ſide. But what ſay you to *artificial* lives and manners? How do you reconcile the maxims, on which, in different ages and nations, theſe are founded?

WHAT do you underſtand by *artificial* lives and manners, ſaid I? I explain myſelf, replied he. You know, that religion had, in antient times, very little influence on common life, and that, after men had performed their duty in ſacrifices and prayers at the temple, they thought, that the gods left the reſt of their conduct to themſelves, and were little pleaſed or offended with thoſe virtues or vices, which only affected the peace and happineſs of human ſociety. In thoſe ages, it was the buſineſs of philoſophy alone to regulate men's ordinary behavior and deportment; and accordingly, we may obſerve, that this being the ſole principle, by which a man could elevate himſelf above his fellows, it acquired a mighty aſcendant over many, and produced great ſingularities of maxims and of conduct. At preſent, that philoſophy has loſt the allurement of novelty, it has no ſuch extenſive influence; but ſeems to confine itſelf moſtly to ſpeculations in the cloſet; in the ſame manner, as the antient religion was limited to ſacrifices in the temple. Its place is now ſupplied by the modern religion, which inſpects our whole conduct, and preſcribes an univerſal rule to our actions, to our words, to our very thoughts and inclinations; a rule ſo much the more auſtere, that it is guarded by infinite, tho' diſtant, rewards and puniſhments; and no infraction of it can ever be concealed or diſguiſed.

DIOGENES is the moſt celebrated model of extravagant philoſophy. Let us ſeek a parallel to him in modern times. We ſhall not diſgrace any philoſophic name by a compariſon with the DOMINICS or LOYOLAS, or any canonized monk or friar. Let us compare him to PASCAL, a man of parts and genius as well as DIOGENES himſelf; and perhaps too, a man of virtue, had he allowed his virtuous inclinations to have exerted and diſplayed themſelves.

THE foundation of DIOGENES's conduct was an endeavor to render himſelf an independent being as much as poſſible, and to confine all his wants and deſires and pleaſures within himſelf and his own mind: The aim of PASCAL was to keep a perpetual ſenſe of his dependance before his eyes, and never to forget his numberleſs wants and neceſſities. The antient ſupported himſelf by magnanimity, oſtentation, pride, and the idea of his own ſuperiority above his fellow-creatures. The modern made conſtant profeſſion of humility and abaſement, of the contempt and hatred of himſelf; and endeavored to attain theſe ſuppoſed virtues, as far as they are attainable. The auſterities of the GREEK were in order to inure himſelf to hardſhips, and prevent his ever ſuffering: Thoſe of the FRENCHMAN were embraced merely for their own ſake, and in order to ſuffer as much as poſſible. The philoſopher indulged himſelf in the moſt beaſtly pleaſures, even in public: The ſaint refuſed himſelf the moſt innocent, even in private.

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The former thought it his duty to love his friends, and to rail at them, and reprove them, and ſcold them: The latter endeavored to be abſolutely indifferent towards his neareſt relations, and to love and ſpeak well of his enemies. The great object of DIOGENES's wit was every kind of ſuperſtition, that is, every kind of religion known in his time. The mortality of the ſoul was his ſtandard principle; and even his ſentiments of a divine providence ſeem to have been very licentious. The moſt ridiculous ſuperſtitions directed PASCAL's faith and practice; and an extreme contempt of this life, in compariſon of the future, was the chief foundation of his conduct.

IN ſuch a remarkable contraſt do theſe two men ſtand: Yet both of them have met with general admiration in their different ages, and have been propoſed as models of imitation. Where then is the univerſal ſtandard of morals, which you talk of? And what rule ſhall we eſtabliſh for the many different, nay contrary ſentiments of mankind?

AN experiment, ſaid I, which ſucceeds in the air, will not always ſucceed in a vacuum. When men depart from the maxims of common reaſon, and affect theſe *artificial* lives, as you call them, no-one can anſwer for what will pleaſe or diſpleaſe them. They are in a different element from the reſt of mankind; and the natural principles of their mind play not with the ſame regularity, as if left to themſelves, free from the illuſions of religious ſuperſtition or philoſophical enthuſiaſm.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION.

AS every enquiry, which regards religion is of the utmoſt importance, there are two queſtions in particular, which challenge our principal attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reaſon, and that concerning its origin in human nature. Happily, the firſt queſtion, which is the moſt important, admits of the moſt obvious, at leaſt, the cleareſt ſolution. The whole frame of nature beſpeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after ſerious reflexion, ſuſpend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theiſm and Religion. But the other queſtion, concerning the origin of religion in human nature, is expoſed to ſome more difficulty. The belief of inviſible, intelligent power has been very generally diffuſed over the human race, in all places and in all ages; but it has neither perhaps been ſo univerſal as to admit of no exceptions, nor has it been, in any degree, uniform in the ideas, which it has ſuggeſted. Some nations have been diſcovered, who entertained no ſentiments of Religion, if travellers and hiſtorians may be credited; and no two nations, and ſcarce any two men, have ever agreed preciſely in the ſame ſentiments. It would appear, therefore, that this preconception ſprings not from an original inſtinct or primary impreſſion of nature, ſuch as gives riſe to ſelf-love, affection betwixt the ſexes, love of progeny, gratitude, reſentment; ſince every inſtinct of this kind has been found abſolutely univerſal in all nations and ages, and has always a preciſe, determinate object, which it inflexibly purſues. The firſt religious principles muſt be ſecondary; ſuch as may eaſily be perverted by various accidents and cauſes, and whoſe operation too, in ſome caſes, may, by an extraor-

dinary concurrence of circumſtances, be altogether prevented. What thoſe principles are, which give riſe to the original belief, and what thoſe accidents and cauſes are, which direct its operation, is the ſubject of our preſent enquiry.

SECT. I. *That Polytheiſm was the primary Religion of Men.*

IT appears to me, that if we conſider the improvement of human ſociety, from rude beginnings to a ſtate of greater perfection, polytheiſm or idolatry was, and neceſſarily muſt have been, the firſt and moſt antient religion of mankind. This opinion I ſhall endeavor to confirm by the following arguments.

'TIS a matter of fact inconteſtable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were idolaters. The doubtful and ſceptical principles of a few philoſophers, or the theiſm, and that too not entirely pure, of one or two nations, form no objection worth regarding. Behold then the clear teſtimony of hiſtory. The farther we mount up into antiquity, the more do we find mankind plunged into idolatry. No marks, no ſymptoms of any more perfect religion. The moſt antient records of human race ſtill preſent us with polytheiſm as the popular and eſtabliſhed ſyſtem. The north, the ſouth, the eaſt, the weſt, give their unanimous teſtimony to the ſame fact. What can be oppoſed to ſo full an evidence?

As far as writing or hiſtory reaches, mankind, in antient times, appear univerſally to have been polytheiſts. Shall we aſſert, that, in more antient times, before the knowlege of letters, or the diſcovery of any art or ſcience, men entertained the principles of pure theiſm? That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they diſcovered truth: But fell into error, as ſoon as they acquired learning and politeneſs.

BUT in this aſſertion you not only contradict all appearance of probability, but alſo our preſent experience concerning the principles and opinions of barbarous nations. The ſavage tribes of AMERICA, AFRICA, and ASIA are all idolaters. Not a ſingle exception to this rule. Inſomuch, that, were a traveller to tranſport himſelf into any unknown region; if he found inhabitants cultivated with arts and ſciences, tho' even upon that ſuppoſition there are odds againſt their being theiſts, yet could he not ſafely, till farther enquiry, pronounce any thing on that head: But if he found them ignorant and barbarous, he might beforehand declare them idolaters; and there ſcarce is a poſſibility of his being miſtaken.

IT ſeems certain, that, according to the natural progreſs of human thought, the ignorant multitude muſt firſt entertain ſome groveling and familiar notion of ſuperior powers, before they ſtretch their conception to that perfect Being, who beſtowed order on the whole frame of nature. We may as reaſonably imagine, that men inhabited palaces before huts and cottages, or ſtudied geometry before agriculture; as aſſert that the Deity appeared to them a pure ſpirit, omniſcient, omnipotent, and omnipreſent, before he was apprehended to be a powerful, tho' limited being, with human paſſions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind riſes gradually, from inferior to ſuperior: By abſtracting from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of perfection: And ſlowly diſtinguiſhing the nobler parts of its frame from the groſſer, it learns to transfer only the former, much elevated and refined, to its divinity. Nothing could diſturb this natural progreſs of thought, but ſome obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of theiſm, and make it overleap, at one bound, the

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vaſt interval, which is interpoſed betwixt the human and the divine nature. But tho' I allow, that the order and frame of the univerſe, when accurately examined, affords ſuch an argument; yet I can never think that this conſideration could have an influence on mankind when they formed their firſt rude notions of religion.

THE cauſes of objects, which are quite familiar to us, never ſtrike our attention or curioſity; and however extraordinary or ſurprizing theſe objects may be in themſelves, they are paſſed over, by the raw and ignorant multitude, without much examination or enquiry. ADAM, riſing at once, in paradiſe, and in the full perfection of his faculties, would naturally, as repreſented by MILTON, be aſtoniſhed at the glorious appearances of nature, the heavens, the air, the earth, his own organs and members; and would be led to aſk, whence this wonderful ſcene aroſe. But a barbarous, neceſſitous animal (ſuch as man is on the firſt origin of ſociety) preſſed by ſuch numerous wants and paſſions, has no leiſure to admire the regular face of nature, or make enquiries concerning the cauſe of objects, to which, from his infancy, he has been gradually accuſtomed. On the contrary, the more regular and uniform, that is, the more perfect, nature appears, the more is he familiarized to it, and the leſs inclined to ſcrutinize and examine it. A monſtrous birth excites his curioſity, and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty; and immediately ſets him a trembling, and ſacrificing, and praying. But an animal compleat in all its limbs and organs, is to him an ordinary ſpectacle, and produces no religious opinion or affection. Aſk him, whence that animal aroſe; he will tell you, from the copulation of its parents. And theſe, whence? From the copulation of theirs. A few removes ſatisfy his curioſity, and ſet the objects at ſuch a diſtance, that he entirely loſes ſight of them. Imagine not, that he will ſo much as ſtart the queſtion, whence the firſt animal; much leſs, whence the whole ſyſtem or united fabric of the univerſe aroſe. Or, if you ſtart ſuch a queſtion to him, expect not, that he will employ his mind with any anxiety about a ſubject, ſo remote, ſo unintereſting, and which ſo much exceeds the bounds of his capacity.

BUT farther, if men were at firſt led into the belief of one ſupreme being, by reaſoning from the frame of nature, they could never poſſibly leave that belief, in order to embrace idolatry; but the ſame principles of reaſoning, which at firſt produced, and diffuſed over mankind, ſo magnificent an opinion, muſt be able, with greater facility, to preſerve it. The firſt invention and proof of any doctrine is infinitely more difficult than the ſupporting and retaining it.

THERE is a great difference betwixt hiſtorical facts and ſpeculative opinions; nor is the knowlege of the one propagated in the ſame manner with that of the other. An hiſtorical fact, while it paſſes by oral tradition from eye-witneſſes and contemporaries, is diſguiſed in every ſucceſſive narration, and may at laſt retain but very ſmall, if any, reſemblance of the original truth, on which it was founded. The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their ſupine careleſſneſs; theſe principles, if not corrected by books and writing, ſoon pervert the account of hiſtorical events, where argument or reaſoning has little or no place; nor can ever recal the truth, which has once eſcaped thoſe narrations. 'Tis thus the fables of HERCULES, THESEUS, BACCHUS are ſuppoſed to have been originally founded in true hiſtory, corrupted by tradition. But with regard to ſpeculative opinions, the caſe is far otherwiſe. If theſe opinions be founded in arguments ſo clear

clear and obvious as to carry conviction with the generality of mankind, the ſame arguments, which at firſt diffuſed the opinions, will ſtill preſerve them in their original purity. If the arguments be more abſtruſe, and more remote from vulgar apprehenſions, the opinions will always be confined to a few perſons; and as ſoon as men leave the contemplation of the arguments, the opinions will immediately be loſt and be buried in oblivion. Which ever ſide of this dilemma we take, it muſt appear impoſſible, that theiſm could, from reaſoning, have been the primary religion of human race, and have afterwards, by its corruption, given birth to idolatry and to all the various ſuperſtitions of the heathen world. Reaſon, when very obvious, prevents theſe corruptions: When abſtruſe, it keeps the principles entirely from the knowlege of the vulgar, who are alone liable to corrupt any principles, or opinions.

SECT. II. *Origin of Polytheiſm.*

IF we would, therefore, indulge our curioſity, in enquiring concerning the origin of religion, we muſt turn our thoughts towards idolatry or polytheiſm, the primitive Religion of uninſtructed mankind.

WERE men led into the apprehenſion of inviſible, intelligent power by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never poſſibly entertain any conception but of one ſingle being, who beſtowed exiſtence and order on this vaſt machine, and adjuſted all its parts, according to one regular plan or connected ſyſtem. For tho', to perſons of a certain turn of mind, it may not appear altogether abſurd, that ſeveral independent beings, endowed with ſuperior wiſdom, might conſpire in the contrivance and execution of one regular plan; yet is this a mere arbitrary ſuppoſition, which, even if allowed poſſible, muſt be confeſſed neither to be ſupported by probability nor neceſſity. All things in the univerſe are evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjuſted to every thing. One deſign prevails thro' the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowlege one author; becauſe the conception of different authors, without any diſtinction of attributes or operations, ſerves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without beſtowing any ſatisfaction on the underſtanding *.

ON the other hand, if, leaving the works of nature, we trace the footſteps of inviſible power in the various and contrary events of human life, we are neceſſarily led into polytheiſm and to the acknowlegement of ſeveral limited and imperfect deities. Storms and tempeſts ruin what is nouriſhed by the ſun. The ſun deſtroys what is foſtered by the moiſture of dews and rains. War may be favorable to a nation, whom the inclemency of the ſeaſons afflicts with famine. Sickneſs and peſtilence may depopulate a kingdom, amidſt the moſt profuſe plenty. The ſame nation is not, at the ſame time, equally ſucceſsful by ſea and by land. And a nation, which now triumphs over its enemies, may anon ſubmit to their more proſ-

* The ſtatue of LAOCOON, as we learn from PLINY, was the work of three artiſts: But 'tis certain, that, were we not told ſo, we ſhould never have concluded, that a groupe of figures, cut from one ſtone, and united in one plan, was not the work and contrivance of one ſtatuary. To aſcribe any ſingle effect to the combination of ſeveral cauſes, is not ſurely a natural and obvious ſuppoſition.

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perous arms. In ſhort, the conduct of events, or what we call the plan of a particular providence, is ſo full of variety and uncertainty, that, if we ſuppoſe it immediately ordered by any intelligent beings, we muſt acknowlege a contrariety in their deſigns and intentions, a conſtant combat of oppoſite powers, and a repentance or change of intention in the ſame power, from impotence or levity. Each nation has its tutelar deity. Each element is ſubjected to its inviſible power or agent. The province of each god is ſeparate from that of another. Nor are the operations of the ſame god always certain and invariable. To day he protects: To morrow, he abandons us. Prayers and ſacrifices, rites and ceremonies, well or ill performed, are the ſources of his favor or enmity, and produce all the good or ill fortune, which are to be found amongſt mankind.

We may conclude, therefore, that in all nations, which have embraced polytheiſm or idolatry, the firſt ideas of religion aroſe not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the inceſſant hopes and fears, which actuate the human mind. Accordingly, we find, that all idolaters, having ſeparated the provinces of their deities, have recourſe to that inviſible agent, to whoſe authority they are immediately ſubjected, and whoſe province it is to ſuperintend that courſe of actions, in which they are, at any time, engaged. Juno is invoked at marriages; Lucina at births. Neptune receives the prayers of ſeamen; and Mars of warriors. The huſbandman cultivates his field under the protection of Ceres; and the merchant acknowleges the authority of Mercury. Each natural event is ſuppoſed to be governed by ſome intelligent agent; and nothing proſperous or adverſe can happen in life, which may not be the ſubject of peculiar prayers or thankſgivings[1].

It muſt neceſſarily, indeed, be allowed, that, in order to carry men's attention beyond the preſent courſe of things, or lead them into any inference concerning inviſible intelligent power, they muſt be actuated by ſome paſſion, which prompts their thought and reflection; ſome motive, which urges their firſt enquiry. But what paſſion ſhall we here have recourſe to, for explaining an effect of ſuch mighty conſequence? Not ſpeculative curioſity ſurely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for ſuch groſs apprehenſions, and would lead men into enquiries concerning the frame of nature; a ſubject too large and comprehenſive for their narrow capacities. No paſſions, therefore, can be ſuppoſed to work upon ſuch barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for happineſs, the dread of future miſery, the terror of death, the thirſt of revenge, the appetite for food and other neceſſaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, eſpecially the latter, men ſcrutinize, with a trembling curioſity, the courſe of future cauſes, and examine the various contrary events of human life. And in this diſordered ſcene, with eyes ſtill more diſordered and aſtoniſhed, they ſee the firſt obſcure traces of divinity.

[1] "Fragilis et laborioſa mortalitas in partes iſta "digeſſit, infirmitatis ſuæ memor, ut portionibus "quiſquis coleret, quo maxime indigeret." Plin. lib. ii. cap. 7. So early as Hesiod's time there were 30,000 deities. *Oper. & Dier.* lib. i. ver. 250. But the taſk to be performed by theſe, ſeems ſtill too great for their number. The provinces of the deities were ſo ſubdivided, that there was even a God of *Sneezing*. See Arist. *Probl.* Sect. 33. cap. 7. The province of copulation, ſuitable to the importance and dignity of it, was divided among ſeveral deities.

SECT. III. *The ſame ſubject continued.*

WE are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true ſprings and cauſes of every event, are entirely unknown to us; nor have we either ſufficient wiſdom to foreſee, or power to prevent thoſe ills, with which we are continually threatened. We hang in perpetual ſuſpence betwixt life and death, health and ſickneſs, plenty and want; which are diſtributed amongſt the human ſpecies by ſecret and unknown cauſes, whoſe operation is oft unexpected, and always unaccountable. Theſe *unknown cauſes*, then, become the conſtant object of our hope and fear; and while the paſſions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of thoſe powers, on which we have ſo entire a dependance. Could men anatomize nature, according to the moſt probable, at leaſt the moſt intelligible philoſophy, they would find, that theſe cauſes are nothing but the particular fabric and ſtructure of the minute parts of their own bodies and of external objects; and that, by a regular and conſtant machinery, all the events are produced, about which they are ſo much concerned. But this philoſophy exceeds the comprehenſion of the ignorant multitude, who can only conceive the *unknown cauſes* in a general and confuſed manner; tho' their imagination, perpetually employed on the ſame ſubject, muſt labor to form ſome particular and diſtinct idea of them. The more they conſider theſe cauſes themſelves, and the uncertainty of their operation, the leſs ſatisfaction do they meet with in their reſearch; and, however unwilling, they muſt at laſt have abandoned ſo arduous an attempt, were it not for a propenſity in human nature, which leads into a ſyſtem, that gives them ſome ſeeming ſatisfaction.

THERE is an univerſal tendency amongſt mankind to conceive all beings like themſelves, and to transfer to every object thoſe qualities, with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conſcious. We find human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds; and by a natural propenſity, if not corrected by experience and reflection, aſcribe malice and good-will to every thing, that hurts or pleaſes us. Hence the frequency and beauty of the *proſopopæia* in poetry, where trees, mountains and ſtreams are perſonified, and the inanimate parts of nature acquire ſentiment and paſſion. And tho' theſe poetical figures and expreſſions gain not on the belief, they may ſerve, at leaſt, to prove a certain tendency in the imagination, without which they could neither be beautiful nor natural. Nor is a river-god or hama-dryad always taken for a mere poetical or imaginary perſonage; but may ſometimes enter into the real creed of the ignorant vulgar; while each grove or field is repreſented as poſſeſt of a particular *genius* or inviſible power, which inhabits or protects it. Nay, philoſophers cannot entirely exempt themſelves from this natural frailty; but have oft aſcribed to inanimate matter the horror of a *vacuum*, ſympathies, antipathies and other affections of human nature. The abſurdity is not leſs, while we caſt our eyes upwards; and transferring, as is too uſual, human paſſions and infirmities to the deity, repreſent him as jealous and revengeful, capricious and partial, and, in ſhort, a wicked and fooliſh man in every reſpect, but his ſuperior power and authority. No wonder, then, that mankind, being placed in ſuch an abſolute ignorance of cauſes, and being

at the ſame time ſo anxious concerning their future fortunes, ſhould immediately acknowlege a dependence on inviſible powers, poſſeſſed of ſentiment and intelligence. The *unknown cauſes*, which continually employ their thought, appearing always in the ſame aſpect, are all apprehended to be of the ſame kind or ſpecies. Nor is it long before we aſcribe to them thought, and reaſon, and paſſion, and ſometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order to bring them nearer to a reſemblance with ourſelves.

In proportion as any man's courſe of life is governed by accident, we always find, that he encreaſes in ſuperſtition; as may particularly be obſerved of gameſters and ſailors, who, tho' of all mankind, the leaſt capable of ſerious meditation, abound moſt in frivolous and ſuperſtitious apprehenſions. The gods, ſays Coriolanus in Dionysius[m], have an influence in every affair; but above all, in war; where the event is ſo uncertain. All human life, eſpecially before the inſtitution of order and good government, being ſubject to fortuitous accidents; it is natural, that ſuperſtition ſhould prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put men on the moſt earneſt enquiry concerning thoſe inviſible powers, who diſpoſe of their happineſs or miſery. Ignorant of aſtronomy and the anatomy of plants and animals, and too little curious to obſerve the admirable adjuſtment of final cauſes; they remain ſtill unacquainted with a firſt and ſupreme creator, and with that infinitely perfect ſpirit, who alone, by his almighty will, beſtowed order on the whole frame of nature. Such a magnificent idea is too big for their narrow conceptions, which can neither obſerve the beauty of the work, nor comprehend the grandeur of its author. They ſuppoſe their deities, however potent and inviſible, to be nothing but a ſpecies of human creatures, perhaps raiſed from among mankind, and retaining all human paſſions and appetites, together with corporeal limbs and organs. Such limited beings, tho' maſters of human fate, being, each of them, incapable of extending his influence every where, muſt be vaſtly multiplied, in order to anſwer that variety of events, which happen over the whole face of nature. Thus every place is ſtored with a crowd of local deities; and thus idolatry has prevailed, and ſtill prevails, among the greateſt part of uninſtructed mankind[n].

Any of the human affections may lead us into the notion of inviſible, intelligent power; hope as well as fear, gratitude as well as affliction: But if we examine our own hearts, or obſerve what paſſes around us, we ſhall find, that men are much oftener thrown on their knees by the melancholy than by the agreeable paſſions. Proſperity is eaſily received as our due, and few queſtions are aſked concerning its cauſe or author. It begets cheerfulneſs and activity and alacrity and a lively enjoyment of every ſocial and ſenſual pleaſure: And during this ſtate of

[m] Lib. viii.

[n] The following lines of Euripides are ſo much to the preſent purpoſe that I cannot forbear quoting them:

Ουκ εστιν ουδεν πιστον, ουτ ευδοξια,
Ουτ' αν καλως πρασσοντα μη πραξειν κακως.
Φυρουσι δ' αυθ' οι θεοι παλιν τε και προσω,
Ταραγμον εντιθεντες, ως αγνωσιᾳ
Σεβωμεν αυτους. Hecuba.

"There is nothing ſecure in the world; no "glory, no proſperity. The gods toſs all life "into confuſion; mix every thing with its re- "verſe; that all of us, from our ignorance and "uncertainty, may pay them the more worſhip "and reverence."

mind, men have little leiſure or inclination to think of the unknown inviſible regions. On the other hand, every diſaſtrous accident alarms us, and ſets us on enquiries concerning the principles whence it aroſe: Apprehenſions ſpring up with regard to futurity: And the mind, ſunk into diffidence, terror, and melancholy, has recourſe to every method of appeaſing thoſe ſecret, intelligent powers, on whom our fortune is ſuppoſed entirely to depend.

No topic is more uſual with all popular divines than to diſplay the advantages of affliction, in bringing men to a due ſenſe of religion; by ſubduing their confidence and ſenſuality, which, in times of proſperity, make them forgetful of a divine providence. Nor is this topic confined merely to modern religions. The ancients have alſo employed it. *Fortune has never liberally, without envy*, ſays a GREEK hiſtorian [p], *beſtowed an unmixed happineſs on mankind; but with all her gifts has ever conjoined ſome diſaſtrous circumſtance, in order to chaſtize men into a reverence for the gods, whom in a continued courſe of proſperity, they are apt to neglect and forget.*

WHAT age or period of life is the moſt addicted to ſuperſtition? The weakeſt and moſt timid. What ſex? The ſame anſwer muſt be given. *The leaders and examples of every kind of ſuperſtition*, ſays STRABO [q], *are the women. Theſe excite the men to devotion and ſupplications, and the obſervance of religious days. It is rare to meet with one that lives apart from the females, and yet is addicted to ſuch practices. And nothing can, for this reaſon, be more improbable, than the account given of an order of men amongſt the* GETES, *who practiſed celibacy, and were notwithſtanding the moſt religious fanatics.* A method of reaſoning, which would lead us to entertain a bad idea of the devotion of monks; did we not know by an experience, not ſo common, perhaps, in STRABO's days, that one may practiſe celibacy, and profeſs chaſtity; and yet maintain the cloſeſt connexions and moſt entire ſympathy with that timorous and pious ſex.

SECT. IV. *Deities not conſidered as creators or formers of the world.*

THE only point of theology, in which we ſhall find a conſent of mankind almoſt univerſal, is, that there is inviſible, intelligent power in the world: But whether this power be ſupreme or ſubordinate, whether confined to one being, or diſtributed among ſeveral, what attributes, qualities, connexions or principles of action ought to be aſcribed to thoſe beings; concerning all theſe points, there is the wideſt difference in the popular ſyſtems of theology. Our anceſtors in EUROPE, before the revival of letters, believed, as we do at preſent, that there was one ſupreme God, the author of nature, whoſe power, tho', in itſelf, uncontrolable, yet was often exerted by the interpoſition of his angels and ſubordinate miniſters, who executed his ſacred purpoſes. But they alſo believed, that all nature was full of other inviſible powers; fairies, goblins, elves, ſprights; beings, ſtronger and mightier than men, but much inferior to the celeſtial natures, who ſurround the throne of God. Now ſuppoſe, that any one, in thoſe ages, had denied the exiſtence of God and of his angels; would not his impiety juſtly have de-

[p] Diod. Sic. lib. iii. [q] Lib. vii.

ſerved

deſerved the appellation of atheiſm, even tho' he had ſtill allowed, by ſome odd capricious reaſoning, that the popular ſtories of elves and fairies were juſt and well-grounded? The difference, on the other hand, betwixt ſuch a perſon and a genuine theiſt is infinitely greater than that, on the other, betwixt him and one, that abſolutely excludes all inviſible, intelligent power. And it is a fallacy, merely from the caſual reſemblance of names, without any conformity of meaning, to rank ſuch oppoſite opinions under the ſame denomination.

To any one, who conſiders juſtly of the matter, it will appear, that the gods of all polytheiſts or idolaters are no better than the elves or fairies of our anceſtors, and merit as little any pious worſhip or veneration. Theſe pretended religioniſts are really a kind of ſuperſtitious atheiſts, and acknowlege no being, that correſponds to our idea of a deity. No firſt principle of mind or thought: No ſupreme government and adminiſtration: No divine contrivance or intention in the fabric of the world.

THE CHINESE, when [a] their prayers are not anſwered, beat their idols. The deities of the LAPLANDERS are any large ſtone which they meet with of an extraordinary ſhape [b]. The EGYPTIAN mythologiſts, in order to account for animal worſhip, ſaid, that the gods, purſued by the violence of earth-born men, who were their enemies, had formerly been obliged to diſguiſe themſelves under the ſemblance of beaſts [c]. The CAUNII, a nation in the leſſer ASIA, reſolving to admit no ſtrange gods among them, regularly, at certain ſeaſons, aſſembled themſelves compleatly armed, beat the air with their lances, and proceeded in that manner to their frontiers; in order, as they ſaid, to expel the foreign deities [d]. *Not even the immortal gods*, ſaid ſome GERMAN nations to CÆSAR, *are a match for the* SUEVI [e].

MANY ills, ſays DIONE in HOMER to VENUS wounded by DIOMEDE, many ills, my daughter, have the gods inflicted on men: And many ills, in return, have men inflicted on the gods [f]. We need but open any claſſic author to meet with theſe groſs repreſentations of the deities; and LONGINUS [g] with reaſon obſerves, that ſuch ideas of the divine nature, if literally taken, contain a true atheiſm.

SOME writers [h] have been ſurprized, that the impieties of ARISTOPHANES ſhould have been tolerated, nay publickly acted and applauded by the ATHENIANS, a people ſo ſuperſtitious and ſo jealous of the public religion, that, at that very time, they put SOCRATES to death for his imagined incredulity. But theſe writers conſider not, that the ludicrous, familiar images, under which the gods are repreſented by that comic poet, inſtead of appearing impious, were the genuine lights, in which the ancients conceived their divinities. What conduct can be more criminal or mean, than that of JUPITER in the AMPHITRYON? Yet that play, which repreſented his gallant exploits, was ſuppoſed ſo agreeable to him, that it was always acted in ROME by public authority, when the State was threatened with peſtilence, famine, or any general calamity [i]. The ROMANS ſuppoſed, that,

[a] Pere le Comte.
[b] Regnard, Voïage de Lapponie.
[c] Diod. Sic. lib. i. Lucian. de Sacrificiis. OVID alludes to the ſame tradition, Metam. lib. v. l. 321. So alſo MANILIUS, lib. iv.
[d] Herodot. lib. i.
[e] Cæſ. Comment. de bell. Gallico, lib. iv.
[f] Lib. ix. 382. [g] Cap. ix.
[h] Pere Brumoy, Theatre des Grecs; & Fontenelle, Hiſtoire des Oracles.
[i] Arnob. lib. vii.

like all old letchers, he would be highly pleaſed with the rehearſal of his former feats of activity and vigor, and that no topic was ſo proper, upon which to flatter his pride and vanity.

THE LACEDEMONIANS, ſays XENOPHON [b], always, during war, put up their petitions very early in the morning, in order to be beforehand with their enemies, and by being the firſt ſollicitors, pre-engage the gods in their favor. We may gather from SENECA [c], that it was uſual for the votaries in the temples, to make intereſt with the beadles or ſextons, in order to have a ſeat near the image of the deity, that they might be the beſt heard in their prayers and applications to him. The TYRIANS, when beſieged by ALEXANDER, threw chains on the ſtatue of HERCULES, to prevent that deity from deſerting to the enemy [d]. AUGUSTUS, having twice loſt his fleet by ſtorms, forbad NEPTUNE to be carried in proceſſion along with the other gods; and fancied, that he had ſufficiently revenged himſelf by that expedient [e]. After GERMANICUS's death, the people were ſo enraged at their gods, that they ſtoned them in their temples; and openly renounced all allegiance to them [f].

To aſcribe the origin and fabric of the univerſe to theſe imperfect beings never enters into the imagination of any polytheiſt or idolater. HESIOD, whoſe writings, with thoſe of HOMER, contained the canonical ſyſtem of the heathens [g]; HESIOD, I ſay, ſuppoſes gods and men to have ſprung equally from the unknown powers of nature [h]. And thro' the whole theogony of that author, PANDORA is the only inſtance of creation or a voluntary production; and ſhe too was formed by the gods merely from deſpight to PROMETHEUS, who had furniſhed men with ſtolen fire from the celeſtial regions [k]. The ancient mythologiſts, indeed, ſeem throughout to have rather embraced the idea of generation than that of creation, or formation; and to have thence accounted for the origin of this univerſe.

OVID, who lived in a learned age, and had been inſtructed by philoſophers in the principles of a divine creation or formation of the world; finding, that ſuch an idea would not agree with the popular mythology, which he delivers, leaves it, in a manner, looſe and detached from his ſyſtem. *Quiſquis fuit ille Deorum* [l]? Which-ever of the gods it was, ſays he, that diſſipated the chaos, and introduced order into the univerſe. It could neither be SATURN, he knew, nor JUPITER, nor NEPTUNE, nor any of the received deities of paganiſm. His theological ſyſtem had taught him nothing upon that head, and he leaves the matter equally undetermined.

DIODORUS SICULUS [m], beginning his work with an enumeration of the moſt reaſonable opinions concerning the origin of the world, makes no mention of a deity or intelligent mind; tho' it is evident from his hiſtory, that that author had a much greater proneneſs to ſuperſtition than to irreligion. And in another paſſage [n], talking of the ICHTHYOPHAGES, a nation in INDIA, he ſays, that there being ſo great difficulty in accounting for their deſcent, we muſt conclude them to

[b] De Laced. Rep [c] Epiſt. xli.
[d] Quint. Curtius, lib. iv. cap. 3. Diod. Sic. lib. xvii.
[e] Sueton in vita Aug. cap. 16.
[f] Id. in vita Cal. cap. 5.
[g] Herodot. lib. ii. Lucian. *Jupiter confutatus, de luctu Saturn.* &c.
[h] Ὡς ομοθεν γεγαασι θεοι θνηλοι τ' ανθρωποι. Heſ. Opera & Dies, l. 108.
[k] Theog. l. 570.
[l] Metamorph. lib. i. l. 32.
[m] Lib. i. [n] Id. ibid.

be

be *aborigines*, without any beginning of their generation, propagating their race from all eternity; as ſome of the phyſiologers, in treating of the origin of nature, have juſtly obſerved. "But in ſuch ſubjects as theſe," adds the hiſtorian, "which "exceed all human capacity, it may well happen, that thoſe, who diſcourſe the "moſt, know the leaſt; reaching a ſpecious appearance of truth in their reaſon-"ings, while extremely wide of the real truth and matter of fact."

A STRANGE ſentiment in our eyes, to be embraced by a profeſſed and zealous religioniſt [a]! But it was merely by accident, that the queſtion concerning the origin of the world did ever in antient times enter into religious ſyſtems, or was treated of by theologers. The philoſophers alone made profeſſion of delivering ſyſtems of this nature; and it was pretty late too before theſe bethought themſelves of having recourſe to a mind or ſupreme intelligence, as the firſt cauſe of all. So far was it from being eſteemed profane in thoſe days to account for the origin of things without a deity, that THALES, ANAXIMENES, HERACLITUS, and others, who embraced that ſyſtem of coſmogony, paſt unqueſtioned; while ANAXAGORAS, the firſt undoubted theiſt among the philoſophers, was perhaps the firſt that ever was accuſed of atheiſm [b].

WE are told by SEXTUS EMPIRICUS [c], that EPICURUS, when a boy, reading with his preceptor theſe verſes of HESIOD,

Eldeſt of beings, *chaos* firſt aroſe;
Next *earth*, wide-ſtretcht, the *ſeat* of all.

the young ſcholar firſt betrayed his inquiſitive genius, by aſking, *And chaos whence?* But was told by his preceptor, that he muſt have recourſe to the philoſophers for a ſolution of ſuch queſtions. And from this hint, EPICURUS left philology and all other ſtudies, in order to betake himſelf to that ſcience, whence alone he expected ſatisfaction with regard to theſe ſublime ſubjects.

THE common people were never likely to puſh their reſearches ſo far, or derive from reaſoning their ſyſtems of religion; when philologers and mythologiſts, we ſee, ſcarce ever diſcovered ſo much penetration. And even the philoſophers, who diſcourſed of ſuch topics, readily aſſented to the groſſeſt theory, and admitted the joint origin of gods and men from night and chaos; from fire, water, air, or whatever they eſtabliſhed to be the ruling element.

[a] The ſame author, who can thus account for the origin of the world without a Deity, eſteems it impious to explain from phyſical cauſes, the common accidents of life, earthquakes, inundations, and tempeſts; and devoutly aſcribes theſe to the anger of JUPITER or NEPTUNE. A plain proof, whence he derived his ideas of religion. See lib. xv. p. 364. Ex edit. RHODOMANNI.

[b] It will be eaſy to give a reaſon, why THALES, ANAXIMANDER, and thoſe early philoſophers, who really were atheiſts, might be very orthodox in the pagan creed; and why ANAXAGORAS and SOCRATES, tho' real theiſts, muſt naturally, in antient times, be eſteemed impious. The blind, unguided powers of nature, if they could produce men, might alſo produce ſuch beings as JUPITER and NEPTUNE, who being the moſt powerful, intelligent exiſtences in the world, would be proper objects of worſhip. But where a ſupreme intelligence, the firſt cauſe of all, is admitted, theſe capricious beings, if they exiſt at all, muſt appear very ſubordinate and dependent, and conſequently be excluded from the rank of deities. PLATO (de leg. lib. x.) aſſigns this reaſon of the imputation thrown on ANAXAGORAS, viz. his denying the divinity of the ſtars, planets, and other created objects.

[c] Adverſus MATHEM. lib. ix.

NOR

NOR was it only on their firſt origin, that the gods were ſuppoſed dependent on the powers of nature. Thro' the whole period of their exiſtence they were ſubjected to the dominion of fate or deſtiny. *Think of the force of neceſſity*, ſays AGRIPPA to the ROMAN people, *that force, to which even the gods muſt ſubmit* [d]. And the younger PLINY [e], ſuitable to this way of reaſoning, tells us, that, amidſt the darkneſs, horror and confuſion, which enſued upon the firſt eruption of VESUVIUS, ſeveral concluded, that all nature was going to wrack, and that gods and men were periſhing in one common ruin.

IT is great complaiſance, indeed, if we dignify with the name of religion ſuch an imperfect ſyſtem of theology, and put it on a level with latter ſyſtems, which are founded on principles more juſt and more ſublime. For my part, I can ſcarce allow the principles even of MARCUS AURELIUS, PLUTARCH, and ſome other *Stoics* and *Academics*, tho' infinitely more refined than the pagan ſuperſtition, to be worthy of the honorable denomination of theiſm. For if the mythology of the heathens reſemble the antient EUROPEAN ſyſtem of ſpiritual beings, excluding God and angels, and leaving only fairies and ſprights; the creed of theſe philoſophers may juſtly be ſaid to exclude a deity, and to leave only angels and fairies.

SECT. V. *Various Forms of Polytheiſm; Allegory, Hero-Worſhip.*

BUT it is chiefly our preſent buſineſs to conſider the groſs polytheiſm and idolatry of the vulgar, and to trace all its various appearances, in the principles of human nature, whence they are derived.

WHOEVER learns, by argument, the exiſtence of inviſible, intelligent power, muſt reaſon from the admirable contrivance of natural objects, and muſt ſuppoſe the world to be the workmanſhip of that divine being, the original cauſe of all things. But the vulgar polytheiſt, ſo far from admitting that idea, deifies every part of the univerſe, and conceives all the conſpicuous productions of nature, to be themſelves ſo many real divinities. The ſun, moon, and ſtars, are all gods, according to his ſyſtem: Fountains are inhabited by nymphs, and trees by hamadryads: Even monkies, dogs, cats, and other animals often become ſacred in his eyes, and ſtrike him with a religious veneration. And thus, however ſtrong men's propenſity to believe inviſible, intelligent power in nature, their propenſity is equally ſtrong to reſt their attention on ſenſible, viſible objects; and in order to reconcile theſe oppoſite inclinations, they are led to unite the inviſible power with ſome viſible object.

THE diſtribution alſo of diſtinct provinces to the ſeveral deities is apt to cauſe ſome allegory, both phyſical and moral, to enter into the vulgar ſyſtems of polytheiſm. The god of war will naturally be repreſented as furious, cruel, and impetuous: The god of poetry as elegant, polite, and amiable: The god of merchandiſe, eſpecially in early times, as thieviſh and deceitful. The allegories, ſuppoſed in HOMER and other mythologiſts, I allow, have been often ſo ſtrained, that men of ſenſe are apt entirely to reject them, and to conſider them as the product merely of the fancy and conceit of critics and commentators. But that alle-

[d] DIONYS. HALIC. lib. vi. [e] Epiſt. lib. vi.

gory

gory really has place in the heathen mythology is undeniable even on the leaſt reflection. CUPID the ſon of VENUS; the Muſes the daughters of memory; PROMETHEUS, the wiſe brother, and EPIMETHEUS the fooliſh; HYGIEIA or the goddeſs of health deſcended from ÆSCULAPIUS or the god of phyſic: Who ſees not, in theſe, and in many other inſtances, the plain traces of allegory? When a god is ſuppoſed to preſide over any paſſion, event, or ſyſtem of actions, it is almoſt unavoidable to give him a genealogy, attributes, and adventures, ſuitable to his ſuppoſed powers and influence; and to carry on that ſimilitude and compariſon, which is naturally ſo agreeable to the mind of man.

ALLEGORIES, indeed, entirely perfect, we ought not to expect as the products of ignorance and ſuperſtition; there being no work of genius, that requires a nicer hand, or has been more rarely executed with ſucceſs. That *Fear* and *Terror* are the ſons of MARS is juſt; but why by VENUS [c]? That *Harmony* is the daughter of VENUS is regular; but why by MARS [d]? That *Sleep* is the brother of *Death* is ſuitable; but why deſcribe him as enamoured of one of the Graces [e]? And ſince the antient mythologiſts fall into miſtakes ſo groſs and obvious, we have no reaſon ſurely to expect ſuch refined and long-ſpun allegories, as ſome have endeavored to deduce from their fictions [f].

THE deities of the vulgar are ſo little ſuperior to human creatures, that where men are affected with ſtrong ſentiments of veneration or gratitude for any hero or public benefactor; nothing can be more natural than to convert him into a god, and fill the heavens, after this manner, with continual recruits from amongſt mankind. Moſt of the divinities of the antient world are ſuppoſed to have once been men, and to have been beholden for their *apotheoſis* to the admiration and affection of the people. And the real hiſtory of their adventures, corrupted by tradition, and elevated by the marvellous, became a plentiful ſource of fable; eſpecially in paſſing thro' the hands of poets, allegoriſts, and prieſts, who ſucceſſively improved upon the wonder and aſtoniſhment of the ignorant multitude.

PAINTERS too and ſculptors came in for their ſhare of profit in the ſacred myſteries; and furniſhing men with ſenſible repreſentations of their divinities, whom they cloathed in human figures, gave great encreaſe to the public devotion, and determined its object. It was probably for want of theſe arts in rude and barbarous ages, that men deified plants, animals, and even brute, unorganized matter; and rather than be without a ſenſible object of worſhip, affixed divinity to ſuch ungainly forms. Could any ſtatuary of SYRIA, in early times, have formed a juſt figure of APOLLO, the conic ſtone, HELIOGABALUS, had never become the object of ſuch profound adoration, and been received as a repreſentation of the ſolar deity [g].

[c] HESIOD. Theog. l. 935.
[d] Id. ibid. & PLUT. in vita PELOP.
[e] ILIAD. xiv. 267.
[f] LUCRETIUS was plainly ſeduced by the ſtrong appearance of allegory, which is obſervable in the pagan fictions. He firſt addreſſes himſelf to VENUS as to that generating power, which animates, renews, and beautifies the univerſe: But is ſoon betrayed by the mythology into incoherencies, while he prays to that allegorical perſonage to appeaſe the furies of her lover MARS: An idea not drawn from allegory, but from the popular religion, and which LUCRETIUS, as an EPICUREAN, could not conſiſtently admit of.
[g] HERODIAN. lib. v. JUPITER AMMON is repreſented by CURTIUS as a deity of the ſame kind, lib. iv. cap. 7. The ARABIANS and PESSINUNTIANS adored alſo ſhapeleſs, unformed ſtones as their deity. ARNOB. lib. vi. So much did their folly exceed that of the EGYPTIANS.

STILPO was baniſhed by the council of AREOPAGUS, for affirming that the MINERVA in the citadel was no divinity; but the workmanſhip of PHIDIAS, the ſculptor [h]. What degree of reaſon may we expect in the religious belief of the vulgar in other nations; when ATHENIANS and AREOPAGITES could entertain ſuch groſs conceptions?

THESE then are the general principles of polytheiſm, founded in human nature, and little or nothing dependent on caprice and accident. As the *cauſes*, which beſtow on us happineſs or miſery, are, in general, very unknown and uncertain, our anxious concern endeavors to attain a determinate idea of them; and finds no better expedient than to repreſent them as intelligent, voluntary agents, like ourſelves; only ſomewhat ſuperior in power and wiſdom. The limited influence of theſe agents, and their great proximity to human weakneſs, introduce the various diſtribution and diviſion of their authority; and thereby give riſe to allegory. The ſame principles naturally deify mortals, ſuperior in power, courage, or underſtanding, and produce hero-worſhip; together with fabulous hiſtory and mythological tradition, in all its wild and unaccountable forms. And as an inviſible ſpiritual intelligence is an object too refined for vulgar apprehenſion, men naturally affix it to ſome ſenſible repreſentation; ſuch as either the more conſpicuous parts of nature, or the ſtatues, images, and pictures, which a more refined age forms of its divinities.

ALMOST all idolaters, of whatever age or country, concur in theſe general principles and conceptions; and even the particular characters and provinces, which they aſſign to their deities, are not extremely different [i]. The GREEK and ROMAN travellers and conquerors, without much difficulty, found their own deities every where; and ſaid, this is MERCURY, that VENUS; this MARS, that NEPTUNE; by whatever titles the ſtrange gods may be denominated. The goddeſs HERTHA of our SAXON anceſtors ſeems to be no other, according to TACITUS [k], than the *Mater Tellus* of the ROMANS; and his conjecture was evidently juſt.

SECT. VI. *Origin of Theiſm from Polytheiſm.*

THE doctrine of one ſupreme deity, the author of nature, is very antient, has ſpred itſelf over great and populous nations, and among them has been embraced by all ranks and conditions of perſons: But whoever thinks that it has owed its ſucceſs to the prevalent force of thoſe invincible reaſons, on which it is undoubtedly founded, would ſhow himſelf little acquainted with the ignorance and ſtupidity of the people, and their incurable prejudices in favor of their particular ſuperſtitions. Even at this day, and in EUROPE, aſk any of the vulgar, why he believes in an omnipotent creator of the world; he will never mention the beauty of final cauſes, of which he is wholly ignorant: He will not hold out his hand, and bid you contemplate the ſuppleneſs and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all one way, the counterpoiſe which they receive from the thumb, the ſoftneſs and fleſhly parts of the inſide of his hand, with all the other circumſtances, which

[h] DIOG. LAERT. lib. ii.

[i] See CÆSAR of the religion of the GAULS, De bello Gallico, lib. vi.

[k] De moribus GERM.

render that member fit for the uſe, to which it was deſtined. To theſe he has been long accuſtomed; and he beholds them with liſtleſſneſs and unconcern. He will tell you of the ſudden and unexpected death of ſuch a one: The fall and bruiſe of ſuch another: The exceſſive drought of this ſeaſon: The cold and rains of another. Theſe he aſcribes to the immediate operation of providence: And ſuch events, as, with good reaſoners, are the chief difficulties in admitting a ſupreme intelligence, are with him the ſole arguments for it.

MANY theiſts, even the moſt zealous and refined, have denied a *particular* providence, and have aſſerted, that the Sovereign mind or firſt principle of all things, having fixed general laws, by which nature is governed, gives free and uninterrupted courſe to theſe laws, and diſturbs not, at every turn, the ſettled order of events by particular volitions. From the beautiful connexion, ſay they, and rigid obſervance of eſtabliſhed rules, we draw the chief argument for theiſm; and from the ſame principles are enabled to anſwer the principal objections againſt it. But ſo little is this underſtood by the generality of mankind, that, wherever they obſerve any one to aſcribe all events to natural cauſes, and to remove the particular interpoſal of a deity, they are apt to ſuſpect him of the groſſeſt infidelity. *A little philoſophy*, ſays my lord BACON, *makes men atheiſts: A great deal reconciles them to religion.* For men, being taught, by ſuperſtitious prejudices, to lay the ſtreſs on a wrong place; when that fails them, and they diſcover, by a little reflection, that the courſe of nature is regular and uniform, their whole faith totters, and falls to ruin. But being taught, by more reflection, that this very regularity and uniformity is the ſtrongeſt proof of deſign and of a ſupreme intelligence, they return to that belief, which they had deſerted; and they are now able to eſtabliſh it on a firmer and more durable foundation.

CONVULSIONS in nature, diſorders, prodigies, miracles, tho' the moſt oppoſite to the plan of a wiſe ſuperintendent, impreſs mankind with the ſtrongeſt ſentiments of religion; the cauſes of events ſeeming then the moſt unknown and unaccountable. Madneſs, fury, rage, and an inflamed imagination, tho' they ſink men neareſt the level of beaſts, are, for a like reaſon, often ſuppoſed to be the only diſpoſitions, in which we can have any immediate communication with the Deity.

WE may conclude, therefore, upon the whole, that ſince the vulgar, in nations, which have embraced the doctrine of theiſm, ſtill build it upon irrational and ſuperſtitious opinions, they are never led into that opinion by any proceſs of argument, but by a certain train of thinking, more ſuitable to their genius and capacity.

IT may readily happen, in an idolatrous nation, that, tho' men admit the exiſtence of ſeveral limited deities, yet may there be ſome one God, whom, in a particular manner, they make the object of their worſhip and adoration. They may either ſuppoſe, that, in the diſtribution of power and territory among the gods, their nation was ſubjected to the juriſdiction of that particular deity; or reducing heavenly objects to the model of things below, they may repreſent one god as the prince or ſupreme magiſtrate of the reſt, who, tho' of the ſame nature, rules them with an authority, like that which an earthly ſovereign exerciſes over his ſubjects and vaſſals. Whether this god, therefore, be conſidered as their peculiar patron, or as

the general ſovereign of heaven, his votaries will endeavor, by every act, to inſinuate themſelves into his favor; and ſuppoſing him to be pleaſed, like themſelves, with praiſe and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which will be ſpared in their addreſſes to him. In proportion as men's fears or diſtreſſes become more urgent, they ſtill invent new ſtrains of adulation; and even he who out-does his predeceſſors in ſwelling up the titles of his divinity, is ſure to be outdone by his ſucceſſors in newer and more pompous epithets of praiſe. Thus they proceed; till at laſt they arrive at infinity itſelf, beyond which there is no farther progreſs: And it is well, if, in ſtriving to get farther, and to repreſent a magnificent ſimplicity, they run not into inexplicable myſtery, and deſtroy the intelligent nature of their deity; on which alone any rational worſhip or adoration can be founded. While they confine themſelves to the notion of a perfect being, the creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the principles of reaſon and true philoſophy; tho' they are guided to that notion, not by reaſon, of which they are in a great meaſure incapable, but by the adulation and fears of the moſt vulgar ſuperſtition.

We often find, amongſt barbarous nations, and even ſometimes amongſt civilized, that, when every ſtrain of flattery has been exhauſted towards arbitrary princes, when every human quality has been applauded to the utmoſt; their ſervile courtiers repreſent them, at laſt, as real divinities, and point them out to the people as objects of adoration. How much more natural, therefore, is it, that a limited deity, who at firſt is ſuppoſed only the immediate author of the particular goods and ills in life, ſhould in the end be repreſented as ſovereign maker and modifier of the univerſe?

Even where this notion of a ſupreme deity is already eſtabliſhed; tho' it ought naturally to leſſen every other worſhip, and abaſe every object of reverence, yet if a nation has entertained the opinion of a ſubordinate tutelar divinity, ſaint, or angel; their addreſſes to that being gradually riſe upon them, and encroach on the adoration due to their ſupreme deity. The Virgin *Mary*, ere checked by the reformation, had proceeded, from being merely a good woman to uſurp many attributes of the Almighty [*]: God and St. Nicholas go hand in hand, in all the prayers and petitions of the Muscovites.

Thus the deity, who, from love, converted himſelf into a bull, in order to carry off Europa; and who, from ambition, dethroned his father, Saturn, became the Optimus Maximus of the heathens. Thus, notwithſtanding the ſublime ideas ſuggeſted by Moses and the inſpired writers, many vulgar Jews ſeem ſtill to have conceived the ſupreme Being as a mere topical deity or national protector.

[*] The Jacobins, who denied the immaculate conception, have ever been very unhappy in their doctrine, even tho' political reaſons have kept the Romiſh church from condemning it. The Cordeliers have run away with all the popularity. But in the fifteenth century, as we learn from Boulainvilliers, an Italian *Cordelier* maintained, that, during the three days, when Christ was interred, the hypoſtatic union was diſſolved, and that his human nature was not a proper object of adoration, during that period. Without the art of divination, one might foretel, that ſo groſs and impious a blaſphemy would not fail to be anathematized by the people. It was the occaſion of great inſults on the part of the Jacobins; who now got ſome recompence for their misfortunes in the war about the immaculate conception. See Hiſtoire abregée, pag. 499.

Rather

RATHER than relinquiſh this propenſity to adulation, religioniſts, in all ages, have involved themſelves in the greateſt abſurdities and contradictions.

HOMER, in one paſſage, calls OCEANUS and TETHYS the original parents of all things, conformable to the eſtabliſhed mythology and tradition of the GREEKS: Yet, in other paſſages, he could not forbear complimenting JUPITER, the reigning deity, with that magnificent appellation; and accordingly denominates him the father of gods and men. He forgets, that every temple, every ſtreet was full of the anceſtors, uncles, brothers, and ſiſters of this JUPITER; who was in reality nothing but an upſtart parricide and uſurper. A like contradiction is obſervable in HESIOD; and is ſo much the leſs excuſable, that his profeſſed intention was to deliver a true genealogy of the gods.

WERE there a religion (and we may ſuſpect Mahometaniſm of this inconſiſtence) which ſometimes painted the Deity in the moſt ſublime colors, as the creator of heaven and earth; ſometimes degraded him nearly to a level with human creatures in his powers and faculties; while at the ſame time it aſcribed to him ſuitable infirmities, paſſions, and partialities of the moral kind: that religion, after it was extinct, would alſo be cited as an inſtance of thoſe contradictions, which ariſe from the groſs, vulgar, natural conceptions of mankind, oppoſed to their continual propenſity towards flattery and exaggeration. Nothing indeed would prove more ſtrongly the divine origin of any religion, than to find (and happily this is the caſe with Chriſtianity) that it is free from a contradiction, ſo incident to human nature.

SECT. VII. *Confirmation of this Doctrine.*

IT appears certain, that, tho' the original notions of the vulgar repreſent the Divinity as a very limited being, and conſider him only as the particular cauſe of health or ſickneſs; plenty or want; proſperity or adverſity; yet when more magnificent ideas are urged upon them, they eſteem it dangerous to refuſe their aſſent. Will you ſay, that your deity is finite and bounded in his perfections; may be overcome by a greater force; is ſubject to human paſſions, pains and infirmities; has a beginning, and may have an end? This they dare not affirm; but thinking it ſafeſt to comply with the higher encomiums, they endeavor, by an affected raviſhment and devotion, to ingratiate themſelves with him. As a confirmation of this, we may obſerve, that the aſſent of the vulgar is, in this caſe, merely verbal, and that they are incapable of conceiving thoſe ſublime qualities, which they ſeemingly attribute to the Deity. Their real idea of him, notwithſtanding their pompous language, is ſtill as poor and frivolous as ever.

THAT original intelligence, ſay the MAGIANS, who is the firſt principle of all things, diſcovers himſelf *immediately* to the mind and underſtanding alone; but has placed the ſun as his image in the viſible univerſe; and when that bright luminary diffuſes its beams over the earth and the firmament, it is a faint copy of the glory, which reſides in the higher heavens. If you would eſcape the diſpleaſure of this divine being, you muſt be careful never to ſet your bare foot upon the ground, nor ſpit into a fire, nor throw any water upon it, even tho' it were conſuming a

whole city [o]. Who can expreſs the perfections of the Almighty, ſay the Mahometans? Even the nobleſt of his works, if compared to him, are but duſt and rubbiſh. How much more muſt human conception fall ſhort of his infinite perfections? His ſmile and favor renders men for ever happy; and to obtain it for your children, the beſt method is to cut off from them, while infants, a little bit of ſkin, about half the breadth of a farthing. Take two bits of cloth [p], ſay the *Roman catholics*, about an inch or an inch and an half ſquare, join them by the corners with two ſtrings or pieces of tape about ſixteen inches long, throw this over your head, and make one of the bits of cloth lie upon your breaſt, and the other upon your back, keeping them next your ſkin, there is not a better ſecret for recommending yourſelf to that infinite Being, who exiſts from eternity to eternity.

THE GETES, commonly called immortal, from their ſteddy belief of the ſoul's immortality, were genuine theiſts and unitarians. They affirmed ZAMOLXIS, their deity, to be the only true god; and aſſerted the worſhip of all other nations, to be addreſſed to mere fictions and chimeras. But were their religious principles any more refined, on account of theſe magnificent pretenſions? Every fifth year they ſacrificed a human victim, whom they ſent as a meſſenger to their deity, in order to inform him of their wants and neceſſities. And when it thundered, they were ſo provoked, that, in order to return the defiance, they let fly arrows at him, and declined not the combat as unequal. Such at leaſt is the account, which HERODOTUS gives of the theiſm of the immortal GETES [q].

SECT. VIII. *Flux and reflux of polytheiſm and theiſm.*

IT is remarkable, that the principles of religion have a kind of flux and reflux in the human mind, and that men have a natural tendency to riſe from idolatry to theiſm, and to ſink again from theiſm into idolatry. The vulgar, that is, indeed, all mankind, a few excepted, being ignorant and uninſtructed, never elevate their contemplation to the heavens, or penetrate by their diſquiſitions into the ſecret ſtructure of vegetable or animal bodies; ſo as to diſcover a ſupreme mind, or original providence, which beſtowed order on every part of nature. They conſider theſe admirable works in a more confined and ſelfiſh view; and finding their own happineſs and miſery to depend on the ſecret influence and unforeſeen concurrence of external objects, they regard, with perpetual attention, the *unknown cauſes*, which govern all theſe natural events, and diſtribute pleaſure and pain, good and ill, by their powerful, but ſilent, operation. The unknown cauſes are ſtill appealed to, at every emergence; and in this general appearance or confuſed image, are the perpetual objects of human hopes and fears, wiſhes and apprehenſions. By degrees, the active imagination of men, uneaſy in this abſtract conception of objects, about which it is inceſſantly employed, begins to render them more particular, and to clothe them in ſhapes more ſuitable to its natural comprehenſion. It repreſents them to be ſenſible, intelligent beings, like mankind; actuated by

[o] HYDE de Relig. veterum PERSARUM. [p] Called the Scapulaire. [q] Lib. iv.

love and hatred, and flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and ſacrifices. Hence the origin of religion: And hence the origin of idolatry or polytheiſm.

But the ſame anxious concern for happineſs, which begets the idea of theſe inviſible, intelligent powers, allows not mankind to remain long in the firſt ſimple conception of them; as powerful, but limited beings; maſters of human fate, but ſlaves to deſtiny and the courſe of nature. Men's exaggerate praiſes and compliments ſtill ſwell their idea upon them; and elevating their deities to the utmoſt bounds of perfection, at laſt beget the attributes of unity and infinity, ſimplicity and ſpirituality. Such refined ideas, being ſomewhat diſproportioned to vulgar comprehenſion, remain not long in their original purity; but require to be ſupported by the notion of inferior mediators or ſubordinate agents, which interpoſe betwixt mankind and their ſupreme deity. Theſe demi-gods or middle beings, partaking more of human nature, and being more familiar to us, become the chief objects of devotion, and gradually recal that idolatry which had been formerly baniſhed by the ardent prayers and panegyrics of timorous and indigent mortals. But as theſe idolatrous religions fall every day into groſſer and more vulgar conceptions, they at laſt deſtroy themſelves, and, by the vile repreſentations, which they form of their deities, make the tide turn again towards theiſm. But ſo great is the propenſity, in this alternate revolution of human ſentiments, to return back to idolatry, that the utmoſt precaution is not able effectually to prevent it. And of this, ſome theiſts, particularly the JEWS and MAHOMETANS, have been ſenſible; as appears by their baniſhing all the arts of ſtatuary and painting, and not allowing the repreſentations, even of human figures, to be taken by marble or colors; leſt the common infirmity of mankind ſhould thence produce idolatry. The feeble apprehenſions of men cannot be ſatisfied with conceiving their deity as a pure ſpirit and perfect intelligence; and yet their natural terrors keep them from imputing to him the leaſt ſhadow of limitation and imperfection. They fluctuate betwixt theſe oppoſite ſentiments. The ſame infirmity ſtill drags them downwards, from an omnipotent and ſpiritual deity, to a limited and corporeal one, and from a corporeal and limited deity to a ſtatue or viſible repreſentation. The ſame endeavor at elevation ſtill puſhes them upwards, from the ſtatue or material image to the inviſible power; and from the inviſible power to an infinitely perfect deity, the creator and ſovereign of the univerſe.

SECT. IX. *Compariſon of theſe Religions, with regard to Perſecution and Toleration.*

POLYTHEISM or idolatrous worſhip, being founded entirely in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great inconvenience, that any practice or opinion, however barbarous or corrupted, may be authorized by it; and full ſcope is left for knavery to impoſe on credulity, till morals and humanity be expelled from the religious ſyſtems of mankind. At the ſame time, idolatry is attended with this evident advantage, that, by limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it naturally admits the gods of other ſects and nations to a ſhare of divinity, and renders all the various

rious deities, as well as rites, ceremonies, or traditions, compatible with each other[a]. Theiſm is oppoſite both in its advantages and diſadvantages. As that ſyſtem ſuppoſes one ſole deity, the perfection of reaſon and goodneſs, it ſhould, if juſtly proſecuted, baniſh every thing frivolous, unreaſonable, or inhuman from religious worſhip, and ſet before men the moſt illuſtrious example, as well as the moſt commanding motives of juſtice and benevolence. Theſe mighty advantages are not indeed over-ballanced, (for that is not poſſible) but ſomewhat diminiſhed, by inconveniencies, which ariſe from the vices and prejudices of mankind. While one ſole object of devotion is acknowleged, the worſhip of other deities is regarded as abſurd and impious. Nay, this unity of object ſeems naturally to require the unity of faith and ceremonies, and furniſhes deſigning men with a pretext for repreſenting their adverſaries as prophane, and the objects of divine as well as human vengeance. For as each ſect is poſitive that its own faith and worſhip are entirely acceptable to the deity, and as no one can conceive, that the ſame being ſhould be pleaſed with different and oppoſite rites and principles; the ſeveral ſects fall naturally into animoſity, and mutually diſcharge on each other, that ſacred zeal and rancor, the moſt furious and implacable of all human paſſions.

THE tolerating ſpirit of idolaters both in antient and modern times, is very obvious to any one, who is the leaſt converſant in the writings of hiſtorians or travellers. When the oracle of DELPHI was aſked, what rites or worſhip was moſt acceptable to the gods? Thoſe legally eſtabliſhed in each city, replied the oracle[b]. Even prieſts, in thoſe ages, could, it ſeems, allow ſalvation to thoſe of a different communion. The ROMANS commonly adopted the gods of the conquered people; and never diſputed the attributes of thoſe topical and national deities, in whoſe territories they reſided. The religious wars and perſecutions of the EGYPTIAN idolaters are indeed an exception to this rule; but are accounted for by antient authors from reaſons very ſingular and remarkable. Different ſpecies of animals were the deities of the different ſects among the EGYPTIANS; and the deities being in continual war, engaged their votaries in the ſame contention. The worſhippers of dogs could not long remain in peace with the adorers of cats or wolves[c]. And where that reaſon took not place, the EGYPTIAN ſuperſtition was not ſo incompatible as is commonly imagined; ſince we learn from HERODOTUS[d], that very large contributions were given by AMASIS towards rebuilding the temple of DELPHI.

THE intolerance of almoſt all religions, which have maintained the unity of God, is as remarkable as the contrary principle in polytheiſts. The implacable, narrow ſpirit of the JEWS is well known. MAHOMETANISM ſet out with ſtill more bloody principles; and even to this day, deals out damnation, tho' not

[a] VERRIUS FLACCUS, cited by PLINY, lib. xxviii. cap. 2. affirmed, that it was uſual for the ROMANS, before they laid ſiege to any town, to invocate the tutelar deity of the place, and by promiſing him equal or greater honors than thoſe he at preſent enjoyed, bribe him to betray his old friends and votaries. The name of the tutelar deity of ROME was for this reaſon kept a moſt religious myſtery; leſt the enemies of the republic ſhould be able, in the ſame manner, to draw him over to their ſervice. For without the name, they thought, nothing of that kind could be practiſed. PLINY ſays, that the common form of invocation was preſerved to his time in the ritual of the pontifs. And MACROBIUS has tranſmitted a copy of it from the ſecret things of SAMMONICUS SERENUS.

[b] Xenoph. Memor. l.b. ii.

[c] Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſiride.

[d] Lib. ii. ſub fine.

fire and faggot, to all other ſects. And if, amongſt CHRISTIANS, the ENGLISH and DUTCH have embraced the principles of toleration, this ſingularity has proceeded from the ſteddy reſolution of the civil magiſtrate, in oppoſition to the continued efforts of prieſts and bigots.

THE diſciples of ZOROASTER ſhut the doors of heaven againſt all but the MAGIANS [e]. Nothing could more obſtruct the progreſs of the PERSIAN conqueſts, than the furious zeal of that nation againſt the temples and images of the GREEKS. And after the overthrow of that empire, we find ALEXANDER, as a polytheiſt, immediately re-eſtabliſhing the worſhip of the BABYLONIANS, which their former princes, as monotheiſts, had carefully aboliſhed [f]. Even the blind and devoted attachment of that conqueror to the GREEK ſuperſtition hindered not but he himſelf ſacrificed according to the BABYLONISH rites and ceremonies [g].

So ſociable is polytheiſm, that the utmoſt fierceneſs and averſion, which it meets with in an oppoſite religion, is ſcarce able to diſguſt it, and keep it at a diſtance. AUGUSTUS praiſed extremely the reſerve of his grandſon, CAIUS CÆSAR, when, paſſing by JERUSALEM, he deigned not to ſacrifice according to the JEWISH law. But for what reaſon did AUGUSTUS ſo much approve of this conduct? Only, becauſe that religion was by the PAGANS eſteemed ignoble and barbarous [h].

I MAY venture to affirm, that few corruptions of idolatry and polytheiſm are more pernicious to political ſociety than this corruption of theiſm [i], when carried to the utmoſt height. The human ſacrifices of the CARTHAGINIANS, MEXICANS, and many barbarous nations [k], ſcarce exceed the inquiſition and perſecutions of ROME and MADRID. For beſides, that the effuſion of blood may not be ſo great in the former caſe as in the latter; beſides this, I ſay, the human victims, being choſen by lot, or by ſome exterior ſigns, affect not, in ſo conſiderable a degree, the reſt of the ſociety. Whereas virtue, knowlege, love of liberty, are the qualities, which call down the fatal vengeance of inquiſitors; and when expelled, leave the ſociety in the moſt ſhameful ignorance, corruption, and bondage. The illegal murder of one man by a tyrant is more pernicious than the death of a thouſand by peſtilence, famine, or any undiſtinguiſhing calamity.

IN the temple of DIANA at ARICIA near ROME, whoever murdered the preſent prieſt, was legally entitled to be inſtalled his ſucceſſor [l]. A very ſingular inſtitution! For, however barbarous and bloody the common ſuperſtitions often are to the laity, they uſually turn to the advantage of the holy order.

[e] Hyde de Relig. vet. Perſarum.
[f] Arrian. de Exped. lib. iii. Id. lib. vii.
[g] Id. ibid. [h] Sueton. in vita Aug. c. 93.
[i] *Corruptio optimi peſſima.*
[k] Moſt nations have fallen into this guilt; tho' perhaps, that impious ſuperſtition has never prevailed very much in any civilized nation, unleſs we except the CARTHAGINIANS. For the TYRIANS ſoon aboliſhed it. A ſacrifice is conceived as a preſent; and any preſent is delivered to the deity by deſtroying it and rendering it uſeleſs to men; by burning what is ſolid, pouring out the liquid, and killing the animate. For want of a better way of doing him ſervice, we do ourſelves an injury; and fancy that we thereby expreſs, at leaſt, the heartineſs of our good-will and adoration. Thus our mercenary devotion deceives ourſelves, and imagines it deceives the deity.
[l] Strabo, lib. v. Sueton. in vita Cal.

SECT.

SECT. X. *With regard to courage or abaſement.*

FROM the compariſon of theiſm and idolatry, we may form ſome other obſervations, which will alſo confirm the vulgar obſervation, that the corruption of the beſt things gives riſe to the worſt.

WHERE the deity is repreſented as infinitely ſuperior to mankind, this belief, tho' altogether juſt, is apt, when joined with ſuperſtitious terrors, to ſink the human mind into the loweſt ſubmiſſion and abaſement, and to repreſent the monkiſh virtues of mortification, penance, humility and paſſive ſuffering, as the only qualities, which are acceptable to him. But where the gods are conceived to be only a little ſuperior to mankind, and to have been, many of them, advanced from that inferior rank, we are more at our eaſe in our addreſſes to them, and may even, without profaneneſs, aſpire ſometimes to a rivalſhip and emulation of them. Hence activity, ſpirit, courage, magnanimity, love of liberty, and all the virtues, which aggrandize a people.

THE heroes in paganiſm correſpond exactly to the ſaints in popery and holy derviſes in MAHOMETANISM. The place of HERCULES, THESEUS, HECTOR, ROMULUS, is now ſupplied by DOMINIC, FRANCIS, ANTHONY, and BENEDICT. And inſtead of the deſtruction of monſters, the ſubduing tyrants, the defence of our native country; celeſtial honors are obtained by whippings and faſtings, by cowardice and humility, by abject ſubmiſſion and ſlaviſh obedience.

One great incitement to the pious ALEXANDER in his warlike expeditions was his rivalſhip of HERCULES and BACCHUS, whom he juſtly pretended to have excelled [m]. BRASIDAS, that generous and noble SPARTAN, after falling in battle, had heroic honors paid him by the inhabitants of AMPHIPOLIS, whoſe defence he had embraced [n]. And in general, all founders of ſtates and colonies amongſt the GREEKS were raiſed to this inferior rank of divinity, by thoſe who reaped the benefit of their labors.

THIS gave riſe to the obſervation of MACHIAVEL [o], that the doctrines of the CHRISTIAN religion (meaning the catholic; for he knew no other) which recommend only paſſive courage and ſuffering, had ſubdued the ſpirit of mankind, and had fitted them for ſlavery and ſubjection. And this obſervation would certainly be juſt, were there not many other circumſtances in human ſociety, which controul the genius and character of a religion.

BRASIDAS ſeized a mouſe, and being bit by it, let it go. *There is nothing ſo contemptible*, ſays he, *but what may be ſafe, if it has but courage to defend itſelf* [p]. BELLARMINE, patiently and humbly allowed the fleas and other odious vermin to prey upon him. *We ſhall have heaven*, ſays he, *to reward us for our ſufferings: But theſe poor creatures have nothing but the enjoyment of the preſent life* [q]. Such difference is there betwixt the maxims of a GREEK hero and a CATHOLIC ſaint.

[m] Arian. paſſim. [n] Thucyd. lib. v. [o] Diſcorſi, lib. vi. [p] Plut. Appoth.
[q] Bayle, Article BELLARMINE.

SECT.

SECT. XI. *With regard to reaſon or abſurdity.*

HERE is another obſervation to the ſame purpoſe, and a new proof that the corruption of the beſt things begets the worſt. If we examine, without prejudice, the ancient heathen mythology, as contained in the poets, we ſhall not diſcover in it any ſuch monſtrous abſurdity, as we may be apt at firſt to apprehend. Where is the difficulty of conceiving, that the ſame powers or principles, whatever they were, which formed this viſible world, men and animals, produced alſo a ſpecies of intelligent creatures, of more refined ſubſtance and greater authority than the reſt? That theſe creatures may be capricious, revengeful, paſſionate, voluptuous, is eaſily conceived; nor is any circumſtance more apt, amongſt ourſelves, to engender ſuch vices, than the licence of abſolute authority. And in ſhort, the whole mythological ſyſtem is ſo natural, that, in the vaſt variety of planets and worlds, contained in this univerſe, it ſeems more than probable, that ſomewhere or other, it is really carried into execution.

THE chief objection to it with regard to this planet, is, that it is not aſcertained by any juſt reaſon or authority. The antient tradition, inſiſted on by the heathen prieſts and theologers, is but a weak foundation; and tranſmitted alſo ſuch a number of contradictory reports, ſupported, all of them, by equal authority, that it became abſolutely impoſſible to fix a preference amongſt them. A few volumes, therefore, muſt contain all the polemical writings of pagan prieſts. And their whole theology muſt conſiſt more of traditional ſtories and ſuperſtitious practices than of philoſophical argument and controverſy.

BUT where theiſm forms the fundamental principle of any popular religion, that tenet is ſo conformable to ſound reaſon, that philoſophy is apt to incorporate itſelf with ſuch a ſyſtem of theology. And if the other dogmas of that ſyſtem be contained in a ſacred book, ſuch as the Alcoran, or be determined by any viſible authority, like that of the ROMAN pontif, ſpeculative reaſoners naturally carry on their aſſent, and embrace a theory, which has been inſtilled into them by their earlieſt education, and which alſo poſſeſſes ſome degree of conſiſtence and uniformity. But as theſe appearances do often, all of them, prove deceitful, philoſophy will ſoon find herſelf very unequally yoaked with her new aſſociate; and inſtead of regulating each principle, as they advance together, ſhe is at every turn perverted to ſerve the purpoſes of ſuperſtition. For beſides the unavoidable incoherencies, which muſt be reconciled and adjuſted; one may ſafely affirm, that all popular theology, eſpecially the ſcholaſtic, has a kind of appetite for abſurdity and contradiction. If that theology went not beyond reaſon and common ſenſe, her doctrines would appear too eaſy and familiar. Amazement muſt of neceſſity be raiſed: Myſtery affected: Darkneſs and obſcurity ſought after: And a foundation of merit afforded the devout votaries, who deſire an opportunity of ſubduing their rebellious reaſon, by the belief of the moſt unintelligible ſophiſms.

ECCLESIASTICAL hiſtory ſufficiently confirms theſe reflections. When a controverſy is ſtarted, ſome people pretend always with certainty to foretell the iſſue. Which ever opinion, ſay they, is moſt contrary to plain ſenſe is ſure to prevail; even where the general intereſt of the ſyſtem requires not that deciſion. Tho' the reproach of hereſy may, for ſome time, be bandied about amongſt the diſputants,

tants, it always reſts at laſt on the ſide of reaſon. Any one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to know the definition of ARIAN, PELAGIAN, ERASTIAN, SOCINIAN, SABELLIAN, EUTYCHIAN, NESTORIAN, MONOTHELITE, &c. not to mention PROTESTANT, whoſe fate is yet uncertain, will be convinced of the truth of this obſervation. And thus a ſyſtem becomes more abſurd in the end, merely from its being reaſonable and philoſophical in the beginning.

To oppoſe the torrent of ſcholaſtic religion by ſuch feeble maxims as theſe, that *it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be*, that *the whole is greater than a part*, that *two and three make five*; is pretending to ſtop the ocean with a bull-ruſh. Will you ſet up profane reaſon againſt ſacred myſtery? No puniſhment is great enough for your impiety. And the ſame fires, which were kindled for heretics, will ſerve alſo for the deſtruction of philoſophers.

SECT. XII. *With regard to doubt or conviction.*

WE meet every day with people ſo ſceptical with regard to hiſtory, that they aſſert it impoſſible for any nation ever to believe ſuch abſurd principles as thoſe of GREEK and EGYPTIAN paganiſm; and at the ſame time ſo dogmatical with regard to religion, that they think the ſame abſurdities are to be found in no other communions. CAMBYSES entertained like prejudices; and very impiouſly ridiculed, and even wounded, APIS, the great god of the EGYPTIANS, who appeared to his profane ſenſes nothing but a large ſpotted bull. But HERODOTUS[1] judiciouſly aſcribes this ſally of paſſion to a real madneſs or diſorder of the brain: Otherwiſe, ſays the hiſtorian, he never would have openly affronted any eſtabliſhed worſhip. For on that head, continues he, every nation are beſt ſatisfied with their own, and think they have the advantage over every other nation.

IT muſt be allowed, that the ROMAN catholics are a very learned ſect; and that no one communion, but that of the church of ENGLAND, can diſpute their being the moſt learned of all the chriſtian churches: Yet AVERROES, the famous ARABIAN, who, no doubt, had heard of the EGYPTIAN ſuperſtitions, declares, that, of all religions, the moſt abſurd and non-ſenſical is that, whoſe votaries eat, after having created, their deity.

I BELIEVE, indeed, that there is no tenet in all paganiſm, which would give ſo fair a ſcope to ridicule as this of the *real preſence*: For it is ſo abſurd, that it eludes the force of almoſt all argument. There are even ſome pleaſant ſtories of that kind, which, tho' ſomewhat profane, are commonly told by the Catholics themſelves. One day, a prieſt, it is ſaid, gave inadvertently, inſtead of the ſacrament, a counter, which had by accident fallen among the holy wafers. The communicant waited patiently for ſome time, expecting it would diſſolve on his tongue: But finding, that it ſtill remained entire, he took it off. *I wiſh*, cries he to the prieſt, *you have not committed ſome miſtake: I wiſh you have not given me God the Father: He is ſo hard and tough there is no ſwallowing him.*

[1] Lib. iii. c. 38.

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A FAMOUS general, at that time in the MUSCOVITE ſervice, having come to PARIS for the recovery of his wounds, brought along with him a young TURK, whom he had taken priſoner. Some of the doctors of the SORBONNE (who are altogether as poſitive as the derviſes of CONSTANTINOPLE) thinking it a pity, that the poor TURK ſhould be damned for want of inſtruction, ſollicited MUSTAPHA very hard to turn Chriſtian, and promiſed him, for his encouragement, plenty of good wine in this world, and paradiſe in the next. Theſe allurements were too powerful to be reſiſted; and therefore, having been well inſtructed and catechized, he at laſt agreed to received the ſacraments of baptiſm and the Lord's ſupper. The prieſt, however, to make every thing ſure and ſolid, ſtill continued his inſtructions; and began his catechiſm the next day with the uſual queſtion, *How many Gods are there? None at all*, replies BENEDICT; for that was his new name. *How! None at all!* cries the prieſt. *To be ſure*, ſaid the honeſt proſelyte. *You have told me all along that there is but one God: And yeſterday I eat him.*

SUCH are the doctrines of our brethren, the Catholics. But to theſe doctrines we are ſo accuſtomed, that we never wonder at them: Tho', in a future age, it will probably become difficult to perſuade ſome nations, that any human, two-legged creature, could ever embrace ſuch principles. And it is a thouſand to one, but theſe nations themſelves ſhall have ſomething full as abſurd in their own creed, to which they will give a moſt implicite and moſt religious aſſent.

I LODGED once at PARIS, in the ſame *hotel* with an ambaſſador from TUNIS, who, having paſſed ſome years at LONDON, was returning home that way. One day, I obſerved his MOORISH excellency diverting himſelf under the porch, with ſurveying the ſplendid equipages that drove along; when there chanced to paſs that way ſome *Capucin* friars, who had never ſeen a TURK; as he, on his part, tho' accuſtomed to the EUROPEAN dreſſes, had never ſeen the groteſque figure of a *Capucin*: And there is no expreſſing the mutual admiration, with which they inſpired each other. Had the chaplain of the embaſſy entered into a diſpute with theſe FRANCISCANS, their reciprocal ſurprize had been of the ſame nature. And thus all mankind ſtand ſtaring at one another; and there is no beating it out of their heads, that the turban of the AFRICAN is not juſt as good or as bad a faſhion as the cowl of the EUROPEAN. *He is a very honeſt man*, ſaid the prince of SALLEE, ſpeaking of de RUYTER, *It is a pity he were a Chriſtian.*

How can you worſhip leeks and onions, we ſhall ſuppoſe a SORBONNIST to ſay to a prieſt of SAIS? If we worſhip them, replies the latter; at leaſt, we do not, at the ſame time, eat them. But what ſtrange objects of adoration are cats and monkies, ſays the learned doctor? They are at leaſt as good as the relicts or rotten bones of martyrs, anſwers his no leſs learned antagoniſt. Are you not mad, inſiſts the Catholic, to cut one another's throat about the preference of a cabbage or a cucumber. Yes, ſays the pagan; I allow it, if you will confeſs, that all thoſe are ſtill madder, who fight about the preference among volumes of ſophiſtry, ten thouſand of which are not equal in value to one cabbage or cucumber [s].

EVERY

[s] It is ſtrange that the EGYPTIAN religion, tho' ſo abſurd, ſhould yet have borne ſo great a reſemblance to the JEWISH, that antient writers even of the greateſt genius were not able to obſerve any difference betwixt them. For it is very remarkable that both TACITUS and SUETONIUS, when they

EVERY by-ſtander will eaſily judge (but unfortunately the by-ſtanders are very few) that, if nothing were requiſite to eſtabliſh any popular ſyſtem, but the expoſing the abſurdities of other ſyſtems, every votary of every ſuperſtition could give a ſufficient reaſon for his blind and bigotted attachment to the principles, in which he has been educated. But without ſo extenſive a knowlege, on which to ground this aſſurance, (and perhaps, better without it) there is not wanting a ſufficient ſtock of religious zeal and faith amongſt mankind. DIODORUS SICULUS[t] gives a remarkable inſtance to this purpoſe, of which he was himſelf an eye-witneſs. While EGYPT lay under the greateſt terror of the ROMAN name, a legionary ſoldier having inadvertently been guilty of the ſacrilegious impiety of killing a cat, the whole people roſe upon him with the utmoſt fury; and all the efforts of the prince were not able to ſave him. The ſenate and people of ROME, I am perſuaded, would not, then, have been ſo delicate with regard to their national deities. They very frankly, a little after that time, voted AUGUSTUS a place in the celeſtial manſions; and would have dethroned every god in heaven, for his ſake, had he ſeemed to deſire it. *Preſens divus habebitur* AUGUSTUS, ſays HORACE. That is a very important point: And in other nations and other ages, the ſame circumſtances has not been eſteemed altogether indifferent[u].

NOTWITHSTANDING the ſanctity of our holy religion, ſays TULLY[x], no crime is more common with us than ſacrilege: But was it ever heard, that an EGYPTIAN violated the temple of a cat, an ibis, or a crocodile? There is no torture, an EGYPTIAN would not undergo, ſays the ſame author in another place[y], rather than injure an ibis, an aſpic, a cat, a dog, or a crocodile. Thus it is ſtrictly true, what DRYDEN obſerves,

> "Of whatſoe'er deſcent their godhead be,
> "Stock, ſtone, or other homely pedigree,
> "In his defence his ſervants are as bold,
> "As if he had been born of beaten gold.
>
> ABSALOM and ARCHITOPHEL.

Nay, the baſer the materials are, of which the divinity is compoſed, the greater devotion is he likely to excite in the breaſts of his deluded votaries. They exult

they mention that decree of the ſenate, under TIBERIUS, by which the EGYPTIAN and JEWISH proſelytes were baniſhed from ROME, expreſsly treat theſe religions as the ſame; and it appears, that even the decree itſelf was founded on that ſuppoſition. "Actum & de ſacris ÆGYPTIIS, "JUDAICISQUE pellendis; factumque patrum "conſultum, ut quatuor millia libertini generis *ea* "*ſuperſtitione* infecta, quis idonea ætas, in inſulam "Sardiniam veherentur, coercendis illic latroci-"niis; & ſi ob gravitatem cœli interiſſent, *vile* "*damnum*: Ceteri cederent Italia, niſi certem an-"te diem profanos ritus exuiſſent." TACIT. ann. lib. ii. c. 85. "Externas cæremonias, ÆGYP-"TIOS, JUDAICOSQUE ritus compeſcuit; coactis "qui *ſuperſtitione ea* tenebantur, religioſas veſtes "cum inſtrumento omni comburere, &c." SUETON. TIBER. c. 36. Theſe wiſe heathens, obſerving ſomething in the general air, and genius, and ſpirit of the two religions to be the ſame, eſteemed the differences of their dogmas too frivolous to deſerve any attention.

[t] Lib. i.

[u] When LOUIS the XIVth took on himſelf the proteſtion of the Jeſuits college of CLERMONT, the ſociety ordered the king's arms to be put up over their gate, and took down the croſs, in order to make way for it: Which gave occaſion to the following epigram:

> Suſtulit hinc Chriſti, poſuitque inſignia Regis:
> Impia gens, alium neſcit habere Deum.

[x] De nat. Deor, l. i. [y] Tuſc. Quæſt. lib. v.

in

in their ſhame, and make a merit with their deity, in braving, for his ſake, all the ridicule and contumely of his enemies. Ten thouſand *Croiſes* inliſt themſelves under the holy banners, and even openly triumph in thoſe parts of their religion, which their adverſaries regard as the moſt reproachful.

THERE occurs, I own, a difficulty in the EGYPTIAN ſyſtem of theology; as indeed, few ſyſtems are entirely free from difficulties. It is evident, from their method of propagation, that a couple of cats, in fifty years, would ſtock a whole kingdom; and if that religious veneration were ſtill paid them, it would, in twenty more, not only be eaſier in EGYPT to find a god than a man, which PETRONIUS ſays was the caſe in ſome parts of ITALY; but the gods muſt at laſt entirely ſtarve the men, and leave themſelves neither prieſts nor votaries remaining. It is probable, therefore, that that wiſe nation, the moſt celebrated in antiquity for prudence and ſound policy, foreſeeing ſuch dangerous conſequences, reſerved all their worſhip for the full-grown divinities, and uſed the freedom to drown the holy ſpawn or little ſucking gods, without any ſcruple or remorſe. And thus the practice of warping the tenets of religion, in order to ſerve temporal intereſts, is not, by any means, to be regarded as an invention of theſe latter ages.

THE learned, philoſophical VARRO, diſcourſing of religion, pretends not to deliver any thing beyond probabilities and appearances: Such was his good ſenſe and moderation! But the paſſionate, the zealous AUGUSTIN, inſults the noble ROMAN on his ſcepticiſm and reſerve, and profeſſes the moſt thorough belief and aſſurance [a]. A heathen poet, however, contemporary with the ſaint, abſurdly eſteems the religious ſyſtem of the latter ſo falſe, that even the credulity of children, he ſays, could not engage them to believe it [a].

Is it ſtrange, when miſtakes are ſo common, to find every one poſitive and dogmatical? And that the zeal often riſes in proportion to the error? *Moverunt*, ſays SPARTIAN, *& ea tempeſtate Judæi bellum quod vetabantur mutilare genitalia* [b].

IF ever there was a nation or a time, in which the public religion loſt all authority over mankind, we might expect, that infidelity in ROME, during the CICERONIAN age, would openly have erected its throne, and that CICERO himſelf, in every ſpeech and action, would have been its moſt declared abettor. But it appears, that, whatever ſceptical liberties that great man might uſe, in his writings or in philoſophical converſation; he yet avoided, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of deiſm and profaneneſs. Even in his own family, and to his wife TERENTIA, whom he highly truſted, he was willing to appear a devout religioniſt; and there remains a letter, addreſſed to her, in which he ſeriouſly deſires her to offer ſacrifice to APOLLO and ÆSCULAPIUS, in gratitude for the recovery of his health [c].

POMPEY'S devotion was much more ſincere: In all his conduct, during the civil wars, he paid a great regard to auguries, dreams, and prophecies [d]. AUGUSTUS was tainted with ſuperſtition of every kind. As it is reported of MILTON, that his poetical genius never flowed with eaſe and abundance in the ſpring; ſo AUGUSTUS obſerved, that his own genius for dreaming never was ſo perfect during that ſeaſon, nor was ſo much to be relied on, as during the reſt of the year.

[a] De civitate Dei, l. iii. c. 17.
[a] Claudii Rutilii Numitiani iter, lib. 1. l. 386.
[b] In vita Adriani.
[c] Lib. 14. epiſt. 7.
[d] Cicero de Divin. lib. 2. c. 24.

That great and able emperor was alſo extremely uneaſy when he happened to change his ſhoes, and put the right foot ſhoe on the left foot[c]. In ſhort, it cannot be doubted, but the votaries of the eſtabliſhed ſuperſtition of antiquity were as numerous in every ſtate, as thoſe of the modern religion are at preſent. Its influence was as univerſal; tho' it was not ſo great. As many people gave their aſſent to it; tho' that aſſent was not ſeemingly ſo ſtrong, preciſe, and affirmative.

We may obſerve, that, notwithſtanding the dogmatical, imperious ſtyle of all ſuperſtition, the conviction of the religioniſts, in all ages, is more affected than real, and ſcarce ever approaches, in any degree, to that ſolid belief and perſuaſion, which governs us in the common affairs of life. Men dare not avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts, which they entertain on ſuch ſubjects: They make a merit of implicite faith; and diſguiſe to themſelves their real infidelity, by the ſtrongeſt aſſeverations and moſt poſitive bigotry. But nature is too hard for all their endeavors, and ſuffers not the obſcure, glimmering light, afforded in thoſe ſhadowy regions, to equal the ſtrong impreſſions, made by common ſenſe and by experience. The uſual courſe of men's conduct belies their words, and ſhows, that the aſſent in theſe matters is ſome unaccountable operation of the mind betwixt diſbelief and conviction, but approaching much nearer the former than the latter.

Since, therefore, the mind of man appears of ſo looſe and unſteddy a contexture, that, even at preſent, when ſo many perſons find an intereſt in continually employing on it the chiſſel and the hammer, yet are they not able to engrave theological tenets with any laſting impreſſion; how much more muſt this have been the caſe in antient times, when the retainers to the holy function were ſo much fewer in compariſon? No wonder, that the appearances were then very inconſiſtent, and that men, on ſome occaſions, might ſeem determined infidels, and enemies to the eſtabliſhed religion, without being ſo in reality; or at leaſt, without knowing their own minds in that particular.

Another cauſe, which rendered the antient religions much looſer than the modern, is, that the former were *traditional* and the latter are *ſcriptural*; and the tradition in the former was complex, contradictory, and, on many occaſions, doubtful; ſo that it could not poſſibly be reduced to any ſtandard and canon, or afford any determinate articles of faith. The ſtories of the gods were numberleſs like the popiſh legends; and tho' every one, almoſt, believed a part of theſe ſtories, yet no one could believe or know the whole: While, at the ſame time, all muſt have acknowleged, that no one part ſtood on a better foundation than the reſt. The traditions of different cities and nations were alſo, on many occaſions, directly oppoſite; and no reaſon could be found for preferring one to the other. And as there was an infinite number of ſtories with regard to which tradition was no way poſitive; the gradation was inſenſible, from the moſt fundamental articles of faith, to thoſe looſe and precarious fictions. The pagan religion, therefore, ſeemed to vaniſh like a cloud, whenever one approached to it, and examined it piecemeal. It could never be aſcertained by any fixed dogmas and principles. And tho' this did not convert the generality of mankind from ſo abſurd a faith;

[c] Sueton. Aug. cap. 90, 91, 92. Plin. lib. ii. cap. 7.

for

for when will the people be reaſonable? yet it made them faulter and heſitate more in maintaining their principles, and was even apt to produce, in certain diſpoſitions of mind, ſome practices and opinions, which had the appearance of determined infidelity.

To which we may add, that the fables of the pagan religion were, of themſelves, light, eaſy, and familiar; without devils or ſeas of brimſtone, or any objects, that could much terrify the imagination. Who could forbear ſmiling, when he thought of the loves of MARS and VENUS, or the amorous frolics of JUPITER and PAN? In this reſpect, it was a true poetical religion; if it had not rather too much levity for the graver kinds of poetry. We find that it has been adopted by modern bards; nor have theſe talked with greater freedom and irreverence of the gods, whom they regarded as fictions, than the antient did of the real objects of their devotion.

THE inference is by no means juſt, that becauſe a ſyſtem of religion has made no deep impreſſion on the minds of a people, it muſt therefore have been poſitively rejected by all men of common ſenſe, and that oppoſite principles, in ſpite of the prejudices of education, were generally eſtabliſhed by argument and reaſoning. I know not, but a contrary inference may be more probable. The leſs importunate and aſſuming any ſpecies of ſuperſtition appears, the leſs will it provoke men's ſpleen and indignation, or engage them into enquiries concerning its foundation and origin. This in the mean time is obvious, that the empire of all religious faith over the underſtanding is wavering and uncertain, ſubject to all varieties of humor, and dependent on the preſent incidents, which ſtrike the imagination. The difference is only in the degrees. An antient will place a ſtroke of impiety and one of ſuperſtition alternately, thro' a whole diſcourſe [h]: A modern often thinks in the ſame way, tho' he may be more guarded in his expreſſions.

LUCIAN tells us expreſsly [i], that whoever believed not the moſt ridiculous fables of paganiſm was eſteemed by the people profane and impious. To what purpoſe, indeed, would that agreeable author have employed the whole force of his wit and ſatyr againſt the national religion, had not that religion been generally believed by his countrymen and contemporaries?

LIVY [k] acknowleges as frankly, as any divine would at preſent, the common incredulity of his age; but then he condemns it as ſeverely. And who can imagine, that a national ſuperſtition, which could delude ſo great a man, would not alſo impoſe on the generality of the people?

THE STOICS beſtowed many magnificent and even impious epithets on their ſage; that he alone was rich, free, a king, and equal to the immortal gods. They forgot to add, that he was not inferior in prudence and underſtanding to an

[k] Witneſs this remarkable paſſage of TACITUS: "Præter multiplices rerum humanarum caſus, cœlo terraque prodigia, & fulminum monitus, & futurorum præſagia, læta, triſtia, ambigua, manifeſta. Nec enim umquam atrocioribus populi Romani cladibus, magiſque juſtis judiciis arbatum eſt, non eſſe curæ Diis ſecuritatem noſtram, eſſe ultionem," Hiſt. lib. i. AUGUSTUS's quarrel with NEPTUNE is an inſtance of the ſame kind. Had not the emperor believed NEPTUNE to be a real being, and to have dominion over the ſea; where had been the foundation of his anger? And if he believed it, what madneſs to provoke ſtill farther that deity? The ſame obſervation may be made upon QUINTILIAN's exclamations, on account of the death of his children, lib. vi. Præf.

[i] Philopſeudes. [k] Lib. x. cap. 40.

old

old woman. For ſurely nothing can be more pitiful than the ſentiments, which that ſect entertained with regard to all popular ſuperſtitions; while they very ſeriouſly agree with the common augurs, that, when a raven croaks from the left, it is a good omen; but a bad one, when a rook makes a noiſe from the ſame quarter. PANÆTIUS was the only STOIC, amongſt the GREEKS, who ſo much as doubted with regard to auguries and divinations[l]. MARCUS ANTONINUS[m] tells us, that he himſelf had received many admonitions from the gods in his ſleep. It is true; EPICTETUS[n] forbids us to regard the language of rooks and ravens; but it is not, that they do not ſpeak truth: It is only, becauſe they can foretel nothing but the breaking of our neck or the forfeiture of our eſtate; which are circumſtances, ſays he, that no way concern us. Thus the STOICS join a philoſophical enthuſiaſm to a religious ſuperſtition. The force of their mind, being all turned to the ſide of morals, unbent itſelf in that of religion[o].

PLATO[p] introduces SOCRATES affirming, that the accuſation of impiety raiſed againſt him was owing entirely to his rejecting ſuch fables, as thoſe of SATURN's caſtrating his father, URANUS, and JUPITER's dethroning SATURN: Yet in a ſubſequent dialogue[r], SOCRATES confeſſes, that the doctrine of the mortality of the ſoul was the received opinion of the people. Is there here any contradiction? Yes, ſurely: But the contradiction is not in PLATO; it is in the people, whoſe religious principles in general are always compoſed of the moſt diſcordant parts; eſpecially in an age, when ſuperſtition ſate ſo eaſy and light upon them[s].

THE

[l] Cicero de Divin. lib. i. cap. 3. & 7.
[m] Lib. i. § 17. [n] Ench. § 17.
[o] The Stoics, I own, were not quite orthodox in the eſtabliſhed religion; but one may ſee, from theſe inſtances, that they went a great way: And the people undoubtedly went every length.
[p] Eutyphro. [r] Phædo.
[s] XENOPHON's conduct, as related by himſelf, is, at once, an inconteſtable proof of the general credulity of mankind in thoſe ages, and the incoherencies, in all ages, of men's opinions in religious matters. That great captain and philoſopher, the diſciple of SOCRATES, and one who has delivered ſome of the moſt refined ſentiments with regard to a deity, gave all the following marks of vulgar, pagan ſuperſtition. By SOCRATES's advice, he conſulted the oracle of DELPHI, before he would engage in the expedition of CYRUS. De exped. lib. iii. p. 294. ex edit. Leuncl. Sees a dream the night after the generals were ſeized; which he pays great regard to, but thinks ambiguous, Id. p. 295. He and the whole army regard ſneezing as a very lucky omen. Id. p. 300. Has another dream, when he comes to the river CENTRITES, which his fellow general, CHIROSOPHUS, alſo pays great regard to. Id. lib. iv. p. 323. The GREEKS ſuffering from a cold north wind, ſacrifice to it, and the hiſtorian obſerves, that it immediately abated. Id. p. 329. XENOPHON conſults the ſacrifices in ſecret, before he would form any reſolution with himſelf about ſettling a colony. Lib. v. p. 359 He himſelf a very ſkilful augur. Id. p. 361. Is determined by the victims to refuſe the ſole command of the army, which was offered him. Lib. vi. p. 273. CLEANDER, the SPARTAN, tho' very deſirous of it, refuſes it for the ſame reaſon. Id. p. 392. XENOPHON mentions an old dream with the interpretation given him, when he firſt joined CYRUS. P. 373. Mentions alſo the place of HERCULES's deſcent into hell as believing it, and ſays the marks of it are ſtill remaining. Id. p. 375. Had almoſt ſtarved the army rather than lead to the field againſt the auſpices. Id. p. 382, 383. His friend, EUCLIDES, the augur, would not believe that he had brought no money from the expedition; till he (EUCLIDES) ſacrificed, and then he ſaw the matter clearly in the Exta. Lib. vii. p. 425. The ſame philoſopher, propoſing a project of mines for the encreaſe of the ATHENIAN revenues, adviſes them firſt to conſult the oracle. De rat. red. p. 392. That all this devotion was not a farce, in order to ſerve a political purpoſe, appears both from the facts themſelves, and from the genius of that age, when little or nothing could be gained by hypocriſy. Beſides XENOPHON, as appears from his Memorabilia, was a kind of heretic in thoſe times, which no political devotee

THE ſame CICERO, who affected, in his own family, to appear a devout religioniſt, makes no ſcruple, in a public court of judicature, of treating the doctrine of a future ſtate as a moſt ridiculous fable, to which no body could give any attention [t]. SALLUST [u] repreſents CÆSAR as ſpeaking the ſame language in the open ſenate [w].

But that all theſe freedoms implied not a total and univerſal infidelity and ſcepticiſm amongſt the people, is too apparent to be denied. Tho' ſome parts of the national religion hung looſe upon the minds of men, other parts adhered more cloſely to them: And it was the great buſineſs of the ſceptical philoſophers to ſhow, that there was no more foundation for one than for the other. This is the artifice of COTTA in the dialogues concerning the *nature of the gods*. He refutes the whole ſyſtem of mythology by leading the orthodox, gradually, from the more momentous ſtories, which were believed, to the more frivolous, which every one ridiculed: From the gods to the goddeſſes; from the goddeſſes to the nymphs; from the nymphs to the fawns and ſatyrs. His maſter, CARNEADES, had employed the ſame method of reaſoning [x].

Upon the whole, the greateſt and moſt obſervable differences betwixt a *traditional, mythological* religion, and a *ſyſtematical, ſcholaſtical* one, are two: The former is often more reaſonable, as conſiſting only of a multitude of ſtories, which, however groundleſs, imply no expreſs abſurdity and demonſtrative contradiction; and ſits alſo ſo eaſy and light on men's minds, that tho' it may be as univerſally received, it makes no ſuch deep impreſſion on the affections and underſtanding.

SECT. XIII. *Impious conceptions of the divine nature in moſt popular religions of both kinds.*

THE primary religion of mankind ariſes chiefly from an anxious fear of future events; and what ideas will naturally be entertained of inviſible, unknown powers, while men lie under diſmal apprehenſions of any kind, may eaſily be conceived. Every image of vengeance, ſeverity, cruelty, and malice muſt occur and muſt augment the ghaſtlineſs and horror, which oppreſſes the amazed religioniſt. A panic having once ſeized the mind, the active fancy ſtill farther multiplies the objects of terror; while that profound darkneſs, or, what is worſe, that glimmering light, with which we are inviroued, repreſents the ſpectres of divinity under the moſt dreadful appearances imaginable. And no idea of perverſe wickedneſs can

devotee ever is. It is for the ſame reaſon, I maintain, that NEWTON, LOCKE, CLARKE, &c. being *Arians* or *Socinians*, were very ſincere in the creed they profeſſed: And I always oppoſe this argument to ſome libertines, who will needs have it, that it was impoſſible, but that theſe great philoſophers muſt have been hypocrites.

[t] Pro CLUENTIO. cap. 61.

[u] De bello CATILIN.

[w] CICERO (Tuſc. Quæſt.) lib. i. cap. 5, 6. and SENECA (Epiſt. 24.) as alſo JUVENAL (Satyr 2.) maintain that there is no boy or old woman ſo ridiculous as to believe the poets in their accounts of a future ſtate. Why then does LUCRETIUS ſo highly exalt his maſter for freeing us from theſe terrors? Perhaps the generality of mankind were then in the diſpoſition of CEPHALUS in PLATO (de Rep. lib. i.) who while he was young and healthful could ridicule theſe ſtories; but as ſoon as he became old and infirm, began to entertain apprehenſions of their truth. This, we may obſerve, not to be unuſual even at preſent.

[x] SEXT. EMPIR. adverſ. MATHEM. lib. viii.

be framed, which thoſe terrified devotees do not readily, without ſcruple, apply to their deity.

THIS appears the natural ſtate of religion, when ſurveyed in one light. But if we conſider, on the other hand, that ſpirit of praiſe and eulogy, which neceſſarily has place in all religions, and which is the conſequence of theſe very terrors, we muſt expect a quite contrary ſyſtem of theology to prevail. Every virtue, every excellence muſt be aſcribed to the divinity, and no exaggeration be eſteemed ſufficient to reach thoſe perfections, with which he is endowed. Whatever ſtrains of panegyric can be invented, are immediately embraced, without conſulting any arguments or phænomena. And it is eſteemed a ſufficient confirmation of them, that they give us more magnificent ideas of the divine object of our worſhip and adoration.

HERE therefore is a kind of contradiction betwixt the different principles of human nature, which enter into religion. Our natural terrors preſent the notion of a deviliſh and malicious deity: Our propenſity to praiſe leads us to acknowlege an excellent and divine. And the influence of theſe oppoſite principles are various, according to the different ſituation of the human underſtanding.

IN very barbarous and ignorant nations, ſuch as the AFRICANS and INDIANS, nay even the JAPONESE, who can form no extenſive ideas of power and knowlege, worſhip may be paid to a being, whom they confeſs to be wicked and deteſtable; tho' they may be cautious, perhaps, of pronouncing this judgment of him in public, or in his temple, where he may be ſuppoſed to hear their reproaches.

SUCH rude, imperfect ideas of the divinity adhere long to all idolaters; and it may ſafely be affirmed, that the GREEKS themſelves never got entirely rid of them. It is remarked by XENOPHON [y], in praiſe of SOCRATES, that that philoſopher aſſented not to the vulgar opinion, which ſuppoſed the gods to know ſome things, and be ignorant of others: He maintained that they knew every thing; what was done, ſaid, or even thought. But as this was a ſtrain of philoſophy [z] much above the conception of his countrymen, we need not be ſurprized, if very frankly, in their books and converſation, they blamed the deities, whom they worſhipped in their temples. It is obſervable, that HERODOTUS in particular ſcruples not, in many paſſages, to aſcribe *envy* to the gods; a ſentiment, of all others, the moſt ſuitable to a mean and deviliſh nature. The pagan hymns however, ſung in public worſhip, contained nothing but epithets of praiſe; even while the actions aſcribed to the gods were the moſt barbarous and deteſtable. When TIMOTHEUS, the poet, recited a hymn to DIANA, where he enumerated, with the greateſt eulogies, all the actions and attributes of that cruel, capricious goddeſs: *May your daughter*, ſaid one preſent, *become ſuch as the deity whom you celebrate* [a].

BUT as men farther exalt their idea of their divinity; it is often their notion of his power and knowlege only, not of his goodneſs, which is improved. On the contrary, in proportion to the ſuppoſed extent of his ſcience and authority, their terrors naturally augment; while they believe, that no ſecrecy can conceal them

[y] Mem. lib. i.

[z] It was conſidered among the antients, as a very extraordinary, philoſophical paradox, that the preſence of the gods was not confined to the heavens, but was extended every where; as we learn from LUCIAN. *Hermotimus ſive De ſectis.*

[a] PLUTARCH. de Superſtit.

from his ſcrutiny, and that even the inmoſt receſſes of their breaſt lie open before him. They muſt then be careful not to form expreſsly any ſentiment of blame and diſapprobation. All muſt be applauſe, raviſhment, extacy. And while their gloomy apprehenſions make them aſcribe to him meaſures of conduct, which, in human creatures, would be highly blamed, they muſt ſtill affect to praiſe and admire theſe meaſures in the object of their devotional addreſſes. Thus it may ſafely be affirmed, that many popular religions are really, in the conception of their more vulgar votaries, a ſpecies of dæmoniſm; and the higher the deity is exalted in power and knowlege, the lower of courſe is he frequently depreſſed in goodneſs and benevolence; whatever epithets of praiſe may be beſtowed on him by his amazed adorers. Amongſt idolaters, the words may be falſe, and belie the ſecret opinion: But amongſt more exalted religioniſts, the opinion itſelf often contracts a kind of falſhood, and belies the inward ſentiment. The heart ſecretly deteſts ſuch meaſures of cruel and implacable vengeance; but the judgment dares not but pronounce them perfect and adorable. And the additional miſery of this inward ſtruggle aggravates all the other terrors, by which theſe unhappy victims to ſuperſtition are for ever haunted.

LUCIAN [o] obſerves, that a young man, who reads the hiſtory of the gods in HOMER or HESIOD, and finds their factions, wars, injuſtice, inceſt, adultery, and other immoralities ſo highly celebrated, is much ſurprized afterwards, when he comes into the world, to obſerve, that puniſhments are by law inflicted on the ſame actions, which he had been taught to aſcribe to ſuperior beings. The contradiction is ſtill perhaps ſtronger betwixt the repreſentations given us by ſome latter religions and our natural ideas of generoſity, lenity, impartiality, and juſtice; and in proportion to the multiplied terrors of theſe religions, the barbarous conceptions of the divinity are multiplied upon us [p]. Nothing can preſerve untainted

[o] Necyomantia.

[p] BACCHUS, a divine being, is repreſented by the heathen mythology as the inventor of dancing and the theatre. Plays were antiently, even a part of public worſhip on the moſt ſolemn occaſions, and often employed in times of peſtilence, to appeaſe the offended deities. But they have been zealouſly proſcribed by the godly in latter ages; and the play-houſe, according to a learned divine, is the porch of hell.

But in order to ſhow more evidently, that it is poſſible for a religion to repreſent the divinity in ſtill a more immoral and unamiable light than the antients, we ſhall cite a long paſſage from an author of taſte and imagination, who was ſurely no enemy to Chriſtianity. It is the chevalier RAMSAY, a writer, who had ſo laudable an inclination to be orthodox, that his reaſon never found any difficulty, even in the doctrines which freethinkers ſcruple the moſt, the trinity, incarnation, and ſatisfaction: His humanity alone, of which he ſeems to have had a great ſtock, rebelled againſt the doctrines of eternal reprobation and predeſtination. He expreſſes himſelf thus: 'What 'ſtrange ideas, ſays he, would an Indian or a 'Chineſe philoſopher have of our holy religion, 'if they judged by the ſchemes given of it by 'our modern freethinkers, and phariſaical doc-'tors of all ſects? According to the odious and 'too *vulgar* ſyſtem of theſe incredulous ſcoffers 'and credulous ſcriblers, "The God of the Jews "is a moſt cruel, unjuſt, partial and fantaſtical "being. He created, about 6000 years ago, a "man and a woman, and placed them in a fine "garden of ASIA, of which there are no re-"mains. This garden was furniſhed with all "ſorts of trees, fountains, and flowers. He al-"lowed them the uſe of all the fruits of this "beautiful garden, except of one, that was "planted in the midſt thereof, and that had in it "a ſecret virtue of preſerving them in continual "health and vigor of body and mind, of exalt-"ing their natural powers and making them wiſe. "The devil entered into the body of a ſerpent, "and ſolicited the firſt woman to eat of this for-"bidden fruit; ſhe engaged her huſband to do "the ſame. To puniſh this ſlight curioſity and "natural deſire of life and knowlege, God not

untainted the genuine principles of morals in our judgment of human conduct, but the abſolute neceſſity of theſe principles to the exiſtence of ſociety. If common conception can indulge princes in a ſyſtem of ethics, ſomewhat different from that which ſhould regulate private perſons; how much more thoſe ſuperior beings, whoſe attributes, views, and nature are ſo totally unknown to us? *Sunt ſuperis ſua jura* [q]. The gods have maxims of juſtice peculiar to themſelves.

" only threw our firſt parents out of paradiſe, but " he condemned all their poſterity to temporal " miſery, and the greateſt part of them to eternal " pains, tho' the ſouls of theſe innocent chil- " dren have no more relation to that of ADAM " than to thoſe of NERO and MAHOMET; ſince, " according to the ſcholaſtic driveller, fabuliſts, " and mythologiſts, all ſouls are created pure, " and infuſed immediately into mortal bodies, ſo " ſoon as the fœtus is formed. To accompliſh the " barbarous, partial decree of predeſtination and " reprobation, God abandoned all nations to " darkneſs, idolatry and ſuperſtition, without any " ſaving knowlege or ſalutary graces; unleſs it " was one particular nation, whom he choſe as " his peculiar people. This choſen nation was, " however, the moſt ſtupid, ungrateful, rebel- " lious, and perfidious of all nations. After " God had thus kept the far greater part of all " the human ſpecies, during near 4000 years, in " a reprobate ſtate, he changed all of a ſudden, " and took a fancy for other nations, beſide the " JEWS. Then he ſent his only begotten Son " to the world, under a human form, to appeaſe " his wrath, ſatisfy his vindictive juſtice, and die " for the pardon of ſin. Very few nations, how- " ever, have heard of this goſpel; and all the " reſt, tho' left in invincible ignorance, are dam- " ned without exception, or any poſſibility of " remiſſion. The greateſt part of thoſe who have " heard of it, have changed only ſome ſpecula- " tive notions about God, and ſome external " forms in worſhip: For, in other reſpects, the " bulk of Chriſtians have continued as corrupt, " as the reſt of mankind in their morals; yea, ſo " much the more perverſe and criminal, that " their lights were greater. Unleſs it be a very " ſmall ſelect number, all other Chriſtians, like " the pagans, will be for ever damned; the great " ſacrifice offered up for them will become void " and of no effect. God will take delight for " ever in their torments and blaſphemies; and " tho' he can, by one *fiat*, change their hearts, " yet they will remain for ever unconverted and " unconvertible, becauſe he will be for ever un- " appeaſable and irreconcileable. It is true, that " all this makes God odious, a hater of ſouls, " rather than a lover of them; a cruel, vindic- " tive tyrant, an impotent or a wrathful dæmon, " rather than an all-powerful, beneficent Father " of ſpirits: Yet all this is a myſtery. He has " ſecret reaſons for his conduct, that are impene- " trable; and tho' he appears unjuſt and barba- " rous, yet we muſt believe the contrary, be- " cauſe what is injuſtice, crime, cruelty, and " the blackeſt malice in us, is in him juſtice, " mercy, and ſovereign goodneſs." Thus the ' incredulous freethinkers, the judaizing Chriſti- ' ans, and the fataliſtic doctors have disfigured ' and diſhonored the ſublime myſteries of our ' holy faith; thus, they have confounded the ' nature of good and evil; transformed the ' moſt monſtrous paſſions into divine attributes, ' and ſurpaſſed the pagans in blaſphemy, by ' aſcribing to the eternal nature, as perfections, ' what makes the moſt horrid crimes amongſt ' men. The groſſer pagans contented themſelves ' with divinizing luſt, inceſt, and adultery; but ' the predeſtinarian doctors have divinized cruel- ' ty, wrath, fury, vengeance, and all the black- ' eſt vices.' See the Chevalier RAMSAY's philoſophical principles of natural and revealed religion, Part II. p. 401.

The ſame author aſſerts, in other places, that the *Arminian* and *Moliniſt* ſchemes ſerve very little to mend the matter: And having thus thrown himſelf out of all received ſects of Chriſtianity, he is obliged to advance a ſyſtem of his own, which is a kind of *Origeniſm*, and ſuppoſes the pre-exiſtence of the ſouls both of men and beaſts, and the eternal ſalvation and converſion of all men, beaſts, and devils. But this notion, being quite peculiar to himſelf, we need not treat of. I thought the opinions of this ingenious author very curious; but I pretend not to warrant the juſtneſs of them.

[q] OVID. Metam. lib. ix. 501.

SECT.

SECT. XIV. *Bad influence of moſt popular religions on morality.*

HERE I cannot forbear obſerving a fact, which may be worth the attention of thoſe, who make human nature the object of their ſcrutiny. It is certain, that, in every religion, however ſublime the verbal definition, which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the greateſt number, will ſtill ſeek the divine favor, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfect being, but either by frivolous obſervances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous extaſies, or by the belief of myſterious and abſurd opinions. The leaſt part of the *Sadder*, as well as of the *Pentateuch*, conſiſts in precepts of morality; and we may be aſſured, that that part was always the leaſt obſerved and regarded. When the old ROMANS were attacked with a peſtilence, they never aſcribed their ſufferings to their vices, or dreamed of repentance and amendment. They never thought that they were the general robbers of the world, whoſe ambition and avarice made deſolate the earth, and reduced opulent nations to want and beggary. They only created a dictator [r], in order to drive a nail into a door; and by that means, they thought that they had ſufficiently appeaſed their incenſed deity.

IN ÆGINA, one faction entering into a conſpiracy, barbarouſly and treacherouſly aſſaſſinated ſeven hundred of their fellow citizens; and carried their fury ſo far, that, one miſerable fugitive having fled to the temple, they cut off his hands, by which he clung to the gates, and carrying him out of holy ground, immediately murdered him. *By this impiety*, ſays HERODOTUS [s], (not by the other many cruel aſſaſſinations) *they offended the gods, and contracted an inexpiable guilt.*

NAY, if we ſhould ſuppoſe, what ſeldom happens, that a popular religion were found, in which it was expreſsly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the divine favor; if an order of prieſts were inſtituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily ſermons, and with all the arts of perſuaſion; yet ſo inveterate are the people's prejudices, that for want of ſome other ſuperſtition, they would make the very attendance on theſe ſermons the eſſentials of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The ſublime prologue of ZALEUCUS's laws [t] inſpired not the LOCRIANS, ſo far as we can learn, with any ſounder notions of the meaſures of acceptance with the deity, than were familiar to the other GREEKS.

THIS obſervation, then, holds univerſally: But ſtill one may be at ſome loſs to account for it. It is not ſufficient to obſerve, that the people, every where, degrade their deities into a ſimilitude with themſelves, and conſider them merely as a ſpecies of human creatures, ſomewhat more potent and intelligent. This will not remove the difficulty. For there is no *man* ſo ſtupid, as that, judging by his natural reaſon, he would not eſteem virtue and honeſty the moſt valuable qualities, which any perſon could poſſeſs. Why not aſcribe the ſame ſentiment to his deity? Why not make all religion, or the chief part of it, to conſiſt in theſe attainments?

[r] Called Dictator clavis figendæ cauſa. T. LIVII, l. vii. c. 3.

[s] Lib. vi.

[t] To be found in DIOD. SIC. lib. xii.

NOR

Nor is it ſatisfactory to ſay, that the practice of morality is more difficult than that of ſuperſtition; and is therefore rejected. For, not to mention the exceſſive pennances of the *Brachmans* and *Talapoins*; it is certain, that the *Rhamadan* of the Turks, during which the poor wretches, for many days, often in the hotteſt months of the year, and in ſome of the hotteſt climates of the world, remain without eating or drinking from the riſing to the ſetting of the ſun; this *Rhamadan*, I ſay, muſt be more ſevere than the practice of any moral duty, even to the moſt vicious and depraved of mankind. The four lents of the Muscovites, and the auſterities of ſome *Roman Catholics*, appear more diſagreeable than meekneſs and benevolence. In ſhort, all virtue, when men are reconciled to it by ever ſo little practice, is agreeable: All ſuperſtition is for ever odious and burthenſome.

Perhaps, the following account may be received as a true ſolution of the difficulty. The duties which a man performs as a friend or parent, ſeem merely owing to his benefactor or children; nor can he be wanting to theſe duties, without breaking thro' all the ties of nature and morality. A ſtrong inclination may prompt him to the performance: A ſentiment of order and moral beauty joins its force to theſe natural ties: And the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty, without any effort or endeavor. Even with regard to the virtues, which are more auſtere, and more founded on reflection, ſuch as public ſpirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity; the moral obligation, in our apprehenſion, removes all pretence to religious merit; and the virtuous conduct is eſteemed no more than what we owe to ſociety and to ourſelves. In all this, a ſuperſtitious man finds nothing, which he has properly performed for the ſake of his deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the divine favor and protection. He conſiders not, that the moſt genuine method of ſerving the divinity is by promoting the happineſs of his creatures. He ſtill looks out for ſome more immediate ſervice of the ſupreme being, in order to allay thoſe terrors, with which he is haunted. And any practice, recommended to him, which either ſerves to no purpoſe in life, or offers the ſtrongeſt violence to his natural inclinations; that practice he will the more readily embrace, on account of thoſe very circumſtances, which ſhould make him abſolutely reject it. It ſeems the more purely religious, that it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive or conſideration. And if, for its ſake, he ſacrifices much of his eaſe and quiet, his claim of merit appears ſtill to riſe upon him, in proportion to the zeal and devotion, which he diſcovers. In reſtoring a loan, or paying a debt, his divinity is no way beholden to him; becauſe theſe acts of juſtice are what he was bound to perform, and what many would have performed, were there no god in the univerſe. But if he faſt a day, or give himſelf a ſound whipping; this has a direct reference, in his opinion, to the ſervice of God. No other motive could engage him to ſuch auſterities. By theſe diſtinguiſhed marks of devotion, he has now acquired the divine favor; and may expect, in recompence, protection and ſafety in this world, and eternal happineſs in the next.

Hence the greateſt crimes have been found, in many inſtances, compatible with a ſuperſtitious piety and devotion: Hence it is juſtly regarded as unſafe to draw any certain inference in favor of a man's morals from the fervor or ſtrictneſs of his religious exerciſes, even tho' he himſelf believe them ſincere. Nay, it has been obſerved, that enormities of the blackeſt dye, have been rather apt to produce ſuperſtitious terrors, and encreaſe the religious paſſion. Bomilcar, having

ing formed a conſpiracy for aſſaſſinating at once the whole ſenate of CARTHAGE, and invading the liberties of his country, loſt the opportunity, from a continual regard to omens and propheſies. *Thoſe who undertake the moſt criminal and moſt dangerous enterprizes are commonly the moſt ſuperſtitious*; as an antient hiſtorian [a] remarks on this occaſion. Their devotion and ſpiritual faith riſe with their fears. CATILINE was not contented with the eſtabliſhed deities, and received rites of his national religion: His anxious terrors made him ſeek new inventions of this kind [b]; which he never probably had dreamed of, had he remained a good citizen, and obedient to the laws of his country.

To which we may add, that, even after the commiſſion of crimes, there ariſe remorſes and ſecret horrors, which give no reſt to the mind, but make it have recourſe to religious rites and ceremonies, as expiations of its offences. Whatever weakens or diſorders the internal frame promotes the intereſts of ſuperſtition: And nothing is more deſtructive to them than a manly, ſteddy virtue, which either preſerves us from diſaſtrous, melancholy accidents, or teaches us to bear them. During ſuch calm ſunſhine of the mind, theſe ſpectres of falſe divinity never make their appearance. On the other hand, while we abandon ourſelves to the natural undiſciplined ſuggeſtions of our timid and anxious hearts, every kind of barbarity is aſcribed to the ſupreme being, from the terrors, with which we are agitated; and every kind of caprice, from the methods which we embrace, in order to appeaſe him. *Barbarity, caprice*; theſe qualities, however nominally diſguiſed, we may univerſally obſerve, to form the ruling character of the deity, in popular religions. Even prieſts, inſtead of correcting theſe depraved ideas of mankind, have often been found ready to foſter and encourage them. The more tremendous the divinity is repreſented, the more tame and ſubmiſſive do men become to his miniſters: And the more unaccountable the meaſures of acceptance required by him, the more neceſſary does it become to abandon our natural reaſon, and yield to their ghoſtly guidance and direction. And thus it may be allowed, that the artifices of men aggravate our natural infirmities and follies of this kind, but never originally beget them. Their root ſtrikes deeper into the mind, and ſprings from the eſſential and univerſal properties of human nature.

SECT. XV. *General Corollary from the whole.*

THO' the ſtupidity of men, barbarous and uninſtructed, be ſo great, that they may not ſee a ſovereign author in the more obvious works of nature, to which they are ſo much familiarized; yet it ſcarce ſeems poſſible, that any one of good underſtanding ſhould reject that idea, when once it is ſuggeſted to him. A purpoſe, an intention, a deſign is evident in every thing; and when our comprehenſion is ſo far enlarged as to contemplate the firſt riſe of this viſible ſyſtem, we muſt adopt, with the ſtrongeſt conviction, the idea of ſome intelligent cauſe or author. The uniform maxims too, which prevail thro' the whole frame of the univerſe, naturally, if not neceſſarily, lead us to conceive this intelligence as ſingle and undivided, where the prejudices of education oppoſe not ſo reaſonable a

[a] DIOD. SIC. lib. XX. [b] CIC. CATIL. I. SALLUST. de bello CATIL.

theory.

heory. Even the contrarieties of nature, by diſcovering themſelves every where, become proofs of ſome conſiſtent plan, and eſtabliſh one ſingle purpoſe or intention, however inexplicable and incomprehenſible.

Good and ill are univerſally intermingled and confounded; happineſs and miſery, wiſdom and folly, virtue and vice. Nothing is pure and entirely of a piece. All advantages are attended with diſadvantages. An univerſal compenſation prevails in all conditions of being and exiſtence. And it is ſcarce poſſible for us, by our moſt chimerical wiſhes, to form the idea of a ſtation or ſituation altogether deſirable. The draughts of life, according to the poet's fiction, are always mixed from the veſſels on each hand of JUPITER: Or if any cup be preſented altogether pure, it is drawn only, as the ſame poet tells us, from the left-handed veſſel.

The more exquiſite any good is, of which a ſmall ſpecimen is afforded us, the ſharper is the evil, allied to it; and few exceptions are found to this uniform law of nature. The moſt ſprightly wit borders on madneſs; the higheſt effuſions of joy produce the deepeſt melancholy; the moſt raviſhing pleaſures are attended with the moſt cruel laſſitude and diſguſt; the moſt flattering hopes make way for the ſevereſt diſappointments. And in general, no courſe of life has ſuch ſafety (for happineſs is not to be dreamed of) as the temperate and moderate, which maintains, as far as poſſible, a mediocrity, and a kind of inſenſibility, in every thing.

As the good, the great, the ſublime, the raviſhing are found eminently in the genuine principles of theiſm; it may be expected, from the analogy of nature, that the baſe, the abſurd, the mean, the terrifying will be diſcovered equally in religious fictions and chimeras.

The univerſal propenſity to believe in inviſible, intelligent power, if not an original inſtinct, being at leaſt a general attendant of human nature, may be conſidered as a kind of mark or ſtamp, which the divine workman has ſet upon his work; and nothing ſurely can more dignify mankind, than to be thus ſelected from all the other parts of the creation, and to bear the image or impreſſion of the univerſal Creator. But conſult this image, as it commonly appears in the popular religions of the world. How is the deity diſfigured in our repreſentations of him! What caprice, abſurdity, and immorality are attributed to him! How much is he degraded even below the character which we ſhould naturally, in common life, aſcribe to a man of ſenſe and virtue!

What a noble privilege is it of human reaſon to attain the knowlege of the ſupreme Being; and, from the viſible works of nature, be enabled to infer ſo ſublime a principle as its ſupreme Creator? But turn the reverſe of the medal. Survey moſt nations and moſt ages. Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the world. You will ſcarcely be perſuaded, that they are other than ſick men's dreams: Or perhaps will regard them more as the playſome whimſies of monkeys in human ſhape, than the ſerious, poſitive, dogmatical aſſeverations of a being, who dignifies himſelf with the name of rational.

Hear the verbal proteſtations of all men: Nothing they are ſo certain of as their religious tenets. Examine their lives: You will ſcarcely think that they repoſe the ſmalleſt confidence in them.

The greateſt and trueſt zeal gives us no ſecurity againſt hypocriſy: The moſt open impiety is attended with a ſecret dread and compunction.

No

No theological abſurdities ſo glaring as have not, ſometimes, been embraced by men of the greateſt and moſt cultivated underſtanding. No religious precepts ſo rigorous as have not been adopted by the moſt voluptuous and moſt abandoned of men.

IGNORANCE *is the mother of Devotion:* A maxim, that is proverbial, and confirmed by general experience. Look out for a people, entirely void of religion: If you find them at all, be aſſured, that they are but few degrees removed from brutes.

WHAT ſo pure as ſome of the morals, included in ſome theological ſyſtems? What ſo corrupt as ſome of the practices, to which theſe ſyſtems give rife?

THE comfortable views, exhibited by the belief of futurity, are raviſhing and delightful. But how quickly vaniſh, on the appearance of its terrors, which keep a more firm and durable poſſeſſion of the human mind?

THE whole is a riddle, an ænigma, an inexplicable myſtery. Doubt, uncertainty, ſuſpence of judgment appear the only reſult of our moſt accurate ſcrutiny, concerning this ſubject. But ſuch is the frailty of human reaſon, and ſuch the irreſiſtible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could ſcarce be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and oppoſing one ſpecies of ſuperſtition to another, ſet them a quarrelling; while we ourſelves, during their fury and contention, happily make our eſcape, into the calm, tho' obſcure, regions of philoſophy.

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FINIS.

ERRATA.

PAGE 75, Line 2, read *ſpreads*. P. 98, l. 3, read *reduce to it*. P. 121, l. 2; in the Notes, ſecond Column, dele, *who*. P. 131. l. 12, for *along* read *together*. P. 134, l. 6, from the Bottom, read *brilliancy*. P. 143, l. 13, for *Diſſertation* read *Eſſay*. P. 196, l. 8, read *Arrian*. P. 216, l. 20, read *Nicias's*. P. 230, l. 6, 7, from the Bottom, for *certain* read *poſitive*. P. 280, l. 3, for *they* read *may*. P. 297, in the Notes, Column 1, l. 1, read *is a Connexion*, Col. 2. l. 1, for *his* read *its*. P. 337, l. 28, read *would here eſtabliſh*. P. 348, l. ult. for *dearth* read *death*. P. 349, l. 27, read *enabled*. Id. l. 32, read *impoſture*. P. 356, l. 8 from the Bottom, for *theſe Eſſays* read *this Enquiry*. P. 375, l. 4, read *or ſome ſuch Fact*. P. 378, l. antepen. read *allapſus*. P. 390, l. 3, read *great*. P. 397, l. 25, read *from mere weakneſs*. P. 399, l. 22, for *repreſs* read *redreſs*. P. 405, l. 5, read *worne*. P. 413, l. 12, read *being then entirely uſeleſs*. P. 425, l. 22, read *praiſe*. P. 428, l. 9, from the Bottom, read *ſtruck with*. P. 431, l. 10, read *aſcribe to it*. P. 432, l. 13, read *imagine that*. P. 434, l. 25, read *Nature*. P. 443, l. 32, for *paper* read *writing*. P. 452, l. ult. for *uſual* read *uſeful*. P. 455, l. 7, dele *not*. P. 457, l. 24, read *an I know not what*. P. 459, l. 5 from the Bottom, for *ſufficient* read *inſufficient*. P. 460, l. 34, read *point of view*. P. 481. l. 15, read *made it appear*.